


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FULLY REVISED & UPDATED

Social Problems in India

RAM AHUJA



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RAM AHUJA

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Preface

All change is not progress. India has changed a lot in the last forty years and it continues to change even today. But what is the direction of change ? What is the logic of change ? Who is being benefitted by this change ? Violence, despite determined declarations, continues unabated. Communalism is on the upsurge. Poverty and unemployment despite the reassuring promises of the early Congress Government, National Front Government, Janta (S) Government and once again of present Congress Government continue to increase. Atrocities against women, Harijans and weaker sections are not on the decline. Youth are becoming more and more frustrated and taking to agitations. Politics has been criminalised. Secessionism has been curbed but terrorism is becoming more and more strident, raucous. Corruption has not been curbed. It exists with different labels. Peasants, industrial workers and government employees are in distress. Social values are fast deteriorating. More and more people are becoming the victims of mental illness. Crime, delinquency, drug abuse, and alcoholism are on increase. The country is facing innumerable social problems

It is time to analyse and understand the nature and magnitude of these social problems. It is time that social scientists try to use a theoretical perspective in their evaluation of these problems. It is time that the planners and power elites think of suitable remedial measures to streamline the existing sub-systems, structures, institutions and laws to contain them. A democracy of status quo and non-planning may turn into a democracy of death and destruction.

An humble attempt has been made to examine the current social problems in India with a sociological perspective. Most of the chapters are based on the data collected through my own empirical studies. Besides, the analysis is also based on the thinking and research of several scholars and academic professionals. Obviously, it is not possible to acknowledge individually every social thinker. The quality

of their work was the inspiration behind this work. Above all, I am indebted to all those unknown scholars and known friends whose knowledge and useful ideas provided me a theoretical insight to analyse varied social problems in Indian context

RAM AHUJA

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1

Social Problems : Concept and Approaches

Drug abuse, alcoholism, terrorism, poverty, unemployment and crime, are not individual problems but affect the public at large. Individual problem is one which affects one individual or one group. Its resolution lies within the immediate milieu of the individual/group. Against this, a public issue is one which affects the society as a whole, or the larger structure of social life. The sociologists' aim is to understand how these problems crop up in the functioning of different social structures, to study the operation of varied patterns of interrelationships in the society and how people are affected by them, and observe how social systems need to be reorganised and restructured in dealing with them. Relating theory to practice provides a scientific perspective to treat the problem.

The Concept of Social Problems

A social problem has been defined as a "deviation from the social ideal remediable by group effort" (Walsh and Furfey, 1961:1). Two elements are important in this definition : (i) a situation which is less than ideal, that is, which is undesirable or abnormal, and (ii) one which is remediable by collective effort. Though it is not easy to determine which situation is ideal and which is not, and there is no definite standard which could be used to judge it, yet it is clear that a social ideal is not something arbitrary and the term 'social problem' is applied only to that 'issue' which social ethics (which describes human conduct as right and wrong in group relations), and society (which is concerned

with the promotion of the common good or the welfare of its members and the preservation of public order) consider as unfavorable. The 'issue' should also be such that an individual cannot handle it by himself. If an individual wants a job and has to compete with others for getting it, then it is merely an individual problem. Likewise, if an individual has become addicted to drugs and has to seek admission to a psychiatric institute or a community centre for deaddiction, that is his personal problem. On the other hand, if 35 million persons are unemployed in villages and cities in a country, and no single individual can do anything effective about it then what is needed to solve the problem is an organised group or social effort. Thus, a problem may be an individual problem under one set of circumstances and a social problem under others.

But social problems change with the passage of time. What was not considered a social problem a few decades ago may become a crucial social problem two decades hence. For example, the population explosion in our country was not viewed as a social problem upto the late 40's of the twentieth century but from the early 50's it came to be perceived as a very crucial problem. Social change creates new conditions in which an issue comes to be identified as a social problem. Similarly, youth unrest in India was not a problem upto the 40's but in the 50's and the 60's it became a problem and in the 70's and 80's it became a very serious one and continues to be so in the 90's.

Let us examine a few more viewpoints on the concept of 'social problem'. Fuller and Myers (1941:320) have defined a social problem as "a condition which is defined by a considerable number of persons as a deviation from some social norms which they cherish". Reinhardt (1952 : 14) has explained a social problem as "a situation confronting a group or a section of society which promises or inflicts injurious consequences that can be handled only collectively." Thus, no one individual or a few individuals are responsible for the appearance of a socially problematic situation, and the control of this situation is also beyond the ability of one person or a few persons. This responsibility is placed upon society at large. Merton and Nisbet (1971 : 184) hold that a social problem is "a way of behaviour that is regarded by a substantial part of a social order as being in violation of one or more generally accepted or approved norms". This definition may apply to some problems like alcoholism, corruption and communalism, but not to problems like population explosion. Some problems are created not by the abnormal and deviant behaviour of the individuals but by the

normal and accepted behaviour. Raab and Selznick (1959 : 32) maintain that a social problem is "a problem in human relationships which seriously threatens society or impedes the important aspirations of many peoples". According to Carr (1955 : 306), "a social problem exists whenever we become conscious of a difficulty, a gap between our preferences and reality". Herbert Blumer (1971 : 19) writes that "social problems involve actions or patterns of behaviour that are viewed by a substantial number of persons in the society as being deleterious to the society or in violation of societal norms, and about which ameliorative action is seen as both possible and desirable". Paul Landis (1959) is of the opinion that "social problems are men's unfulfilled aspirations for welfare." Clarence Marshall Case (1976 : 310) has said that "a social problem refers to any situation which attracts the attention of a considerable number of competent observers within a society and appeals to them as calling for readjustment or remedy by social (that is, collective) action of some kind or other."

Horton and Leslie (1970 : 4) write that a social problem is "a condition affecting a significant number of people in ways considered undesirable, about which it is felt that something can be done through collective social action." Though this definition emphasizes that a social problem is a condition "affecting a significant number of people" it does not give the exact number of people who must be affected. It only points out that 'enough people' should be affected so that notice is taken of it and people begin to talk and write about it. One way of 'measuring public concern' about a condition is to assess the number of articles devoted to it in popular magazines. Thus, the problem of 'environmental pollution' in India was not taken up earnestly till the beginning of the eighties, manifest by the fact that not many articles appeared on this issue in newspapers and magazines. The appearing of numerous articles in the last five or six years indicates that the condition has attracted widespread consideration and has become a social problem.

Another element in the definition which needs attention is "in ways considered undesirable". The custom of *sati* in India was no social problem as long as most people thought it was desirable. When Raja Ram Mohan Roy took initiative and a considerable number of people came to support him and started criticising the practice as harmful and awful, only then did the custom of *sati* turn into a social problem. In recent times, it was only after the incident of Roop Kanwar, a 21 year old Rajput girl, who committed *sati* on the funeral pyre of her husband

in Deorala in Sikar district in Rajasthan in September, 1987 that this practice came to be condemned and an Act was passed in February, 1988 by the state of Rajasthan prescribing serious penalty for persons forcing a woman to commit *sati*.

A social problem, thus, involves a value judgement, a feeling that a condition is detrimental and requires change. Political corruption came to be viewed as a social problem only in the 70's and 80's of the twentieth century, though it was prevalent in our country earlier too. Issues like wife-battering and child abuse are yet to be accepted as serious social problems.

Conditions that cannot be changed or evaded are also not accepted as social problems. Thus, famine was not considered a social problem until recently because of the widespread belief that the paucity of rains was the result of the wrath of the rain-god. Today, famine in states like Rajasthan is viewed as a social problem and is seen to be the result of the failure to complete the Rajasthan canal because of the scarcity of economic resources. The scarcity of drinking water became a social problem in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, only when it was realised that it was not a misfortune to be endured but "something could be done" to remove this scarcity. Thus, it is the *belief* and *hope* in the possibility of prevention and treatment that causes people to consider situation as a social problem.

The last portion in the definition of Horton and Leslie is 'collective action'. A social problem cannot be solved by an individual or a few individuals. All social problems are *social* in treatment, that is, it is believed that they can be tackled only by public concern, discussion, opinion formation and pressure.

According to Weinberg (1960 : 4), social problems are behaviour patterns or conditions which arise from social processes and are considered so objectionable or undesirable by many members of a society that they recognise that corrective policies, programmes and services are necessary to cope with them. Weinberg gives six characteristics of social problems:

1. Social problems arise by being collectively defined as objectionable by many members of the community. Thus, adverse conditions not defined by the community as reprehensible are not considered as social problems. For example, if taking alcohol is not regarded as objectionable by the society, it is not considered a social problem. But as the society recognizes and discusses the problems

inherent in alcohol consumption, studies its consequences and devises a plan of corrective action to control it, it comes to be defined as a social problem even though the original situation may not have changed.

2. Social problems change when the concerned behavioural patterns are interpreted differently. For example, till a few decades ago, mental illness was viewed as insanity and it was considered so disgraceful that the families kept the member's mental illness a secret. Now mental illness is seen only as one type of 'deviant behaviour' which requires psychiatric and social treatment. Thus, the problem of mental illness today is met more realistically and effectively.

3. Mass media (like newspapers, television, radio, magazines, movies) play an important role in creating awareness about the scope and urgency of social problems.

4. Social problems have to be viewed in the context of the society's values and institutions, for example, the problem of racial conflict in the United States is different from the problem of untouchability in India.

5. Social problems need to be analysed in terms of the influences upon them by group processes and social relationships.

6. Since social problems vary historically, contemporary social problems are the society's concern, that is, the problem of refugee settlement in India in 1947-48 was different from the problem of settling refugees from Assam in 1968, or the Tamils from Sri Lanka in 1988-89, or the Indians from Kuwait and Iraq in September, 1990. Similarly, the problem of immigrants in the United Kingdom in 1988 was different than it was in 1967 or 1947.

Characteristics of Social Problems

On the basis of the above definitions, we can identify the following characteristics of social problems :

- All social problems are *deviations* from the 'ideal' situation.
- All social problems have some *common basis* of origin.
- All social problems are *social in origin*.
- All social problems are *inter-connected*.
- All social problems are *social in their results*, that is, they affect all sections of society.
- The *responsibility* for social problems is *social*, that is, they require a collective approach for their solution.

Reactions to Social Problems

Different people react differently to social problems. The differences may be explained in terms of the following four factors :

(i) *An attitude of unconcern* : Many people remain indifferent to a problem thinking that it does not affect them. Sometimes their own individual problems like family tensions and job pressures keep them so engaged that they do not find time to take interest in what affects others. It is only when their own interests are involved that they become agitated and start taking interest in the problem.

(ii) *Fatalism* : Some people are so fatalistic that they attribute every thing to destiny. Issues like poverty and unemployment, are explained in terms of misfortunes and past *karma* . They, therefore, suffer the misfortune quietly and wait for some miracle to happen.

(iii) *Vested interest* : Some people do not take interest in the existing problems because they stand to gain so long as the problem exists. Motivated by self interest, they describe the problem as insoluble and talk about its eradication as a waste of time.

(iv) *Absence of expert knowledge* : Some people, though, they remain concerned about the problem, yet (they) do not take much interest in it believing that its solution is impossible unless people change their attitudes and values. As the changes must be initiated by a change in outlook, they remain unconcerned about finding alternative possibilities of treatment. Dowry is one such problem in our society.

Some people have incorrect, unreliable and superficial knowledge or fallacies about social problems. We can point out to eight such feelings. *One*, it is wrong to believe that there is agreement among all people on the nature of the social problems. For example, some people think that drug abuse is a social problem in India while others believe, on the basis of the empirical studies conducted in different parts of the country pointing out to the low magnitude of drug abuse, that it cannot be perceived as a social problem. Similarly, for some people in India, untouchability is no longer a social problem after the measures adopted after Independence to emancipate the Harijans, whereas for others, it is still a social problem. They even refer to the harassment and beating up of the Harijans who were prevented from entering the Nathdwara temple in Rajasthan in September, 1988 which provoked the President of India (Shri R. Venkataraman) to declare that he was willing to lead a procession of Harijans to enter the Nathdwara temple. Thus, on some problems there may be complete agreement and on others there may be little agreement as to their existence. *Two*, it is fallacious to believe that

social problems are caused by nature and are inevitable. In fact, no social problem is beyond human control if certain social arrangements are changed. *Three*, it is a misnomer to believe that social problems are caused by selfish, brutal, exploitative and indifferent people or by the wilful wickedness of a few. In fact, many problems are caused by the good people because either they mind their own business or they remain indifferent and callous to certain issues. For example, the growth of slums which promotes family disorganisation and increases certain kinds of crime is the result of the callousness of rich persons and politicians. However, these people do not have any 'evil motive' in their indifference or thinking and behaviour. It may be said that a social problem is the product of certain social practices and not of wilful wickedness of certain individuals. *Four*, it is wrong to believe that social problems are created by talking about them. The problems are caused not because people irresponsibly talk about them and thus incite others or stir up trouble or evoke hatred and so on. In fact, people are often mobilised to solve problems and initiate action against the factors that perpetuate the problem. *Five*, it is incorrect to assume that all people like to see the social problems solved, for example, the conservative Brahmans may not be interested in taking up the issue of untouchability for discussion; or many Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward castes/classes people may prefer to remain 'backward' for fear of losing out on the reservation benefits; or many capitalists may not be in favour of full employment for fear of not getting adequate workers at low wages; or many landlords may not be interested in constructing more houses and reducing the problem of housing-shortage for fear of getting low rents, or owners of one-room tenements in slum areas may not be interested in slum clearance because of their vested interests. Thus, a sizeable number of people can be found to be disinterested in solving social problems because of selfish interests. *Six*, it is not correct to believe that social problems will solve themselves, if left alone. The feeling that time will solve all problems is unsound and unrealistic in this age. It is only a rationalisation for inactivity. It may, in fact, aggravate the problems like poverty, pollution and population. *Seven*, the feeling that unravelling facts will solve the problem is not correct. Though it is true that no problem can be intelligently understood without collecting complete facts, it is also true that without scientifically interpreting the gathered data, measures cannot be taken to solve a problem. For example, the mere collection of the facts on the magnitude of the

problem of drug abuse among youth, the nature of drugs used by them, the methods of using drugs, the sources of getting drugs and the withdrawal syndromes will not help much in suggesting measures to control the drug misuse unless we analyse and interpret facts like the reasons for taking drugs, the role of peer group and the role of the family in controlling drug abuse. Thus, data in itself is nothing; it is the objective interpretation of the data which is meaningful. *Last*, it is untrue to think that problems can be solved without institutional changes. In a way, it is impossible to solve problems without planning, without structural changes, without adjustments and adaptations, or without altering the existing institutions and practices. For example, we cannot eradicate corruption unless the people change their values and beliefs, the laws are enacted, the courts set examples by giving retributive and deterrent punishment to corrupt people in high positions, including corrupt politicians and so on. Many a time, a solution to one of the problems creates many new problems to be solved. Since change in institutions and values comes slowly, solving a problem is not easy and quick and takes considerable time. Sometimes we succeed in changing some conditions and thus in partly reducing the magnitude or the frequency of the problem. We may not be able to eliminate crime completely but we can surely reduce the rate of crime in society by checking the frustrations of the people and providing them with alternatives to compensate failure in one field with success in another. It may not be possible to eliminate family disorganisation but it is surely possible to find means to reduce tensions in the family. Thus, it may not be possible to locate solutions to all problems, but there are prospects of achieving some success in reducing the personal suffering due to social problems.

Causes of Social Problems

Social problems arise out of pathological social conditions. They occur in all societies—simple (that is, small, isolated and homogeneous with a strong sense of group solidarity, and which change slowly) as well as in complex (which are characterised by impersonal secondary relations, anonymity, loneliness, high mobility and extreme specialisation, and where change it faster), that is, wherever and whenever a relationship is affected between a group of individuals leading to maladjustments and conflicts.

Three factors are important in the understanding of the causal factors in social problems:

(1) The causal conditions are numerous. Broadly, we can classify them into two groups: found in individuals and found in the social environment.

Potential Causes of Social Problems

<i>Found in Individuals</i>	<i>Found in the Social Environment</i>
(a) Hereditary Traits	(a) Contradictions in Social Systems
(b) Acquired Traits	(b) Malfunctioning of Economic Systems
	(c) Lack of Change in Religious Systems
	(d) Defective Functioning of Political Systems

All the factors are not present in all the problems, that is, the causal factors vary from problem to problem.

(2) Social problems provide a strong basis of common causal factors.

(3) Social problems are interrelated and interdependent in the sense that they are cumulatively promotive and provocative, that is, they foster and encourage one another.

Reinhardt (1952: 7-12) has referred to three factors in the development of social problems:

(1) Differentiation and Multiplication of Interests and Functions

The principle that the greater the number of parts in a machine or an organism, the greater the probability of maladjustment among the parts holds good for human societies too, where there is increased opportunity for the collision of interests of various individuals, groups, institutions and systems. Untouchability, communal riots and political crimes, are the social problems which are the result of the clash of interests of different castes and classes.

(2) Accelerating Frequency of Social Change or Growth of Civilization

This has been made possible due to the multiplication of scientific and mechanical innovations. For example, the innovation of machines has destroyed many old forms of employment resulting in the migration of millions of people, and has given rise to class conflicts. It is, thus, the structural and functional maladjustments arising from revolutionary inventions which create many social problems.

(3) Man's Developed Insight to Make a Scientific Analysis

Ever since man has developed his social insight of looking into the working of nature, issues which were formerly regarded as simple are now perceived as the result of various kinds of natural conditions which influence man and society.

Theoretical Approaches to Social Problems

Though social problems are essentially subjective, they can be studied scientifically. We will examine some of the theoretical approaches which present universal explanations for all types of social problems.

Social Disorganisation Approach

Social disorganisation is a condition of a society, community or group in which there is a breakdown of social control, or of a social order, or of formal and informal norms that define permissible behaviour. It is characterised by the lack of cooperation, common values, unity, discipline and predictability. Warren (1949: 83-87) has described it as a condition involving (a) lack of consensus (disagreement about group purposes), (b) lack of integration of institutions (after working at cross purposes), and (c) inadequate means of social control (preventing individuals from playing their individual roles due to confusion). Elliott and Merrill (1950: 20) have defined it as a process by which relationships between members of a group are broken or dissolved. Social disorganisation occurs when there is a change in the equilibrium of forces, a breakdown of the social structure so that the former patterns no longer apply, and the accepted forms of social control no longer function effectively. This disruptive condition of society, which is evidenced by normlessness, role conflict, social conflicts, and demoralisation, increases social problems. For example, increasing industrialization, spread of education, and women taking up paid work have affected the relations between husband and wife, and between parents and children. Many of the old rules which governed the intra-family and inter family relations seem to have broken down. Many people feel frustrated and unhappy. This is the condition of social disorganisation, in which changes in the basic conditions of life, causing breakdown of traditional norms, have resulted in widespread discontentment and disillusionment. In other words, change has disrupted the organisation of the former system of behaviour. Talking of social disorganisation in slum life, Whyte (1955: 268) has referred to deviant or non-approved group organisation in slums.

However, according to one school of thought, the state of social disorganisation does not always create social problems. For example, during Hitler's regime, Germany was not a disorganised society nor during Stalin's regime, was Russia in a state of disorganisation; yet many conditions in these countries were shocking "deviations from the social ideal, demanding social action", that is, there were social problems. Reacting to this view, some scholars say that even if the social disorganisation theory may not explain all social problems, it does explain some of the social problems, for example, mental illness may not be a symptom of a disorganised society but corruption in the society does lead to the malfunctioning of institutions, lack of perfect consensus and the evasion of social control by some citizens.

In employing the social disorganisation approach to social problems (Horton and Leslie, 1970: 33), one looks to factors like: What were the traditional norms and practices? What were the major changes that made them ineffective? What are the old rules which have broken down partially or completely? What is the nature and direction of social change? Who are the dissatisfied groups and what solutions do they propose? How do various proposed solutions fit in with the trend of social change? What may become the accepted rules in the future?

Cultural Lag Approach

Culture lag is a situation in which some parts of a culture change at a faster rate than other related parts resulting in the disruption of integration and equilibrium of the culture, for example, material culture changes more rapidly than the non-material culture in industrial societies through rapid advances in science and technology (Ogburn, 1966). The theory of culture lag, in particular holds that in modern societies there has been a tendency for change in the political, educational, family and religious institutions to fall behind technological changes. It is thus easy to see how culture lag can create social problems. Even after rapid industrialization in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and in the first quarter of the twentieth century, some people were so influenced by the rigid restrictions of the caste system that they refused to work with members of other castes in the industries and preferred to remain unemployed and poor. The first quarter of the twentieth century, thus, remained a period of culture lag. It took more than a generation to adapt technological development in agriculture and industry. Our social institutions, thus, retained the traditional flavour whereas technology advanced in the world.

Though the culture lag theory explains some of the social problems but it does not explain all social problems. It, therefore, cannot be accepted as a universal explanation of all social problems.

Value Conflict Approach

A value is a generalised principle of behaviour to which the members of a group feel a strong, emotionally-toned positive commitment and which provides a standard for judging specific acts and goals. Each member of the group is expected to remain committed to the values accepted by the group. Values, thus, provide the generalised standards of behaviour. Examples of values are equality, justice, freedom, patriotism, mobility, individualism, collectivism, compromise, sacrifice, adjustment and so forth. Because of the strong emotional feeling attached to values and because they serve as standards for judging concrete goals or actions, they are often regarded as absolute (Theodorson, 1969 : 456).

Different groups have different systems of values. Incompatibility between the values of two or more groups to the extent that the role performance of individuals is interfered with is called 'value-conflict'. This state of conflict may last only a short while or it may be a persistent problem. For example, conflict in values of workers and employers leads to industrial unrest, strikes and lockouts; or conflict in values between land owners and landless peasants leads to agrarian unrest or agricultural labourers movements; or the liberal businessmen may believe in encouraging hard-work, thrift, honesty and ambition and may reward these virtues financially, but on the other hand, the conservatives may differ profoundly with this view and may believe in the profit motive and individual initiative. Liberals and conservatives, thus differ not only on matters of policies but more profoundly on those of values.

The value-conflict theorists like Waller, Fuller, Cuber and Harper, hold that clashes in value system are of basic importance in the origin and development of social problems. Waller (1936 : 924) has referred to the conflict between 'organisational' and 'humanitarian' values. The former favour private property and individualism, while the latter are votaries of remedying the misfortunes of others.

But this theoretical approach is too vague. The propounders have not explained their views in concrete details. It is probably true that our current values overemphasise money and material possessions and this attitude may encourage corruption, smuggling, drug trafficking,

blackmarketing, and taking of bribes but problems like white collar-crime cannot be reduced to a conflict of values. The problem of divorce may be the result of value conflict but all family problems cannot be explained merely in terms of disagreements between husband and wife or parents and children. Agreement on common values helps in maintaining harmonious inter-personal relations in the family or outside it but it is not the only thing needed for family stability or group success. Thus, the value-conflict theory may be useful in some areas like economics, in the analysis of social problems, but it certainly cannot be accepted as a universal explanation.

On applying the value conflict approach, questions which are generally asked (Horton and Leslie, 1970: 40) are : what are the values that are in conflict ? How deep is the value conflict? What groups in the society hold to each of the competing values ? How powerful are they ? Which values are more consistent with other larger values such as democracy and freedom ? What value sacrifices would each solution require ? Are some problems insoluble at present because of certain irreconcilable value conflicts ?

Personal Deviation Approach

Deviation is non-confirmity to social norms. It is different from abnormal behaviour because the latter connotes psychological illness rather than social maladjustment or conflict. Thus, people who deviate from social norms are not necessarily mentally ill.

In the social disorganisation approach to social problems, one looks to the rules that have broken down and the changes that have taken place because of the breaking of the rules. In personal-deviation approach, one looks to the motivation and behaviour of the deviants who are instrumental in causing the problems. Two factors that need explanation in the personal deviance approach are: (i) How does personal deviancy develop ? (ii) What types of personal deviation are frequently involved in social problems ? Personal deviancy develops because of either (a) an individual's *inability to follow* generally accepted norms, or (b) an individual's *failure to accept* generally accepted norms. The first is caused because of a person's emotional, social or biological deficiency, that is, some persons are so constituted biologically, emotionally, or socially that they are incapable of adhering consistently to generally accepted standards. The socially deficient do not truly violate norms ; rather they manifest an inability to learn and follow the norms. The cause of emotional deficiency is bio-

psychological. These deviants who constitute social problems and also contribute to problems often require medical, psychiatric and environmental or social therapies. On the other hand, an individual's failure to accept social norms has something to do with deficiency in socialization. These individuals, though they have learned the norms and values like honesty, truthfulness, integrity, justice and cooperation, but they cannot put them into practice. They remain disposed to telling lies, cheating, exploiting, defaming others when it suits their purposes. Their deviance does not produce any guilt-feeling or shame in them. They may change sides completely on a social issue if it serves their purpose. They care little whether social problems exist and whether they are solved or not so long the situation can be used for their vested interest.

Horton and Leslie (1970: 35-36) have referred to three types of personal deviations: (i) Deviation that results from conformity to norms of diverse reference groups. Because of cultural variability, most people are exposed to a different set of norms that may be in conflict with one another. For example, a person may belong to one religion or caste but his professional role may literally force him to deviate from the norms of his religion/caste. Similarly, a clerk as well as an officer may accept bribe because it serves his economic interests. (ii) Deviation that results from the existence of deviant sub-cultures, for example, the criminal norms in slum areas of large cities. (iii) Outright deviation from generally accepted norms. Deliberately hiding one's income while filling income-tax returns provides a good example of this type of deviation.

In applying the personal deviation approach to social problems, the questions asked (Horton and Leslie, 1970: 37) are: What deviant persons/groups are involved? Are deviants themselves the problem or they help create the problem? What deviant sub-cultures are involved? What alternatives are there for dealing with the deviants?

Anomie Approach

This approach was propounded by Merton. Anomie is a condition characterised by the relative absence or weakening or confusion of norms and values in a society or a group. The concept of anomie was originally developed by Durkheim to explain division of labour and suicide but it was Merton who used this concept 41 years after the publication of Durkheim's *Suicide* to explain deviant behaviour in

terms of functioning of social and cultural structures in the society (Merton, 1938: 672-73). Anomie involves a breakdown in the cultural structure, occurring particularly when there is disjunction between cultural norms and goals and the socially structured capacities of members of the group to act in accordance with them.

Anomie is the counterpart of the idea of social solidarity. Just as social solidarity is a state of collective ideological integration, anomie is a state of confusion, insecurity and normlessness. According to Merton, the disjunction between goals and means and the consequent strain leads to the weakening of men's commitment to the culturally prescribed goals or institutionalised means, that is, to a state of anomie. Merton maintains that people adapt to this disjunction either by rejecting the cultural goals or the institutionalised means or both. He gives four varieties of deviant behaviour. Merton, thus, locates the sources of strain not in the characteristics of individuals but in the culture and/or social structure. He says, "the social problem arises not from people failing to live upto the requirements of their social statuses but from the faulty organisation of these statuses into a reasonably coherent social system" (Merton and Nisbet, 1971: 823).

However, Merton's theory is an incomplete theory. All social problems cannot be perceived as the result of the responses to strains or mode of adaptation and adjustment.

Types of Social Problems

Clarence Marshall Case (1964: 3-4) has given four types of social problems on the basis of their origin: (i) those which are rooted in some aspect of the physical environment, (ii) which are inherent in the nature or distribution of the population involved, (iii) which result from poor social organisation, and (iv) which evolve from a conflict of cultural values within the society.

Fuller and Myers (1941: 367) have given three types of problems: (i) *Physical problems* : though these are problems for the society but their causes are not based on value-conflicts, for example, floods and famines, (ii) *Ameliorative problems* : there is consensus about the effects of these problems but there are differences pertaining to their solutions, for example, crime, poverty, and drug addiction, and (iii) *Moral problems* : there is no consensus pertaining to the nature or causes of these problems, for example, gambling and divorce.

Methods of Studying Social Problems

Three methods have mainly been used in studying social problems : (1) Case study method, (2) Social survey method, and (3) Multiple-factor method. Each method has certain advantages as well as limitations.

The Case Study Method

This method is qualitative instead of quantitative. It analyses the social process involved in the development of a social problem as well as in the causal analysis. It focuses on the sequence of events, motivations of persons, social influences affecting persons and events, social relations, sub-cultures and so forth (Bettelheim, 1955: 318) For collecting information, it depends on both primary and secondary sources like documents, letters and newspapers, (Allport Gordon, 1942). Depending upon the nature of the social problem, the case study can be used to study a subculture of deviants such as that of organised criminals, blackmarketeers, smugglers, drug-addicts, the organisation of personality or the modes of relations in an institution such as prison.

In analysing the causes of a social problem, the case study method is a qualitative procedure which seeks to formulate generalisations about the development of problem behaviour. One example of this is the analysis of causes of drug-addiction. By exhaustive probing of case after case and the comparing of crucial cases, Lindesmith (1948: 13-15) compared addicts with non-addicts who received drugs for a long time without becoming addicted. This enabled him to isolate the causal processes of addiction that were absent in cases of non-addiction.

This method requires a capacity for cultivating the cooperation and trust of subjects as well as a skill for intensive guided interviewing (Wernberg, 1960: 69).

The Social Survey Method

This is a valuable technique for studying social problems in contemporary society. It collects data from samples of respondents representing a cross section of a given population through a schedule or a questionnaire. This instrument is frequently used in the field of sociology to answer concrete as well as abstract questions. Studies on begging, drug-abuse, alcoholism, female crime, dowry, juvenile delinquency and violence against women in India, or Kansey's (1948) survey of sex behaviour in the U.S.A. are the best examples of studying social problems through this technique. All these studies have pointed

out the empirical relationship between two or more variables in creating a social problem.

The survey method does not necessarily start with a hypothesis. It can end in developing a hypothesis or it may not at all be concerned with hypothesis. When it seeks answers to questions, it does not test a hypothesis. For example, what is the magnitude of abuse among child girls in a particular type of industry is a practical question which the information gathered in the survey will answer. But the survey can test the hypothesis too. For example, this author tested the hypothesis that "familial maladjustment is the most important cause of criminality among females" (Ram Ahuja, 1966); and also the hypothesis that crime/violence against women is caused by "social structural conditions that create anxieties and stresses which affect the adjustment, attachment and commitment of man." "Maladjustment, unattachment and non-commitment lead to frustrations and relative deprivations which in turn determine man's attitude toward women. Depending on his personality traits and the resistance potential of the victim, the man uses violence against women" (Ram Ahuja, 1987).

The Multiple-Factor Method

This method determines the relationship between several factors and a social problem. Factors such as the nature of associations, socio-economic status, sub-culture, marital status, residential background, intra-family relations, frustrations and inherited traits can be correlated positively or negatively with the social problem under investigation; for example, the relation between crime and poverty or between drug-addiction and peer-group associations and high economic status or between wife battering and inferiority complex and alcoholism or between suicide and feeling of social isolation, marital status, and religion.

The multi-factor approach is used both in single disciplinary studies as well as in inter-disciplinary studies of social problems, for instance, collaborative studies on drug addiction by medical scientists, psychologists, sociologists and criminologists in India (Mohan D., *Drug Addiction*, 1980).

Stages in the Development of a Social Problem

Fuller and Myres (1941: 320-28) have referred to three stages through which the problems pass in the process of being defined and solved:

1. *Awareness* : In this first stage, people become convinced that the problem exists, the condition is undesirable, and that something can be done about it. In the beginning, only a few people raise questions but gradually more people become aware of the existence of the problem.

2. *Policy determination* : As awareness spreads to larger segments of the society, possible solutions come to be discussed, for example, population explosion in India and discussion of various means of family planning in the 50s, 60s, 70s and 80s. Thus, the emphasis in the second stage shifts from what should be done to how should it be done.

3. *Reform* : As basic solutions and policies are decided upon, the stage of *action* is reached, for example, not only a plan for clearing the slums is put in to practice but people living there are also accommodated elsewhere. No wonder, this stage is called the state of implementation rather than the stage of decision.

Herbert Blumer (1971, 290-309) has referred to five stages in the course of a social problem: (1) emergence of a problem, (2) legitimation of a problem, (3) mobilisation of action, (4) formulation of an official plan, and (5) implementation of the official plan. He says that movement from one stage to other is not automatic but it depends on many contingencies.

Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse (1977, 141-50) have talked of four stages in the development of a social problem:

(1) *Agitation* : The people feel aggrieved about the existing situation in the society. They agitate against this grievance (i) to convince others that the problem exists, and (ii) to initiate action to improve conditions and to attack the alleged cause of the grievance. The agitation is started not necessarily by the victims but even by moral crusaders on behalf of the victims, for example, the prohibition movement is started not by alcoholics but by social workers and social reformers. Thus, the agitation is to convert private troubles into public issues by declaring them to be harmful, offensive and undesirable. However, it is not necessary that their efforts should succeed. The efforts fail either because the claims made are too vague, or because the group that makes these efforts is insignificant or powerless, or because the group creates conflicting interests.

(2) *Legitimation and Cooptation* : When the group in power or the power-holders acknowledge the existence of the problem, the problem acquires legitimacy. Whereas in the first stage, the claimants of the problems are viewed as peculiar individuals, in this stage they are viewed as legitimate spokesmen of the aggrieved people. They are,

therefore, coopted for discussing alternate solutions, for example, giving representation to workers in factories, in management bodies or to students in the Academic Councils.

(3) *Bureaucratization and Reaction* : When the focus in the first stage is on the complaint-group, in the second stage it is on the decision-makers and in the third stage, it is the bureaucrats and their efficiency which attracts attention in the third stage. The extent to which the bureaucrats look for solutions to the problem and the extent to which they are able to fob off vested interests, will determine whether the agitation will take the form of a movement or not.

(4) *Re-emergence of the Movement* : The defective policies of the decision-makers and the bureaucrats and their disinterestedness in the problem rekindle the feelings of the aggrieved people and their crusaders who start a movement to force the power-holders to adopt ameliorative measures for solving the problem.

Thus, according to Spector and Kitsuse (1977: 20) "social problems are pre-eminently a political process through which the problem comes to be publicly accepted as such and through which particular institutional responses to the problem are shaped and then reshaped"

Rural and Urban Problems

Many scholars have referred to characteristic difference between the rural and the urban areas and social problems are sometimes identified by these differences.

Characteristics of rural problems

Some important characteristics of the rural areas in India which are associated with certain social problems are: (i) people are directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture, (ii) the upper caste people still hold large lands while people of the lower castes own either marginal land or work as landless labourers, (iii) people are scattered in comparison to the urban people, (iv) not only the roles but the values of the rural people too continue to be traditional, and (v) the price the farmers get for their products is less in relation to the work they put in. Although the rural economic distress does not affect all farmers equally but the lower and middle-class farmers who are in a majority are forced to send their sons and brothers to the urban areas to find new sources of livelihood. In cities, they are forced to remain in slum and work as daily wage-earners due to the lack of education and proper training. The

standard of living of the rural farmers is very low and their exploitation by big landlords, intermediaries and money-lenders is far greater. No wonder, their whole life is generally frustrating. The other rural problems are due to the fact that since the rural people do not live in concentrated masses, the availability of specialised services to them is minimal. This is true for medical, market, banking, transport, communication, education, recreation, and many other services necessary for modern living. Thus, in a general way, people in the rural areas are at a great disadvantage and have to suffer many social problems

Characteristics of Urban Problems

Just as many of the rural problems are the result of isolation and scattered living, many urban problems spring from concentration of population. Slums, unemployment, crimes, delinquencies, begging, corruption, drug abuse, air pollution, etc are all urban problems which are generally the result of intolerable living conditions in towns and cities. In a village, each man is so known to the others that his misdeeds are noticed and talked about. But in a city, the crowded conditions make for anonymity. Most city people live without social pressures which tends to increase the rate of deviance. Besides, the interdependence in the city life is so high that the failure of even one *small but essential part renders the other parts inoperative*. The simple examples are strikes by scavengers, by transport workers, by employees of the State Electricity Board, by workers of water-works or by shopkeepers. Anonymity increases cases of riots, communal conflicts, and agitations. It is no wonder that the characteristics of city life become responsible for many social problems.

Solving Social Problems

The solving of a social problem depends upon finding out the causes of troublesome social conditions which create the problem. As already stated, though every social problem is caused by multiple factors, but it is always possible to find out the chief factor, the cooperative factors, and the minor aggravants in the origin and development of the problem. Every problem is likely to be unique and is likely to have individualistic traits which may differentiate it from other problems. Many a time, the nature of the social problem is such that the control becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible. This happens when a

social problem is occasioned by natural factors like droughts or floods or when the conflict of social interests blocks the application of curative programmes, or a revolution is needed to change the existing political or economic systems. But after understanding and judging social problems, the society has to be effective and has to take some action whether it is by attempting to alter the established social institutions or by trying to alleviate them by adopting measures without trying to change the existing institutions. Further, action can be organised or personalised. The former is action through group effort like giving a share to industrial workers in the management of the industry, the latter is action through individual life and influencing others by living a life in accordance with good principles. Gandhi used the second method for solving the problem of untouchability—by living with untouchables and treating them with sympathy and kindness. When others imitated his example and followed him, the effect became greater and greater and the government was ultimately forced to enact a law in 1955 prohibiting the practice of untouchability.

Organised action, thus, can be taken by the state or a political party or by the *panchayat* or an official group. An important point in organised action is the distribution of functions between state agencies and those not connected with the state. Sometimes the problem is solved by the combination of organised and personalised action.

Social problems can be solved only when individuals in a society possess the following four feelings: (1) feeling that a situation can be corrected, (2) determination to correct the situation, (3) confidence in the people and a belief that there is no limit to progress because of their intelligence and efforts, and (4) the use of technological and rational knowledge and skill for correcting the situation.

The following three points have to be remembered while trying to reach a solution to social problems.

1. *Multiple-factor Approach* · Each social problem is caused by a number of factors, for example, the problem of crime cannot be contained unless it is collectively perceived in terms of heredity, poverty, unemployment, social associations, functioning of social structures, strains and frustrations, and so on.

2. *Interrelatedness* · No social problem can be perceived atomistically. Each problem has some relation to the other problems.

3. *Relativity* · Each social problem is related to time and space. What is considered a problem in one society may not be considered so in the other.

Social Problems and Social Change in India

Societies often face problems because of social and cultural changes. Social change is change in the patterned roles, or a change in the network of social relations, or a change in the structures and organisation of a society. Social change is never complete, it is always partial. It can be minor or fundamental. Further, the change can be spontaneous or planned. Planned change is to achieve some set collective ideals. After Independence, India also had set some collective goals to achieve.

Some of the important changes that we find in our society in the last four decades are change from tradition to modernity in certain values and institutions, from ascribed status to achieved status, from predominance of primary groups to predominance of secondary groups, from informal means of control to formal means of control, from collectivity to individualism, from sacred values to secular values, from folklore to science and rationalism, from homogeneity to heterogeneity, and increasing processes of industrialization and urbanization, increasing awareness of rights among various sections of society due to the spread of education, weakening of the caste system, weakening of traditional sources of security, an increase in the aspirations of minority groups, occupational mobility, enactment of several social laws, and linking religion with politics.

Thus, though we have achieved many of the set collective goals, many contradictions have also set into our system. For example, aspirations of the people have become high but the legitimate means for achieving these aspirations are either not available or not accessible. We preach nationalism but practice casteism, linguism, and parochialism. Many laws have been enacted but either these laws are full of loopholes or they are not properly implemented. We talk of egalitarianism but we enforce discrimination. We aspire for ideational culture but what is emerging is the sensate culture. All these contradictions have increased discontentment and frustrations among people which in turn have resulted in many social problems. Youth unrest, tribal unrest, peasant unrest, industrial unrest, student unrest, violence against women, and so forth, have all led to agitations, riots, insurgency and terrorism.

Sociology, Sociologists and Social Problems

The three problems which need analysis with regard to the relationship between sociology and social problems are (1) how does sociology

perceive social problems; (2) what sociological principles does sociology offer about the social problems; and (3) to what extent is the knowledge of the sociologists about social problems impartial, confirmed, and concrete ?

As far as the sociologists' perspective is concerned, they view social problems as problems which arise out of the functioning of systems and structures in a society, or which are the result of group influences. They are also concerned with social relationships which emerge and are sustained because of the social problems. Thus, in analysing alcoholism, whereas a doctor will be concerned with its effects on the body, a psychiatrist will be concerned with its effects on attitudes and behaviour, a sociologist will be concerned with its effects on social relations and roles, that is, the relations with family members, with colleagues in the office, and with neighbours and friends as well as its effect on work efficiency, status, and so on

The study of social problems in sociology aspires toward a body of valid and logically related principles, and in some cases towards a systematic theory too (Arnold Rose, 1957. 189-99). Sociological knowledge of social problems is not complete. We have considerable knowledge about some problems like crime and drug abuse, but inadequate knowledge about others, like suicide, war, mental illness. According to Weinberg (1960. 64), this unevenness in knowledge about social problems is because our approach to social problems is generally 'problem-centred' than 'theory-centred' Most sociologists study social problems because of the practical interest of the community rather than for building a theory, or filling up the theoretical gaps As regards bias in the sociologists' knowledge, though it is true that their orientation and their values can influence their study of social problems, yet they try to interpret facts without any distortion (Kolb, 1954. 66-67) For example, a sociologist from a lower or a middle class is likely to have a bias towards his own class, yet he does not analyse corruption in upper class on the basis of his personal reactions. He remains impartial without being affected by any pressures. However, one possibility that exists is that the persons involved in many social problems (that is, subjects) can and do directly influence the knowledge which emerges. For example, a sociological study of wife battering is possible in a society like India on a 'snow-ball' method because the complaints of assault are never lodged with the police. The study generally points out the involvement of women from lower income groups. Hence, we do not have much knowledge

about battered women in upper-middle or upper income groups. The fact that data on all types of battered women is not available is bound to affect the sociological conclusions or hypotheses. Similarly, the study of role adjustment of working women restricted to the lower class rarely points to separation, desertion or divorce between husband and wife but the study of working women in middle and upper classes would probably show a higher likelihood of these problems

One more fact in the study of social problems by the sociologists is that some sociologists think that the only role of a sociologist is that of an analyst, that is, he is to understand social problems but not take interest in their solution. Others think that a sociologist has not only to study social problems but has to devise ways and means to correct them. Knowledge cannot be detached completely from concerted corrective action. It has to be used in alleviating social problems. But the fact to be remembered is that a sociologist by himself cannot solve a social problem. Much depends on the officials, politicians, agencies and the general public.

What is the task of the sociologist? The time has come when sociologists have to undertake 'management of change in society' like management of business or management of administration. The central concerns of sociology are order and change. The concern for change includes the directionality of change, and sociologists have to move from delving deep into the hoary past through Indology and ancient history and from postulating concepts and theories suitable to study Indian social reality to futuristic plans and to identifying and dealing with crises in the society.

A question may be raised: should the sociologists be concerned with applied programmes directed at finding solutions to our social problems and in the basic research activities designed to support them? My answer would be in the affirmative. The depth of a society's problems may require deeper structural and cultural changes. While the sociologists have always been involved in analysing and understanding established practices, now they have to be called upon to suggest new structures and new practices. In so doing, the question arises as to what are the appropriate ways for the sociologists to suggest changes? The first question is, how directly should the sociologists involve themselves in effecting a change in public policy? Should sociologists remain dispassionate scientists, only providing data for others to use, or should they become actively involved as impassioned advocates of change? There is a school which stresses direct action in public policies

on the part of the sociologists. We have to support this school. Sociology is a science which has to be pursued for its fruits, for the sake of what it can do. In its initial stages, the gifts of sociology may not have been great but after the labour that has been put in developing this science in the last five to six decades, the fruits may be plucked not for their beauty but for their utility. Earlier, we might have been bogged down in explaining various concepts or in historically tracing the growth and functioning of various social institutions and communities but today our discipline has to take up the questions of the present and the future imbalances seriously. In this, questions of relevance and priorities in researches are significant. Why have top Indian sociologists remained indifferent to studying problems and crucial issues like insurgency in North-East India; terrorism in Punjab; linguistic mobilization in Assam; cultural polarization in Mizoram; anti-reservation agitations in Gujarat; Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar; communal riots in Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, and Maharashtra; police torture and criminalization of politics in Bihar? Is it because they are afraid of displeasing the establishment by their unbiased and critical evaluations and losing their positions in Councils and Committees and Commissions, or is it because they think that these issues do not fall within the scope of their pure science? I am not trying to be critical but only pointing to the need for sociologists to take interest in the management of change in society. If sociology and sociologists alienate themselves from the immediate issues and problems of our society, both our discipline and our scholars will render themselves irrelevant to the nation as well as to humanism. It is time that the sociologists develop better predictive capabilities and present the options to the public in a comprehensible manner. This alone will help the society in tackling social problems effectively.

To conclude, it may be said that the sociologists' role in social problems is to create an awareness about the social problems, to analyse the causes of social problems, to develop theories about social problems, to discuss effects of social problems on individuals, groups and society, and to examine the consequences of alternate plans suggested for solving the problems.

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Poverty

It is only in the twentieth century that poverty and the poor have come to be matters of our concern and obligation. After a long neglect of the poor during the British Rule, the measures adopted after Independence signify the recognition of poverty and the social responsibility for alleviating and reducing it. How did this happen? What have we done? How far have we succeeded? Before attempting to answer these questions, let us first take up the question of the concept of poverty

The Concept

Three precepts are often used to define poverty (i) the amount of money required by a person to subsist, (ii) the life below a 'minimum subsistence level' and 'living standard' prevalent at a given time in a given place, and (iii) the comparative state of well-being of a few and the ill-being of the majority in society. The last approach explains poverty in terms of relativity and inequality. Whereas the first two definitions refer to the economic concept of absolute poverty, the third definition views it as a social concept, that is, in terms of the share of the total national income received by those at the bottom. We will explain each of the three views separately

The First View

In terms of a minimum income required for subsistence, poverty has been defined as an inability to graufy the physiological needs, that is, need for survival, safety and security. These physiological needs are different from the social needs (ego-satisfaction and self-esteem), the

need for autonomy, need for independence and the need for self-actualization. The minimum requirements for fulfilling the physiological needs are food and nutrition, shelter, and preventive and protective health care. This requires 'minimum' income (varying from society to society) to buy necessities and avail of facilities.

Here 'poverty' is perceived in terms of poverty line which is determined by the prevailing standards of what is needed for health, efficiency, nurturing of children, social participation, and the maintenance of self-respect (Howard Becker, 1966: 436) In practice, however, the poverty line is drawn on the basis of a barest minimum desirable nutritional standard of calorie intake. In India, the poverty line is drawn on the basis of a per capita (adult) daily intake of 2,400 calories for the rural and 2,100 calories for the urban areas. On the basis of this can be worked out the monthly per capita consumption expenditure.

The minimum consumption expenditure in our country as recommended in 1962 by the Perspective Planning Division of the Planning Commission and calculated on the basis of the 1961 prices was Rs. 100 for a household of five persons in the rural areas and Rs. 125 in the urban areas. This came to Rs. 20 per capita per month in the rural areas and Rs. 25 in the urban areas. In 1978-79, this was worked out as Rs. 76 for the rural and Rs. 88 for the urban areas and in 1984-85, the revised poverty line was drawn at a per capita monthly expenditure of Rs. 107 for the rural and Rs. 122 for the urban areas (*India*, 1990:404). With an average household comprising five persons, rural households with an annual consumption expenditure of less than Rs. 6,420 and urban households below an annual expenditure of Rs. 7,320 were deemed to be *poor*.

At the current price level, a person in a rural area today requires an income of about Rs. 127 and in an urban area about Rs. 149 per month to fulfil his food and other basic requirements. This comes to Rs. 635 per family per month for the rural areas and Rs. 745 for the urban areas. Here the focus is on a 'minimum subsistence' level which is different from a 'minimum adequacy' level and a 'minimum comfort' level.

According to Ornat Oscar (1964: 440), in 1963 in the United States, 'minimum subsistence' level for a family of four was \$2,500 per year, the 'minimum adequacy' level was \$3,500 per year and the 'minimum comfort' level was \$5,500 per year. On this basis, 10% of the families in the U.S. were below the minimum subsistence level in 1963, 25% were below the minimum adequacy level, and 38% were below the

minimum comfort level. The poverty level in the United States for a family of four during 1982 was \$ 8,450 a year (Prabhakar Malgavkar, 1983: 3); during 1986 it was \$ 10,989 a year; and during 1990 it was \$ 14,200 a year. In India, the number of poor people (that is, people below minimum subsistence level) in 1989 was estimated at 20% of the total population. It should, however, be noted that the 'poor' are not a homogeneous group. They can be classified into three sub-groups: the *destitutes* (who spend less than Rs. 71 a month at current (1989-90) prices), the *very poor* (who spend less than Rs. 83 a month), and the *poor* (who spend less than Rs. 127 a month).

The Second View

This view maintains that poverty has three main aspects of want of material goods or materialistic possessions: (i) those necessary to avoid physical suffering and needed to fulfil the requirements of hunger and shelter, that is, those needed to survive, (ii) such as are essential to meet human needs of health, that is, to get nutrition and to avoid disease; and (iii) those needed to maintain a minimum subsistence level. In simple terms, this refers to a minimum amount of food intake, adequate housing, clothing, education and health-care. At the current (1989-90) prices, this refers to the ability to spend Rs. 150 a month (per person) in the rural areas and Rs. 190 a month in the urban areas.

Gross and Miller (1946 : 83) attempted to explain poverty in terms of three factors: income (covert and manifest), assets, and availability of services (educational, medical, recreational.) But others have considered the concept of poverty with this perspective elusive. For example, in the United States, from out of the families living 'below the poverty level' in 1960, 57.6% had a telephone, 79.2% owned a TV set and 72.6% possessed a washing machine (Howard Backer, 1966: 435). The assets or the materialistic possessions, therefore, cannot be the basis of specifying poverty. Likewise, poverty cannot be related to the 'income' factor. If there is an increase in the 'price level', people may not be able to provide the necessities of life for their family members. Obviously then, poverty has to be related to time and place.

The Third View

This view defines poverty as a condition of falling below the minimum standards of subsistence appropriate to each society, or "the absence of enough money to secure life's necessities", or "a condition of acute

physical want—starvation, malnutrition, disease, and want of clothing, shelter and medical care". The latter is measured by comparing the condition of those at the bottom of the society with the other segments of the population. It is, thus, a matter of subjective definition than of objective conditions. Poverty is determined by the standards that exist within a society. Miller and Roby (1970 : 34-37) have said that in this approach, poverty is sharply regarded as 'inequality'. From a sociological point of view, this definition is more important in terms of the impact which inequality of income has on the life situation and life chances of the poor. Absolute poverty can be reduced/eliminated by putting money into the hands of the poor but 'inequality' cannot be solved by moving people above a certain relative line. As long as there are people at the bottom of the income scale, they are in some way poor. Such a condition will continue to exist as long as we have social stratification.

Michael Harrington (1958 : 83) defined poverty with reference to 'deprivation'. According to him, poverty is the deprivation from those minimal levels of food, health, housing, education, and recreation which are compatible with the contemporary technology, beliefs and values of a particular society. Martin Rein (1968 : 116) identifies three elements in poverty. *Subsistence* emphasizes the provisions of sufficient resources to maintain health and working capacity in the sense of survival, and capacity to maintain physical efficiency. *Inequality* compares the lot of individuals at the bottom layer of stratified income levels with that of the more privileged people in the same society. Their deprivation is relative. *Externality* focuses on the social consequences of poverty for the rest of society, apart from the impact on the poor themselves.

Sociologically speaking, the poor are caught up in vicious circles. Being poor means living in a poor neighbourhood, which means being unable to send children to schools, which means not only the poor themselves but their children too will have low-paying jobs or no jobs at all, which means remaining poor for ever. Also, being poor means eating poor food, which means having poor health, which in turn means being handicapped or too weak to handle the heavy manual work, which also means accepting low paid work, which leads to remaining poor for ever. Thus, each circle begins and ends with being poor. No wonder, sociologists like Thomas Gladwin (1967 : 76-77) give more importance to 'inequality' or the social concept of poverty.

Manifestation or Measurements

What are the measurements of poverty? The important measurements are: malnutrition (below a limit of 2,100 to 2,400 calories per day), low consumption expenditure (below Rs. 127 per person per month at 1989-90 price level), low income (below Rs. 150 per person per month at current price level), chronic illness or poor health, illiteracy, unemployment and/or under-employment, and insanitary housing conditions. Broadly, the poverty of a given society is expressed in terms of poor resources, low national income, low per capita income, high disparity in income distribution, weak defence, and the like.

Some scholars have referred to poverty-linked characteristics of families to point out that individuals from these families have a greater risk of being poor. The chances increase as the families exhibit more of these characteristics. The more important among these characteristics are, absence of a wage-earner in the family, families where the men are above 60 years age, families headed by a female, families with more than six children of less than 18 years of age, families whose heads are living on daily wages, families whose members have less than the primary grade education, families with absence of work experience, and families having part-time employment.

Incidence and Magnitude

India represents a dichotomy in development. It ranks XIXth in world industrial production and XIIth in total gross national production (GNP), yet it has a large population that is extremely poor. Although since Independence, the country has registered a significant overall growth rate, there has been a progressive decline in the per capita income, and hence a deterioration in the living standards of a large section of the population. The World Bank in its 1981 World Development Report placed India among the ten poorest nations of the world. At the bottom was Bhutan while Bangladesh was the second poorest. India comes not only below China but also below Pakistan and even Sri Lanka. Not only is our country's per capita income one of the lowest but it is growing (1980-81) at a meagre annual rate (1.6%) compared to China (4.5%), Sri Lanka (2.9%) and Pakistan (2.5%).

In 1984-85, 36.9% of country's total population, 39.9% of rural population and 27.7% of urban population was estimated to be below the poverty line. The Seventh Five Year Plan (1985-90) envisaged bringing down the poverty ratio to 25.8% by the year 1989-90. In

absolute terms, the number of the poor were to decline from 272.7 million persons in 1984-85 to 210.8 million persons in 1989-90. In the budget of 1990-91, the government claimed that the number of poor persons (below poverty line) in the country was less than 300 million (out of estimated population of 850 million). The economists and the World Bank, however, claim the number to be nearer 400 million. This means that the abjectively poor in India total the population of Pakistan and Bangla Desh put together

Of the 400 million poor persons in India, the absolute destitutes—which are the bottom 10% of the society—are around 50-60 million. These are the old, the sick, and the disabled people, for whom it is not employment and the opportunity of earning of income that has to be provided, but some kind of social security, involving regular monthly payment. This leaves some 250 million (according to official figures) to 350 million (according to economists) people living at various levels of poverty for whom employment opportunities have to be provided. In the rural areas, these poor are the landless (wage) labourers, casual labourers, the marginal farmers, and the displaced village artisans such as the blacksmiths, the carpenters and the leather workers, while in the urban areas, these poor are the non-unionised industrial workers, vegetable, fruit and flower-vendors, the servants in tea-shops, domestic servants and daily wages earners

National income is a comprehensive index of the state of an economy and a measure of its growth over time. The figures of national income in India available for the last four decades record an impressive rise. At 1989-90 prices, India's national income which was Rs. 8,812 crore in 1950-51, increased to Rs. 1.22 lakh crore in 1980-81, Rs. 2.32 lakh crore in 1985-86 and Rs. 2.91 lakh crore in 1987-88. Thus, even after making allowance for the rise in the price level over these years, the fact remains that in over the last one decade, Indian national income has recorded a nearly two and a half fold increase. The per capita income has of course failed to record a similarly impressive increase due to the rise in population over these years. At 1989-90 prices, the per capita income was Rs. 246 in 1950-51 and it went upto Rs. 1,627 in 1980-81, Rs. 2,734 in 1985-86 and Rs. 3,284 in 1987-88. At 1970-71 prices, the per capita income worked out at Rs. 466 in 1950-51, Rs. 698 in 1980-81 and Rs. 798 in 1985-86. This shows an increase of hardly 70% over the 35 years.

Disparity in the rural and urban per capita incomes is also glaring (it being one for rural to 2.4 for urban areas). The income distribution in rural and urban areas in 1983 shows that 11% families in the urban

areas and 3.0% families in the rural areas belonged to the 'upper class' (with an income of more than Rs. 3,000 per year at the 1970-71 price level) The average income of an upper class family in this year (1983) in urban areas was Rs 5,985 per year and in rural areas was Rs. 4,564 per year. On the other hand, the average income per family per year in the 'lowest class' was Rs. 1,212 in the urban areas and Rs. 1,044 in the rural areas

It has been estimated that 70% of the rural households own no lands. Of the remaining 30% who cultivate land, 44.0% own less than one acre, 33.8% own 1-5 acres, 16.8% own 6-15 acres, 5.0% own 16-50 acres and 0.4% own above 50 acres. Further, of the 30% families who own land, 31.43% are marginal households, 35.71% are small households, 22.81% are medium households, 8.81% are big households and 1.24% are 'giant' households. While 15% in the top rungs of the rural economic ladder earn 42% of the total income, the remaining 85% are left to scramble for the rest of the 58% of the economic cake.

The main dependence of the landless people is on wage employment in agriculture or outside agriculture. Nearly three-fourths of the labour households work as casual labourers, that is, they work if and when work is available, otherwise, they remain unemployed. The remaining one-fourth are 'attached' labourers, that is they work for a single employer under some kind of a contract. It is, thus, clear that the rural poor consist predominantly of agricultural labour households and small landholders with cultivated holdings of less than five acres each.

If we look at the income distribution in India, we find that the lowest 20% of our population gets about 7% of the gross income whereas the top 20% gets about 50%. This distribution is not different from that of other countries or from the average international figures as shown in Table 2.1.

If we take the present top twenty business houses of India (Birla, Tata, Reliance, Singhanra, Thapar, Mafatlal, Bajaj, Modi etc.) their total assets in 1972 were Rs 3,071 crore which increased to Rs. 13,103.54 crore in 1983, Rs 20,136 crore in 1985, and about Rs 30,000 crore in 1990. In other words, their assets increased 4.3 times from 1973 to 1983, 6.5 times by 1985 and 10.0 times in less than twenty years.

It is alarming to see the size of the foreign debt which has been accumulating in India every year. It is estimated that our total debt at the beginning of 1988-89 was Rs. 50,000 crore (78% domestic and 22% foreign) which increased to Rs 65,000 crore by the end of the

Table 2.1: Income Distribution (1974)

Distribution of population	Income distribution				
	India	U.S.A	U.K	West Germany	Average International
1 Top 20% or highest fifth	49.2	42.8	30.8	46.2	48.0
2 Next 20% or fourth fifth	19.1	24.7	23.9	22.0	22.0
3 Next 20% or middle fifth	14.4	17.3	18.4	15.0	15.0
4 Next 20% or second fifth	10.7	10.7	12.6	10.3	10.0
5 Bottom 20% or lowest fifth	6.6	4.5	6.3	6.5	5.0

Source: World Development Report, 1980, quoted in *Population, Poverty, and Hope* by The Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, p. 13

year. By March, 1991, the total debt was somewhere near Rs. 1,80,000 crore (domestic Rs. 1,40,000 crore and external Rs. 40,000 crore). The mere servicing of this debt takes 15% of our annual earnings. This is bound to make India gasp for breath. According to the World Bank, among the 96 Third World countries, India is the fourth largest debtor. The following table shows the growing income and debt in India.

Table 2.2: Growing Income and Debt in India

Year	Income per capita per annum (at 1989-90 prices)	Debt per capita per annum
1969-70	597	158
1974-75	1,003	189
1979-80	1,337	320
1984-85	2,493	769
1986-87	2,974	1,167
1987-88	3,284	1,313

India was the fifth highest indebted country in the world in 1987, according to the World Bank. At present (1991), we are spending 13% of our national income on defence (against 17% in 1990 and 27% in 1989) and 21% on paying interest on debt (against 35% in 1990) (*India 1990*, 568 and *The Hindustan Times*, March 5, 1991).

Unless the inequality in income distribution is reduced, the chances of reducing the number of people below the poverty line will be low. But even if the present inequality continues, if a growth rate of 6% is achieved and if the population does not exceed 945.4 million by 2001, only 10% of the population will be below the poverty line in 2001.

Causes

There are two extreme perspectives on the basis of which we can analyse the causes of poverty—the old and the modern. One view of poverty is that it is providential and it is considered to be the result of the individual's past *karmas* (deeds), or sins. The other view ascribes poverty to be the result of a failure of an individual's working abilities or due to his lack of motivation. Describing the richness of a rich person in terms of his destiny and the poverty of a poor person in terms of his lack of abilities serves the economic interest of the rich people as they escape paying high taxes to be used for uplifting the poor. One modern view links poverty with factors which are beyond an individual's control, the other describes the functioning of social systems in the society as the cause of poverty.

David Elesh (1973: 359) has given three causes of poverty: the individual, the culture or sub-culture, and the social structure.

(i) Individual

The ideology of individualism which finds the cause of poverty within the individual is that success and failure of an individual are his personal matters. If one ends up in poverty, it is his own fault, because he is lazy, dull, inefficient or lacks initiative. This ideology maintains that poverty is good for society because the fittest will survive. Another aspect of this ideology is the Protestant ethics described by Max Weber which emphasises an individual's success through individual hard work, virtue, and honest work. If he fails, he has no one but himself to blame, for he has vices, is idle and has bad habits. The typical 'victim-blamer' is a middle-class person who is enjoying reasonably good material success and has a good job and steady income. He says: "I had to struggle to make it, why can't the poor? There must be something wrong with them". Spencer, Carnegie, and Lane believe in this ideology.

(ii) Culture or Subculture of Poverty

The second cause of poverty is the culture of poverty, or the way of life of the poor. Such a culture blocks all attempts of the society to change the values, norms, beliefs and life style of the poor. The 'culture of poverty' concept suggests that despite economic changes, the poor have remained so because of their culture or sub-culture. The culture of the poor fosters behaviour and values associated with poverty; it has kept the poor out of the mainstream of industrial society. Oscar Lewis popularised the notion of culture of poverty in 1959. He maintained that it was a special culture that passes on poverty from generation to generation. This conservative concept, often shared by the politicians and the public, has given our society a reason for doing little or nothing about the poor and poverty as a social problem. Advocates of this ideology identify lower-class culture and assume that the lifestyle of the poor is the cause of continued poverty. Ryan and Clifman believe in this school of thought.

(iii) Social Structure

While 'individual' and 'culture of poverty' are accepted as causes of poverty by the conservatives, the liberals, the radicals, and the sociologists link poverty to social structure or to 'miserable and unjust social conditions'. Our social institutions, our economy, low educational attainment, lack of employable skills, long-term unemployment or under-employment causes and perpetuate poverty. Change in social and economic structures is not brought about, or hindered by the vested interests. Sociologist Herbert Gans has pointed out to three functional gains—economic, political and social—that the middle-class derive from having a poverty-group in society. These range from getting society's 'dirty work' done to preserving one's high status or keeping oneself in power. Thus, the fault of poverty lies with those individuals/groups who do not want to change the social structure, values and norms for their vested interests.

We will now analyse poverty in terms of three causes—economic, demographic and social.

Economic Causes

For understanding the economic causes, we have to understand the difference in people engaged in work and those not engaged in work. Why are the latter not engaged in work? Is it because of their own

defects, that is, of 'flawed character' or because of the defects in the society, that is, of 'restricted opportunities' ? This may be examined in terms of the following five factors: inadequate development, inflationary pressures, lack of capital, lack of skill in workers, and unemployment.

Inadequate development has been described as the cause of poverty in India because the planning between 1951 and 1991 has been so defective that the rate of growth has only been 3.5%. Indian economy had stagnated over a period of nearly five decades before Independence. The trend of growth rate between 1900-01 and 1945-46 was only 1.2% for national income, about 0.3% for agricultural production and 2.0% for industrial production. With the growth of population, these growth rates were hardly sufficient to provide a bare minimum existence to the people of India. The planning for development of economy, therefore, became necessary after Independence.

Planning for the economy involves a long-term perspective plan which indicates the desired objective to be realised over a terminal period, of say, 10 to 15 years. Then there are Five Year Plans which are designed to give concrete shape to the development efforts indicated in the perspective plan. And then each Five Year Plan consists of Annual Plans which assess the performance of the various sectors of economic activity from year to year. In India, the Planning Commission was set up in March, 1950 to assess the resources of the country and formulate a plan for the balanced and effective utilization of resources. The NDC (National Development Council) was set up in 1952 to review the working of the plan from time to time and prescribe guidelines for achieving the aims and targets set out in the plan. However, in spite of completing seven Five Year Plans so far, the growth rate of industrial production of electricity, of transport, of increasing employment opportunities, and of developing human resources has been much below the target. Unless the short-falls are corrected, unless the ruling politicians take planning and development seriously, India will continue to face the increasing problem of poverty.

Inflationary pressures have also increased poverty. With 1960-61 as the base, the index of wholesale prices jumped from 165.4 in 1968-69 to 281.7 by 1973-74, an increase of 70% in a five year period. The index registered an increase of 6.2% in 1989-90 as against 4.6% in 1988-89. The annual rate of inflation currently (1991) is running at 7.2%. The value of a rupee has come down to 8.28 paise from 1960-61 to 1990-91.

Lack of capital too prevents industrial growth. The value of India's exports in relation to imports increased from Rs. (-) 328 crore in 1961-62 to Rs. (-) 1,222 crore in 1975-76, Rs. (-) 5,813 crore in 1980-81 and Rs. (-) 7,517 crore in 1986-87. The value of imports increased from Rs. 996.3 crore in 1961-62 to Rs. 5,265.2 crore in 1983-84 and Rs. 20,083.5 crore in 1986-87. This value of foreign trade in 25 years indicates the limited capital invested in industry.

Human capital deficiencies or lack of skills and abilities in workers prevents them from finding good employment and thereby increasing their income. Achieving skills and abilities depends more on the availability and accessibility of opportunities than on genetic endowments or natural ability. Since the poor belong to a social environment where they fail to get the required opportunities, they remain unskilled, which in turn affects the industrial growth.

High rate of unemployment in the country too leads to the drop in the demand for labour. The number of employed persons in the country in the organised sector increased from 161.92 lakh in 1966 to 210 lakh in 1977, 230 lakh in 1981 and 253.49 lakh in 1987. On the other hand, the number of unemployed people (registered in employment exchanges) increased from 27.40 lakh in 1967 to 93.26 lakhs in 1976, 162 lakhs in 1980 and 200 lakh in 1986. The back-log of unemployment in 1985 at the start of the Seventh Plan was roughly estimated at 90 million. The Seventh Plan estimated that the labour force will be increasing at an annual rate of 2.56% a year during 1985-90, thus, adding about 40 million to the working force in five years. However, there was a marginal increase in employment of less than 3% in the period of the Seventh Plan in the public sector and very little expansion in the private sector. If no new projects are undertaken in the near future, there will be large scale unemployment not only among engineers, overseers, and other technicians but also among the cultivators, industrial workers, and matriculates and graduates by the end of this century.

Demographic Causes

Population growth is the most important factor in poverty. According to one estimate, the per capita consumption expenditure, that is, the minimum amount required per person per year for food, shelter, health, education or to maintain a minimum standard at the 1981 price level in 2001 would be Rs. 1,032 and the per capita income per year at 6% annual growth rate would be Rs. 3,285 (in 1980-81, it was Rs. 1,627).

Apparently, the per capita income is enough to meet the consumption needs of the people. If the population can be restricted to 945.4 million by 2001, then the per capita income would be Rs. 2,320 instead of Rs. 2,038. This would reduce the pressure on food, education and health services, while there would be income available for development.

If the present inequality of income perpetuates, the lowest 30% people will be below the poverty line. Moreover, it is estimated that our population will be about 1032 million by 2001. As such, its impact on the per capita income will be profound and the number of people living below the poverty line is bound to increase. It is, therefore, essential that all efforts towards population control must continue.

There is a relationship between poverty and *age structure* of the country's population too. One study in the United States in 1973 showed that out of 230 lakh poor people, 33.5 lakh or 14.5% were more than 65 years of age. In India also, out of about 2,727 lakh poor people in 1984-85, 7% were old. Those above 60 in India today number over 4.75 crore and this figure is likely to swell to 7.56 crore by the year 2001. The life expectancy in India has increased from 32.45 years in 1941 to 54 years in 1981 and 60 years in 1991 because of which the number of old people in these 40 years has increased greatly. Though attaining the age of 55, 58 or 60 years does not make a person incapable of work but after retirement it is not easy to gain employment. A person has, therefore, to depend on his children for economic support unless he gets pension/provident fund. Thus, the poverty of the old people is forced and involuntary.

Poverty is related to *health* also. If a person is healthy, he is not only able to earn but he spends less on his sickness. If large number of people in the country suffer from chronic malnutrition or live in an insanitary environment, they suffer from many diseases which makes them incapable of working and earning.

Poverty is correlated to *increase in family size* as well. The larger the family, the lower the per capita income and the lower the standard of living. The average size of an Indian family is estimated to be 4.2 at present.

Lastly, the *educational level* of the people in the country also contributes to poverty. One study in the United States in 1973 revealed that the average annual income of a person educated upto eighth standard was 6,465 dollars, a person educated upto tenth standard earned 11,218 dollars, and a person who was a graduate earned 15,794

dollars. In India, 52.1% people are educated in 1991 whereas in 1981, the literacy rate in our country was 36.2%. In absolute terms, the number of illiterates was 40.33 crore in 1981. Of the literate persons, the number of graduates and post-graduates or holders of technical degree/diploma is very small. No wonder that the income of large number of people is found low.

Social Causes

Discrimination, prejudices, casteism, communalism and parochialism, also affect employment opportunities and the gross income. Imbalances based on regionalism in India point out difference in income in different states. Punjab, Haryana, Maharashtra and Gujarat are more developed than Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan or Orissa. No wonder then, in 1981 when the number of people living below poverty line in Orissa was 66.4% (of the total population of the state), in Bihar it was 57.5%, in Madhya Pradesh it was 57.4%, in Haryana it was 24.8% and in Punjab it was only 15.1%. Similarly, when the per capita income in 1981 (on 1970-71 price level) in Punjab was Rs. 1,298, in Haryana it was Rs. 973, in Gujarat it was Rs. 786, in Rajasthan it was Rs. 542, in Orissa it was Rs. 501, in Madhya Pradesh it was Rs. 494 and in Bihar it was only Rs. 43. At the then existing prices, the per capita income in 1986-87 in different states was : Punjab - Rs. 4719, Haryana - Rs. 3925, Uttar Pradesh - Rs. 2146, Madhya Pradesh - Rs. 2020, Orissa - Rs. 1957, Rajasthan - Rs. 2150, Maharashtra - Rs. 3793, Gujarat - Rs. 3223, Tamil Nadu - Rs. 2732, Kerala - Rs. 2486, Andhra Pradesh - Rs. 2344, and Bihar - Rs. 1802.

B. N. Ganguly has given the following causes of poverty in India - foreign rule and exploitation of a class society, over-population, lack of capital, high illiteracy, lack of ambition and economic motivation, poor health and lack of stamina in hot climate, lack of committed and honest administrators, outmoded social system with lack of social and economic mobility, and an exploitative land system that keeps the cultivators in a state of utter stagnation.

Climate is another reason for poverty. The hot climate reduces the capacity to work hard.

Colonial legacy is also responsible for poverty, for the colonial masters enforced backwardness for reasons of commercial interests. They destroyed the self-confidence of the people and created a habit of dependence.

The *wars and threats of wars* also force the state to spend huge amounts of money on defence instead of development. After Independence, India had to fight wars with China and Pakistan. Constant threats from some neighbouring countries force the government to spend about 15% to 25% of its total national income on defence. In 1989-90, out of a total non-plan expenditure of Rs. 54,347 crore, Rs 9,093 crore were spent on defence reducing the percentage of expenditure from 27.17 in 1988-89 to 16.7 in 1989-90 (*India 1990* : 568). India has become the fourth country in the Third World to indigenously produce war planes, ships, armoured vehicles and missiles—the four categories of major weaponry systems.

Concluding the discussion on the causes of poverty, my feeling is that poverty in India needs to be perceived in relationship to three factors: (i) diverse historical and cultural roots of Indian attitudes, ideas, beliefs and values, that is, peoples' strong linkages with the past, (ii) fundamental relationship between the biological and psychological characteristics of man, and (iii) changes in Indian society pertaining to public policy, particularly during and after the British Rule. As such, if poverty existed in India, it was because of the economic policies of the British government, lack of incentives to the people, lack of education and technological knowledge, lethargy, callousness and exploitation of the rural people, and religious and social barriers to control the family size. If after Independence efforts are being made to contain poverty, it is through family planning, new industrial and agricultural policies, spread of education, and giving subsidy and training to the needy people.

Problems of the Poor and the Pains of Poverty

After 40 years of planning, India is still one of the poorest countries in the world. Other countries, much smaller than India, have surged forward. Of the world's poor, every third person is an Indian, and the number is on the increase.

Some of the variables on which the poor differ from others are degree of participation in the labour force, kind of employment, characteristics of family, degree of knowledge of the larger society, political awareness, awareness of social and economic rights, and value orientations in politics, religion and social customs. Rossi and Blum (1969 : 39-41), however, maintain that the poor are different but in matters of degree rather than of kind.

The important problems the poor in our society face are: (1) social discrimination and social condemnation, (2) housing, and (3) sub-culture of poverty.

Social Discrimination

The employers, the rich, the officials and even the government looks down upon the poor. They are considered lethargic, inefficient and a burden on the society. They are harassed, humiliated and discriminated against at every level. Being unrepresented and powerless, they are always the targets of attack and hostility by the powerful. They have to face the challenges of illiteracy and social prejudice. They lack collective power and whenever they make an effort to unite at the local or micro level against the politically, economically and socially stronger sections of the society (who appear to threaten their dominance) they are crushed. They have to pay a higher interest rate for credit. They are accused and labelled as indisciplined, immature, having very little foresight. They receive little or no attention in offices they visit. Whenever a theft or crime is reported to the police, the police first rush to the areas inhabited by the poor as if it is only the poor who commit crimes. They are rarely considered reliable, dependent and trust-worthy. The hostile attitude of the society at every stage thus, lowers their self-image, creates in them a feeling of inferiority and curbs their efforts of gaining means to help themselves.

Housing

Houselessness, overcrowding, slums and rental laws are serious problems in urban areas. The family's dwelling unit and the neighbourhood within which it is located are important elements in the problems associated with poverty. The houses of the poor are not only over-crowded but lack privacy. The importance of the housing design on the family is suggested by the postulation of two polar types of family values: the *familistic* type and the *emancipated* type. The former is characterised by strong feelings of fulfilling family obligations, providing support and security to old, infirm and the unemployed in the family, identification with family traditions, common efforts of members to achieve family goals, and concern for family status. The latter emphasises personal pursuit of individual goals, restricted obligations to family, and subordination of family welfare to individual welfare. In addition to the position of the family in a continuum

between these polar types of values, the neighbourhood too has an influence on the members' relations outside the home. In urban slums, a considerable portion of family life is conducted outside the dwelling unit. The drabness of the houses drives the children out into the streets creating problems for the parents in controlling their children. The existing space does not permit proper sleeping arrangements and forces an invasion of privacy. Family tensions also affect their personality as well as their behaviour; self-respect is eroded and cynicism fostered. Poverty forces living in the substandard houses and leaves little for the prerequisites of decent living. The deficient housing contributes to the weakening of family solidarity also.

Subculture of Poverty

When poverty is transmitted over generations, it becomes a culture, according to Oscar Lewis. Louis Kriegberg (1963 : 335-336) has said that although the membership of the poor changes to an important degree over the generations, the successive generations resemble each other in behaviour and values as a product of the common experiences of being poor and of being subjected to similar social pressures. The children of the poor inherit a subculture of violence in which physically aggressive responses are either expected or required by all members. The use of violence in such a subculture is not viewed as illicit conduct and the users do not have to deal with feelings of guilt about their aggression. Violence becomes a part of the lifestyle, the medium for solving difficult problems and is used primarily between persons and groups who themselves rely upon the same supportive values and norms. On the one hand, this subculture is seen as the effect of poverty, that is, it refers to the similarities in the behaviour and thinking patterns of the people, and on the other hand, it is seen as the cause of poverty.

The very instruments which had helped Indian economy to grow from infancy to maturity upto 1978 have now become the most serious impediments to its further development. The chief among these are: (1) industrial licensing laws, (2) the controls on monopolies and foreign enterprises, and (3) differential treatment given to small industries. No wonder that in the last two years (1990, 1991), we find our government speeding up licensing procedures, relaxing import controls, and delicensing large sectors of industry. What is most needed for alleviating poverty is an assertive and aggressive outward-looking economic orientation in place of an inward-looking orientation. Today it is not sufficient to say we can produce some kind of a car or steel or

cement that is good enough for our domestic needs. We must demand from ourselves that we should produce a car that can outsell the cars of Japan and Korea at least in markets that are closer to us than to them, and that we can produce steel and cement at prices and of quality that makes others want to buy from us.

After 40 years of Independence, the average real income per head is not even twice what it used to be. In many countries, it has increased five or six times and, in the case of Japan it is fifty times what it was immediately after the war. The disparities between the poor and the rich are much more in India than, say, in Europe or Japan. And these are increasing, instead of narrowing down. The average Indian cannot look beyond survival, and even bare survival is now in doubt.

The system cannot provide either incomes or jobs. Every fifth young Indian is unemployed and every fourth farmer is a destitute. And because there are not enough jobs to go round—and there will never be one as long as the present system continues—they are being rationed just like other commodities in short supply. 'Mandalisation' is nothing but a rationing system of jobs.

It has been clearly suggested by the three social scientists associated with the Mandal Commission that the report itself is phoney and that the very basis of classifying castes/classes as 'backward' is unscientific and based on spurious statistics. But the most diabolical part of the reservation system is the link-up between jobs and votes. In no other country are jobs linked with votes. This is bound to affect the economy and debase the system even further.

Though the government saved Rs. 10 crore every year by abolishing the privy purses of rulers, it is spending hundreds of crores every year on the politician *maharajas*. Today's rulers have grand lifestyles. The Chief Minister of a state uses the state aeroplane to fetch his personal *pyjamas* which costs the state over Rs. 16,000. The interior of head of the state's aircraft is so refurbished for foreign visits that it would put the most luxurious hotel in the world to shame. The Prime Minister spends a holiday on an island with the Indian Navy standing by, specially flown-in cooks and brand new air-conditioned cottages. The wife of Chief Minister of a state gets a specially renovated main suit of the State Bhawan (all expenses paid) and a full-time state government car on being elected to the Lok Sabha. Her official residence is used by her political party. A junior Central Minister spends Rs. 3,000 for a single evening's entertainment at a five star hotel and when the news is leaked out, the statement is given that it was his security personnel who

indulged in the bout of expensive drinking. A senior Union Minister in the government, which lasted only eleven months, allegedly hailed a private taxi from the Provident Fund Office and sent it to his house so that his private staff could fetch vegetables from NOIDA. The amount of petrol this taxi consumed for this single task seems to be an irrelevant issue for the honourable minister. Perhaps, it were these petty acts of our politician rulers that triggered off the slogan "Mera Bharat Mahan". But then who will dare to attack these political *maharajas* who claim to be the nation's policy-makers ?

When the policies of the top rulers of the country are based on arrogance, self-righteousness and obduracy; when they think that 'they' are the only persons in the large country who have any feelings for the 'oppressed'; when they govern on the basis of caste versus class, rural versus urban, community versus community; when they have proved to be the 'divisive force' in the country; when their single-minded resolve to stay in office spawns blood-letting and acts of self-immolation; when the system has collapsed and become highly centralised and highly politicized and all political decisions are taken by a pack of power-hungry, unscrupulous and corrupt decision-makers; when the national income is not growing fast enough ; and when the political leadership is bankrupt, how can we expect that poverty in our country will ever be alleviated and sufferings of the poor be mitigated ?

Anti-poverty Strategies

After Independence, the central and state governments have adopted the following important measures to reduce poverty: (1) Five Year Plans, (2) Nationalisation, (3) 20-point Programme, and (4) IRDP, NREP, Antyodaya and the Jawahar Rozgar Yojna programmes. We will discuss each of these measures separately.

The Five Year Plans

The Planning Commission set up in 1950 has been formulating Five Year Plans for India's development taking an overall view of the needs and resources of the country. The First Plan was started in April, 1951 and the Third Plan ended in March, 1966. After this, there were three one year plans from April, 1966 to March, 1969. The Fourth Plan started in April, 1969 and the Eighth Plan is supposed to have been started in 1991.

The *First Five Year Plan* (1951-56) was designed to rectify the imbalances created by the Second World War and the partition of the country in 1947 and the maladies persisting in the economy as a legacy of the British Raj. Though the Plan aimed at achieving an all-round balanced development, it accorded top priority to agriculture and irrigation investing 44.6% of the total Plan budget on this sector. This was to reduce the country's dependence on agricultural imports and save foreign exchange. The industrial sector was not assigned much importance in this Plan and less than 5% of the Plan outlay was spent on industries. However, the Plan did give some importance to the development of power, rural development (community projects) and development of social welfare programmes. Of the total budget of the Plan (Rs. 2,378 crore), only two-thirds (65.6%) was actually spent. At the end of the plan, the country's national income increased by 18% and per capita income by 11%.

The *Second Five Year Plan* (1956-61) aimed at achieving rapid industrialization of the economy and bringing about greater equality in income and wealth for the establishment of a socialistic pattern of society in India. It stressed that the benefits of development should accrue more to the relatively less privileged sections of society and that there should be a progressive reduction in the concentration of income. It focussed on the growth of basic and heavy industries, expansion in employment opportunities and increase of 25% in the national income. The total amount spent during this Plan (Rs 4,672 crore) was double the amount spent in the First Plan. However, the performance of the Plan did not justify the hopes that had been placed on it. Achievements in almost all the sectors of the economy were lower than the Plan targets. Consequently, as against a near 13% fall in price-index during the First Plan, the Second Plan witnessed a 12.5% rise in price level.

The *Third Five Year Plan* (1961-66) aimed at securing a marked advance towards self-sustaining growth. It listed a set of five objectives, namely, increase in annual national income by 5%, self-sufficiency in agriculture, growth of basic industries (like steel, power, chemicals) maximum use of manpower resources, and decentralization of economic power. Agriculture was once again given top priority and about 35% of the outlay was allocated to this sector. As compared to this, 23% was accounted to industries and 25% to transport and communications. The plan aimed at increasing the national income by about 30% and the per capita income by about 17%. The total amount spent during the Plan (Rs 12,767 crore) was 9% more than the allocated amount (Rs. 11,600 crore).

The performance of the Third Plan was also as disheartening as that of the Second Plan. Over the five year period, the national income grew by 2.6% as against the target of 5%. In the agricultural sector also, the production suffered a set-back. The industrial production turned out to be 7.9% as compared to the target of 11%. The price index in 1965-66 was 32% higher than in 1960-61. The Indo-Pakistan War, the Sino-Indian conflict, and the successive failures of the monsoon were the factors beyond human control. The shape of the economy was in fact so bad at the end of the Third Plan that the Fourth Plan which was to be launched in March, 1966 had to be abandoned and was replaced by three *Annual Plans*. The three year period between 1966 and 1969, sometimes described as a period of 'Plan Holiday', was devoted to rectifying the ills that had crippled the planning process during the operation of the Third Five Year Plan. The main objective of the three Annual Plans was to continue the unfinished tasks of the Third Five Year Plan.

The *Fourth Five Year Plan* (1969-74) aimed at increasing national income by 5.5%, creating economic stability, reducing inequalities in income distribution, and achieving social justice with equality. Simultaneous growth of both agricultural and industrial sectors was fully recognised under the Fourth Plan. Though the total amount spent during this Plan was Rs 22,862 crore, this Plan could not ensure economic growth. Neither could it achieve self-sufficiency in food-grains, nor could the generation of employment opportunities make any significant dent in the widespread unemployment problem. The inflationary situation was also aggravated. With 1960-61 as the base, the wholesale price index jumped from 165.4 in 1968-69 to 281.7 by the end of 1973-74, an increase of 70% in a five year period.

The *Fifth Five Year Plan* (1974-79) was formulated when the economy was facing severe inflationary pressures. It mainly aimed at removal of poverty and attainment of self-reliance. The aim was to bring larger sections of the poor masses above the poverty line by assuring a minimum income of Rs 40 per person per month calculated at 1972-73 prices. The Plan also aimed at an increase in employment opportunities, self-sufficiency, policy of minimum wages, removal of regional imbalances, and encouragement of exports. The Plan targeted an annual growth rate of 5.5% in the national income.

The Plan ended during the Janata regime in 1978 instead of 1979 and the Sixth Plan was started as the Rolling Plan. But when the Congress once again came into power in 1978, the period of the Fifth

Plan was described as being from 1974 to 1979. The Fifth Plan was uniquely unlucky. It was indeed a collection of annual development programmes. It could not achieve its targets in any field, except in the increase of foodgrains.

The Sixth Five Year Plan (1980-85) was formulated after taking into account the achievements and shortcomings of the past three decades of planning. Removal of poverty was the foremost objective of the Plan, even though it was recognized that this objective could not be achieved in a short period of five years. Stress was laid on economic growth, elimination of unemployment, bringing down of inequality in the distribution of income, self-sufficiency in technology, raising the life-styles of the weaker sections of society, improving the public distribution system and control of the increasing population. The total amount spent during this Plan was Rs. 1,58,710 crore.

This Plan made a fairly convincing success. The growth target of 5.2% envisaged in the plan was actually exceeded. According to NSS (National Sample Survey), the proportion of people living below the poverty line declined from 48.3% in 1977-78 to 36.9% in 1984-85.

The Seventh Five Year Plan (1985-90) had three priorities of increasing food, work and productivity. With its emphasis on generating substantial productive employment, the Plan aimed at a significant reduction in the incidence of poverty and an improvement in the quality of life of the poor. The poverty ratio was expected to decline from 37% to 26% by 1990. The plan had a total allocation of Rs. 1,80,000 crore (Rs. 3,48,148 crore at 1989-90 prices). However, this Plan also failed totally in achieving its targets. There was a severe setback on the agricultural front, in the manufacturing sector, in creating employment, and in the balance of payments position of the country.

The Eighth Five Year Plan (1990-95) which had not been finally approved by the government till June, 1991, is expected to have a budget of over Rs. 6 lakh crore at 1989-90 prices. This means that the country will be spending about Rs. 120 thousand crore a year or about Rs. 2,500 crore a week. Half the amount will be spent by the government, and the other half by private industries and business.

The Plan is supposed to be oriented towards employment generation. More investment is supposed to be made in small industries which are expected to be job-intensive. The Plan aims at achieving an overall GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth rate of 5.5% to 6.5%, agricultural growth rate of 5%, industrial growth rate of 12%, service

sector growth rate of 8% to 10% and export growth rate of 10%. The Plan size is nearly the double of the previous plan but then all plans have been twice the size of the previous plans. The growth rate is targeted at 5.5%, which is also more or less what the previous plans aimed at. The fact that they rarely reached the target except in the First and the Seventh Plans is a different matter. The Eighth Plan is thus not different from the earlier plans, and its results will be no different either. It has now been decided to start the Eighth Plan from April, 1992.

Assessment of Five Year Plans

If we make an appraisal of all the seven plans, we find that we have completed about four decades of planning. All our plans have been oriented towards something, sometimes self-reliance in agricultural production, sometimes employment, sometimes industrial growth, and so on. But poverty and unemployment have always increased.

During this period of 40 years, the average rate of economic growth has been 3%. Though it is not bad in comparison to the world's average of 4%, it is definitely poor in comparison to the average of the developing countries of 7%-10%. During 1951 to 1991, our annual national income has increased by about 3.5%, agricultural production by 2.7%, industrial production by 6.1%, and the per capita consumption by 1.1%. Though the government claims that the number of people below the poverty line has come down to 28% in 1989 but since the number of unemployed people has increased, we cannot concede that poverty has been contained. No wonder, more people feel frustrated today and the number of agitations is increasing every year.

The Eighth Plan will pour thousands of crores of fresh money into heavy industries, small industries, power stations, oil refineries fertiliser plants, irrigation systems, transport units and so on. But will this money make any dent in the percentage of unemployment and poverty? Will it improve the quality of life of the poor? We have to wait and watch before we decide to give planning a long holiday. The countries that have done better are those which have no Planning Commissions and have no plans. Japan and Germany are two amongst them and both have progressed considerably.

Nationalisation

The policy of nationalisation was adopted in 1969 when 14 banks were nationalised. This was followed by the nationalisation of coal mines in

1972 and the government's taking over the control of a big private iron and steel company and a wholesale business in foodgrains. The nationalization aimed at granting credit to weaker sections. It is true that the credit share of agriculture, small-scale industry, professionals and transport operators has risen sharply from 14% in 1969 to nearly 33% in 1980 and 42% in 1988, and the banks have helped modernize the village economy, but nationalisation has some negative side effects too. Judged from the standpoint of efficiency, the quantum of profits, the standard of service to the general public or even deposit mobilization, the banks have not been the pace-setters the government claims them to be. Lack of efficiency, initiative and commitment have been the casualties of nationalisation. Only in two areas—branch expansion and grant of credit to the weaker sections—have the banks done better than expected. The loans advanced by the banks are not given to the really needy people but are sanctioned to people having some political backing. Most of these loans are never recovered. In 1990, when the National Front government came to power, it announced the policy of waiving loans below Rs. 10,000 of the farmers. While the Central and State governments were to share the burden, the Centre's liability alone was expected to vary between Rs. 2,600 crore and Rs. 3,000 crore. *The entire farm-loan waiver scheme* cost the exchequer more than Rs. 10,000 crore. Many economists had described this policy as being detrimental to the country. Even the Reserve Bank Governor had said that it was going to cause harm to the economy.

20-Point Programme

Indira Gandhi propounded this programme in July, 1975 for reducing poverty and economic exploitation, and for the upliftment of the weaker sections of the society. The five important goals of this programme were: (a) controlling inflation, (b) giving incentive to production, (c) welfare of the rural population (d) lending help to the urban middle classes and (e) controlling economic and social crimes. The programmes included in the 20-point Programme were: increase in irrigational facilities, increase in production programmes for rural employment, distribution of surplus land, minimum wages to landless labourers, *rehabilitation of bonded labour*, *development of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes*, growth of housing facilities, increasing power production, family planning, tree plantations, extension of

primary health facilities, programmes for the welfare of women and children, increase in primary education, strengthening of the distribution system, simplification of industrial policies, control of black money, betterment of the drinking water facilities, and developing internal resources.

The programme was discontinued with the change of government, when the Janata Party became the ruling party at the Centre. However, in January, 1982, the programme was again implemented with a revised format. Among other things, the revised programme included an increased tempo of rural development and a direct attack on rural poverty, besides specific schemes for the upliftment of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

In the light of the experience gained in the Sixth Plan period (1980 - 85) the 20-point Programme was restructured and revised in August 1986. This restructured programme aims at eradicating poverty, raising productivity, reducing income inequalities, removing social and economic disparities and improving the quality of life. The 20-point Programme in the restructured plan of 1986 contains the following commitments: attack on rural poverty, strategy for rain-fed agriculture, better use of irrigation water, bigger harvests, enforcement of land reforms, special programmes for rural labour, clean drinking water, health for all, two-child norm, expansion of education, justice to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, equality for women, new opportunities for youth, housing for the people, improvement of slums, new strategy for forestry, protection of the environment, concern for the consumer, energy for the villages, and a responsive administration.

The fact that the rural people and the urban poor are more discontented and feel more frustrated today points to the failure of the 20-point Programme in fulfilling its commitments.

IRDP, NREP, Jawahar Yojna and the Antyodaya

Several poverty alleviation programmes have been launched by the government for the rural poor, comprising the small and marginal farmers, landless labourers and rural artisans. The important programmes currently functioning are shown in Table 2.3 :

Table 2.3: Poverty Alleviation Programmes for the Rural People

<i>Programme</i>	<i>Outlay (1985-90) (Rs million)</i>	<i>Coverage (Blocks)</i>		<i>Elements</i>
		<i>Total</i>	<i>5,092</i>	
IRDP	32,290	All		Subsidised loans for self-employment
NREP	24,870	All		Wage-employment in slack season
RLEGP	17,440	All		80 - 100 days of wage-employment to every landless household
MNP	43,550	All		Minimum facilities of elementary and adult education, health and family planning, nutrition, roads, drinking water and house-sites for the landless
DPAP	2,370	615		Area development of drought-prone areas
DDP	2,450	132		Area development of hot and cold deserts
CDPR	3,522	All		Communal facilities and expenses for PR institutions
Land reform	3,960	All		Redistribution of land
Jawahar Yojna	Started only in April, 1989	All		Employment for 50 - 100 days in a year to at least one member in poor family

We will discuss each of these programmes separately.

SFDA and MFAL

In the Fourth Five Year Plan (1969-74), two schemes—Small Farmers Development Agency (SFDA) and Marginal Farmers and Agricultural Labour (MFAL)—were introduced to make small and marginal farmers economically self-sufficient by raising the productivity of smaller holdings and by improving the lot of landless agricultural labourers by generating employment through subsidiary occupations. A Rural Work Programme (RWP) was also started to provide employment in areas where drought was a recurring feature. During the Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-79), the SFDA and the MFAL were merged into a single scheme and their territorial coverage expanded. The RWP was reoriented as Drought Prone Areas Programme (DPAP). All these programmes were replaced by a new IRDP programme in 1978-79 to generate additional

employment and to raise the income level of the identified target groups consisting of small and marginal farmers, share croppers, agricultural labourers, rural artisans, and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

IRDP

The Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) is a major instrument of the government to alleviate poverty. Its objective is to enable selected families to cross the poverty line by taking up self-employment ventures in a variety of activities like agriculture, horticulture and animal husbandry in the primary sector; weaving and handicrafts in the secondary sector; and service and business activities in the tertiary sector.

The aim of the IRDP is to see that a minimum stipulated number of families are enabled to cross the poverty line within a given investment and in a given time-frame. Thus, the three variables involved are: (a) number of families, (b) the resources available for investment, and (c) the time-span over which the investment would yield an income which would enable the family to cross the poverty line.

The IRDP was launched by the Centre in March, 1976 in 20 selected districts, but from October, 1982 it was extended to all the 5,011 blocks in the country. This programme considers the family as the basic unit of development. Under this programme, during the Sixth Five Year Plan (1980-85), against a target of assisting 15 million families, 16.5 million families were assisted for improving their economic conditions and rising above the poverty line. The Seventh Plan envisaged an outlay of Rs. 2,643 crore and the targeted coverage was 20 million (10 million old and 10 million new) beneficiaries. Upto the end of 1985, a family was considered 'poor' if its annual income was Rs. 3,500 irrespective of the number of family members. But on 16 December, 1985, this definition was changed and accordingly 'poor' was defined as one whose annual income was Rs. 6,400 and the quantum of assistance was also raised from Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 6,000 per family.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), the Institute of Financial Management and Research (IFMR), Madras, the Programme Evaluation Organisation of the Planning Commission (PEO) and a number of other institutions have undertaken studies with respect to the implementation and working of the IRDP. Since most of these studies are based on the experience of the initial years of the programmes, their

findings do not give a clear picture. At the most, they point out the flaws in the implementation of the programme. None of these studies have questioned the utility of the programme.

The main criticisms against this scheme are: (1) The poorest are largely excluded. This is mainly because of three factors: (a) the poor are unable to pay large bribes, fill up complicated forms, influence the village headman and find the 'guarantors' for themselves, (b) bank officials are often reluctant to deal with poor borrowers because they believe—rightly or wrongly—that giving loans to the poor is risky since recovery is often used as a major indicator of the performance of a particular branch of a rural bank, and (c) the poor themselves take less interest in the programme because they are afraid of being cheated or of not being able to repay. (2) There is too much corruption, misuse and malpractice in the implementation of the loan programme. The loans are often misallocated with little apparent violation of the guidelines of the schemes for (a) the guidelines make it clear that for fair allocation of loans, *Gram Sabha* (village assembly) meetings should be convened for selecting the beneficiaries but in practice this does not happen because the village headman and the *Gram Sevak* act as the intermediaries between the villagers and the administration; (b) bribing is a *sine qua non* of obtaining a loan; and (c) household surveys on which the list of eligible households are supposed to be based are not conducted. (3) The IRDP loan neither raises the living standards of the beneficiaries nor does it have any impact on rural poverty by raising the number of people above the poverty line. This has been indicated by several studies conducted in Rajasthan, Gujarat, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Karnataka.

This also does not mean that the existing poverty alleviation programmes of the government need to be dispensed with. The government cannot abdicate its responsibility. It has only to concentrate more on programmes of employment generation and removing corruption to enable the disadvantaged group to get the real benefits of the existing schemes.

TRYSEM

The scheme of Training Rural Youth for Self Employment (TRYSEM) was started on August 15, 1979, to provide technical skills to the rural youth to enable them to seek employment in fields of agriculture, industry, services and business activities. Only youth in the age group of 18-35, belonging to families living below the poverty line (with

consumption expenditure of less than Rs. 6,400 per family per year or Rs. 535 per family per month or less than Rs. 107 per person per month) (*India, 1989* 296) are eligible for training. Priority for selection is given to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe persons, ex-servicemen and those who are ninth pass. One-third seats are reserved for women. Stipend to the trainees ranges from Rs. 75 to Rs. 200 per month.

NREP

The National Rural Development Programme (NREP) was planned for creating additional employment opportunities in the rural areas with the help of surplus foodgrains. Initially this programme was called Food for Work Programme (FFWP). It was drawn at the end of 1976-77 but it actually came into effect on April 1, 1977. Under this Scheme, 44 million mandays of employment were created in 1977-78, 355 million in 1978-79 and 534 million in 1979-80 by utilising 1.28 lakh tonnes, 12.47 lakh tonnes and 23.45 lakh tonnes of foodgrains respectively in the three years. The works undertaken were flood protection, maintenance of existing roads, provision of new links, improvement of irrigation facilities, construction of *panchayat ghars*, school buildings, medical and health centres and improvement of sanitation conditions in the rural areas.

On finding certain shortcomings in the programme, it was restructured in October, 1980 as part of the Sixth Plan (1980-85) and is now known as NREP. It takes care of those rural poor who largely depend on wage employment and virtually have no source of income in the lean agricultural period. The important points on which stress is laid in the implementation of this programme are: (1) 10% allocation is earmarked exclusively for drinking-water wells in Harijan colonies and community irrigation schemes in Harijan areas. Likewise, another 10% is earmarked for social forestry and fuel plantations. (2) Only such works are undertaken which have some durability. (3) Allocations are made both at inter-state and inter-district/block levels. The central government releases the state's share of the NREP allocation in cash every quarter. (4) Maintenance of assets created under this programme is the responsibility of the state governments. (5) *Panchayati Raj* institutions are actively involved in this programme.

Around Rs. 980 crore was provided for this programme during the Sixth Plan (1980-85) in the Central Plan. During 1980-81, that is, the first year of the Sixth Plan, the entire cost of the programme (Rs. 340

crore) was borne by the Centre. From 1981-82, the states are sharing 50% of the cost. However, the NREP schemes could only generate 700 million mandays of employment (in Sixth Plan period) which meant that it could provide 8% to 10% of full employment to the rural poor. The Seventh Plan (1985-90) assisted another 20 million families.

Antyodaya Programme

'Antyodya' means development (*udya*) of the people at the bottom level (*anti*), that is, the poorest of the poor. This programme was initiated by the government of Rajasthan on October 2, 1977 for special assistance to the people below the poverty line. The idea was to select five of the poorest families from each village (out of 33,000 villages) every year and to help them in their economic betterment. Initially, a random survey was undertaken in 25 villages situated in different ecological regions of the state and information about individual families with regard to indebtedness, dependency ratio, physical assets of land, cattle, occupation, educational level, income and size of the family was collected. Thereafter, a detailed scheme of Antyodaya was drawn up. The economic criterion, in order of priority, for the selection of the poor families was laid down as: (1) families under severe destitution without any productive assets and with no member in the age-group of 15-59 years capable of any economic activity; (2) families without any productive assets of land or cattle but having one or more persons capable of working and with a per capita income upto Rs. 20 per month; (3) families having some productive assets with per capita income upto Rs. 30 per month; and (4) families having a per capita income upto Rs. 40 per month.

The task of identification of the families was entrusted to the village assembly (*gram sabha*). Under this scheme, the help was given in the form of allotting land for cultivation, monthly pension, bank loan or help in getting employment. Each selected family was given a pension of Rs. 30-40 per month. A bank loan was sanctioned for purchasing bullocks, carts, animal husbandry (purchasing buffaloes, cows, goats and pigs), basket making, purchasing carpentry tools, opening a tailor's shop or a tea-shop or a barber's shop or a grocer's shop and for manufacturing activities like soap-making and *niwar* making.

The administration of the Antyodaya scheme was entrusted to the collectors at the district level, and to the Agriculture Department at the state level. The Rajasthan Government had a plan of helping six lakh and six thousand families in five years from 1978 to 1982 under this

scheme with a budget of Rs 187 crore. Of this amount, one-third (Rs. 61 crore) was to be given as pensions, about two-third (Rs. 117 crore) as loans, and 4% (Rs. 9 crore) as help (subsidy and loan) through the Khadi Boards. Under this scheme, upto 31 December, 1980, out of the total families (Rs. 2.61 lakh) identified, 83% (Rs. 2.17 lakh) were assisted. 29.0% of the selected families were allotted land, 40.5% were given loans, 21.7% were given social security benefits and 8.8% were provided employment and other benefits (Mehta, 1983 : 347)

The Government of Rajasthan, however, revived the programme in 1981. It selected 1,800 families below the poverty line in every block for benefiting them during a period of three years. Social security benefits and land allotment have been taken out of the assistance package.

Following in the footsteps of the Rajasthan Government, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh also launched the programme on the same model in 1980. But the political changes in the states affected the programme. It may now be said that by and large this scheme has been a total failure. The main reasons for failure were: partiality in selecting the families, lack of cooperation on the part of the officials, delay in the payment of loans, and neglect of the after-care work. The Rajasthan Government, however, has reintroduced the scheme since September, 1990 in the State.

RLEGP

The Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme (RLEGP) is different from the Antyodaya Scheme. While the latter aims at raising the productive capacity of the identified families, the former aims at providing supplemental employment to the poor on public works at a very low wage of Rs. 3 per day. Maharashtra is one state which has used the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) for the unemployed in rural areas by levying EGS surcharge or collections of land revenue, sales tax, motor vehicles tax, irrigated holdings, and on professionals. The amounts so collected, with matching contributions from the state government, are credited to an EGS fund for taking up employment works.

MNP

The Minimum Needs Programme (MNP), taken up in 1974-75 as an integral part of the Fifth Five Year Plan, included within its scope

elementary and adult education, rural health, water supply, road building, electrification, houses for landless labourers, nutrition in rural areas and environmental improvement of the urban slums. The amount allocated for MNP in the Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-79) was Rs. 1,518 crore, and in the Sixth Plan (1980-85) it was Rs. 5,807 crore. In the Sixth Plan, of the total amount, 34.5% was spent on rural water supply, 20.1% on rural roads, 17.8% on elementary and adult education (enrolling children in 6-11 and 11-14 age groups in schools and giving formal education to adults), 9.8% on rural health (establishing Primary Health Centres and Community Health Centres and increasing the number of C.H. Volunteers), 6.1% on rural housing to the landless labours, 5.2% on rural electrification, 3.8% on nutrition (mid-day meals to children and health care of pregnant women), and 2.6% on improvement of urban slums (Centre for Policy Research, 1983 : 464).

Garibi Hatao and Bekari Hatao Programmes

The *Garibi Hatao* slogan was given by Indira Gandhi in March, 1971 at the time of national elections while the *Bekari Hatao* slogan was given by the All India Congress Committee (AICC) at its annual session in April, 1988. Infact, the Congress party had been talking of 'socialism' since the 1950s. It declared 'socialism' as its main goal in its Avadi session of 1955, Bhubaneshwar session of 1964 and Kamraj Nagar session of April, 1988. But to what extent the Congress Party was able to work upto 1988 for this goal is indicated by the fact that more than 10 lakh people in our country are living by begging and about half a lakh people are surviving on donated blood.

Jawahar Rozgar Yojna

This programme was announced in April, 1989. Under the scheme, it is expected that at least one member of each poor family would be provided with employment for 50 to 100 days in a year at a work place near his/her residence. About 30% of the jobs under this scheme are reserved for women. All the rural wage employment programmes (like the IRDP, the REP, and the RLEGP) were merged in this Yojna. Central assistance to the Yojna is 80%. The Scheme has been implemented through the village panchayats. *Panchayats* with a population ranging between 4,000 to 5,000 persons are given an annual financial assistance from Rs. 0.80 lakh to Rs. 1 lakh. The expenditure on this scheme in 1989-90 was Rs. 2,100 crore and in 1990-91 was Rs. 500 crore. The Yojna covers 46% of the population.

Critical Evaluation of the Anti-poverty Programmes

The government's poverty alleviation programmes are hampered mainly because of haphazard planning. Secondly, despite the fact that the government has given top priority to agricultural production and productivity, removal of social and economic disparities and reduction in income equalities, the fruits of these schemes have not reached the poorest in all parts of the country. Water resources, credit, subsidy in fertilisers and other facilities have been usurped by a handful of big farmers and the medium and poor farmers have to buy these things at a much higher price. Thirdly, there is no coordination among various programmes. After the merger of various employment programmes into the Jawahar Yojna, the government is now able to pass on the funds to the *panchayats* in time. Fourthly, the officials associated with these programmes do not appear to have much faith in the goals set by the government, with the result they lack commitment to the roles assigned to them. As such, they take the least pains either in creating the necessary awareness among the people for the success of these programmes or in getting their cooperation and confidence. No wonder, the government has not been able to use even the available resources in the most effective manner. Fifthly, the central funds in Jawahar Yojna are diverted for party purposes by the states. For example, one of the studies has revealed that Rs. 30,000 sanctioned by the central government for new irrigation wells in Nalgonda district in Andhra Pradesh were swindled by the Telugu Desam Party members and not a single well was sunk. Planning by itself is not enough. What matters most is sincere and honest efforts on the part of the implementing agencies in making the anti-poverty drive a big success.

Effective Measures in Poverty Alleviation

The Leftists feel that a mixed economic system in the country is a barrier in reducing poverty. The absence of a minimum wage policy has increased discontentment among the labourers who today take more interest in strikes than in increasing production. The capitalists think that lack of free licensing policy has hampered industrial growth. The socialists maintain that measures like control over prices of manufactured commodities, fixing the profit-margin of industrialists, action against black money, and control over urban property will alleviate poverty in the country. Intellectuals and some economists believe that change in the tax structure, control over conspicuous

consumption, reduction in administrative expenses, change in the distribution system and added incentives to medium class entrepreneurs will contain poverty.

Broadly speaking, the measures for alleviating poverty can be classified into four groups: (1) those affecting the demand for workers; (2) those affecting the supply of labour skill; (3) those affecting the transfer of income; and (4) those affecting change in the existing social system. All these necessitate the following measures for eradicating poverty or at least reducing it significantly.

Creating Employment

The experience upto the end of the Seventh Plan has shown that certain kinds of economic activities do not create jobs. To this group belong all large industries, all industries using a lot of capital, and all industries which require import of machinery, components and raw materials. These industries only produce goods which increase the well-being of the upper and upper-middle classes. They generate little employment on which the poor depend. As such, small and cottage industries and agriculture in neglected areas, as employment generating sources, now need to be identified and the credit and tax incentives need to be channelised more intensely to these areas.

Creating employment by such means as the Jawahar Yojna (which now includes the EGS, the NREP and the FFWP) is not difficult. It does not require new production technologies. It only calls for initiatives in the political policy. If the estimated 20 million people who are unemployed and therefore also unproductive become productive in the process of being employed, they would become an enormous productive asset for the community.

Then, the people have to be motivated to adopt new techniques. Today, this task is not as difficult as it was four decades ago. Small farmers have started accepting extension methods and small entrepreneurs have become more responsive to technological innovations. The credit network has also become much stronger, enabling more people to adopt the newer methods of raising productivity.

Distributive Justice

The problem of poverty is not necessarily the problem of GNP growth only but of distribution also. It is true that wealth has to be created

before it is properly distributed among the different sections of the society but the modality and extent of development also determine the level of benefits that will trickle down to the poor who are the barometer of a society's development. And hence the necessity of the 're-ordering of priorities' for stopping the growing inequality between the rich and the poor. Total egalitarianism in income and property may not be possible, but at least the laws can be so enacted and implemented that the rich do not escape the paying of taxes, and the land in villages may be protected from *benamu* transfers and deals.

Man-land Ownership

While land cannot be increased, productivity can, by use of high technology. Even small holdings can be made profitable by proper irrigational facilities, use of modern techniques and by diversification. The man-land ratio in India fell from 0.15 hectare per person in 1965 to 0.13 hectare per person in 1975 and 0.12 hectare per person in 1988, but the dependence on land increased from 60% in 1970 to 70% in 1988 (Singh, 1988). Therefore, for a country to prosper, industry must absorb most working people. The share of agriculture in the U.S. national income came down from 69% in 1839 to 12% in 1928 and 4% in 1988. This has been the pattern in most developed countries.

Controlling Population Growth

If India's population had been frozen by some miracle at the 1947 level (300 million), the growth achieved so far would have been enough to abolish poverty completely. What has accentuated poverty is the lack of modern outlook in the people. Its one evidence is the rising fundamentalism and parochialism which today constitute a threat to the country's welfare, integration and progress. The primary task, therefore, should be to control population by persuasion, if we can, and by coercion, if we must. It is also the time to build a political consensus on population control. Making education free and compulsory will also help in changing the outlook of the people which in turn is necessary for control over population.

Elimination of Black Money

Black money is unaccounted money, tax-evaded, concealed income and undisclosed wealth. Many ingenious ways are employed by industrialists, export houses, the film-industry, businessmen and the

corporate sectors to hoodwink the taxman in the ongoing game of hide and seek. This money is usually spent on conspicuous consumption and corrupt practices to further generate income and wealth. The Wanchoo Committee appointed by the Union Government in 1970 to investigate the problem was of the view that tax-evasion and black money have reached such a stage in our country that they have become a menace to our economy and a challenge to the fulfilment of the avowed objectives of distributive justice and setting up of an egalitarian society. The latest report on black money was prepared by the National Institute of Public Finance (under the chairmanship of Shri Chelliah). The black wealth today is estimated at around Rs. 50 thousand to Rs. 60 thousand crore per year. According to this report also, the present structure of high rates of taxation and the range and complexity of control of the economic activities lead to the creation of tax-evaded income.

Decentralising Planning and its Execution

For the success of such programmes as the IRDP, the NREP, the RLEGP, the Jawahar Yojna and the Antyodaya, in the rural areas, it is necessary that they be planned by the village panchayats. Unless the planning and its execution is decentralised, unless the families living in poverty are identified by individual village panchayats at the local level, the programmes will not benefit the persons for whom they are made. In the urban areas also, the municipal councils should plan the self-employment programmes based on local resources and the skills of the slum dwellers. Decentralised plans alone can help in reducing and ridding ourselves of poverty.

Other Measures

For alleviating poverty; (1) It is necessary to ensure full participation and involvement of the people in development programmes. (2) The *panchayati raj* institutions should be strengthened so that they can become institutions of democratic management of rural development both at the district and block levels. The government officials at the district and village levels should provide technical, managerial and marketing support on the one hand and on the other hand stimulate social awareness and mobilise the poor households. (3) The help of non-government organisations should be taken in the administrative arrangements for the implementation of rural and urban development programmes. It calls for keeping the formal staff to the minimum and

increasing the non-formal staff as part of full-time consultants drawn from academic or voluntary organisations. Non-government organisations here include professional/technical institutes, polytechnics, agricultural universities, university faculties, management institutes, research organisations, welfare/voluntary organisations and professional resources of business organisations and banking sectors.

Besides the above measures, some measures like land redistribution, elimination of industrial monopolies, plugging of national drainage, efficient and democratic management of public sector enterprises, drastic reduction in the present high defence budget (as was done in 1989-90 budget and in Vote-on-Account for 1990-91) will also help in reducing poverty in our country.

The attack on poverty can provide a basis for a partnership between the people, the government, the voluntary agencies and the industrialists. The community has to assume responsibility not only towards the poor, the old, the infirm and the absolute destitutes having no means of support but it has also to assist the able-bodied poor and the unemployed or underemployed by helping them become an integral part of a self-supporting population. The rich may grumble about taxes and welfare schemes, the conservatives may keep on talking about "too much government spending" but the anti-poverty programmes are indispensable. The humanitarian concern for the poor is greater now than ever before.

So long as we have a double mind about what path of developmental style to adopt, we will fail economically in our goals. It is not the lack of resources or technical skills which are hindrances in our development, it is the lack of the political policies. Planning is to be based on the fact that poverty is not a cause but a result. Elimination of poverty is not merely a question of economic upliftment but is a social and a political issue related to the level of the politico-social awareness of the people.

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3

Unemployment

A man has to perform many roles in his life, the most crucial of which is that of an earning member. It is crucial not because a man spends approximately one-third of his lifetime performing this role but because it determines both livelihood and status and also enables the individual to support his family and fulfil his social obligations to the family and society. It also enables him to achieve power. If a person, with a capacity and potential to work, refuses to work or fails to obtain work, he not only does not gain any status in the society but also comes to suffer from several emotional and social problems. His plight affects not only himself but his family and society too. No wonder, unemployment has been described as the most significant sociological problem in the society. Opportunities for employment then becomes a must in all such cultures which claim to be democracies. Equal employment opportunity is a prerequisite for equal accessibility to achieved status. Attempts to deal with unemployment have hitherto been two-pronged, one, to alleviate the status of the unemployed and two, to abolish unemployment itself. Since local communities have proved unequal to cope up with the problem, the governments—both central and state—have taken the problem into their hands after Independence. However, the government has remained ineffective in tackling this problem and in providing assistance to persons unable to support themselves. It still views unemployment as an economic phenomenon rather than a social phenomenon.

What is unemployment? If a man with a Ph.D degree works as a petty clerk in an office, he will not be considered an unemployed person. At most, he would be viewed as an 'underemployed' person.

An unemployed person is "one who having potentialities and willingness to earn, is unable to find a remunerative work". Sociologically, it has been defined as "forced or involuntary separation from remunerative work of a member of the normal working force (that is, of 15-59 age group) during normal working time at normal wages and under normal conditions". D'Mello (1969 : 24) has defined it as "a condition in which an individual is not in a state of remunerative occupation despite his desire to do so". Naba Gopal Das has explained unemployment as "condition of involuntary idleness". The Planning Commission of India has described a person as 'unemployed' when he/she remains without work for one day in a week. Against this, the ILO considers that person as 'employed' who remains with work for 15 hours (about two days) in a week (of five days). This definition may be accepted in a developed country which provides social security to the unemployed but it cannot be accepted in a developing country like India which has no Unemployment Insurance Scheme.

Unemployment has three elements: (i) the individual should be capable of working, (ii) the individual should be willing to work, and (iii) the individual must make an effort to find work. On this basis, a person who is physically and/or mentally disabled, or who is chronically ill and unable to work, or a *Sadhu* who because of his status as an incharge of a *Math*, considers it below dignity to work, or a beggar who does not want to work, cannot be included in the definition of unemployed persons. A society is believed to be in a 'condition of full employment' if the period of enforced idleness remains minimum. A society with full employment has four characteristics: (i) the individual takes very little time to find remunerative work according to his capabilities and qualifications, (ii) he is sure of finding remunerative work, (iii) the number of vacant jobs in the society exceeds the number of job seekers, and (iv) the work is available on 'adequate remuneration'.

Magnitude

Though it is often repeated that there has been an alarming rise in unemployment in our country since Independence, the exact number of unemployed persons is not yet known, as no survey has been undertaken either by the Planning Commission or by the National Sample Survey (NSS), or the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) or the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI). The figures given are based only on estimates. The estimates only take into consideration the number of

persons registered in the employment exchanges and these employment exchanges cover mainly the urban areas. Registration with the employment exchanges being voluntary, not all the unemployed register their names in the exchanges. Further, some of the registrants are already employed but register again to seek better employment. However, most of the social scientists are of the opinion that an enormous proportion of the working population is not regularly employed in our country and that these unemployed and under-employed people and their families are dependent upon their family members or kin for even their bare necessities.

While the number of unemployed persons in the country registered in the employment exchanges in 1952 was 4.37 lakh, in 1967 it increased to 27.40 lakh, in 1971 to 50.99 lakh, in 1976 to 93.26 lakh (*Surya*, January, 1979: 50-51), in 1981 to 178 lakh, in 1983 to 220 lakh, in 1985 to 263 lakh, in 1987 to 301 lakh, and in 1990 to 334 lakh (*India Today*, May 31, 1991: 117).

Using 1952 as an index of 100, the following unemployment index points out how unemployment has increased markedly in India after Independence.

Unemployment Index
(1952 = 100)

Year	Index	Year	Index	Year	Index
1952	100	1976	2,134	1983	5,024
1967	627	1980	3,707	1985	6,011
1969	783	1981	4,082	1986	6,641
1971	1,167	1982	4,520	1990	7,894

Thus, when between 1952 and 1970 or in a period of about 18 years, the number of registered unemployed persons in the country had increased about eight times, between 1971 and 1990, the number increased 6.8 times. If we take the population of the country in 1991 to be 844 million, we can say that 5.3% of the total people are unemployed in our country. But this will be a wrong assessment because the number of people who are expected to be capable of working belong to the age group of 15-59 years. Since 498 million of the total population of 844 million in 1991 belonged to this (15-59) age group, we could claim that 6.4% of the working people (34.4 million out of 498 million) are unemployed in India.

In May, 1990, the highest number of persons registered in employment exchanges was in the state of West Bengal (4.63 million), followed by Bihar (3.16 million), Kerala (3.13 million), Uttar Pradesh (3.10 million) Tamil Nadu (3.05 million), Maharashtra (2.99 million), Andhra Pradesh (2.83 million), Madhya Pradesh (2.03 million), Karnataka (1.25 million), Assam (0.99 million), Gujarat (0.94 million), Rajasthan (0.93 million), Orissa (0.86 million), Delhi (0.80 million), Punjab (0.63 million), Chandigarh (0.20 million), Tripura (0.15 million), Jammu and Kashmir (0.11 million), Mizoram (0.08 million), Nagaland (0.04 million), and Meghalaya (0.02 million) (*Rajasthan Patrika*, October 15, 1990). In other words, about half (49.5%) of the total unemployed persons live in three states of northern India (West Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh) and two states of southern India (Kerala and Tamil Nadu).

Types

Unemployment may either be classified as rural and urban, or it may be classified as seasonal, cyclical, and technological. Urban unemployment has been sub-classified as educational and industrial.

Seasonal unemployment is inherent in the agricultural sector and certain manufacturing units like sugar and ice factories. The nature of work in a sugar factory or an ice factory is such that the workers have to remain out of work for about six months in a year.

Agricultural unemployment is caused because of a number of factors. First, the land-holdings are so small that even the family members of the working age-groups are not absorbed by the land. Second, the nature of work is seasonal. Broadly speaking, a cultivator in India remains unemployed for about four to six months in a year. According to one Land Revenue Commission appointed in Bengal, a cultivator (in Bengal) remains unemployed for about six months in a year. Keatings in *Rural Economy of Bombay Deccan* describes that a cultivator in Maharashtra works for 180 to 190 days in a year. Calvert is of the opinion that in Punjab, a cultivator does not work for more than 150 days in a year. R.K. Mukerjee in *Rural Economy of India* has said that an average cultivator in north India does not remain busy for more than 200 days in a year. Slater in *Some South Indian Villages* maintains that in southern India, cultivators remain busy only for five and half months in a year. Jack in *Economic Life of a Bengal District* explains that a jute worker remains unemployed for nine months and a rice-manufacturer for seven and a half months in a year. All these are

examples of seasonal unemployment which is caused because of the nature of work involved. Of the total population in the rural areas, only 29.4% people are self-supporting, 59.0% are non-earning dependents, and 11.6% are earning dependents. This means that 29.4% people not only support themselves but they also support the remaining 70.6% people as well.

Cyclical unemployment is caused because of the ups and downs in trade and business. When the entrepreneurs earn high profits, they invest them in business which increases employment, but when they get less profits or suffer from losses or their products remain unsold and pile up, they reduce the number of workers in their industries which causes unemployment. A boom is generated when investments exceed savings, and similarly a depression results when savings exceed investment. This is probably an over simplification of the concept of cyclical unemployment but it is still basically true.

Industrial unemployment is caused because of a large-scale migration of people from rural to urban areas, losses incurred by industries, slow growth of industries, competition with foreign industries, unplanned industrialization, defective industrial policies, labour strikes or employer's lock-outs, rationalisation, and so on.

Technological unemployment is one caused due to the introduction of automation or other technological changes in industry or other work places. It is also caused due to the reduction of man power necessary to produce a finished article. Throughout the course of economic development, particularly since the industrial revolution, man has been forced to adjust himself to the processes of mechanization. An increase in mechanical skills has both its advantages as well as its disadvantages. Machine production has multiplied the number of commodities consumed by average man. This has meant a constantly rising standard of material comfort and a concomitant increase in the consumption of luxury goods. Certain items which were at one time considered as luxury items for one class of people have today become items of necessity for them. On the other hand, the industry has diminished the average man's economic security since every advance in technology has meant a displacement of human labour. In fact, new inventions do more than merely displace labour. They create poverty which results from the destruction of old investments and, therefore, restricts the market for new productions. A vicious circle is thus created. In the long run, it is true that technological improvements may increase employment in related service industries (Elliott & Merrill,

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1950: 607-8). Nevertheless, continued improvements in mechanical devices mean that employment opportunities have to increase proportionately or there will be an added residue of unemployment.

Educational unemployment is caused because the system of education is largely unrelated to life. In fact, one of the University Grants Commission (UGC) Annual Reports laid out clearly that the present system of education is generating much waste and stagnation. The (education) system is irrelevant because of the stress it lays on higher education which can be given only to a small minority, most of whom would in any case be unemployed or unemployable once they graduate. The education is of little relevance to the needs of the nation. The Kothari Commission (1964-66) also admitted that there is a wide gulf between the contents of the present education and purposes and the concerns of national development. According to a study made by the UGC in 1977, a majority of the courses taught in the universities have not been revised for the last 30 years and are obsolete. Scores of expert committees—in fact more than 50 panels appointed after Independence—have delved into the problems and churned out tonnes of pompous reports and memoranda, but nothing seems to have really changed.

The main obstacles to a radical reform of the curriculum in higher education are the university teachers. Such changes would require teachers to constantly update their education and keep abreast of the latest developments in their respective fields. A good number of teachers remain indifferent to studies or are so bogged down in tuitions, part-time business, and university/college politics that education has become a business rather than a profession for them.

The irrelevance of the educational system is also manifest in the rise in the rate of unemployment among the educated youth. During 1965-77 the number of unemployed graduates rose at the rate of 21.0% annually (from 9 lakh in 1965 to 56 million in 1977). Then during 1980-88, their number rose at the rate of 23.0% every year, and between January, 1988 and January, 1989, the percentage increased by 19.2.

The highest number of unemployed degree holders is found in the state of West Bengal (27.21% of the total unemployed), followed by Bihar (24.85%), Kerala (21.10%), Karnataka (18.49%), Punjab (13.7%), Tamil Nadu (12.96%), Uttar Pradesh (9.96%), Gujarat (9.23%), Maharashtra (7.68%), Rajasthan (6.54%) and Nagaland (4.42%).

The expansion of the various faculties of the universities bears no relationship to the needs of the economy. While the number of arts graduates between 1980 and 1988 increased by 13.0% a year, the rate of unemployment among them increased by 26.0%. In the case of science graduates, the corresponding percentages were 12.9 and 33.0; for commerce graduates 16.4 and 27.4; for engineering graduates 4.6 and 29.0; and for medical graduates 12.2 and 37.0.

In the case of postgraduates, the situation is even worse. During the Fifth and Sixth Plans, only five out of 10 postgraduates found jobs. The gravity of the situation is reflected in the case of a nationalised bank which received 15,000 applications from graduates and postgraduates for 100 posts of clerks-typists. Though, the government spends about Rs 40,000 to educate an engineer, about 20,000 of them were looking for jobs in 1989.

Unemployment among the educated youth, on the other hand, poses another set of problems. It makes the youth so angry and frustrated that they become militants, rebels and a threat to the unity of the country. The widespread and gruesome agitation that followed the announcement of the acceptance of the Mandal Commission recommendations in August-September, 1990 provides good testimony of the deep emotions that the question of employment stirs among the youth.

Causes

Economists have explained unemployment in terms of lack of capital and lack of investment, and high production. Some believe that unemployment has its roots in the decline in the business cycle following a period of industrial prosperity. A few hold that dislocations in the industries and an inability to forecast the market have put a sizeable proportion of men out of work. Yet others are of the opinion that sudden economic deflation and impersonal forces of economic competition cause loss of work. Improvements in machine technology, over-production, falsely stimulated speculation, social emphasis upon monetary success and the inevitable depressions—all these make for crippling disruption in the demand of labour. The classical school of thought places the essential cause of unemployment on the 'Wage Fund Theory', according to which the wages of the workers are fixed in advance but because of lack of capital the manufacturers engage only a small number of workers which results in unemployment. The new classical school believes unemployment to be the result of 'over-

production'. Over production reduces the prices of the commodities which necessitates reducing the workers, which in turn increases unemployment. Keynes (1952 : 18-22) has talked of the 'desire for saving' as the cause of unemployment. People invest little because they want to save more. Small investments cause low production which causes more unemployment. Some economists have referred to the imbalance between demand and supply as the cause of unemployment. When effective demand declines for the products of industry, prices drop, factories close down, wages stop, and men are shifted from the employed to the unemployed status through no fault of their own. Less demand is the result of slow rate of development in early years, or postponing investments due to poor trade and commerce, and/or shift (or investment) from the industrial to the non-industrial sector. Lionel Edie (1926 : 422) is of the opinion that unemployment is caused by the disruption of the economic structure. Elliott and Merrill (1950 : 606) have said that unemployment is primarily a result of the decline in the business cycle following a period of industrial prosperity. Advances in technical skills and highly specialised division of labour also make it impossible for able-bodied and capable men to secure jobs. Bartlett (1949 : 6-9) has said that the virtually monopolistic industries, like iron and steel industry, have been major factors in producing depressions. These industries, he charges, do not lower their prices sufficiently during the period of declining price levels in other industries to make it possible to keep up their production.

Several scholars have now maintained that unemployment cannot be ascribed only to economic factors. Social and personal factors equally contribute to unemployment. In sociological terms, unemployment can be described as the product of a combination of social factors like degrading social status, geographical immobility, rapid growth of population, and defective educational system; and personal factors like lack of experience, vocational unfitness, and illness and disability.

Degrading social or work status causes unemployment in the sense that some people consider it below their dignity to take up certain jobs and prefer to remain unemployed. For example, the youth considers the IAS, IPS and teaching in the university to be prestigious jobs and teaching in schools, salesmanship, and typing to be low-status and low-profile. They prefer to remain unemployed rather than accept the latter. Many students though uninterested in doing research and working for a Ph.D degree prefer to accept scholarships of Rs. 400, Rs. 600 or Rs. 800 per month for two or three years rather than accepting a clerical or

a typist's job only because it gives them social acceptance and the status of a 'research scholar'. They stall their friends and relatives by claiming that they are "preparing for the competitive examinations" knowing fully well that they neither have the necessary potential nor the interest to undertake such examinations. Sometimes young persons refuse to accept certain jobs because they consider their family's position higher to the job they have been offered. In a public opinion survey conducted in four metropolitan cities on the occupational aspirations of the youth, 52.0% of the respondents gave preferences to government jobs and college lecturership (*Career Aspiration: The Conflict with Realities*, Vol. 14, No 1, October 1968, 14-15). It is good to have high aspirations and a growing desire for a high standard of living but it is unwise to refuse to accept substitute interests and preferences.

The upsurge in the birth rate or the *rapid growth of population* is the factor which immensely affects the availability of work. Gunnar Myrdal (1940), the eminent Swedish sociologist and an authority on population, considered the problem of population from the standpoint of the weal of democratic nations and said. "To my mind, no other factor—not even that of peace or war—is so tremendously fatal for the long time destinies of democracies as the factor of population. Democracy, not only as a political form but with all its content of civic ideals and human life, must either solve this problem or perish". The greater the number of unemployed children in the family, the greater is the dependency to be borne by the parents; the greater the number of unemployed persons in the society, the greater is the responsibility to be assumed by the government. For a number of reasons, the pattern of responsibility to be borne by the joint family system has been changing. Maintaining unemployed dependents by nuclear families is not economically feasible for most families. This detachment not only weakens the family ties but also creates many problems for the society. The increasing unemployment due to the unchecked growth of population, thus, not only increases the responsibilities of the society but also leads to degradation as well as loss of social esteem for the unemployed individual.

Unemployment is triggered off by *geographical immobility* too. There is surplus labour in one place and inadequate labour in another place, when people refuse to move from one region to other. The immobility may also be due to the lack of information regarding the availability of jobs in other cities or because of the language problem or family responsibilities.

Last, unemployment is also a result of the *defective educational system*. The educational system introduced more than 150 years ago by the British to train *babus* for their burgeoning bureaucracy, can no longer be described as 'purposeful' today. The education system is inadequate because it does not give due priority to primary education and what it imparts at the higher levels, at a great cost to the exchequer, does not instill attitudes needed for nation building. The education industry is truly gigantic. Its annual budget of Rs. 2,500 crore is second only to that of defence. The benefit of education is confined to a small middle and high income group and has not been able to help young persons find employment. Ironically perhaps, it even makes them unemployable by turning their minds into a duffle-bag crammed with text book theories which are out of date and inappropriate for India's development.

As regards the personal factors, the lack of experience of the person (seeking a job) because of his young age, old age affecting one's capacity to work, lack of vocational training, physical disabilities and illness—all go against the unemployed and the unemployable.

Consequences

Unemployment affects the individual, family, as well as the society, or it may be said that unemployment causes personal disorganisation, family disorganisation, and social disorganisation.

From the point of view of *personal disorganisation*, the unemployed person faces disillusionment and cynicism. Having no outlet to release their depression, the young persons tune their creative energies into wrong channels which explains the rise of the number of youthful bandits, highway robberies and bank holdups. These anti-social activities offer a chance to the indisciplined and recalcitrant youth to extract a living. Most of the criminals are undoubtedly recruited from boys with a history of earlier delinquencies but there has been an increase in the number of daring criminals with the decrease in work opportunities. On the other hand, the plight of an earning person who loses his job is equally sad. Ex-wage earners are more liable to physical illness, tension, suicide and crime, because the lack of working opportunities makes it impossible for them to support their dependents. Their own dependency on others is very often morally sapping because of the humiliation that follows. Some people in this state are even known to turn to illegal occupation like smuggling and drug trafficking rather than facing up to the true situation. During economic

depressions, the reduction in wages and the increase in part-time jobs is further frustrating. Wages are often unbelievably low because of the competition for jobs, and the increase in unemployment further reduces the chance of finding a job and depreciates the wages. The underemployed and underpaid are subjected to nearly as many difficult adjustments as those who are completely out of work (Wight Bakke, 1940).

Family disorganisation because of unemployment is easier to measure. Unemployment affects the unity of interests of family members, the unity of objectives, as well as the unity of personal ambitions. The disharmonious functioning of the members creates discord within the family, which means that not only do the tensions between the unemployed husband and wife increase but conflicts between parents and children also arise. Sometimes the wife of an unemployed person wants to take up a job but the idea of a wife taking up a job irritates the husband with traditional and conservative values so much that there is tremendous conflict within the home. Many husbands object to any substantial assumption of authority by their wives in the fields which they (the husbands) consider traditionally their own. On the other hand, the conflict between husband and wife may arise when the unemployed husband wants his wife to take up a job and the wife is reluctant to do so because of the presence of small children at home.

Social disorganisation caused by unemployment is harder to measure. Social disorganisation is a breakdown of the social structure, or change because of which old forms of social control no longer function effectively, or a process by which social relationships between members of a group are broken or dissolved. The activities of the unemployed are so restricted and their attitudes so bitter that in this phase of disillusionment and discouragement, they lose their desire to work and their skills may deteriorate with a resultant loss to the whole community (Joanna Colcord, 1941). In a brave effort to manage the family with a little saving and/or borrowing in cash or kind, many families suffer slow starvation by resorting to unbelievable economy in food and other necessities of life.

Measures Taken to Control Unemployment

Our policy planners have brought employment generation into focus in the Eighth Five Year Plan with other parameters so set so as to achieve a 3.0% growth a year in employment. The overall magnitude of

employment to be generated in the Seventh Plan (1985-90) was estimated at 48.58 million which included the backlog of 9.2 million at the out set of the Plan. The plan envisaged that the overall employment would grow from 186.7 million standard person year (SPY) in 1984-85 to 227.06 million SPY in 1989-90, implying a growth of 3.99%. In particular, the Plan envisaged that the special employment programmes of the NREP and RLEGP would generate 2.26 million SPY of employment in 1989-90. Similarly, the IRDP was envisaged to generate 3.0 million mandays, concentrating mainly on agriculture.

The Uttar Pradesh Government has recently taken some innovative steps to solve the pressing problem of unemployment. These steps will not only help the rural people get jobs in different regions but will also reclaim most of the large areas of barren and uncultivable land, making it possible to distribute this reclaimed land among the landless villagers. Towards this end, a land army called 'Bhoomi Sena' has been organised. The 'Bhoomi Sainiks' are given funds by the state government in the form of bank loans for the afforestation of land. If a loan is repaid within two years, the liability to pay 10.5% annual interest on such loans does not operate. It costs nearly Rs. 10,000 on the afforestation of one hectare of land. The belief is that the accumulation of salt above and under the land, makes it barren. By a year-long accumulation of water, the land is washed and then made even. The salt settles down and ceases to affect the roots of plants, it is said. The barren piece of land is, thus, rendered cultivable. Likewise, land lying along rivers remains uncultivable because of the overflowing river water. By checking the overflow of river water, this land could be made useful for planting trees and raising crops. Similarly, by preventing soil erosion, the land could be reclaimed for intensive cultivation. The 'Bhoomi Sena' has been organised in the state (Uttar Pradesh) to create work and help landless labourers to lead a life of economic self-sufficiency. The state government has earmarked 52.0% of the state budget for the development of the rural sector. Of this, Rs. 38 crore was spent in 1990-91 and Rs. 27 crore are to be spent in 1991-92 on the 'Bhoomi Sena' alone. It has been estimated that Rs. 219 crore will be spent on land reclamation schemes during the Eighth Plan period, benefiting nearly 1,80,000 landless labourers. Till now, nearly 14,370 hectare barren land has been identified for reclamation and the reclamation work is going in 12 districts including Varanasi, Kanpur, Etawah, Ghaziabad, Raibareli, Unnao, Sultanpur and Fatehpur. One *sainik* gets one hectare of land for afforestation. Till February, 1991,

about one thousand hectare land was distributed for afforestation to about one thousand *sainiks*. This is besides a provision of Rs. 6.3 crore made under the Adarsh Gram Yojna to remove unemployment in every district in the state.

Evaluation of Measures Adopted

Unemployment has been a major election plank of the parties which have been in power in the last two decades but a satisfactory solution still eludes the policy planners. The important reason is that in most cases employment generation schemes are not backed up with adequate resources.

Rural Unemployment

Take the question of rural unemployment. For a number of years now, the state governments have announced a number of employment guarantee programmes, perceiving them as poverty alleviation strategies. There was the Food-for-Work Programme, renamed the National Rural Employment Programme (NREP). Then came the Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme (RLEGP) and the Jawahar Yojna. To this, the National Front government added the Employment Guarantee Scheme in March, 1990, but the scheme never took off despite periodic announcements about adopting the Maharashtra model, said to be functioning well.

Why have these schemes failed? Let us take up the RLEGP launched in 1983 and funded fully by the Central Government. The basic objective of this programme was to improve and expand employment opportunities in the rural areas for the landless labour, guaranteeing employment to at least one member of a rural landless household upto 100 days in a year. From 1989, the programme stood merged with the Jawahar Rozgar Yojna. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) found in the test audit that against the assessed annual requirement of the Rs. 3,750 crore for providing employment guarantee to the extent envisaged, the annual availability of funds ranged between Rs. 100 crore and Rs. 762 crore during the years 1983 to 1989. The release of Rs. 762 crore in 1988-89 would have been adequate to provide employment for only 22 days. Worse still, it now turns out that the total release of funds from 1983 to 1989 was only Rs. 3,140 crore, short of even the annual requirement of Rs. 3,750 crore, and even from this the utilization was only Rs. 2,797 crore. So, not only

were the necessary funds not released but whatever little was made available was not fully utilized.

The report has some illuminating details. From the available funds, as much as Rs. 26.50 crore got diverted to other schemes and spent on —of all things—cars, jeeps, air-conditioners, video cameras and for investment in term deposits and the National Savings Schemes. Foodgrains meant for distribution under the RLEGP found their way to the public distribution agencies and other organisations. But, surprisingly despite all these shortcomings, the programme generated some 14,72 lakh mandays during 1983-89 exceeding the official target of 13,310 lakh mandays. The CAG, however, does not accept these figures as authentic and reliable. It found the method of calculating mandays wrong. Instead of compiling the generated mandays on the basis of actual muster rolls, many states (like Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Nagaland and West Bengal) were compiling employment generation figures on a notional basis by dividing the wage component of the outlay by the prescribed minimum daily wage rate. In one district of Maharashtra, it was found that the figures of mandays created were being worked out by dividing the actual expenditure (including the non-wage component also) by the minimum wage rate, thus inflating the figures.

If this is illustrative of the rural employment schemes, little wonder that more than four decades after Independence, the country still carries the burden of 36.0% of the population under the poverty line.

What has been the job scheme for the educated unemployed? The important scheme is that the banks sanction loans to the educated unemployed for self employment. The Central Government provides capital subsidy for this purpose and routes it through the Reserve Bank of India. But like the rural employment scheme, the scheme of loans for self-employment has also failed. The number of educated persons getting loans is decreasing, and so is the subsidy released by the Central Government. There was a gradual decline in the achievement of yearly targets set for the self-employment scheme in the Seventh Five Year Plan. When in 1985-86, 2.20 lakh unemployed youth against the target of 2.43 lakh were sanctioned loans, the number in 1986-87 was 2.16 lakh against 2.50 lakh and in 1987-88 was only 50,000 against the target of 1.25 lakh. Thus, the number of beneficiaries continuously went down. If the self-employment scheme flops, as the trend shows, the employment calculations of the Five Year Plans are bound to be badly affected. Besides, the law and order machinery, the political

system would also come under greater strain in the years to come because of the rising unemployment.

The Janata Dal promised a new carrot of 'Right to Work' in its election manifesto in 1990. This meant that the government was to shape its economic policies so as to create productive, useful jobs for all those who wanted them and to ensure that all those who wanted to work were provided the opportunity to do so. But before it could take up this challenge, the government had to quit in November, 1990.

The question is : In the present situation of our country, is the guarantee of the Right to Work feasible ? With cold hard statistics, can a concrete blueprint of an employment generation programme be worked out or will it remain another piece of populism ? My feeling is that this is nothing but a digressive, escapist, tangential, flippant, and a comic proposal. Mere making a promise or making a provision in the constitution is not likely to provide work for anyone, except perhaps for the politicians who are experts in making impossible promises. They find nothing wrong in adding one more promise of 'Right to Work' without giving substantial thought to comprehensive economic policies, innovative employment generation schemes, efficient organisation of the economic system, and other pragmatic and result-oriented techniques. The 'Right to Work' is neither viable nor enforceable without massive inputs. It is a distant fantasy and an empty shibboleth. Where are the resources and billions and trillions of rupees to give jobs to about 50 million unemployed persons, considering the large amount of money that is needed per year to create even one job ? Will this slogan not lead to wholesale frustration and disillusionment all around ? Is not 'Right to Work' linked with obtaining a mandate from a court of law to get a job and the right of employer to terminate the employee's services, collective bargaining, and so forth ? Is it not contradictory to the right of reservation (A M Singhvi, 1990) ? Do we, therefore, not find a pathological fallacy in the thinking of politicians who give such populist slogans and promises ?

Remedy of the Problem

One solution to the problem of unemployed educated people would be to regulate the admissions at a higher level, keeping in view the economy's manpower requirements. Long back (in 1957), even the then chairman of the UGC (Shri C.D. Deshmukh) had reiterated that we shall have to restructure university education by and large to the number of university educated men and women that the country will be

needing from time to time. Unfortunately, despite this need, the universities continue to proliferate to a situation where jobs would have to be created for about 7 million of graduates by 2000 A.D. just to clear the backlog. If the current rate of growth of the number of graduates and technical personnel continues at a compound rate of 10.0% a year, then by 2000 A.D. about 10 million graduates would be unemployed. A single job requires roughly Rs. 22,000 per year. At that rate and at the conservative estimate of a total 50 million unemployed in the country, the government of India has to dole out Rs. 11,00,000 million. Do we have this astronomical figure of more than Rs. one hundred thousand crores per year to spare for the unemployed alone? Why does not the government, therefore, control higher education? Perhaps, the crux of the matter is that not only the government but the politicians, teachers, students, public—all have a vested interest. The teachers like their sinecures. Students want a haven where the spectre of unemployment can temporarily be kept at bay. The elite want to hog the largest piece of the cake at the expense of the poor. The politicians prefer large universities spawning hoardes of idle and frustrated and ill-educated students, for they are the ones who steel their political muscles.

Another reason why jobs aren't growing fast enough is the labour law. In India, it is virtually impossible to retrench labour, hence businessmen often prefer contract labour to permanent staff. Not surprisingly, the number employed by the private organised section has remained more or less constant over the last decade at around 7.4 million. Only public sector jobs have been on the rise, but even here the rate of growth has slowed down from over 6% in the early 60s to just over 2% in the late 80s. The anti-employment ethos created by rigid laws therefore needs to be tackled by the government.

The solution, if any, to unemployment does not lie in making Indian industry more labour-intensive as has been tried in the past. Instead, in the growing service sector lies the hope of absorbing more and more of the educated youth, provided the right training and the required institutional help in the form of financial assistance is forthcoming. For the rural areas, development of the village as an integrated unit could partly answer the problem.

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Population Explosion

In the midst of political uncertainty and communal fury over the past decade, and particularly in the last few years, the problem of population explosion has been relegated to the background. Neither the social scientists nor the political parties or the government seem to think it necessary to focus attention upon what is surely the most crucial single problem facing the nation. There is no dearth of studies and views of the scholars to highlight the fact that India is falling behind in the race for economic development mainly because it has not shown much progress in controlling the population growth.

Increase in Population

India today (1991) accounts for 16.0% of the world population, as compared to about 15.0% a decade ago. It is the second largest country in the world, next only to China. The countries with dense population are China : 21.7%, USSR : 6.0%, and USA : 5.0%. India along with these three countries (China, USSR and USA) accounts for nearly half (48.3%) of the world population.

The scale at which India's population is increasing is simply mind boggling. When the total population of our country in 1600 was estimated to be 10.0 crore, it increased to 25.4 crore in 1871, 27.89 crore in 1931, 31.86 crore in 1941, 36.10 crore in 1951, 43.92 crore in 1961, 54.81 crore in 1971, and 68.51 crore in 1981. The preliminary estimate (Registrar General and Census Commissioner) is that on March 1, 1991, our population was 843.9 million (843,930,861 to be precise) (*The Hindustan Times*, March 26, 1991). Thus, while we added

39.68 million people to our population during the decade 1931-41, we added, 42.42 million in 1941-51, 78.14 million in 1951-61, 103.92 million in 1961-71, 137.02 million in 1971-81, and 158.74 million in 1981-91. While the net increase of population during the three decades from 1931-61 was 161 million, during the three decades from 1961 to 1991, it was 404 million. Or, when between 1921-51 the percentage of increase was 12.9, between 1961-91 it was 98.4. The addition of 158.74 million people in the 1981-91 decade means an addition of 158.74 lakh persons every year, or about 13.22 lakh persons every month, or about 44.09 thousand persons every day, or about 1837 persons every hour, or about 31 persons every minute. In comparison to this, the increase in number of persons per minute was 21 in the 1961-71 decade, 15 in the 1951-61 decade, and eight in the 1941-51 decade. This points out that whereas the rate of growth of population during the middle decades of the present century was moderate, now it is faster as well as alarming.

The disaster is that:

- Every sixth person on the globe today is an Indian, and by the turn of the century, every fifth living person will be an Indian.
- India adds about 10 lakh persons to its population every three weeks.
- Every year India adds to its population an equivalent of one Australia.
- Some time in the twenty-first century, India would overtake China as the world's most populous nation, with India's population reaching 1642.8 million as compared with China's 1,530 million (at present China's population being 1160 million).
- More than three times as many couples enter the reproductive span than those leaving it, with the fertility rate of the younger group three times higher than that of those passing out of the reproductive range.
- At the present rate of growth, life for most Indians would be unbearable—medical facilities would be impossible to provide, expenses on education, housing, etc. would be exorbitant, technical and professional education would become the exclusive prerogative of the elite, and the scarcity of food would plunge three-fifth of the nation below the poverty line.

The goal of containing India's population at the level of 950 million by the turn of the century has receded beyond redemption. No amount of jugglery with statistics, particularly in relation to the acceptance of contraception by couples, can wash away the harsh reality that we would be somewhere between one and 1.1 billion when we move on to the next century.

Causes of Population Growth

We may identify the following important causes for population explosion :

Widening Gap Between Birth and Death Rates

The average annual birth rate in India has declined from 41.2 per thousand during 1961-71 to 37.2 per thousand during 1971-81. In 1989, the birth rate showed a further decline. It was 30.5 per thousand in comparison to 31.5 in 1988. The death rate has also shown a similar decline from 19.2 per thousand during 1961-71 to 15.0 per thousand during the 1971-81 decade. In 1989, the death rate was 10.2 per thousand per year in comparison to 11.0 in 1988 (*The Hindustan Times*, December 27, 1990). According to the preliminary estimate of 1991 census, the birth rate is projected to decline to 27.5 and death rate to 9.4 during 1991-96 period. Thus, since birth rate has shown a marginal decline and the death rate has gone down rather sharply, the widening gap has increased our population rapidly.

For the past ten years, the average family size has stayed out at 4.2 children. If we add the annual figures of abortions (between 5 and 6 million) to the annual number of births (16 million) that take place in the country, we come to the shocking conclusion that in this age of family planning, one out of every five Indian women in the reproductive age group of 15-45 years is pregnant at any time.

Low Age at Marriage

Child marriages have been very common in our country. According to the 1931 census, 72.0% marriages in India were performed before 15 years of age and 34.0% before ten years of age. Since then, there has been a continuous increase in the mean age of marriage among both males and females. The mean age at marriage of females has increased from 13.1 in 1901 to 13.2 in 1911, 13.7 in 1921, 12.7 in 1931, 14.7 in 1941, 15.6 in 1951, 16.1 in 1961, 17.2 in 1971, and 17.6 in 1981.

Against this, the mean age at marriage of males has increased from 20.0 in 1901 to 20.7 in 1921, 19.9 in 1951, 21.4 in 1961, 22.2 in 1971 and 22.6 in 1981 (*Handbook on Social Welfare Statistics*, 1981: 50). Thus, though the mean age of marriage has been continuously increasing, yet a large number of girls even today marry at an age at which they are not ready for marriage either socially and emotionally, or physiologically and chronologically.

The infant mortality rate is directly related to the age of women at marriage. If we divide women in three groups in terms of age at marriage, namely, below 18, 18-20, and 21 and above, the infant mortality rate in each of these three groups in rural areas (in 1978) was 141, 112 and 85 respectively while in the urban areas, it was 78, 66 and 46 respectively (*Social Welfare Statistics*, 1981: 50). If we relate fertility rates with age groups, we find that as the age group increases, the fertility rate decreases. If population growth is to be controlled, marriage of females is to be preferred in 21-24 or 24-27 age groups than in 15-18 or 18-21 age groups

High Illiteracy

Family planning has a direct link with female education, and female education is directly associated with age at marriage, general status of women, their fertility behaviour, infant mortality rate and so forth. According to the preliminary estimates of the 1991 census, the overall literacy percentage in India is 52.11 as compared to 43.56 ten years ago. The male literacy percentage is 63.86 while the female literacy percentage is 39.42 (*The Hindustan Times*, March, 26, 1991). Education makes a person liberal, broad-minded, open to new ideas, and rational. If both man and woman are educated, they will easily understand the logic of planning their family, but if either of them or both of them are illiterate, they would be more orthodox, illogical and religious-minded. This is evident from the fact that Kerala which has the overall literacy rate of 90.59% and female literacy rate of 74.8% (in 1991) has the lowest birth rate (22.4 per thousand) while Rajasthan's appallingly low female literacy rate of 20.84% (in 1991) gives rise to the third highest birth rate in the country (36.4%), the highest having been registered in Uttar Pradesh (37.5%) followed by Madhya Pradesh (37.1%). These statistical figures hold good for most of the other states too.

Religious Attitude Towards Family Planning

The religiously orthodox and conservative people are against the use of family planning measures. There are women who disfavour family planning on the plea that they cannot go against the wishes of God. There are some women who argue that the purpose of a woman's life is to bear children. Other women adopt a passive attitude: "If I am destined to have many children, I will have them. If not, I will not have them. Why should I bother about it".

Indian Muslims have a higher birth rate than the Hindus. According to a survey conducted among the Muslims by the Operations Research Group in 1978, although a majority of both male and female respondents were aware of modern family planning methods, they were either against using them on religious grounds or they lacked clear and adequate knowledge about them.

Other Causes

Some of the other causes responsible for the increase in population are: joint family system and lack of responsibility of young couples in these families to bring up their children, lack of recreational facilities, and lack of information or wrong information about the adverse effects of vasectomy, tubectomy and the loop.

Many poor women produce children not because they are ignorant but because they need them. This is evident from the fact that there are some 35 million child workers in our country. It has been explained in eighth chapter of this book (on "Child Abuse and Child Labour") that in the match-box and cracker industries of Sivakasi in Tamil Nadu itself there are about 75,000 child workers who are employed. Nearly 45,000 of them are below the age of 15 and nearly 10,000 below ten. The number is equally large in other states. If families stop those children from working, their family funds will be ruined.

Effects of Population Explosion

The growth of population has a direct effect on the living standards of the people. This is why, despite our spectacular progress in the agricultural and industrial spheres since Independence, our per capita income has not risen appreciably. The appalling over-crowding of our cities (which like cancerous growths are mushrooming unchecked with slums proliferating) has brought about a virtual breakdown of transportation, electricity and other services. It has also led to the rise

of crime and an increase in conflict in the urban and the semi-urban areas. All this has been directly fuelled by the addition of about 16 million people every year. If the population continues to increase at this rate, in a few years from now, we will have an army of unemployed, hungry and desperate people who will threaten the very foundations of the social, economic and political systems and institutions of the country. All sectoral demands have a numerical dimension. Whether it is education, employment, health, housing, water supply or any other sector, the perennial question is for how many? Even for the present population of 843.93 million (in 1991), it is futile to think of jobs for all or shelter for all or health-protection programmes for all by 2000 A.D. especially when another 200 million people would have been added and, hence, need to be accommodated.

It has been calculated that for every addition of about 135 million people in our country, we will require 1.35 lakh primary and middle schools, 10 thousand higher secondary schools, 50 lakh primary and middle school teachers, 1.5 lakh higher secondary school teachers, 4000 hospitals and dispensaries, 1500 primary health centres, two lakh hospital beds, 50 thousand doctors, 25 thousand nurses, 20 million tonnes cereals, 25,000 metres of cloth and 2,500 million houses (*India Today*, September 16-30, 1979 : 53).

What do these figures predict? The countdown for India's great leap into the twenty-first century has begun. In the beginning of the 1970s, there was light and hope. Then came the darkness in a biblical reversal in 1980s. Population explosion, militancy and separatism gathered momentum. Matters touched rock-bottom as the decade of 1980s staggered to a close and we entered the decade of 1990s. What has the 1990s in store for us? Our country has to either come to terms with the highly competitive world economy or go bust. India will be looking for a Gorbachev in the next decade who chose restructuring (*perestroika*) and opening up (*glasnost*) and tried to save his country. We also want a leader who can be bold enough to take up the issue of controlling population explosion seriously. Unless India can find such a leader, its future is doomed.

Population Policy

A 'policy' is a "plan of action, statement of aims and ideals, specially one made by a government, political party, business company, etc." It guides the present and the future decisions. 'Population policy' in its narrower sense, according to UNO (1973 : 632) is "an effort to affect

the size, structure and distribution or characteristics of population". In its broader range, it includes "efforts to regulate economic and social conditions which are likely to have demographic consequences". Dorothy Nortman (1975 : 20) describes the narrower meaning as 'explicit policy' which affects directly the population characteristics, and the broader meaning as 'implicit policy' which affects the characteristics indirectly, sometimes without any explicit intention.

Any public policy, including population policy, is a step towards the future and an attempt to achieve desired goals. As such, it is to be laid down in terms of goals, the past and present trends towards the achievement of these goals, social conditions accounting for the direction and intensity of these trends, projections for probable future, and alternatives likely to be achieved most in reaching the desired goal(s). This means that the policy (population) has to be associated with participants, values or goals, institutions and resources.

We may suggest two types of population policies: (a) the anti-natalist policy which aims at discouraging the growth of the population, and (b) the distributional policy which deals with the distributional imbalances of the population. The National Academy of Sciences has discerned population policy as one (a) which influences the demographic processes according to a pre-set objective (for example, encouraging people to move from urban to suburban areas), and (b) which will cope with the demands created by the demographic processes (for example, providing basic facilities to people in suburban areas).

The population policy of a developing country like India has to aim at: (i) decreasing the mortality, (ii) creating awareness among the masses, (iii) procuring necessary contraceptives, (iv) enacting laws like legalising abortion, and (v) giving incentives as well as disincentives. On the other hand, it has also to aim at (a) checking the concentration of people in congested areas, (b) providing necessary public services for effective settlement in new areas, and (c) relocation of offices to less populated areas.

Once the need for the population policy is realised, it has to be framed by appointing various committees and commissions for studying and advising and consulting experts. It has then to be implemented through various programmes and then evaluated from time to time.

India's population policy is the direct result of (a) the total size of the population, (b) a high growth rate, and (c) the problem of uneven

distribution in rural and urban areas. Since our policy aimed at 'enhancing the quality of life', and 'increasing individual happiness', it acted as a means to attaining a broader objective of achieving individual fulfilment and social progress. Initially, the policy framed in 1952 was *ad hoc* in nature, flexible, and based on a trial and error approach. Gradually, there was more scientific planning. The sub-committee on population appointed in 1940 under the chairmanship of Dr. Radha Kamal Mukherjee by the National Planning Committee (appointed by Indian National Congress in 1938) laid emphasis on self-control, spreading knowledge of cheap and safe methods of birth control and establishing birth control clinics. It also recommended raising the marriage age, discouragement of polygamy, and an eugenic programme of sterilizing persons suffering from transmissible diseases. The Bhore Committee of 1943 appointed by the government criticised self-control method and advocated 'deliberate limitation of families'. After Independence, a Population Policy Committee was created in 1952 and a Family Planning Research and Programmes Committee in 1953. A Central Family Planning Board was created in 1956 which emphasised on sterilizations. During the 1960s, a more vigorous family planning programme was advocated for stabilizing the growth of population over a reasonable period. When earlier, it was assumed by the government that the family planning programme had enough motivation among the people and the government was only to provide facilities for contraception, later on it was realised that people needed motivation and masses had to be educated. The primary objective of the Fourth Five Year Plan (1969-74) was to reduce the annual birth rate to 32 by 1974 and family planning was given high priority. The Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) Act was passed in 1971. The Fifth Five Year Plan integrated family planning programme with maternal and child health programmes. In 1976, the Government of India announced a population policy, ratified by the Lok Sabha, of reducing the birth rate to 25 per thousand by the end of the Sixth Five Year Plan. However, during the period of Emergency, coercive measures were used to sterilize the people which gave the family planning programme a set-back. After 1980, the government has been more careful in implementing the programme.

Family Planning

India was the first country to evolve a government-backed family planning programme in 1950s when the rest of the world was not aware

of the problem. Today after 40 years, India is trailing behind in population control. During the notorious Emergency regime between 1975 and 1977, the political leaders and many of their cronies and government officials and policemen shouted themselves hoarse advocating sterilization. They concocted ambitious programmes and carried them out against popular wishes and even used such harsh and coercive methods for sterilization that today one is reluctant to talk of family planning to the populace. The concerned officials have been scared away from it. The experts have jettisoned hopes of reaching the targets. In fact for all practical purposes, the country is without an effective programme or an effective target. Political parties studiously skirt the subject, and election campaigns are conducted without a word of it. What was once a highly dramatic political issue has suddenly become taboo.

In 1977, 'Family Planning' was rechristened as 'Family Welfare' and tasks beyond its competence embracing all aspects of family welfare, including improvement of women's educational level, were included in it. In family planning, India adopted the UNFP formula of delaying the first child and spacing the subsequent birth(s).

The methods adopted in family planning are sterilization, vasectomy, loop, pill, withdrawal, rhythm, sheath, and diaphragm. The sheath and the pill seem most popular among the high socio-economic groups, the withdrawal method and the sheath among the middle socio-economic groups and sterilization is preferred by people belonging to the low social strata. Operations for planning are not very popular among the socially well-placed, as this group is exposed to other methods of birth control. A good number of women use more than one method, depending on the circumstances, availability and the mood of the moment.

Measures Adopted

Officially mobilized in 1951, only 147 family planning clinics were established during the First Five Year Plan period (1951-56). Another 1949 clinics were added on during the Second Five Year Plan (1956-61). The outlay of the expenditure rose from Rs. 15 lakh during the First Plan to Rs. 21.6 crore during the Second, and Rs. 3,250 crore during the Seventh Plan.

Of the various methods of family planning, the government depends more on the 'camp approach' which relies implicitly on the district authorities applying pressure on their officials to intensify the

sterilization campaign (mostly male sterilization). The government sets targets for different states and districts and adopts persuasive, monetary, as well as coercive measures to achieve the targets. The highest rate of target achievement (190.9%) was in 1976-77 when the sterilization programme was ruthlessly and brutally implemented during the Emergency period. The achievement rate of sterilization targets in different years has normally varied between 42.0% and 64.0%. The highest rate of achievement in 1976-77 has been described as 'Sanjay Effect' which was the result of coercion, cruelty, corruption, and inflated achievement figures. Sanjay Gandhi laid emphasis more on the sterilization method than on the IUD (loop) method or conventional contraceptives (condoms). The worst victims of the cruelty and brutality of Sanjay Gandhi's (the president of Indian Youth Congress) methods were the Harjans, peons, clerical staff, school teachers, innocent rural people, hospital patients, jail inmates and pavement-dwellers. This brutality through family planning (sterilization) method ultimately led to the fall of the Indira Gandhi government in 1977.

The Primary Health Centres established in villages are also engaged in family planning programmes. They perform two specific functions: providing services to the people and disseminating information about these services in an effective manner in order to motivate the people to accept family planning. At present, there are about 10,000 Primary Health Centres and nearly one lakh sub-centres in villages. Nearly half a million medical and para-medical persons are engaged in it, besides half a million part-time village health guides.

Progress Achieved

After the First Five Year Plan, the following Five Year Plans gave increasing priority to the programme but it was only in 1968-69 that the decline in the birth rate became noticeable. The birth rate which stood at 41.7 per thousand in 1961 came down to 39 per thousand in 1969. The Fourth Five Year Plan (1969-74) had set the target of reducing the birth rate to 32 per thousand by 1972-73. But the target fell short by seven points. At the end of 1974, the birth rate was 38 per thousand. In 1981, it came down to 37.2, in 1986 to 32.5 and in 1989 to 30.5. When the percentage increase during the decade 1941-51 was 13.3, it increased to 21.5% during 1951-61, 24.8% during 1961-71, 24.6% during 1971-81, and 23.5% during 1981-91. The achievement of the targets has been disastrous almost in all fields. The number of sterilizations has fallen; there is decline in the number of IUD (loop)

insertions; and there is fall in the use of number of conventional contraceptives. Today, the effort has altogether slackened to the extent that Dr. Ashish Bose, a noted demographer of our country, in his talk on 'Indian Population in 1990s' on February 8, 1991 at Delhi said "family planning programme has completely failed in the country and entirely a new approach is needed for its success".

The progress in containing population growth has been extremely slow as is evident when we compare it with China which has avoided the birth of 200 million children since 1970 through a vigorous family planning programme and brought the 'fertility rate' down to 2.5 from 5.82 among eligible mothers (the average number of children a woman will have during her child bearing years of 15 to 49) (*The Hindustan Times*, November 19, 1988). China adopted the norm of one child per couple in urban centres and a ceiling of two children per couple in rural areas, with several incentives for the planned child as also the parents. Those who violated these norms were penalised. The planned child was given special allowances till the age of 14 for education and upbringing, and the couple were provided with land for building a house or for farm machinery. A major component of the programme in China is encouraging late marriage and late childbirth. In 1988, China had a population of 1,080 million (against 820 million in India) with birth rate of 23.26 per thousand (against 31.5 in India), death rate of 7.1 per thousand (against 11.0 in India), and a national growth of 16.16 per thousand (against 20.5 in India).

Attitudes Towards Family Planning

The idea of family planning has been sold to the average Indian woman. The attitude of a woman towards family planning is influenced by education, age, income background, husband's occupation, woman's (working) status among other factors. In terms of age, it has been found that the percentage approving of family planning decreases as the age group increases. But the acceptance is about two-thirds even among the older age groups. This clearly shows that the great majority of Indian women approve of family planning, irrespective of age. A survey conducted by Khanna and Varghese (*Indian Women Today*, 1978) on Indian women's attitudes to family planning showed that the percentage of women who did not approve of family planning was less than 10.0 in the 15-24 age bracket. The figure increased with age to reach 36.0% in woman above 45 years. The researchers also discovered

that while women enamoured of tradition chose to resign themselves to 'fate', the young, educated and more informed showed a deep concern for the size of the family.

This author also conducted a survey in 1981 in seven villages of Jaipur district on "Awareness of Rights Among Rural Women". During the survey, 753 married women (belonging to 18-50 years of age group) and 733 men were questioned on family planning. To the question pertaining to the optimum number of children a couple should have, 7.0% females answered they should have as many as they want, 63.5% wanted 2-3 children and 29.5% desired 4-5 children. Against this, 60.9% males were of the opinion that a couple should have only 2-3 children, 27.8% were in favour of 4-5 children, and 11.3% wanted the couple to have as many children as they desired. Thus, about two-third respondents (66.0%) were in favour of 2-3 children only.

Further, 25.0% of the female respondents were not in favour of using any methods of family planning, 45.0% were fully in favour, and 30.0% favoured family planning methods with a few conditions and reservations thrown in. Of the 566 women who were fully or partially in favour of family planning, 43.3% were actually using some methods to control their family size. The reasons given by the remaining 321 women for not using a contraception were: their husbands did not permit the use of any measures (42.4%), they wanted one or two more children (25.2%); they had crossed the child-bearing age (15.0%); the required contraceptives were not available in their villages (6.5%); they did not have sufficient knowledge about the usage of contraceptives (5.0%); they had no means to dispose off contraceptives after the use (2.8%); and they wanted sons as they only had daughters (3.1%).

It was also found that 9.4% of the respondents (females) were in favour of abortion and 90.6% were against it. Another 2.7% had even undergone abortion. All this shows that women want to control their fertility and men also want to plan their families. It is also necessary to give them the required information, education and means to do so through medical, para-medical, social and community institutions and workers.

A survey was conducted on attitude towards family planning in 1970 in Vellore city of Tamil Nadu and its surrounding villages by Rao and Inbaraj. In all 2,426 persons were interviewed with the intention of finding out whether they considered it within the power of the couple to control the number of children. Around 37.0% replied in the

affirmative and 41.0% replied in the negative (*The Journal of Family Welfare*, June 1970 : 20-22). Of those 899 persons who considered it possible, 46.6% considered it possible through family planning measures, 37.5% through control on self, while 15.9% did not point to any specific method. When they were asked whether they themselves were in favour of family planning, 64.6% said 'Yes' and 25.4% said 'No'. The reasons given for the hostility to family planning methods were: that it was harmful to the women, it went against family economy and against god's will and constituted unnatural behaviour. However, it remains that seven out of every ten persons were in favour of family planning which points to the fact that people today are not very traditional in their beliefs and values.

A study made in 1965 by the National Institute of Community Development covering 365 villages in 16 states and 43 districts and 7,224 respondents also revealed that 51.6% were in favour of family planning and 23.7% were against it (Balakrishna and Narayan Murthy, *The Journal of Family Welfare*, December, 1968 : 42).

Khanna and Varghese's survey showed that the acceptance of family planning is directly related to education. As many as 40% of women with primary school education or below did not favour family planning. If education level increases to even the middle school level, the percentage drops to 14.0%. This shows that education brings about a drastic change in the attitude to family planning. If the woman remains unexposed to family planning methods, she continues to be conservative and holds on superstitious beliefs and fears.

Informal education also affects the practice of family planning methods. Many young women are in favour of family planning but do not know how to go about it. The illiteracy of the husband also acts as a barrier because they remain unconcerned about planning the family.

Since illiteracy is found more among the poorer section of our society, it is seen that women with low education in the lower strata are more reluctant to accept family planning methods. Their contention is that since they have no money to fall back upon, their only hope of survival is their children's income. An average Indian couple is not satisfied with less than three children. Time and again, studies in various parts of the country have revealed this fact. A few years ago, a large scale survey covering some 32,000 respondents sponsored by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare came to the conclusion that most couples want not only three or more children but they also want that two of them should be sons (*The Hindustan Times*, November 5, 1987).

The encouraging feature is that though the older generation is inclined towards passive helplessness, they want their daughters to have fewer children and adopt birth control methods. In the rural areas it has been observed that a woman with six children now compels her married daughter to undergo an operation to stop childbirth after her third delivery. In the urban areas especially with the breakdown of the joint family system, many women in nuclear families face difficulties in bringing up children. Servants are a problem and there is no help from the in-laws or one's own mother. Housing is often a problem and commodities are scarce. No wonder that urban women in the younger age group favour family planning methods which allow them to devote their attention to their careers.

Though a large number of women approve of family planning; only half of them actually practice it. Khanna and Varghese's survey revealed that the lower the social strata the more ignorant a woman is about family planning methods. From over 75.0% usage of contraceptives in the high socio-economic strata, the percentage came down to 56.0% in the middle and dropped to 19.5% in the lower socio-economic group in their survey. This becomes very significant when we consider that women in the low and middle strata need to be more effectively covered by family planning methods than those who are economically better off.

Evaluation of the Programme

Family planning in India has come to a standstill. In fact, the programme is moving backward as today (in 1991) we are producing 31 children every minute in comparison to 21 children per minute in 1971 and eight children per minute in 1941. This stagnation is bound to wipe out all the effort that has been made since 1952. Though it is true that the couple protection percentage has gone up steadily from 22 to approximately 35 in the last 12-15 years, it should be asked who are these couples who are supposed to have obtained protection? The answer is principally those who have had three or more children and who have already done their part of the damage to the two-child family norm.

The question that is being asked is: If it took 19 years for the country's birth rate to dip by 6.3 points (from 36.8 in 1970 to 30.5 in 1989), how many years will it take to bring about a drop of 9.5 points so as to realise the birth rate target of 21 set for the turn of the century?

The official calculations of the Health Ministry point out that it is the four larger states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan with high fertility levels which have to bear the cross. These four states together hold 40.0% of the country's population. The birth rate in these states was much above the national average of 31.5 per thousand population for 1988 (the birth rate was 37.5 in Uttar Pradesh, 37.1 in Madhya Pradesh, 36.4 in Rajasthan and 36 in Bihar). Surprisingly, the targets of sterilizations set for these four states are much lower than what their population size should warrant. For example, when the target of Uttar Pradesh (with 138.76 million people according to the preliminary estimates of 1991 census) was 6.5 lakh sterilizations for 1987-88 and the target for Bihar (with 86.33 million people in 1991 (*The Hindustan Times*, March 26, 1991) was 6.0 lakh sterilizations, the target for Tamil Nadu (with 58.4 million people in 1991) was 5.60 lakh sterilizations, and the target for Andhra Pradesh (with 63.5 million people in 1991) was 6.0 lakh sterilizations (*The Hindustan Times*, June 2, 1988). Unless these four states improve their performance level, containing the population may continue to remain a big problem for the country.

Various studies have highlighted that the services of Primary Health Centres (PHCs) in the rural areas are grossly underutilized. In states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, where the need is more pronounced, utilization is less than 15.0%. Countless studies have made the point that in villages only the media which answers the people's questions instantaneously can help in family planning. The Block Extension Educators and the Health Assistants have been assigned only this role. But significantly, inter-personal communication is very small.

What should be our objective and method of family planning propoganda? One important suggestion is that our slogan should be "Third child should not be born and no child after 35 years of age". These are the two options which are entirely within the control of the couple. This type of propoganda linked with improving the standard of living, provision of better education, and health guarantee of (two) children and improved services for the health of women/mothers will put the couples in a frame of mind where they would themselves be anxious to work for this objective. Money incentives cannot be a motivating factor. The money may be incentive for the campaigner to motivate the couple but not for the person undergoing sterilization.

The then Minister of Health and Family Planning, Dr. Karan Singh, had presented before the Parliament in April, 1976 the National Population Policy framed after prolonged and intensive consultations with governmental and non-official organisations, academic institutions, as well as eminent demographers and economists. This policy covered a wide spectrum of programmes including raising the statutory age of marriage, introducing fiscal incentives to states which perform well in the field of family planning, paying special attention to improving female literacy, public education through all available media (radio, television, press, films), introducing direct monetary incentives for adoption of vasectomy and tubectomy operations, and a new thrust towards research in reproductive biology and contraception. Though this policy was endorsed by the Parliament, it was planned at a time when the Emergency was in operation. As stated earlier, there were so many excesses in the sterilization campaign under the leadership of Sanjay Gandhi, the President of Indian Youth Congress, that it came to be regarded with hostility by the people. The programme was so over-zealously and insensitively implemented in some of the north Indian states that during the election in 1977 after the Emergency, these excesses became an important election issue and the Congress lost the elections at the Centre, so much so that for the first time after 30 years after Independence, a non-Congress party became the ruling party in the country. When in 1980, Indira Gandhi returned to power, she became extremely cautious and unenthusiastic in reviving her commitment to the family planning programmes. Since then the policy of almost all governments in the states and at the centre has been so lop-sided that the growth rate of population which was expected to have fallen below the 2.0% mark, is still around 2.35%.

Some scholars present optimistic blueprints to check the population explosion in coming years. One point usually made is that our country has many untapped resources which, if properly developed, will sustain even three times the present population. The second point urged is that industrial growth, economic development and increase in exports will take care of poverty, unemployment, and the increasing population. Both these views are rather naive and unsound. What is useful and important for any country is the goods and services actually available and not likely to be available to meet the needs of the population. With the present political instability in the country, with the ruling parties laying focus on power rather than the 'community development' and with increasing casteism, parochialism, regionalism, and linguism, how

can we expect our power elite to take an interest in development and modernization and/or tapping the untapped resources ?

Measures Suggested to Control Population Explosion

Division into zones and Regions

The continuing population explosion in our country calls for some soul searching. The government is aware of the magnitude of the problem and considers the alarming population growth as the biggest challenge facing the nation as well as the government. But the 1976-77 experience of the government in adopting serious measures to achieve the set targets in the field of family planning has made all the following governments very cautious.

There is, however, still time to act. A recent study (in February, 1990) by two population experts of the Operation Research Group at Baroda has shown how the problem could be tackled. On the basis of the fertility pattern, they have divided the country's 350 districts into 16 zones and four regions. They have identified districts and zones which reflect the positive impact of family planning on the fertility rates, the areas where fertility rates have remained low despite hardly any family planning efforts, and those regions which are the hard core areas where the maximum effort is needed. The 1990 survey has pointed out that the areas of high fertility are Arunachal Pradesh (birth rate being 35.2), Bihar (34.4); Haryana (34.8), Madhya Pradesh (35.1), Uttar Pradesh (37.0), and Rajasthan (33.9). This region-wise approach is expected to help in correcting the lacunae in the implementation of the family planning programme.

Searching for New Contraceptives

The search for a new, inexpensive, easy to use and harmless contraceptive has not met with dramatic success so far. Though pills have come to be accepted in a big way and this method is catching on in Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, West Bengal, Gujarat and Orissa, it is necessary that Indian herbs also be thoroughly investigated for their effects. Pursuing vigorous investigation of the health status and dietary habits of some of the tribals in Andaman and Nicobar Islands, among some of whom the fertility rate is found to be extremely low, might provide the needed solution.

Controlling Early Marriages

There is a direct relationship between age of marriage, size of family and attitude towards family planning. One study in Kerala revealed that the average age of marriage went up in mid 1970s. In 1969, the number of married women in the age group 15-19 years was 30.0% where as in 1974 it dropped to 14.0%. For those in the 20-24 age group, the decline was from 73.0% in 1969 to 56.0% in 1974 (*India Today*, March 1-15, 1980). Sociologically, this is an important reason for the dramatic decline in birth rate in Kerala. Raising the marriage age is, thus, bound to reduce the family size in other states too. This only requires creating the necessary public awareness.

The problem of changing social norms is extremely difficult. In the rural areas, the number of children, particularly the number of sons is considered important as they are regarded as potential providers in old age. The adult education measures might create the required awakening in these areas too.

Economic Development

Economic development may prove to be the best contraceptive. We have to go for quick population control at any cost on sheer economic principles of supply and demand. To balance any economic equation, we can either increase the supply which depends on both financial and material resources, or reduce the demand which depends on the number of people asking for varied services and commodities. For example, on the supply side, in housing alone an annual outlay of Rs. 3,000 crore would be required to build three million houses for the 16 million people added to country's population every year, assuming that we require only Rs. 10,000 to build one small house. But if we tackle the same problem from the demand side and prevent the annual addition of 16 million to the population through an effective population control strategy, the demand for three million houses or Rs. 3,000 crore required per year for constructing the houses will disappear. (Ahluwalia, 1987). Thus, working for the supply is as good as preventing the demand. This is balancing the supply and demand at no cost. And this is the no-cost solution we are looking for. What applies to housing also holds good for education, jobs, transport and health sectors. Tackling each problem from the demand side will have an enormous pay off.

This approach has another important dimension. If we tackle the problem from the supply side, it will increase the demand *per se* in other sectors. For example, if we increase the number of houses, it would increase demand for cement, bricks, wood-material and electrical goods. But if we approach the problem from the demand side and reduce the number of houses needed, the pressure in all sectors will be relieved. With 31 births every minute or about 16 million births every year, the demand for money and materials in sectors like education, transport and welfare, will so increase that in ten years' time the situation will cross the point of no return and incalculable and irretrievable damage will be done to the country and its economy.

Conclusion

The population policy of our government should aim not only at controlling the unregulated human growth of numerical strength (population explosion) but also at checking the unregulated movement of population and the increasing concentration of people in the urbanised areas (population implosion), and providing adequate living space and attractive environment to heterogeneous mixture of people (population dispersion). These goals have to be jointly linked with the formulation and implementation of policies aimed at population regulation and planning for harnessing both natural and human resources. Thus, only population growth *per se* may not be perceived as a problem but its relation with the availability of resources may be viewed with great concern (Misra, 1980: 272-73).

Family planning needs to be salvaged from the morass into which it has drifted. For this, the programme has to look inwards and treat itself as a development input in its own right. In fact, development is the best method of controlling population growth though the reverse is also true that high population growth is a sure recipe for slow, if not negative development. A variety of measures will have to be introduced to put the family planning campaign back on its feet. Compulsion will not work; only persuasion will succeed. Legal measures may help, but what is urgently required is social awareness and involvement to create responsible parenthood.

What is to be stressed most in achieving a commensurate demographic effect is promoting spacing method instead of over-emphasising on sterilization in the family planning programme. About three-fifths (57.1%) of the married women in our country are under the age of 20 years and already mothers of two or more children. We have

to check the phenomenon of "children producing children". This could be achieved only by promoting spacing methods and marrying girls after 21 years of age.

In addition to its important role in checking the population explosion, family planning will help to improve the general status of women. A woman who has a large number of children to support and who goes through repeated deliveries spends more time as a mother and a wife and is confined to the four walls of her home. She cannot play any role in the community and the society, unless she is able to limit her family to a reasonable size. Family planning will improve not only family welfare but will contribute to social prosperity and individual happiness.

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5

Communalism and Communal Violence

The rising trend of communalism and the accompanying violence have created a feeling of insecurity among the religious minorities and ethnic groups. Muslims and Sikhs, in particular, fear discrimination and confrontation in the days to come. This may just be a fear, but the nation cannot afford to let about one-sixth of the country's population to fall victim to panic, suspicion and insecurity. The events of 1990 and 1991 in Kashmir, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Assam and Andhra Pradesh give ample evidence and taste of the destructive outcome of the communal virus in its varied forms. Muslims, Sikhs and other religious minorities in India are protected by the Constitution which provides for the existence of perfect justice, tolerance, equality and freedom. But in an age in which religious fundamentalism is on the verge of becoming religious bigotry, intolerance and narrow mindedness, the notion of 'Ram Rajya' is misinterpreted by Muslims to mean the rule of the god Ram, i.e., Hindu rule. The presence of police near the gurdwaras to keep an eye on and to check the abode of terrorists in the religious shrines is viewed as interference in religious faith. Therefore, to prevent damage to the peace and integrity of the nation, there is a need to analyse and debate on the problem of communalism and communal violence. It has become absolutely important to define 'communalism' today. Also it is equally pertinent to discover who is 'communal'.

If a Hindu declares with pride that he is a Hindu, is this communalism? If a Muslim says, he is proud of being a Muslim and

would give his life to stay a good Muslim, would that be communalism? When a minority community feels (rightly or wrongly) that it has been suppressed by decades of injustice and is being exploited and deprived and reacts and protests sharply, sometimes even violently, can this be called communalism? If the Christians, the Buddhists and the Parsis lead their personal and private lives in the way they like, according to their own beliefs and creeds, are they communal? Do those Hindus, who accuse Muslims of hurting their religious sentiments and sensibilities by a variety of acts of omission and commission, be permitted to feel that they are above public accountability by dint of sheer superiority in numbers when they themselves commit the same sin of hurting Muslims' sentiments and faith in a systematic fashion? Can those people who fight over one particular place of worship and neglect thousands of temples, mosques, churches, gurudwaras and similar holy places, which are crumbling because of lack of repair and maintenance, be called religious leaders? Is a religious leader bigger than the nation? Should the religious leaders be exempted from the definition of communalism? All these factors compel us to precisely define 'communal' and 'communalism.'

Concept of Communalism

Communalism can be considered an ideology which states that society is divided into religious communities whose interests differ and are, at times, even opposed to each other. The antagonism practised by members of one community against the people of other community and religion can be termed 'communalism'. This antagonism goes to the extent of falsely accusing, harming and deliberately insulting a particular community and extends to looting, burning down the homes and shops of the helpless and the weak, dishonouring women, and even killing persons.

'Communal persons' are those persons who practise politics through religion. Among leaders, those religious leaders are 'communal' who run their religious communities like business enterprises and institutions which raise the cries of 'Hinduism, Islam or Christianity in danger,' the moment they find that donations into their holy 'corporations' begin to dwindle, or their leadership has been challenged, or their ideology has been questioned. Thus, 'communal' is not one who is 'a man of religion' but 'one who practices politics by linking it with religion'. These power politicians are not good Hindus

nor good Muslims nor Sikhs nor Christians nor Parsis nor Buddhists. They can be viewed as dangerous political 'scum'. For them God and religion are merely instruments to be used to live luxuriously as the 'king parasites' of society and attain their political goals. (*Day After*, June, 1990 : 35-36).

Communalism can be practised in many ways: for example, as political communalism, religious communalism and economic communalism. Political communalism is the product of abiding or lasting political expediency and developing and conserving in which covering up one's wrongs and, at the same time, diverting the attention of the people by a series of 'lid off' exercises to pass the 'communal buck' and shift the blame of one's rival constitute the familiar game plan. In this political game plan, leaders invariably say what they do not mean and mean what they do not say.

T.K. Ooman (1989) has suggested six dimensions of communalism : assimilationist, welfarist, retreatist, retaliatory, separatist, and secessionist. *Assimilationist* communalism is one in which small religious groups are assimilated/integrated into big religious group. Such communalism claims that Scheduled Tribes are Hindus, or that Jains, Sikhs, and Buddhists are covered by the Hindu Marriage Act. *Welfarist* communalism aims at the welfare of a particular community, say, improving living standard and providing for education and health; for example, Christian associations working for the betterment of Christians, or Parsi associations working for the uplift of the Parsis. Such communal mobilisation aims at working only for the members of one's own community. *Retreatist* communalism is one in which a small religious community keeps itself away from politics, for example, Bahai community, which proscribes its members from participating in political activities. *Retaliatory* communalism attempts to harm, hurt, injure the members of other religious communities. *Separatist* communalism is one in which one religious group wants to maintain its cultural specificity and demands a separate territorial state within the country; for example, the demand of some Mizos and Nagas in north-east India or Bodos in Assam, of Jharkhand tribals in Bihar. Lastly, *secessionist* communalism is one in which a religious community wants a separate political identity, and demands an independent state. A very small militant section of Sikh population demanding Khalistan is engaged in practising this type of communalism. Of these six types of communalism, the last three create problems engendering agitations, communal riots, terrorism, and insurgency.

Communalism in India

The pluralistic society of India is composed not only of religious groups such as Hindus (82.63%), Muslims (11.36%), Christians (2.43%), Sikhs (1.96%), Buddhists (0.71%), Jains (0.48%), and so on, but these groups are further divided into various subgroups. Hindus are divided into sects like Arya Samajis, Shivites, Sanatanis, and Vaishnavas, while Muslims are divided into Shias and Sunnis on the one hand, and Ashrafs (aristocrats), Azlafs (weavers, butchers, carpenters, oilmen), and Arzals on the other. The strained relations between Hindus and Muslims have existed for a long time, whereas some Hindus and Sikhs have started viewing each other with suspicion only for the last eight years or so. Although in one state in South India, we now hear of some conflicts between Hindus and Christians and Muslims and Christians too, but by and large, Christians in India do not feel deprived or exploited by other communities. Among Muslims, Shias and Sunnis do bear prejudicial attitudes towards each other. Here, we will mainly analyse Hindu-Muslim and briefly Hindu-Sikh relations

Hindu-Muslim Communalism

Muslim attacks on India started from Xth Century A.D., but early Muslim conquerers like Mohammad Ghazni and Mohammad Gori were more interested in looting rather than establishing religious dominance. It was when Qutubdin became the first sultan of Delhi that Islam found a footing in India. Later, it were the Moghuls who consolidated their empire and Islam in the process. Some of the policies, proselytisation efforts, destruction of Hindu temples and construction of mosques over these temples by Moghul rulers aroused communal bickerings between Hindu and Muslim communities. When the British established their dominance in India through the East India Company, they initially adopted the policy of patronising Hindus, but after the first war of independence in 1857 in which Hindus and Muslims fought shoulder to shoulder, the Britishers adopted the policy of 'divide and rule' which resulted in fostering communal clashes deliberately for keeping intact their hegemony. The relations between Hindus and Muslims were further strained when during the freedom struggle, power politics came into play. Thus, though antagonism between Hindus and Muslims is an old issue, but Hindu-Muslim communalism in India can be described a legacy of British rule during the freedom struggle. Communalism

operates today in a significantly changed social and political milieu. It is now perceived as a problem that impedes and warps the process of development of our country. It is the single largest threat to the secular ideals that our Constitution emphasises. The sectarian interests keep on fanning the flames of communal hatred.

Let us examine the genesis and historical roots of Hindu-Muslim communalism in order to provide some understanding of this phenomenon in its contemporary context. What were the religious and political ideologies and aspirations of the political parties that participated in the freedom struggle? Given the diversity of Indian society, the nationalist movement had to accommodate the interests of all groups—economic, linguistic, and religious. The nationalist appeal was to address itself to two important factors to unite the diverse groups: first, freedom from the exploitation of colonial rulers and second, democratic rights for all citizens. Did major political parties such as the Congress, the Muslim League, the Communist party and the Hindu Maha Sabha share these sentiments? Perhaps not. What was the policy of the Congress party towards communalism and communal parties? According to historian Bipan Chandra (*Communalism in Modern India*), the Congress from its very inception adopted a policy of 'unity from the top' in which the effort was to win over the middle-class and upper-class Muslims who were accepted as leaders of the Muslim community, leaving it to them to draw the Muslim masses into the movement, instead of making a direct appeal to the anti-imperialist sentiments of both the Hindu and the Muslim masses. This 'unity from the top' approach could not promote Hindu-Muslim cooperation in fighting imperialism. The Khilafat movement launched by the Muslim League against the British interference in Turkey hinged on a religious issue. The Congress only extended its support to this movement. All the serious efforts between 1918 and 1922 at bringing about Hindu-Muslim unity were in the nature of negotiations among the top leaders of the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communities and the Congress. Quite often, the Congress acted as an intermediary among the different communal leaders instead of acting as an active organiser of the forces of secular nationalism (*Frontline*, 2-15 April 1988 : 99-104). There was, thus, an implicit acceptance within the early nationalist leadership that Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs were distinct communities which shared only the political and the economic concerns but not the religious, social and cultural practices. This is how seeds of communalism were sown in the first quarter of the twentieth century. However, the Muslim League and

the Hindu Maha Sabha remained fairly weak organisationally till 1936. In the 1937 elections, the Muslim League won only 22.0% of the total seats reserved for Muslims (482) in the provincial assemblies. It did not fare well even in the Muslim-majority provinces. It was only after 1942 that the Muslim League emerged as a strong political party and claimed the right to speak for all Muslims. M. A. Jinnah described the Congress as a 'Hindu' organisation, a claim that the British supported. Within the Congress itself, some leaders like Madan Mohan Malaviya, K.M. Munshi and Sardar Patel took up pro-Hindu positions. Thus, the Congress could not purge its ranks of communal elements. The slogan of Pakistan was first articulated by the Muslim League in Lahore in 1940. Different sections of the Muslim population had different perceptions of Pakistan. For the Muslim peasant, it meant freedom from the exploitation of the Hindu Zamindar; for the Muslim business class, it meant freedom from a well-established Hindu business network; and for the Muslim intelligentsia, it meant better employment opportunities. Later, when the Congress leaders accepted the partition in 1946, it led in 1947 to the displacement of millions of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs amid bloodshed and carnage. About 2 lakhs persons were estimated to have been killed in the 1947 partition riots and about 6 million Muslims and four and a half million Hindus and Sikhs became refugees. Even after the partition, the Congress failed to come to grips with communalism. It could, therefore, be said that Hindu-Muslim communalism in India had politico-social origins, and religion alone was not the cause of the conflict between Hindus and Muslims. Economic interests and cultural and social mores (such as festivals, social practices and lifestyles) were factors that further divided the two communities.

Today, the Muslims constitute the second largest religious community in India as well as the second largest Muslim minority in the world. Approximately, 120 million Muslims are spread out over all parts of our country, and the ratio of Muslim population over Hindu population exceeds the national average (1 : 7.3) in some states like Jammu and Kashmir, Assam and West Bengal. India's Muslims are as varied in language, culture and socio-economic conditions as the Hindus. There is little in common between the Muslims in Uttar Pradesh and the Muslims in Kerala or in Jammu and Kashmir. Their unifying factor is religion but the fact is that they do not even have a common language. Though over 11.0% of Indians are Muslims, only about 5.0% speak Urdu, and all those who speak Urdu are not Muslims.

A closer look reveals that the 16 cities which are more susceptible to Hindu-Muslim communal riots are Moradabad, Meerut, Aligarh, Agra and Varanasi in Uttar Pradesh; Aurangabad in Maharashtra; Ahmedabad in Gujarat; Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh, Jamshedpur and Patna in Bihar; Silchar and Gauhati in Assam, Calcutta in West Bengal; Bhopal in Madhya Pradesh; Srinagar in Jammu and Kashmir; and Cuttack in Orissa. Of these cities, 11 lie in the northern belt of India, three in the eastern belt, and two in the southern belt. Except in Jammu and Kashmir and Lakshadweep which are predominantly populated by Muslim citizens, the Muslim concentration varies from 20% to 50% in other states. Could it be presumed that the Muslims in the south of India are culturally better assimilated because of their involvement in trade and commerce which calls for goodwill with all the communities? But this is true in the case of five towns in Uttar Pradesh also. We have, therefore, to find another explanation for this phenomenon.

The Hindu-Muslim antagonism can be ascribed to a complex set of factors: These are: (1) Muslim invasions in which the invaders looted the property and constructed mosques over/near Hindu temples. (2) British encouragement of Muslim separatism for their own ends during their imperial rule. (3) The behaviour of some of the Muslims in India after partition who hoisted Pakistani flags when the Pakistani team won the cricket match and observed the national Independence day as a 'black day' after a call given by some Muslim leaders created a feeling among a majority community that these Muslims were not patriotic. The stereotype image of a Muslim which is entrenched in the Indian psyche is that of a bigoted, inward-looking outcaste. A Muslim similarly looks upon a Hindu as a conniving, all-powerful opportunist and he views himself as victimised by him and alienated from the mainstream of society. (4) A new aggressiveness on the part of the Muslim political parties in an effort to find a place in the sun. Reports are rife about some Muslim extremists obtaining 'foreign money', turning into 'foreign agents', indulging in a well-designed plan to soil the secular ideal of the country, and attempting to incite Indian Muslims. (5) A failure on the part of Muslim leaders to unite Muslims and resolve their problems is perhaps due to frustrations because they have been influenced by the wave of Islamic fundamentalism sweeping West Asia and Pakistan. The leaders have only exploited the numerical strength of the Muslims (especially in Kerala and U.P.) to strike barter deals, secure a chunk of Muslim seats in the Parliament and legislatures and to seek power and pelf for themselves and their friends. (6) The

government is also responsible for neglecting the Muslims, large sections of whom feel alienated and hence become willing victims of selfish leaders. The ruling elite merely preaches religious amity and has little understanding of the real problems of the Muslims. The Hindu leadership only deals with those Muslim leaders who toe their line.

The Indian Muslims, not surprisingly, tend to consider their future as a question of 'Us' versus 'They'. When they make their demands known, as any segment of society would do to voice their grievances, it most often than not explodes into an orgy of Hindu-Muslim violence which leads to accusation of foreign incitement. Should the Muslim problem be perceived only as a communal problem? Is it not a fact that the Hindu-Muslim issue is not any different from the anti-Brahmin agitations in Tamil Nadu or the inter-caste conflicts in U.P., Bihar and some other states, or the Bengali-Assamese trouble in Assam, or the Maharashtrian versus non-Maharashtrian conflict in Maharashtra? The problem in reality is one of social and economic change.

The militant Hindus maintain that the Muslims in the country are being pampered. The recent Ramjanam Bhoomi-Babri Masjid issue has further affected the balance of communal harmony. After losing hope in the Congress (I), the Muslims developed faith in the Janata Dal (1990). However, the break-up of the Janata Dal and the emergence of Janata Dal (S) in power (November, 1990) followed by the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi (May, 1991) has created confusion. The Muslims today feel far more concerned about their safety and security.

Hindu-Sikh Communalism

The Sikhs constitute less than 2.0% (1.3 crore) of India's population. Though dispersed widely over the entire country and even outside the country, their largest concentration is in Punjab, where they form the majority of the state's population. Sikhism started as a reform movement against the dogmas of Hindu religion. After the tenth *guru*, the tradition of *gurus* among Sikhs ended and the *Granth Sahib* was accorded utmost reverence. The Sikh shrines (*gurudwaras*) remained under the control of priests, some of whom misused their position and amassed personal wealth. In the early years of the twentieth century, some young Sikhs started a movement against the hegemony of the Sikh *mahants*. These people—called *Akalis*—wanted shrines to be managed by a body of democratically elected representatives. The SGPC (Sikh Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee), thus, came into existence in 1925 after the Sikhs waged a hard struggle to liberate their

gurudwaras from the corrupt *mahants*. Since its inception, the SGPC has been a seat of great power. Its president (Mr. Tohra remained its president for 18 years with a respite of six months in 1986. He relinquished the office of presidentship in November, 1990 but resumed it again in November, 1991) has always played a major role in Sikh affairs. He has even been described as a maker or demolisher of the Chief Minister of Punjab. No *Akali* survives without his support.

Another group (sect) called the *Nirankaris* started a movement against the dogmas, rituals and traditions which crept into Sikhism. Thus, the *Nirankari* movement was a reformist movement (purely religious in character) against the induction of Hindu religious practices in the Sikh system of worship.

It emphasized the elimination of the worship of several deities and revived simplicity, austerity and purity in rituals and ceremonies. The *Nirankaris* remained within the Sikh fold till 1943 after which there was tension. In 1973, the undivided Akali Dal under the leadership of Master Tara Singh demanded 'autonomous status' for Punjab dominated by Sikhs. On 17th October, 1973, the *Akalis* passed a resolution, now popularly called the Anandpur Resolution, in which they made 45 demands. Later, the *Akalis* came to be divided into extremists and moderates. One militant group led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale emerged as a powerful group in the early eighties. Initially, he launched a movement against the *Nirankaris* to purify the Sikh religion but ultimately he started a Sikh separatist movement and began a demand for Khalistan. Though a small section of Sikhs continues to work for this demand, the majority of the *Akalis* are for a state in which the authority of the Centre is to be confined to defence, foreign relations, communications, railways and currency.

The Sikh agitation, which started in the early eighties with the murder of a local editor, hijacking of a Srinagar-bound flight, and the issuing of passports to a fictitious nation called Khalistan, began to intensify. The number of killings and firings increased and the Sikh protests became organised, militant and increasingly violent. However, despite the Sikh agitation, the relations between Hindus and Sikhs have remained cordial. There is goodwill and respect among them for each other's religious beliefs and places of worship.

Ethnic Violence

Besides the Hindu-Muslim conflicts and Hindu-Sikh skirmishes, how do we perceive the relations between different ethnic groups, say

between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, or between the Assamese and the non-Assamese? In Assam, for nearly 150 years the economic development of the state was fuelled by the labour and enterprise imported from outside the state. Over this period spanning a century and a half, Assam has been home to generations of the so-called 'outsiders', who have known no home, no land other than the soil of Assam itself. Some have indeed grown rich, but most have remained desperately poor. The Assamese population (Ahors) have now raised the question of nationality. The All Assam Students' Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AGSP) agitation (which fathered the AGP as a political party) confused 'outsiders' with 'foreigners' (including Bengali refugees from the Bangladesh). Fantastic figures were brandished ranging from five million at one stage, six million at another and then seven million at yet another stage as the number of 'foreigners' (*bahuragai*) illegitimately lurking in the Valley. This issue of ridding Assam of foreigners held the state to ransom for six years—from 1979 till the Assam accord on 15th August, 1985. Hatred was stoked against the Bodos, the Bengalis, the Marwaris and the non-Assam Muslims. This secessionist movement was responsible for thousands of innocent deaths. The massacre of 1,383 women and children and some men in ten villages in and around Nellie in Nowgong district was a part of this ethnic violence. The AGSP which remained in power in between 1985 and 1990 could not contain the ethnic tension.

The ULFA militants launched a movement in the state and it is with little wonder that the President's rule was imposed in the state in November, 1990 instead of holding elections due in January, 1991. The army and the security forces launched an operation to round up the rebels and recover weapons. The President's rule was lifted on 30th June, 1991 when the new Congress (I) government assumed power in the State. But the ULFA militants jolted new government by kidnapping 14 government servants including eight top ONGC officials from different parts of the state on the very first day of government's tenure. The militants are yet to realise that Assam is like all other states in India, and it belongs to all the legitimate citizens of India whatever the language they speak, whatever the religion they follow and whatever the rites and rituals they practice.

How do we explain the caste carnage in Belchi, Pantnagar, Jamshedpur, Naraunpur, Dohia, Parasbigha, Gonda and many other villages in U.P., Bihar and other states? Some of these incidents of

communal violence started because of the tension between the 'upper castes' and the 'backward castes' while others started over land disputes. Also the orgies of killing and rape, the incidents of assault, loot and arson are in many ways fanned by political leaders for their own ends.

The ethnic violence in Sri Lanka still rages. On the question of the future of the Tamil majority in the North-Eastern province, the rebel group LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) keeps on fighting with the Sinhalese government and troops, refusing to heed to the intervention of the IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force) and demanding its withdrawal. The British had taken more than 10 lakh Tamil labourers from different parts of Madras to Sri Lanka promising alluring terms of employment in the tea and coffee gardens in the 19th century. For over hundred years, these Tamils laboured for the prosperity of Sri Lanka but in 1948-49, the Sinhalese government passed stringent citizenship laws which deprived them of their citizenship. Their representation was reduced to eight seats in the 75-member Sri Lankan Parliament. On this issue, discussions continued between the Tamil and the Sinhalese government and an agreement was signed in 1964 by the governments of India and Sri Lanka (known as Srimavo-Shastri Pact) which provided that 5,25,000 Tamils would be sent back to India and Sri Lanka would confer citizenship on three lakh Tamils during a period of 15 years. Still there remained one and a half lakh Tamils without citizenship. After some time, there was a further agreement between the two governments that each of them would absorb 50,000 of the stateless Tamils. But since 1976, the Sri Lankan government had been extending the time limit of 15 years provided in the pact. In 1982, India refused to grant any further extension. The hostility of the Sinhalese towards the Tamils and the escalating ethnic violence worsened the situation. Tamils have been claiming mass killings of the people of their community, burning of their factories, hotels and shops and atrocities committed by Sinhalese soldiers on them. In this perspective, the Indo-Sri Lankan accord was signed by the Indian and the Sri Lankan governments on July 29, 1987 and the IPKF was sent to Sri Lanka to maintain peace in that country. In their efforts to restore peace and help the Sri Lankan government in the running of hospitals, power-houses and schools, more than 1,100 Indian soldiers and officers were killed and 30,000 were injured. Gradually, however, the new Sri Lankan President asked for the withdrawal of IPKF from Sri Lanka and all IPKF soldiers were

ultimately withdrawn in 1990. But the Tamils continue to fight for their rights and the ethnic violence continues to persist.

Communal Violence

The Concept

The problems and characteristics of communal violence are different from those of student agitations, workers' strikes and peasants' movements. At the conceptual level, we have to differentiate between communal violence and agitations and terrorism and insurgency. This difference has been examined at six levels: mass mobilization and degrees of violence, degree of cohesion, target of attack, flareups, leadership and victims, and aftermath experiences (Singh, V.V., 1990).

The *mass mobilisation* in agitations is to register protest and voice grievances and demands in the form of processions, demonstrations and *gheraos*. In communal violence, the involvement of people is mobilised against another community. The movements here are unpredictable, uncheckable and carry an emotional fury and violent expressions which take the form of rioting.

The degree of violence and the methods of executing violence also vary in agitations and communal riots. In terrorism, the support of masses is passive, latent and clandestine. Considering the insurrection impossible, it is a few active armed terrorist groups who use violence systematically. In insurgency, the mass support is mobilised to change a political order as against communal violence in which resentment is expressed against the social order. Insurgency is fought by trained groups whereas people participating in communal riots are untrained. In insurgency, propaganda among masses is against a regime but in communal riots, it is against social discrimination, social neglect and social and religious exploitation.

The degree of cohesion also varies in communal violence, agitations, terrorism and insurgency. The high degree of cohesion in a communal riot situation is built around hostility, tensions and polarisation of population while in agitations it is based on rationalisation of interest. In terrorism and insurgency, the cohesion is between activists and the leader; in masses it exists relatively at a lesser degree.

The target of attack in insurgency and terrorism is the government, in agitations it is the group in power, and in communal violence it is members of the 'enemy' community. Sometimes, violence in both

agitations and communal riots is exercised against public property in the form of loot and arson. Anti-social elements are given a free hand to operate in agitations and communal riots but this is not the case in terrorism and insurgency. The weapons used against targets in insurgency and terrorism are more modern and sophisticated than those used in agitations and communal disturbances.

The *flare-ups* in communal disturbances are restricted to particular structures whereas in insurgency and in terrorism, the flare-ups are indefinite and uncertain. In agitations, flare-ups do not depend on particular structures but are dependent on perceived deprivations and the organisation of people..

The *leadership* in terrorism, insurgency, and agitations is easily identifiable but not always so in communal riots. There is no leadership in communal riots which could control and contain the riot situation. In agitations, terrorism and insurgency on the other hand, actions emanate from leaders' decisions who have effective control over the situation.

Lastly, the *aftermath* of communal violence is intensified animosity, prejudice and mutual suspicions of one community against the other. In agitations, the human loss is comparatively much less though the loss of property is sometimes large. When agitations are settled, the animosity against government agencies also subsides and the revengeful attitude dies down in the due course. In terrorism, the victims are mostly innocent. They remain passive against terrorists and feel more secure in passive behaviour. Victims can never think of revenge because of the terrorists' anonymity and their being armed in an organised way with sophisticated weapons. In insurgencies, the victims are mostly the members of the security forces or government servants who help in counter-insurgency measures.

It could, thus, be said that communal violence is based mainly on hatred, enmity and revenge. This brings us to the question of features of communal violence.

Features of Communal Riots

A probe of the major communal riots in the country in the last four decades has revealed that : (1) Communal riots are more politically motivated than fuelled by religion. Even the Madan Commission which looked into communal disturbances in Maharashtra in May, 1970 had emphasised that "the architects and builders of communal tensions are the communalists and a certain class of politicians—those all-India and

local leaders out to seize every opportunity to strengthen their political positions, enhance their prestige and enrich their public image by giving a communal colour to every incident and thereby projecting themselves in the public eye as the champions of the religion and the rights of their community". (2) Besides political interests, economic interests too play a vigorous part in fermenting communal clashes. (3) Communal riots seem to be more common in North India than in South and East India. (4) The probability of recurrence of communal riots in a town where communal riots have already taken place once or twice is stronger than in a town in which riots have never occurred. (5) Most communal riots take place on the occasion of religious festivals. (6) The use of deadly weapons in the riots is on the increase.

Incidence of Communal Riots

In India, communal frenzy reached its peak in 1946-48 whereas the period between 1950-1963 may be called period of communal peace. Political stability and economic development in the country contributed to the improvement of the communal situation. The incidences of rioting shot up after 1963. Serious riots broke out in 1964 in various parts of East India like Calcutta, Jamshedpur, Rourkela, and Ranchi. Another wave of communal violence swept across the country between 1968 and 1971 when the political leadership at the Centre and in states was weak (The Congress was divided in 1969 and SVD governments were in political power in some states) The total number of communal riots in the country between 1954-55 and 1988-89 have been listed: 1954-55 : 125, 1956-57 : 100, 1958-59 : 60, 1960-61 : 100, 1962-63 : 100, 1964-65 : 675, 1966-67 : 310, 1968-69 : 800, 1970-71 : 775, 1972-73 : 425, 1974-75 : 400, 1976-77 : 315, 1978-79 : 400, 1980-81 : 710, 1981-82 : 830, 1982-83 : 950, 1983-84 : 1090, 1984-85 : 1200, 1985-86 : 1300, 1986-87 : 764, 1987-88 : 711, 1988-89 : 611 (Sarolia, 1987 : 60 and *The Hindustan Times*, 2 April, 1990).

The communal riots in Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat in November-December, 1990 are a pointer to the disastrous turn which the communal situation has taken. In the riots which took place between 8th and 11th December, 1990 in Andhra Pradesh, more than 50 people died in clashes. In Aligarh, in the riots which took place in the same period, more than 100 people were reported to be killed. In Kanpur, at least six persons were killed, 27 were injured and several cases of arson and loot were reported. In Etah, 13 persons were killed.

From the communal point of view, while 61 districts out of 350 districts in India were identified as sensitive districts in 1961, 216 districts were so identified in 1979, 186 in 1986, 254 in 1987 and 186 in 1989. Apart from the loss in terms of lives, the communal riots cause widespread destruction of property and adversely affect economic activities. For instance, property worth Rs. 14 crore was damaged between 1983 and 1986 (*Times of India*, 25 July, 1986). In the 2,086 incidences of communal riots in 3 years between 1986 and 1988, 1,024 persons were killed and 12,352 were injured.

The highest number of communal riots in 1988 was in Maharashtra (96), followed by Uttar Pradesh (85), Bihar (84), West Bengal (74), Madhya Pradesh (43), Rajasthan (19), Assam (8), Jammu and Kashmir (5), Haryana (3), Kerala (2), and Delhi (2). Gujarat in recent years has degenerated into a hunting ground of communalists of all hues. Against 142 riots in 1986, there was 146 riots in 1987 and 69 in 1988.

Causes of Communal Violence

Two approaches may be used to understand the problem of communal violence: (a) viewing the functioning of structures, and (b) reasons for process of its emergence. In the former case, communal violence can be understood by looking at the functioning of social system or the operation of structures in the society, while in the latter case the emphasis is on the planned/unplanned or conscious/unconscious methods which perpetrate communal violence. Communal violence is taken as a 'fact' or as a 'given' incident in the first case and then explanations for it are sought, while in the latter, an attempt is to find correlates for the emergence of communal violence so that it can be studied as a process.

Different scholars have approached the problem of communal violence with different perspectives, attributing different causes and suggesting different measures to counter it. The Marxist school relates communalism to economic deprivation and to the class struggle between the haves and the have-nots to secure a monopoly control of the market forces. Some political scientists view it as a power struggle. Sociologists see it as a phenomenon of social tensions and relative deprivations. The religious experts call it a diadem of violent fundamentalists and conformists.

In this multi-factor approach, ten major factors have been identified in the etiology of communalism (Sarolia, 1987 : 62). These are: social, religious, political, economic, legal, psychological, administrative,

historical, local, and international. The *social* factors include social traditions, caste and class ego, inequality and religion-based social stratification; the *religious* factors include decline in religious norms and secular values, narrow and dogmatic religious values, use of religion for political gains and communal ideology of religious leaders; the *political* factors include religion-based politics, religion-dominated political organisations, canvassing in elections based on religious considerations, political interference, political justification of communal violence and failure of political leadership, the *economic* factors include economic exploitation and discrimination, lop-sided economic development, competitive market, non-expanding economy, displacement and non-absorption of workers and the influence of gulf money, the *legal* factors include absence of common civil code, special provisions and concessions for some communities in the Constitution, the special status of some states, reservation policy and special laws for different communities, the *psychological* factors include social prejudices, stereotypical attitudes, distrust, hostility and apathy against another community, rumour, fear psyche and the misinformation/misinterpretation/misrepresentation by mass media; *administrative* factors include the lack of coordination between the police and other administrative units, ill-equipped and ill-trained police personnel, inept functioning of intelligence agencies, biased policemen, police excesses and inaction and poor PAC; the *historical* factors include alien invasions, damage to religious institutions, proselytisation efforts, divide and rule policy of colonial rulers, partition trauma, past communal riots, old disputes on land, temples and mosques; the *local* factors include religious processions, slogan raising, rumours, land disputes, local anti-social elements and group rivalries; and the *international* factors include training and financial support from other countries, other countries' mechanizations to disunite and weaken India and then support to communal organisations

Against these approaches, we need a holistic approach to understand the problem of communal violence. The emphasis of this approach would be on various factors distinguishing the major from the minor. Like Cyril Burt (1944), we can classify these factors in four sub-groups: most conspicuous, chief cooperating, minor-aggravating, and apparently inoperative. Specifically, these factors are communal politics and politicians' support to religious fanatics, prejudices (which lead to discrimination, avoidance, physical attack and extermination), the growth of communal organizations, and conversions and

proselitisations. Broadly speaking, attention may be focussed on fanatics, anti-social elements and vested economic interests in creating and fanning violence in the rival communities. My own thesis is that "communal violence is instigated by religious fanatics, initiated by anti-social elements, supported by political activists, financed by vested interests and spread by the callousness of the police and the administrators." While these factors directly cause communal violence, the factor which aids in spreading violence is the ecological lay-out of a particular city which enables rioters to escape unapprehended.

The case studies of Baroda and Ahmedabad communal riots in Gujarat in Central India; Meerut, Aligarh and Moradabad riots in Uttar Pradesh; Jamshedpur in West Bengal; and Srinagar in Kashmir in Northern India, Hyderabad and Kerala riots in South India; and Assam riots in East India support my thesis.

From all these cases, we can take one case as an illustration—the case of communal riots in Meerut in May, 1987. In the last 45 years, there have been over a dozen serious outbreaks of communal violence in this city. Meerut has a population of over eight lakhs. The 1987 riots started in Meerut on May 16, spread to the walled city of old Delhi in 24 hours, and over the next few days affected Modinagar, Bulandshahar, Hapur, Ghaziabad, Muradnagar, Muzaffarnagar and Moradabad. The incident was sparked off by the murder of a Hindu boy by four Muslims over a land dispute. When police went to arrest these Muslims, three constables were dragged into the lane and their rifles snatched. The fight, which initially was only a fight between the police and the protectors of the accused persons, soon assumed a communal hue. A shop was set ablaze and the shop-owner was stabbed to death. During the melee, some fanatics used the mosque loud-speakers to call 'the believers of the faith' to come and protect their religion. This brought both Muslims and Hindus into the fray leading to ugly scenes.

In the following ten days, the army, para-military forces and armed police laid siege to the city to stamp out violence. During this period, the fanatics and the anti-social elements looted/destroyed property worth more than Rs. 20 crore, killed 150 people and wounded about 1,000 persons. The callousness of the administrators and bureaucrats was evident from the withdrawal of police contingents who were patrolling the city following riots barely two months earlier. This indifference is telling especially in the light of the fact that the intelligence reports had indicated that members of both communities had begun to stockpile huge quantities of arms. The administration

even went as far as releasing those detained for disturbing peace in the previous riots. There was enough indication of trouble when there was a relay of announcements from places of worship. In this riot, communal and anti-social elements exploited the religious sentiments of the people, while the religious leaders had given fiery and provocative speeches about a month before (the Muslim leaders had addressed three lakh Muslims in Delhi gathered from all over the country while the Hindu leaders had addressed a congregation of one lakh Hindus in Ayodhya) The administration had done nothing about intelligence reports and many politicians worked to add fuel to the existing trade rivalry between Hindus and Muslims in local crafts like scissor-making and the textile business. Even the PAC platoon showed communal bias killing people and burning houses (in a nearby small cluster of villages) in the name of keeping the tension under control.

All this shows how religious fanatics, anti-social elements, politicians and bureaucrats together with the police were responsible for the origin and flare-up of the communal tension and violence in the city. In this holistic approach, a few factors need explanation. One is the illogical feeling of discrimination among the Muslims. Muslims constitute 11.4% (7.5 crore) of the total population at present in the country. Upto 1986, the percentage of Muslims in the IAS was 2.9, in IPS it was 2.8, in banks 2.2 and in the judiciary 6.2. Muslims, thus, felt that they are discriminated and denied opportunities in all these fields. The fact is that the number of Muslims who compete for these jobs is very low. But they have tried to find excuses in accusations of religious discrimination and nepotism. The feeling of discrimination among Muslims is ludicrous and irrational.

The other factor is the flow of money from the Gulf and other countries to India. A sizeable number of Muslims migrate to the Gulf countries to earn a handsome income and become affluent. These Muslims and the local rich Sheikhs send money to India generously for building mosques, opening *madarsas* (schools), and for running charitable Muslim institutions. This money is, thus, believed to help Muslim fundamentalism. Pakistan is one country whose rulers always had a feeling of hostility for India. They have been continuously interested in creating instability in India. It has now been officially established that Pakistan is actively supporting Muslim and Sikh terrorists (of Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab) by providing training and military hardware. These destabilising efforts of Pakistan and other governments have further created ill-feeling and suspicion among the

Hindus against the Muslims. The same thing can be said about Hindu militants and Hindu organisations in India which whip up antagonistic feelings against the Muslims and Muslims organisations. Issues like the Ram Janambhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute in Ayodhya, the Krishna Janam Bhoomi and nearby masjid alteration in Mathura, the dispute between Kashi Viswanath temple and its adjoining mosque in Varanasi, and the controversial masjid in Sambhal claimed to be the temple of Lord Shiva from the days of Prithviraj Chauhan, and Shahbuddin's (M.P.) giving a call for non-attendance of Muslims on Republic day and the observing of January 26, 1987 as a 'black day', have all aggravated the ill-feeling between the two communities.

The press and the media also sometimes contribute to communal tensions in their own way. Many a time the news published in papers are based on hearsay rumours or wrong interpretations. Such news add fuel to the fire and fan communal feelings. This is what happened in Ahmedabad in the 1969 riots when 'Sevak' reported that several Hindu women were stripped and raped by Muslims. Although this report was contradicted the next day, the damage had been done. It aroused the feelings of Hindus and created a communal riot.

One of the issues which has been agitating both the Muslims and the Hindus in recent years is the Muslim Personal Law. With the decision of the Supreme Court in favour of Shah Bano, the Muslims fear that their personal law is being interfered with. The politicians also exploit the situation to keep themselves in power. The Bharatiya Janata Party, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Shiv Sena and the RSS are the organisations which claim to be the champions of Hinduism. Likewise, the Muslim League, the Jamiat-e-Islami, the Jamiat-Ulema-a-Hind, the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Musalmeen, and the Majlis-e-Mushawarat, use Muslims as their vote banks by championing their religious problems. The communal politics in Jammu and Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are examples of such behaviour. Politicians charge the social atmosphere with communal passion by their inflammatory speeches, writings and propaganda. They plant the seeds of distrust in the minds of the Muslims while the Hindus are convinced that they are unjustly coerced into making extraordinary concessions to the Muslims in the economic, social and cultural fields. They also exploit the deep religious traditions of both the communities and highlight the differences in their respective practices and rituals. The leaders also try to use economic arguments to instil fear and suspicion in the minds of people and prepare their followers to start a

riot at the least provocation. It has happened in Bhiwandi, Moradabad, Meerut, Ahmedabad, Aligarh and Hyderabad.

Social factors like the Muslims refusing to use family planning measures also create suspicion and ill-feeling among the Hindus. In 1982, leaflets were distributed in Pune and Sholapur in Maharashtra by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad downgrading the Muslims for not accepting family planning programme and practising polygamy with an aim to allegedly increase their population and install a Muslim government in India. All this demonstrates how a combination of political, economic, social, religious and administrative factors aggravate the situation and lead to communal riots.

Theories of Communal Violence

Communal violence is a collective violence. When large sections of people in the community fail to achieve their collective goals, or feel that they are being discriminated against and deprived of equal opportunities they feel frustrated and disillusioned and this collective frustration (or what Feierabend and Nesvold have called 'systematic frustration') leads to collective violence. However, it is not the whole community which launches a violent protest. In fact, the action planned by discontented people against the ruling group or the power elite (against whose ways they protest) is often non-violent. It is only a small band of protesters who consider non-violence ineffective and violence essential for the success of the struggle, who snatch every precipitating opportunity to use violence to assert the strength of their ideology.

This sub-group indulging in violent behaviour does not represent the whole community or the total group of discontented people. The behaviour of this sub-group, by and large, is not equivocally supported by the rest of the community. My contention, thus, falls close to the old 'ruffian theory' of violent riot behaviour which holds that the majority of the people disown and oppose the violent/delinquent behaviour of the sub-group of describing it as 'irresponsible' behaviour.

The question is, what causes the 'group of individuals' to be violent. Two of the important theoretical propositions on collective violence are: (i) it is a normal response to provocation, and (ii) it is a response that is consistent with norms supporting its use. This calls for the analysis of some of the important existing theories. Excluding the psycho-pathological theories (because they focus on the aggressors' psychological personality characteristics and pathological disorders as the chief determinants of violence, and I consider this important for

explaining individual violence but not collective violence), other theories may be classified into two categories: (a) on the level of the socio-psychological analysis, and (b) on the level of the socio-cultural or sociological analysis. In the first group, theories like Frustration-Aggression Theory, Perversion Theory, Motive Attribution Theory and Self-Attitude Theory may be included, while in the second group theories like System Tension Theory, Anomie Theory, Theory of Subculture of Violence, or Social Learning Theory may be included. My contention is that all these theories fail to explain the phenomenon of collective violence in communal riots. My theoretical approach (called Social Bond Approach) concentrates on the sociological analysis of social-structural conditions.

Social Bond Theory

The conditions which lead to collective communal violence are : stress, status frustration and crisis of various kind. My thesis is that aggressors use violence because they suffer from insecurity and anxiety. The origin of these feelings and anxieties can be traced to social barriers created by the oppressive social systems, the power elite, as well as the individual's background and upbringing which have probably put up hurdles for him and which serve to aggravate his tendency to irrational and unrealistic attitudes to social norms and social institutions. My theory also takes into account three factors in aggressors' behaviour, namely, adjustment (in status), attachment (to community) and commitment (to values), as well as the social environment (in which individuals/aggressors live) and the socialised personalities of the individuals (aggressors) My theoretical model, thus, gives importance to the social system, the personality structure of individual aggressors, and sub-cultural patterns of the society in which individuals use violence. In social system, I include strains and frustrations which are the result of the functioning of social structures in society; in personality structure, I include adjustment, attachment and commitment of the individual aggressors; and in sub-cultural patterns, I include the values which operate as a means of social control

My thesis is that the maladjustment, non-attachment, and non-commitment lead to a feeling of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is the perceived discrepancy between a groups' expectations and their capabilities (conditions of life individuals/groups think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the proper opportunities and legitimate means). Here the important term is

'perceived' (by the aggressors); hence different variations in behaviour, or relative deprivations do not always lead to violent behaviour.

Relative deprivation (of a group) occurs when (i) expectations increase while capabilities remain the same or decline, or (ii) when expectations remain the same while capabilities decline. Since both expectations and capabilities rest on perception, therefore, value orientations of a group have an important bearing on (a) the way the group will perceive deprivation, (b) the target to which it (relative deprivation) will be directed, and (c) the form in which it will be expressed. Since each group/individual is subjected to different forces, each group/individual will respond differently in terms of violence or participation in collective communal violence.

Let us take one case out of several cases of collective communal violence—Aligarh in 1978, Jamshedpur in 1979, Mordabad in 1980, Hyderabad in 1981, Meerut in 1982 and again in 1987, Bhiwandi and Delhi in 1984, Ahmedabad in 1985, Jaipur in 1990 and Varanasi in 1991. We take the Ahmedabad riots of 1985. The violence in Ahmedabad was the result of the feeling of deprivation. The main issue was the reservation issue, where both groups—the anti-reservationists as well as the pro-reservationists—felt deprived and frustrated. Their frustration was exploited by the political parties for their vested interests and the reservation issue came to be linked with caste and religion. Anti-social elements engaged in bootlegging and thriving on political support were used to spread communal distrust. Even a minor provocation was enough to cause flare-ups in the population which was sharply divided along communal lines.

My Social Bond Theory is not essentially an elitist theory of violence where a small group, ideologically superior, takes the initiative to spread violence and decides how to use it 'for the good' of the whole frustrated group on whose behalf it violently vocalises its protest. Further, the small group does not depend upon the widespread collective action of the frustrated masses. In this context, my explanation is opposed to the orthodox Marxist theory because Marx did not envisage this kind of uprising and mass revolution.

Theory of Polarisation and Cluster Effect

Recently, a new conceptual paradigm has been developed based on an empirical study of communal riots in Uttar Pradesh to explain the inter and intra-community violence in India (Singh, V.V., *Communal Riots*,

1990). The paradigm is based on three concepts—polarity, cleavage, and cluster. *Polarity* is “sense of affinity, affiliation, belongingness, concern and identity which people share with a particular issue”. The issue may be religious, ideological, political, or economic in nature. *Polarization* is the “heightened sense of identity and belongingness resulting in emotional, mental or physical mobilisation of individuals or groups to cause cohesion.” *Cleavage* is a phenomenon by which population in a particular place is divided into two different polarities which have conflicting, contrasting or opposite principles or tendencies. *Cluster* refers to the habitation pattern of the people belonging to one polarity sharing commonness in a given area at a particular time. The paradigm has been built up on the basis of the facts in ‘pre-riot’, ‘riot’ and ‘post-riot’ situations and the analysis of group behaviour of individuals belonging to different social groups (polarities) in animosity with each other. Since the communal disturbances involve two antagonistic social groups, it necessitates a careful analysis of animosity (state of mind and psyche), structural conduciveness (physical situation), and prejudices.

The individual in isolation is weak and insecure. The strength lies in assemblies, collectivities and groups. The individual joins them for his gain and security

Various polarities exist in the society at all times. To each individual, these polarities are references in the matter of inter-personal relationships. The polarities are of two types—permanent and temporary. To the former category belong ideology, religion, language, caste, region and sex. These polarities constitute individual’s basic identity which lasts with the individual. To the second category belong occupation, profession, functions based on vested interests. Though normally the polarities are not mutually exclusive but they become exclusive when the society undergoes a cleavage phenomenon due to perceived difference and division of the population as a consequence of polarisation. When the masses in general assign the same closeness to single polarity, it becomes a dominating polarity at that time at that particular place for that particular population. This dominant polarity sets the pattern of inhabitation of the population (cluster-formation), that is, the polarity-based clusters dot the demographic living pattern. Such clusters in old cities and towns are based on religion, caste and sect, but in modern cities these are more class-based. When such clustering takes place due to two different polarities (say of religion/ or religious sects), there is a clash

The social dynamics of living in clusters is that they prove highly conducive to the emergence of a riot-prone situation, as inter-personal relationships deteriorate and build irritants which are often perceived as deliberate insult, deprivation and injury by one to the other. The incidents affect most people in the clusters due to the physical proximity. This prompts people to build contacts among one's own polarity population and also facilitates the building of mass insurrection.

The communal call given at the level of leadership also accelerates the process of polarisation. For example, Shahi Imam Bukhari's inflammatory speech in Meerut city to the Muslim population in 1982 sparked off a great reaction among Hindus to polarise against Muslims to safeguard their interest which ultimately resulted in communal riots in the city. He gave a similar provocative speech in Anantnag, Kashmir on April 8, 1988, inciting Kashmiri Muslims by claiming that they have been enslaved since the Partition. He asserted that the Centre has not created better economic conditions for them, they are being deprived of their rights, and their problems are not looked into.


The nature of polarity dominance depends upon five factors: (1) time and space (that is, period, area, location and situation or geographical limits), (2) social structure (that is, caste, community and social group), (3) education (that is awareness of interest), (4) economic interests, and (5) leadership (that is, emotional speeches, promises and policies of the leaders).

On the basis of the above analysis, V.V. Singh describes the riot-prone (communal) structure as follows :

- (1) Bi-polarity population in identifiable clusters;
- (2) Close proximity,
- (3) Common interest and resultant animosity;
- (4) Potency of polarised population. Potency is based on numerical strength, economic prosperity, state of possession of arms, cohesion, type of leadership, and the strength of activity; and
- (5) Administrative expediency and inefficiency of district police and public administration.

The flare-up (of communal riot) process is explained by him as follows :

Diagram 1 : Process of Flare-up of Communal Riots



Role of the Police

The role of the police in communal violence is to arrest trouble shooters, disperse rioters congregated at one place, protect public property from loot and arson, prevent the spreading of false rumours (which instigate people of different communities in other districts and states), and maintain public order. The police cannot perform the role of enforcing law and order without the active co-operation of politicians, bureaucrats, judiciary and the people at large. It is seen that, by and large, the bureaucrats in our country are ritualists, politicians function on the basis of vested interests, judicial officials are traditionalists, and people have no confidence in the police. The police have, thus, to face many constraints in enacting their expected roles. Controlling riots and preventing communal violence by police have, therefore, to be examined in the background of these constraints.

The prevention of communal violence requires a check on the symptoms of tension-building and tension-management in riot-prone

areas. The police has to identify riot-prone structures in states, districts and cities where communal riots take place frequently and keep a watch on the various polarity-based clusters of population in the city lay-outs. Clusters of polarity-based populations are not alike. A cluster can be predominantly fundamentalist or liberal or radical or a mixed one. Clusters vary in their callings, behavioural patterns and response to leadership. Keeping a watch on individuals in different clusters and their militant tendencies and *modus-operandi* is vital for the police to identify sensitive zones, common meeting places, targets of violence, insecure belts, hide-outs and shelter places at the time of rioting.

Tension-management in riot-prone areas requires working out indices in relation to inter-group conflicts. These indices are: identification of tension-building issues, discovery of group anxieties, treatment of issues and restoration of fractured status, negotiation, mobilisation of functional group and stopping of rumours. Rumour management involves isolation of rumour zone, counter balance, rendering rumour mongers inoperative and sensitivising public administration.

Prescriptive Measures

The canker of communal confrontation is widespread in India. Many cities have been a communal powder keg these last several years. There are a good number of states where communalism has taken deep and seemingly permanent roots and communal politics is in full bloom. About 4,000 people were killed in communal riots during the 1980s. This was almost four times the figure as compared to the 1970s, when there had been relative lull after the Ahmedabad riots of 1969 when 1,500 people were killed. The support for communalists has certainly swelled in the last few decades. Communal organisations, numbering less than a dozen in 1951, have grown to over 500 now (1991) with an active membership running into several millions. The number of districts affected by communal violence has grown. People with established criminal records are supporting leaders with communal philosophies and are using them as a shield to protect themselves from police action and as a crutch of respectability.

If the surging tide of communalism is not reversed, it will swamp the country. The solution is both politico-psychological as well as administrative-economic. Before Independence, it was easy to argue that communal violence was the result of the British policy of divide and rule. Now the reality is more complex. Religion has come to be

politicised and the politics has come to be criminalised. Unless all communities consider themselves a part of one nation, the containing of communal disharmony will remain difficult. A country that prides itself on the secular character of its policies has to be wary of politicians who speak only for their own religious community. It has to expose and alienate the bureaucrats who consider secularism only as a theoretical possibility. The police can no longer afford to allow communal issue to foster in the manner that it has. Stopping communally minded politicians and debarring them from contesting elections, giving deterrent punishment to religious fanatics, adopting corrective measures like keeping the police department free from the politicians' control, strengthening the police intelligence section, restructuring the police force, gearing the police administration to be more sensitive, and reworking the training programme of police officials and enabling them to acquire a secular outlook and making them responsible for their failures could prove to be effective measures to tackle the problem of communal riots. An efficient police organisation, enlightened policemen, well equipped and specially trained police wings are bound to yield positive results.

The government has also to take measures for removing the feeling of discrimination and deprivation which do not actually exist. Symbolic gestures will not suffice. It is necessary to look at the real problems of the Muslims in terms of employment, literacy and getting them a fair share of representation in every field. Efforts are needed for the development of the minority communities and removing their mass illiteracy and unemployment. Secular structures have to be promoted and preserved. Vigorous attacks need to be launched on religious institutions which foster communalism. Suspensions between communities must be rigorously weeded out. A common civil code in the country is the need of the day. There should be no special laws for specific communities and no special status for any state. The reservation policy has to be abandoned. Political manipulation has to be tackled. Politicians interfering with police functioning and disallowing arrests of trouble shooters have to be severely dealt with. Public opinion and mass enlightenment have to be brought about to make secular values functional.

Along with these measures, other measures that should be undertaken by the government to contain communal violence are (1) Posting of secular-minded district and police officials in riot-prone areas. (2) Earmarking of special courts to try communal offences

(3) Providing immediate relief and adequate financial assistance to victims of communal riots for their rehabilitation. (4) Taking severe action against all those who incite communal tensions or take part in violence.

Thus, multi-pronged measures are needed to contain the communal tensions and bring about communal harmony in the country. We have not only to fight religious communalism but have also to contain political communalism which is more degrading and dangerous. A vast majority of Muslims and Sikhs in India have no appetite for communal violence, and this mirrors the sentiments of most Hindus. Even the members of the Muslim and Sikh communities are convinced that the growing tension can be stopped if politicians are somehow prevented from exploiting people for their narrow ends. The Muslim on the street is slowly recognising the exploitative intentions of politicians. Religious sloganeering does not affect him so much now. He no longer harbours a sneaking desire to seek economic redress across the border. He feels considerably more secure here.

If Muslims and other minorities are encouraged to consider themselves as a valuable commodity to be traded at election time, rather than being equal citizens of a free India, they can never be enthused to greater endeavour for the national good. Social scientists and intellectuals have to take serious interest to control the national malaise of communalism and in related issues like religious violence, separatism, secessionism, and terrorism.

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6

Backward Castes, Tribes and Classes

The amelioration of the lot of the underprivileged people in India, particularly of the tribes and those castes and classes which are given an inferior status due to the accident of birth, has to be an important aim of any government committed to democracy.

The Constitution of India prescribes protection and safeguards for the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) with the object of removing their social disabilities and promoting their varied interests. The main safeguards are : abolition of untouchability, protection from social injustice and various forms of exploitation, throwing open religious institutions of public character to all sections, removal of restrictions on access to shops, restaurants, wells, tanks, and roads, giving them the right to move freely and acquire property, giving them right of admission to educational institutions and receiving grants out of state funds, permitting the state to make reservation for them in services, giving them special representation in the Lok Sabha and the State Vidhan Sabhas, setting up separate departments and advisory councils to promote their welfare and safeguard their interests, prohibition of forced labour, and making special provision for the administration and control of the scheduled areas.

The machinery for safeguarding the interests of SCs and STs has been created in the form of setting up a Commission for SCs and STs. This has now been renamed as National Commission for SCs and STs.

It functions as an advisory body on issues and policies related to the development of SCs and STs. It includes experts from the field of Social Anthropology, Social Work, and other social sciences. The important functions of the National Commission are :

- To study the extent and ramifications of untouchability and social discrimination arising therefrom and effectiveness of the present measures.
- To study socio-economic circumstances leading to the commission of offence against persons belonging to SCs and STs.
- To take up studies on different aspects of development of SCs and STs to ensure integration of these groups with the mainstream of the society.

The National Commission consists of a chairman and eleven members. Its term is three years

Welfare Measures Undertaken

The State Governments have separate departments to look after the welfare of SCs and STs and Other Backward Classes. Their administrative set-up, however, varies from state to state. A number of voluntary organisations also promote the welfare of SCs and STs. The important organisations of an all India character include the Harijan Sevak Sangh, Delhi; the Hindu Sweepers Sevak Samaj, New Delhi; and the Bharatiya Adimjati Sevak Sangh, New Delhi.

The welfare of SCs and STs has been given special attention in the Five Year Plans. The size of the investment on the special programmes has been increasing from plan to plan. The expenditure of Rs. 30.04 crore in the First Plan (1951-56) increased to Rs. 79.41 crore in the Second Plan (1956-61), Rs. 100.40 crore in the Third Plan (1961-66), Rs. 172.70 crore in the Fourth Plan (1969-74), Rs. 296.19 crore in the Fifth Plan (1974-78), and Rs. 1,337.21 crore in the Sixth Plan (1980-85). The State Governments have also been spending a sizeable amount on the welfare of SCs and STs

Some of the important centrally sponsored schemes are : (1) Coaching and training for various competitive examinations (IAS, IPS etc.) in order to improve the representation of SCs and STs in various services, (2) Post-matric scholarships for providing financial assistance for higher education, (3) Construction of hostels for providing residential facilities to SC and ST girls studying in schools, colleges

and universities, (4) Financial assistance to reputed social science research institutions for research in development and problems of SCs and STs, (5) Providing text books to SC and ST students of medical/engineering courses, and (6) Scholarships and passage grants for higher education outside India

Besides the above measures to bring about their speedy development, the Constitution has also provided for adequate representation in the legislative organs at different levels as well as reservation in services and educational institutions. The reservation is 15.0% for the SCs and 7.5% for the STs. This limit has been exceeded in several states. For example, in the states of the north-east, the reservation for ST has reached the level of 85.0%. In a state like Karnataka, the reservation is of the order of 68.0%. There are moves in some states of the north-east to increase this percentage to 95.0 and in a state like Karnataka, the reservation may reach the level of 80.0%. Other states are not behind in this regard.

Though the principle of separate electorate was not accepted but the constituencies are earmarked from time to time from which persons belonging only to either SCs or STs can seek election. The number of reserved seats reflects their proportion in the population.

In government services, special quotas are allotted to them. The reservations are not only confined to recruitments but they are also extended to promotions for higher positions. To facilitate their adequate representation, concessions such as relaxation of age limit, relaxation in the standards of suitability, relaxation of the qualification and experience, have also been provided to them.

The Scheduled Tribes

The Tribal Strength

The tribal population of India, according to the 1981 census, was 51.62 million. It is estimated to have increased to 52.03 million in 1991. This is almost equal to the population of the United Kingdom. The tribals form 7.8% of the country's total population. India has the second largest tribal population in the world, only next to Africa. The tribes in India are spread over the length and breadth of the country. They vary in strength from a few hundreds to several lakhs. About two-thirds of the total tribal population of the country are found in the five states of Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar, Gujarat and Maharashtra. There are three states (Rajasthan, West Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh) where tribes

with more than 20 lakhs population are found. There are five states and union territories where tribes constitute 70% to 95% of the total population of the state/territory. These are Mizoram, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura. The following table presents some important facts about tribals in our country:

<i>State/Union Territory</i>	<i>Tribal Population (in lakhs)</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Population in the State</i>
1. Madhya Pradesh	98.14	23.56
2. Orissa	50.75	23.13
3. Bihar	49.33	8.75
4. Gujarat	37.57	14.00
5. Maharashtra	33.41	6.62
6. Rajasthan	31.35	12.13
7. West Bengal	26.03	5.87
8. Andhra Pradesh	22.26	5.12
9. Assam	13.44	9.48
10. Meghalaya	8.14	80.43
11. Nagaland	4.58	89.00
12. Arunachal Pradesh	3.69	78.85
13. Tripura	3.44	69.92
14. Manipur	3.34	31.13
15. Mizoram	3.13	94.28
16. Uttar Pradesh	1.99	0.22

Some of the important features of the tribals are that most of them live in isolated terrains, the main sources of their livelihood are agriculture and gathering of forest products; they do not cultivate for profit; they still depend upon barter system, they spend a greater part of their earnings on social and religious ceremonies; and a large number of them are illiterate and are victimized by unscrupulous forest contractors and money-lenders.

Tribal Exploitation and Unrest

For ages, tribals were considered a primitive segment of Indian society. They lived in forests and hills without having more than a casual contact with the so-called civilized and advanced neighbours. There being no population pressures, there was no attempt to penetrate their areas and impose alien values and beliefs on the tribals. But when the British consolidated their position in the country, their colonial

aspirations and administrative needs necessitated to 'open up' the entire country through an effective communication system. The British introduced the system of land ownership and revenue. Annual tax was trebled which was beyond the paying capacity of tribal cultivators. Under the increasing pressure of population, many outsiders also started settling in tribal regions. With their money power, they offered credit facilities at the doorstep. Initially, it provided relief to tribals but gradually the system became exploitative. Newly established courts of law helped the exploiters. This economic and later social and cultural exploitation aroused the tribal leaders to mobilise the tribals and start agitations. With the increasing feelings of deprivation, mass agitations, struggles and movements also increased. Initially they were against the blood suckers and usurpers of their rights but ultimately turned against the government or the rulers.

Tribal unrest and discontent, thus, may be described as the cumulative result of a number of contributory factors. The main factors were

- Lethargy, indifference, and lack of sympathy from administrators and bureaucrats in dealing with tribal grievances
- Harshness of forest laws and regulations
- Lack of legislation to prevent the passing of tribal lands into the hands of non-tribals
- Lack of credit facilities.
- Inefficiency of government measures to rehabilitate tribal population
- Lack of interest and dynamism among the political elites to solve tribal problems
- Delay in the implementation of recommendations made by high level bodies
- Discrimination in implementation of reformatory measures.

In short, the causes of tribal unrest may be described as economic, social and political.

Tribal Problems

The main problems the tribal face are :

- They possess uneconomic holdings because of which their crop yield is less and hence they remain chronically indebted.
- Only a small percentage of the population participates in occupational activities in the secondary and tertiary sectors

- A good portion of the land in tribal areas has been legally transferred to non-tribals. Tribals demand that this land should be returned to them. In fact, the tribals had earlier enjoyed much freedom to use the forest and hunt their animals. Forests not only provide them materials to build their homes but also give them fuel, herbal medicines for curing diseases, fruits, wild games, etc. Their religion makes them believe that many of their spirits live in trees and forests. Their folk-tales often speak about the relations of human beings and the spirits. Because of such physical and emotional attachment to forest, the tribals have reacted sharply to restrictions imposed by the government on their traditional rights.
- Tribal development programmes have not helped the tribals much in raising their economic status. The British policy had led to ruthless exploitation of the tribals in various ways as it favoured the *zamundars*, landlords, money-lenders, forest contractors, and excise, revenue and police officials.
- Banking facilities in the tribal areas are so inadequate that the tribals have mainly to depend on the money-lenders. The tribals, therefore, demand that Agricultural Indebtedness Relief Acts should be enacted so that they may get back their mortgaged land.
- 90% of the tribals are engaged in cultivation and most of them are landless and practice shifting cultivation. They need to be helped in adopting new methods of cultivation.
- The unemployed and the under-employed need to be helped in finding secondary sources of earning by developing animal husbandry, poultry farming, handloom weaving and the handicrafts sector.
- Most of the tribals live in sparsely populated hills and communication in the tribal areas remains tough. The tribals, therefore, need to be protected from leading an isolated life, away from towns and cities, through the network of new roads.
- The tribals are exploited by Christian missionaries. In several tribal areas, mass conversion to Christianity had taken place during the British period. While the missionaries have been the pioneers in education and opened hospitals in tribal areas, they have also been responsible for alienating the tribals from their culture. Christian missionaries have many a time instigated the tribals to revolt against the Indian government

Relations between the tribals and non-tribals are worsening and non-tribal residents are increasingly depending for protection on the para-military forces. The demand for separate states for tribals has taken the shape of insurgency in Mizoram, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, and Tripura. Neighbouring countries, unfriendly to India, are active in exploiting these anti-Indian sentiments. Infiltration of foreign nationals, gun running, trafficking in narcotic drugs and smuggling are very serious problems in these states surrounded by tribals belts.

In short, the main problems of the tribals are poverty, indebtedness, illiteracy, bondage, exploitation, disease and unemployment.

Tribal Struggles

Numerous uprisings of the tribals have taken place beginning with the one in Bihar in 1772, followed by many revolts in Andhra Pradesh, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Mizoram and Nagaland. The important tribes involved in revolt in the seventeenth century were Mizos (1810), Kols (1795 & 1831), Mundas (1889), Daflas (1875), Khasi and Garo (1829), Kacharis (1839), Santhals (1853), Muria Gonds (1886), Nagas (1844 & 1879), Bhuiyas (1868) and Kondhs (1817).

After Independence, the tribal struggles may be classified into three groups - (1) struggles due to exploitation of outsiders (like those of the Santhals and the Mundas), (2) struggles due to economic deprivation (like those of the Gonds in Madhya Pradesh and the Mahars in Andhra Pradesh), and (3) struggles due to separatist tendencies (like those of the Nagas and Mizos).

The tribal movements may also be classified on the basis of their orientation into four types - (1) Movements seeking political autonomy and formation of a state (Nagas, Mizos, Jharkhand), (2) Agrarian movements, (3) Forest-based movements, and (4) Socio-religious or socio-cultural movements) the Bhagat movement, movement among tribals of South Gujarat or the Raghunath Murmu's movement of the Santhals).

If we take all the tribal movements, including the Naga revolution (which was started in 1948 and continued upto 1972 when the new elected government came into the power and the Naga insurgency was controlled), the Mizo movements (guerilla warfare which ended with the formation of Meghalaya state in April 1970, created out of Assam

and Mizoram in 1972), the Gond Raj movement (of Gonds of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, started in 1941 for a separate state and reaching its peak in 1962-63), the Naxalite movements (of the tribals in Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Assam), the Agrarian movements (of the Gonds and the Bhils in Madhya Pradesh), and the forest-based movements (of the Gonds for getting customary rights in the forests), it could be said that the tribal unrest and the resultant movements were mainly the movements fighting for liberation from (i) oppression and discrimination, (ii) neglect and backwardness, and (iii) a government which was callous to the tribals' plight of poverty, hunger, unemployment and exploitation.

Three instances of tribal exploitation are highlighted to explain the cause of their struggles. At the time of Independence, there existed a government order in Andhra Pradesh according to which all land transactions had to be in favour of the tribals. In 1974, the then Congress government passed an order which permitted non-tribals to own 15 acres (5 wet and 10 dry) of land in the area. After this order, the non-tribals took away a sizeable part of tribal land. Tribals claimed that about 30,000 acres of land had passed into the hands of non-tribals in between 1974 and 1984. During this period, 2,000 cases of land disputes were lodged in courts and 400 tribals convicted. The Telugu Desam government quashed the Congress government order in 1984 because of which the non-tribals took a defensive position. The tribals were organised by the extremists against the non-tribal feudal classes. There were continuous incidents of violence between the Gonds (tribals) and the non-tribals. In one such incident, the tribals took away standing crops of cotton and jowar of the non-tribals. The non-tribals put up a fight. They burned the tribal hutments, criminally assaulted women, wounded and killed the tribals and forced them to do slave labour for them. In another incident, 40 tribals were caught by 250 non-tribals and handed over to police after a night of beating. In yet another instance, 21 non-tribals who were allegedly stealing firewood from the forest were caught by the tribals and taken to their village and kept imprisoned till the police rescued them.

In another case, on March 10, 1984, the Gonds hoisted a flag atop one temple in a place called Keslapur in Adilabad district in Andhra Pradesh. Some described it as religious flag and others described it as a flag of revolt. The police reached the place in four jeeps and two vans. When it left, 40 persons had been injured and 70 arrested. It claimed that "the revolt of the tribals at the behest of the Naxalis had been

suppressed". Was it really a revolt or was it merely an eruption of discontent?

The third case refers to a tribal convention organised on February 25-26, 1984 in Vidarbha region near Nagpur in Maharashtra. The venue was a small village called Kamalpur, with a population of 1,000 persons. The convention was expected to be attended by 20,000 persons. It was to be inaugurated by the President of Nagpur High Court Bar Association and presided by persons like Vijay Tendulkar (novelist), Tapan Bose (film director) and Suhasini (cine artist). Two days before the conference, all routes leading to the venue were sealed, 1,000 persons were arrested, and prohibitory orders banning the assembly of five or more persons were issued. Interestingly, the persons arrested were under charges like carrying objectionable literature, felling trees in forests, and theft of forest wealth (*Onlooker*, 7 April, 1984: 29). The chairman of the Reception Committee was arrested under the charge of theft of forest wealth. He was released by the magistrate but promptly rearrested on a different charge. Among the others arrested included musicians who were to perform at the convention, and representatives of student organisations from Bombay, Hyderabad, and Madras. Thus, what could have passed off as innocuous conference with few fiery speeches was transformed into a major episode giving the venue a battle-camp like appearance.

All this depicts the frustrations of the tribals. When the law does not help them, the government remains callous, and the police fails to protect them and harasses them, they take up arms against the exploiters. These struggles and movements indicate that the tribals adopted two paths of achieving goals: (a) non-violent path of bargaining and negotiating with the government and using a variety of pressure struggles without resorting to violence/revolution, and (b) militant path of revolution or mass struggle based on developing the fighting power of the exploited/oppressed tribal strata. The consequences of both these paths are different. One indicates struggle oriented to reforms, while the other indicates structural transformation of the community. The fact that tribals continue to suffer from problems and also continue to feel discontented and deprived points out that both the paths have not helped them to achieve their goals.

Development Programmes

The British had superimposed their own administrative patterns in tribal areas and deprived the tribals of their traditional methods of

interacting with people. The tribals have no written laws but the sanction of the community has a force which none dares to resist. Every able-bodied person is ready to lay down his life in defence of his village in time of a crisis. The tribal village had been an autonomous unit and, barring areas such as the Mizo and Khasi Hills where the administration of number of villages was sometimes coordinated under a chief assisted by a council of elders, the village remained independent for all intents and purposes. The isolation helped them to retain the shape and strength of their social institutions and social structures.

After Independence, the Constituent Assembly appointed a sub-committee under the chairmanship of A.V. Thakkar, after whose recommendations the development of tribal areas became an integral part of development of the Indian people as a whole.

The bonded labour in tribal areas was made prohibited under the constitution. In practice, however, it continues to exist in some form or other in tribal areas of most of the states. In 1976, when the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act was passed, it was found that 80.0% of the bonded labourers in the country belonged to SCs and STs. To loose the grip of the money lenders and the *mahajans* on the tribals, the government organised Large Area Multi-purpose Societies (LAMPS). However, their performance has been reported to be poor. There have been a large number of instances when the tribals have been cheated into signing bank loans. The cooperative societies failed to extend adequate credit for productive purposes, to purchase agricultural and minor forest produce from the tribals and fair price shops of essential consumer goods.

Tribal development has been based on a two-pronged approach : (a) promotion of development activities to raise the level of living of the scheduled tribes, and (b) protection of their interests through legal and administrative support. The tribal sub-plans evolved for the tribal development projects during the Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-79) and today (in 1991) cover 19 states/union territories, and 372 lakh tribal population. The plans are implemented through 184 Integrated Tribal Development Projects (ITDPs) covering 73 primitive tribes. The financial resources for the sub-plans are drawn from state plans, special central assistance (by the Ministry of Welfare), central ministries' programmes, and institutional finance.

The amount allocated for the tribal sub-plans in the Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-79) was Rs. 1,100 crore, in the Sixth Plan (1980-85) it was Rs. 5,535 crore and in the Seventh Plan (1985-90) it was Rs. 10,500

crore. During the Seventh Plan, the specific objectives set forth under the tribal sub-plan strategy were : (i) raising production in the field of agriculture, small industries, horticulture, and animal husbandry, (ii) elimination of exploitation of tribals in money lending, bondage, forest, liquor vending, etc. (iii) development of education and training programmes, (iv) development of tribal areas, and (v) upgradation of environment of tribal areas.

The 20-point programme too focussed attention on the development of scheduled tribes, including assisting the tribal families economically to enable them to cross the poverty line.

The Tribal Research Institutes also play a useful role not only in the research and training of the tribals but also in the formulation of tribal sub-plans, project reports and their evaluation. These institutions at present are functioning in 12 states including Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal. For marketing the tribal produce, the Tribal Cooperative Marketing Development Federation of India (TRIFED) has been set up. It also works to eliminate exploitation of the tribals and realisation of better prices.

Scheduled Castes

The Strength

The total population of the SCs according to 1981 census was 104.75 million, which is estimated to have increased to 106.23 million in 1990 (*The Hindustan Times*, 12, April, 1990). The SCs comprise 15.7% of the country's total population. The highest number of SCs is found in Uttar Pradesh (22.3% of the total SC population in the country) followed by West Bengal (11.4%), Bihar (9.6%), Tamil Nadu (8.5%), Andhra Pradesh (9.6%), Madhya Pradesh (7.0%), Rajasthan (5.6%), Karnataka (5.3%), Punjab (4.3%), and Maharashtra (4.3%). Thus, about two-third population of the SCs (66.4%) is concentrated in six states.

About 84.0% of the SC people live in rural areas and are working as agricultural labourers, share-croppers, tenants and marginal farmers. Almost all persons engaged in jobs like sweeping, scavenging and tanning are from SCs.

In terms of work/occupations, according to the 1981 census, of the total scheduled caste population of 1,047 lakh, 441.8 lakh (42.2%) fall in the category of workers. Of the total workers, 53.8% are working as leather workers, 12.4% as weavers, 7.9% as fishermen, 6.8% as toddy-

tappers, 5.2% as basket and rope-makers, 4.6% as washermen, 3.7% as scavengers, 1.3% as artisans, 1.3% as fruit/vegetable sellers, 0.9% as shoe-makers, 0.4% as liquor manufacturers, 0.3% as drummers, and 0.1% as carpenters and iron-smiths. Remaining 1.3% are engaged in some other petty occupations. About two-thirds of the bonded labourers are from the Scheduled Castes. Literacy among the Scheduled Caste people is extremely low. It was only 12.4% in 1981 as against the all India average of 41.3% (excluding SCs and STs). Most of them live below the poverty line and are the victims of social and economic exploitation. In theory, untouchability might have been abolished but in practice, Scheduled Caste people continue to be the subject of discrimination.

Development Strategies for the Scheduled Castes

A comprehensive three-pronged strategy was evolved for the development of the Scheduled Castes during the Sixth Five Year Plan (1980-85). This was a combination of three schemes : (i) Special Component Plans (SCPs) of the central ministries and state governments, (ii) Special Central Assistance (SCA) to SCs for the SCs of the states, and (iii) Scheduled Caste Development Corporations (SCDCs) in the states.

The SCPs envisage identification of schemes of development which would benefit SCs, quantification of funds from all divisible programmes, and determination of specific targets as to the number of families to be benefitted from these programmes. The overall objective is to assist SC families to substantially improve their income. The provision of basic services and facilities and of access to opportunities for social and educational development are also to be brought under the purview of the SCPs. During the Sixth Five Year Plan (1980-85), Rs. 4,481 crore were earmarked for the SCPs. Upto 1990, only eight central ministries had formulated the SCPs for the Scheduled Castes.

The Special Central Assistance (SCA) to the SCs for Scheduled Castes is an additive to the state plans and programmes for SCs. It does not follow the systematic pattern for special schemes. The states use this additional assistance from the Centre for income-generating economic development schemes in conjunction with the outlays in their SCPs so as to assist the economic advancement of the maximum possible number of Scheduled Caste families living below the poverty line. For example, it may be illustrated that the percentage of SCP outlay of the State Plan outlay in between 1980-81 and 1988-89 had

varied between 4% to 7% each year, while the SCA during this period had varied from Rs. 100 crore to Rs. 175 crore each year.

The Scheduled Caste Development Corporations (SCDCs) in the states are envisaged to interface between the Scheduled Caste families and financial institutions in respect of bankable schemes of economic development. The corporations provide money, loan assistance to these families, thereby helping to increase the flow of funds from financial institutions to Scheduled Caste families. The corporations have been set up in 18 states and three union territories. Grants are given by the Central Government to the State Governments for investment in the share capital of the corporations in the ratio of 49 : 51. For example, when during 1980-81 and 1989-90, the State Governments' contribution in each year had varied between Rs. 140 million and Rs. 190 million, the amount released by the Centre to the corporations in each year had varied between Rs. 130 million and Rs. 150 million each year.

The corporations provide loans upto Rs. 12,000. Besides arranging financial assistance for traditional occupations like agriculture, animal husbandry and household industry, the corporations also arrange for diversification of occupations such as financing of small shops, industries, auto-rickshaws and many other trades and professions. Some corporations arrange for irrigation facilities too like digging wells and tube-wells. Some of them also impart training to enable the beneficiaries to take up profitable occupations or to improve their existing skills.

Sulabh Sauchalaya Schemes have been launched in several states for converting dry latrines into water-borne latrines in order to liberate scavengers and rehabilitate them in alternative occupations.

Crimes against Scheduled Castes

The reports of the National Commission on Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have been regularly reporting an increase in the number of crimes against the Scheduled Castes. Most of the SC women are the victims of rape by upper caste men. The SC men on the other hand are exploited by upper castes by usurping their lands, giving them low wages, using them as bonded labourer, and so forth. For checking this exploitation, a set of comprehensive guidelines covering preventive measures have been formulated and communicated by the Central Government to the states for necessary action. Some of the measures taken by the states in this connection are :

- Gearing up machinery for apprising the government of disputes of land, wages, concerning the Scheduled Castes.
- Helping the Scheduled Castes in getting possession of lands belonging to them or allotted to them.
- Specially instructing police authorities to intervene in instances of criminal trespass into lands belonging to Scheduled Castes. The police is instructed to treat cases of crimes against Scheduled Castes as special report cases and arrange for quick trial and prosecution.
- Helping agricultural labourers in getting statutory minimum wages.
- Setting up special courts (in some states) for ensuring quick disposal of cases pertaining to Scheduled Castes.
- Instructing officers to spend a part of their time, when on a tour, in residential areas of Scheduled Castes
- Setting up special Scheduled Caste Cells under DIG Police to ensure that crimes against Scheduled Castes are properly registered, promptly investigated and expeditiously prosecuted.
- Setting up state level committees (in the states) under the chairmanship of the Chief Ministers to look after various aspects concerning welfare of Scheduled Castes.

The increase in the number of crimes against the Scheduled Castes recorded by the police is evident from the fact that as against 180 cases registered with the police in 1955, the number of cases registered in 1960 was 509, in 1972 it was 1,515, in 1979 it rose to 13,884 and in 1987 the figure reached at 19,342. The Untouchability Act of 1955 was renamed in 1976 as Protection of Civil Rights Act. The highest number of crimes against Scheduled Castes are reported in Uttar Pradesh, followed by Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala, Rajasthan, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Gujarat. For example, of the total crimes against Scheduled Castes reported in 1987, 29.5% were reported in Uttar Pradesh, 27.8% in Madhya Pradesh 15.5% in Bihar, 6.4% in Kerala and 5.5% in Rajasthan. Further, 10.1% of cases were reported as cases of violence, 7.3% as arson cases, 7.1% as rape cases and 2.8% as murder cases.

As regards the atrocities and murders against the Scheduled Castes, the incidence of Belchi village in Bihar in May 1977 cannot be forgotten. Similar cases were reported in Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh in between 1978 and 1991. Because of these atrocities, the cases of proselytisation of Harijans into Islam and

Christianity are also reported from time to time. Such conversion of religion was reported in Meenakshipuram in Tamil Nadu in February 1981 in which about 1,000 Hanjans were converted into Islam.

Evaluation of Welfare Schemes

It is believed that the under-privileged people have registered little progress in the last four decades. There has been a quality of ritualistic formalism about many welfare and development schemes formulated for these castes, tribes and classes. The financial incentives and educational reservations have bestowed little real benefit to these groups. The quality of education has been described as unrelated to their lifestyle and questioned. No efforts have been made to induct them into the new ethos of learning and to inculcate in them verbal and non-verbal skills that are a pre-condition to academic success (Dube, S.C., September, 1990). The drop-out rate at the school and college/university levels has assumed alarming proportions. At the university/college level, the teachers complain that SC/ST students are seen only when their scholarship cheques are received from the Social Welfare Departments. They mostly remain absent from the class-rooms. Though their percentage of attendance remains very low, yet they appear in examinations only because of the policy of the university administration to withdraw the percentage of compulsory attendance at the last moment. That the quality of their education is poor is evident in their performance at the entrance tests for professional courses. An example shows that in 1989 in Madhya Pradesh, so few SC and ST students qualified at the entrance tests for professional colleges that the minimum eligibility marks for them had successively to be lowered. For engineering studies, the unreserved quota had to have at least 50.0% marks, for Scheduled Castes the prescribed minimum was 35.0% and for Scheduled Tribes 25.0%. Eventually, SC students with 15.0% and ST students with 7.0% marks had to be admitted (*The Hindustan Times*, September 3, 1990).

Other Backward Castes/ Classes

The reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was provided in the Indian Constitution framed after Independence but the reservation for other backward castes/classes was announced by the Janata Dal Government only on August 7, 1990. As many as 27% seats were proposed to be reserved for 3,742 other backward castes/classes.

This was done in accordance with implementing the Mandal Commission's Report. This Commission submitted its report on December 31, 1980. It was discussed by both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha in 1982 and thereafter the matter was remitted to a Committee of Secretaries for examination. The matter was repeatedly taken up in both the Houses of Parliament but no action was taken. The sudden announcement of accepting its recommendation has been described as a political decision of the then Prime Minister Shri V.P. Singh, taken without an indepth study of the various issues arising out of its implementation and also without verifying the correctness and validity of the selection of castes and the indicators.

What were the criteria used by the Mandal Commission for identifying a specific caste/class as 'backward' ? The Commission used three indicators : social, educational, and economic (V. Gauri Shankar : *The Hindustan Times*, October 24, 1990). With regards to social indicators there were four criteria, in the educational indicators there were three criteria, and in the economic indicators there were four criteria. Thus, in all, there were 11 indicators

The four *social* indicators were : (i) Castes/classes which are considered as socially backward by others, (ii) Casts/classes which mainly depend on manual labour for their livelihood, (iii) Castes/classes where at least 25.0% females and 10.0% males above the state average get married at 17 years in rural areas and at least 10.0% females and 5.0% males do so in urban areas, and (iv) Castes/classes where participation of females in work is at least 25.0% above the state average.

The three *educational* indicators were : (i) Castes/classes where the number of children in the age group of 5-15 years who never attended school is at least 25.0% above the state average, (ii) Castes/classes where the rate of student drop-outs in the age group of 5-15 years is at least 25.0% above the state average, and (iii) Castes/classes amongst whom the proportion of non-matriculates is at least 25.0% above the state average.

The four *economic* indicators were : (i) Castes/classes where the average value of family assets is at least 25.0% below the state average, (ii) Castes/classes where the number of families living in *kutcha* houses is at least 25.0% above the state average, (iii) Castes/classes where the source of drinking water is beyond half a kilometre for more than 50.0% of households, and (iv) Castes/classes where the number of households having taken loan is at least 25.0% above the state average

The weightage that was given to each indicator was arbitrary and illogical. The social indicators were given a weightage of three points, the educational indicators two points and the economic indicators were accorded one point. The total value was 22 points. Castes which secured the score of 50.0%, that is, 11 points or above, were listed as 'backward'.

The government's decision to implement the Mandal Commission report on reservations for the backward castes provoked widespread resentment among students. Spontaneous agitations erupted all over the country. Most families endure hardship and sacrifice to educate their children. The prospects of gainful employment already remain bleak because of the vast unemployment in our country. Most students are haunted by the nightmare of unemployment or of underemployment. In such a situation the government's 'electoral' decision to reserve jobs on the basis of caste for an additional 27.0% to the existing quota of reservation of 22.5% for SCs and STs, was bound to create frustrations among the youth.

Earlier, the Minorities Commission headed by M.S. Beg in the report had cautioned against granting of recognition to backward classes as recommended by the Mandal Commission. When the Janata Dal government announced its decision to implement the Mandal Report, no political party openly opposed it. The parties adopted an ambiguous stance, though major political parties gave implicit or overt support to the report with the stipulation that it should be based on economic need rather than on caste. It was only the National Front government which remained adamant that the Mandal Report would not be diluted under any circumstances. As a sop, it offered 5.0% 10.0% reservation in government jobs on an economic basis in addition to the 27.0% proposed by Mandal. However, it is now a well-known fact that the National Front also was riven by internal dissension on the Mandal Report issue.

Challenging the true purpose of the government in accepting the Mandal Report, the students went on a rampage and took to agitations and immolations. Between 19 September 1990 (when the first case of self-immolation of a third year student was reported from a Delhi College) and 16 October 1990, 160 youth had attempted to commit suicide against the government's decision to implement the recommendations of the Mandal Commission. All of them were below the age of 25 and most of them were either students studying in schools and colleges or were unemployed (*Sunday*, November 4-10, 1990: 39)

A large number chose to set themselves on fire in full public view while some took poison or burnt themselves to death quietly. There were 17 self-immolation attempts in these 26 days in Delhi, followed by similar attempts in places like Hoshiarpur in Punjab, Jaunpur and Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh, Kota in Rajasthan, and Patna in Bihar. In almost all the cases, the victims came from the lower-middle class families. The elite and the poor were, however, not hit by the anti-Mandal wave. In all cases, the students left behind melodramatic and vitriolic suicide notes. Some students were killed in police firing at various places; many were injured, while thousands were arrested. The students also damaged thousands of government vehicles, private buses, cars and trains. Though the exact figure on the extent of damage was never given by the government, the total loss was estimated to be worth several crores of rupees. There was a sense of frustration and anger at the system, a feeling that the system had given them the false hope that education would give them better jobs.

Arguments in Favour of Mandal Report

The following arguments are given in favour of the Mandal Commission's recommendations:

- These fulfil the mandatory requirement of the Constitution (Articles 15, 16 and 46) of satisfying those sections of the society who have been simmering with discontent for decades.
- It is our moral and social duty to ensure that the oppressed and the suppressed people are at par with the affluent people in the society. The underprivileged people need to be instilled with a sense of confidence.
- The reservation will be only for the Central Government services and not more than 10% of the total population of the country are in these services. Of that 10%, 27.0% has been reserved for the backward classes. Therefore, the reservation will not adversely affect mass people.
- The recommendations are not based on caste as is wrongly believed by most people. For example, the Rajputs in Bihar are not included in the list but the Rajputs in Gujarat are included; the Patels of Bihar are in the list but Patels of Gujarat are not; and the Yadavas of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are included but Yadavas in Haryana are not. Thus, the basis is the situation in each state of a particular caste.

- Nation's SC, ST and other backward class population with 52.0% strength has altogether a mere 4.0% representation in Class I government and public sector employment. This is purely injustice with weaker sections which needs to be corrected
- One argument given by the anti-reservationists against increasing reservation is based on the question of 'merit'. Here the assumption is that merit resides with the high castes who, therefore, must be allowed according to the colonial fashion, to continue to bear the burden both of running the state and its services and of civilizing the low castes. Is this argument valid and justified? Is this not the argument supported by the British government while giving higher posts to the British and lower posts to the Indians? Was not the Britishers' reluctance to grant self-government to India based on a similar argument? Did we accept that? If we had described that argument as fallacious at that time, how can we accept a similar argument against the lower castes and classes today? Further, if it is argued that employment in this country has all along taken place on the basis of 'merit', have we offered concrete opportunities to the deprived low castes to acquire merit? If our state places every citizen on an equal footing, denying, equal opportunity to the backward groups, it is nothing but continuing dominance of the oppressed. Extending reservations to these oppressed and the underprivileged people, therefore, calls for much soul-searching, something that many of us seem instinctively to resist.

Arguments Against the Mandal Report

The Mandal Report has elicited severe criticism from several quarters on various scores. Five major arguments against it are : (i) the criteria used for defining the other backward castes/classes, (ii) using very old census data for making population projections on the basis of an assumed constant rate of population growth, (iii) bungling of facts and figures related to the identification of the other backward castes/classes, (iv) non-objective sampling procedure and lacunae in the data collected, and (v) the terminological discrepancies specifically with reference to the use of terms like 'caste' and 'class'. We can elaborate these arguments as below :

1. The 'backwardness' has been defined only on caste basis. This is to perpetuate the abominable caste prejudices and discriminations endemic to the (caste) system. Any special provisions should be meant for all the poor irrespective of their caste and based only on economic criterion. Besides using only one criterion of 'caste' to locate the other backward castes/classes underscores the importance of multiple criteria—religion, income, occupation, and residence in a locality—stressed by many scholars.
2. Though great pains were taken to define 'caste', no definition of 'class' was provided and sociologically speaking, caste and class are two distinct categories. Hence, the Mandal Report at best located 'Other Backward Castes' and not 'Other Backward Classes' as required.
3. The criterion used for identifying the other backward castes/classes was erratic, whimsical and politically motivated. It was not based on a rigorous scientific method. The eleven indicators adopted by the Mandal Commission to determine social, educational and economic backwardness of caste/class do not largely satisfy the characteristics of good indicator. For example, the social indicator pertaining to the criterion of early marriage is not wedded to any particular caste or class. It is an age-old social evil prevalent in all castes or classes in general. Hence, it should not have been taken as an indicator to distinguish the castes or classes. Also, the social indicator relating to female participation in work may be considered an economic indicator, as the females have to work to augment their family incomes. Moreover, it is also a general tendency among rural women to assist their family in agricultural operations and this is not related to any particular caste or class.

Similarly, a person was to be treated as 'educationally backward' if neither his father nor his grandfather had studied beyond the primary level. He was to be treated as 'socially backward' if (in the case of Hindu) he did not belong to any of the three twice-born (*Dvij*) 'varnas', that is, he was neither a Brahmin, nor a Kshatriya nor a Vaishya, and/or (in the case of a non-Hindu), he was a convert from those Hindu communities which have been defined as socially backward, or his parental income was below the prevalent poverty-line, that is, Rs. 71 per head per month. Were these elaborate inquiries really made? The evidence does not indicate this.

Most dejecting part is the selection of economic indicators, where per capita family income has been completely left out. Family assets and consumption loans refer to their expenditure, depending upon whether they have big or small families, or they are prone more to following social traditions and incurring loans often.

Lastly, the economic indicator where the source of drinking water is taken into consideration is related to an exogenous factor not at all related to any particular caste or class. Thus, since the identification of the backwardness of castes/classes is not based on correct indicators, efforts to expand reservation cannot have any acceptability.

4. The definition and identification of 'backward' class is unscientific. When the Mandal Commission has identified 3,742 classes as 'backward', the first Backward Classes Kalelkar Committee had identified somewhere around 2,000 and odd. Either, the identification by the Kalelkar Committee was not correct or there had been a scramble afterwards by a large number of other communities to get themselves classified as backward classes in order to get benefits. Or, the other inference could be that a number of communities became 'backward' after the Kalelkar Committee submitted its report. It was, therefore, necessary to consult the State governments to identify the backward classes. For example, when the Kerala Government itself had identified 79 castes as backward, the Mandal Commission recommended 208 as backward. Similarly, Orissa did not specify even one caste as backward but the Mandal Commission identified 224. The Mandal Commission, thus, did not consider necessary to consult the State governments.
5. The population projection of the categorisation of castes was based on the use of the 1931 census data. At that time, the social, economic and demographic map of India was totally different. 'Caste' was identified on the basis of its traditional occupation. After 1931, the listing of castes was discontinued in census operations, and many changes have taken place between 1931 and 1990 by the rapid increase in industrialization, urbanization, educational growth, migration and mobility. As such, the old census basis adopted in 1980 by the Mandal Commission gives a totally distorted picture of the criteria

adopted. Land reforms made since Independence have appreciably altered the social and educational status of various castes and made them a significant part of the rural elite. The Yadavas and the Kurmis in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are the best example. The Gujars, the Koeris, and the Lodhs have also become owner cultivators in some states.

The urban population had increased from 12.0% in 1931 to about 24.0% in 1981. In urban areas, the level of income and occupation influences social status to a greater extent than position in the traditional caste hierarchy. Change from a purely agricultural economy into one in which manufacturing and service industries were becoming increasingly important have also resulted in the decline of some rural occupations. The Commission does not appear to have taken all these changes into account in assuming the population of the other backward castes/classes in 1980 to be 52.0% of that total. In 1990, when the government decided to announce the acceptance of the Mandal Commission's report, urbanization had increased by another 4.0%, and further changes had occurred in the occupational distribution of the population making figures and conditions based on 1931 census even more unrealistic.

In addition to urbanization and occupational changes, there has been substantial growth even of higher education, the number of students in universities and colleges increasing from 1.03 lakh in 1951 to 36.75 lakh in 1978-79 and 52.43 lakh in 1989-90. The increase in the number of SC/ST students shows that the expansion of higher education among these backward sections of population, undoubtedly facilitated by the grant of stipends, had been more remarkable. The total number of SC/ST students receiving higher education in 1987 was about 3.36 lakh in comparison to 4,000 in 1950-51. How could these changes between 1931 and 1990 be ignored?

6. Another false assumption made by Mandal was that the proportion of the other backward castes/classes among the non-Hindus was of the same order as the Hindus. The proportion of non-Hindu other backward castes/classes was taken as 8.40% of the total population or 52.0% of their actual population, but the derived figure of Hindu other backward castes/classes as given by this report is 43.70% and not 52.0%. It is only when 8.40% is added to 43.70% that the rounded total of 52.0% is arrived at.

The figures 8.40% and 52.0% were both taken arbitrarily. This is a fundamental methodological error of the report.

How was the figure 43.70% obtained? This figure was derived by subtracting from the total population of Hindus (83.84%), the population of SC/ST (22.56%) and that of forward Hindu communities (17.58%) Working by this method, the figure obtained is 43.70%. This is a methodological fallacy.

7. The sampling procedure used for the socio-educational field survey was very defective. It involved the selection of two villages and one urban block from each district. The objectivity of the sample chosen with only 1.0% population coverage is highly questionable.
8. In determining the criteria for backwardness, the importance given to economic criteria was very inadequate. Of the 22 points set by the Mandal Commission for the classification of castes/classes as 'backward', only four points were given to economic criteria. This shows that the 'backwardness' of class was decided upon without much regard for the economic position of the group.
9. The Indian Constitution has not defined 'backward class' but it provides for appointment of a commission "to investigate the conditions of backward classes". It does not make it mandatory that the government should ask the commission to identify the backward classes. The Chairman of the Mandal Commission, being himself a member of a backward caste and famous for his biased statements during his political career, had played a biased role in identifying the indicators and assigning scores to them for identifying the backward castes/classes. Since a thorough investigation and survey was not made and proper criterion was not applied, the Mandal Commission's mandate to select the castes/classes cannot be accepted. Even the Commission itself had confessed that its listing of classes as socially and educationally backward was "somewhat arbitrary and had the merit only of a tenable viewpoint and no more".
10. How was the constant rate of population growth assumed and the percentage adopted? How was 27.0% fixed straight away? The government is expected to give consideration to the totality of reservations, including the SCs, STs, handicapped persons, ex-servicemen, displaced persons, and other special categories.

which when added to 27.0% recommended by the Mandal goes beyond 59.0%. The remaining percentage left open is so small that the students and the youth belonging to this section are bound to react and agitate particularly because these reservations act as barricades to a *gainful employment*.

11. The Mandal Commission report was kept lying in the limbo for ten years. When any report is dug out after such a long time, it should be updated and examined in terms of the altered needs and its lacunae, and evaluated in terms of its effects of acceptance. This is done in a given time-frame. The government that announced the acceptance of Mandal Commission's report never bothered to go through this process, with the result that with its lacunae it led to violence and agitations.
12. The Constitution lays down that a class cannot be categorized as backward when it is adequately represented in the services under the State. This task is not an easy one as statistical details are not available on this aspect, except a confused set of figures compiled on the basis of the lists of backward classes in some states.
13. One consequence that will follow the Mandal Commission report's implementation will be that since the Mandal Commission report does not divide the reservation of 27.0% further into quotas for each of the backward castes, the bulk of the 27.0% reservations will be hogged by a few castes that are *more dominant among the backward castes*. Even among these few dominant castes again, it will be a few families which will prosper at the cost of their unfortunate brethren. This has been experience of the reservation policies implemented earlier for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. There is no limit in the Mandal Commission report on the number of members from one family who might benefit from reservation. Nor is there any economic criterion to prevent even the most affluent member of the concerned caste from availing of the reservation quota.

The question whether adequate representation is to be taken with reference to each one of the categorised backward classes is important. If the totality of backward classes is taken and it is found that a few groups have monopolised the posts to go beyond adequate representation (as is the case of Meena tribe in north India or some castes in south states), would there be social justice? If individual groups are taken and caste forms the basis of selection, is it possible to

keep a roster for 3,500 castes which may be constantly fluctuating in the representation in services ? These things should be tackled first before talking of social justice.

Some other arguments given against the Mandal Commission report are :

1. The manner of its implementation was too hasty. The people should have been prepared for its implementation as it was likely to give a feeling of deprivation to some sections. Even within the party, there was no discussion on the report. Other constituents of the National Front Government were also kept in the dark by the Janata Dal. The report was, thus, implemented without any consensus.
2. While reserving the quota for the backward classes, the economic cut off point has not been fixed. A family with an income above a certain level should not have been entitled to reservation.
3. The administrative efficiency has been imperilled in the name of concessions to backward classes. Even the Constitution maintains that the reservation shall be consistent with and not subversive to the maintenance of efficiency of the administration.
4. Reservation should have been valid only for one generation.

Thus, an unscientific study based on assumptions, fallacies, paucity of relevant data, loopholes in information, arbitrariness, subjectivity, anomalies, a high degree of generalisation, and which goes against the expert social scientists' advice needs to be treated with extreme caution. Jolted by the scale and intensity of the agitation, immolation cases of students and the criticism of the political parties, the press and the people against the thoughtless acceptance of the Mandal Report, the government came out with some proposals to defuse the crisis. It was announced (in October, 1990) that reservations will not be applied to education and to vital sectors like science, defence and top jobs. Nor will there be reservations in promotions. The report will also be not applicable to those states (like Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and West Bengal) which had rejected the Mandal Report.

The youth in India have to realise that reservation policy is not a problem to fight for. The real problem is India's ruling elite and their attitudes and obscurantist notions which have corrupted the thinking of our society and brought the country to its present critical condition. Instead of fighting against the Mandal Commission's report, they have

to fight the entire political system. If they want to protect their future, if they want to be the future elite of the nation, they have to raise voice against the present corrupt and self-centred political elites. They have to widen their perspective to encompass the basic problems of our society instead of focussing on one problem of reservation for other backward castes/classes.

The issue of implementing the Mandal Commission's recommendations is now in the Supreme Court. The present Congress (I) government has now proposed (25 September, 1991) that within 27% of the Union Government civilian jobs reserved for the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs) preference will be given to the 'poor sections' of such classes. As many as 10% of these jobs shall be reserved for "other economically backward sections" of the people who are not covered by any of the existing schemes of reservation.

The Reservation Policy

The demand for special concessions and privileges to the under-privileged are matters of right and not of charity or philanthropy. All the commissions and the committees that have examined this issue, like the Miller Committee appointed by the erstwhile Mysore State or the Kalelkar Commission appointed in 1955 by the Government of India, have accepted the need for compensatory discrimination. Some of the courts also in hearing the cases that have come up before them have examined the issue. One Hon'ble Judge pointed out that the reservation policy has generated a spirit of self-denigration, each caste and community competing to be more backward than others. In another case, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Shri Chandrachud) had recommended that the reservation policy should be reviewed every five years so that the state can rectify distortions and the people—both backward and non-backward—can ventilate their views in public debates on the practical impact of the reservation policy. The question to be discussed today, therefore, is : Is reservation policy, or protective discrimination, a logical and the useful strategy for ensuring justice and equal opportunity to the economically exploited and socially oppressed groups ?

The first argument is that reservation in educational institutions and government jobs, by themselves, cannot achieve much. In fact, if extended to larger sections of the population, they can be counter productive too (S.C. Dube : September, 1990) At best, reservations are 'palliatives' and no decisive transformations can take place unless such

a measure is accompanied by structural changes in the nation's production relations, and most crucially, until land reforms become a reality, and educational support systems are so buttressed that candidates from any social groups are available for higher level jobs.

The second argument is that our country is already divided into various groups. Reservation will further divide the population artificially. Earlier, reservations were accepted under special conditions for a period of fifteen years only but continuing them for ever will produce vested interests and separatism, and will lead to a caste-war and the disintegration of the country. Sometimes back, it was ordered that caste will not be mentioned in applications for jobs. But if the reservation policy is to be continued for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward castes/classes, the applicants will have to mention their caste, otherwise how will they be known? This will fragment the Hindu society into pieces.

The third argument is that when the reservation policy was implemented after the Independence, there were only a few SC and ST people in the administrative set-up. Later on, Shri Jagjivan Ram introduced reservations even in promotions when he was the Railway Minister, so that the superiors were passed over by their subordinates belonging to SCs and STs. This not only politicised the civil services but also affected the efficiency of the administration. Just as at the time of partition of the country, the Muslim members of the administrative services were working for Pakistan and the non-Muslims for India, similarly because of the reservation policy, the officers are now working on the basis of caste and creed. If this goes on even for 10-15 years more, there will be total disruption. It is time that the beneficiaries and society should give up reservations. The society should immediately think of bringing about conditions where all jobs and admissions are decided only on merit in an open competition, in which all aspirants are assured of a fair chance.

The fourth argument is that our experience in the last 43 years has shown that the reservation policy has not delivered the desired results. The small percentage of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe representatives in Parliament and Vidhan Sabhas have not been able to adequately articulate the grievances and needs of the people of their constituencies. Reservation in jobs and in educational institutions have benefited only a few tribes (like Meenas) and a few castes (like Barwas). The reservations have also generated conflicts and tensions. The seventies and the eighties and beginning of the nineties witnessed

country-wide waves of violent protests. Budgetary allocations earmarked for the development of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were frittered away in non-essential projects that contributed little to the process of self-generating growth.

There is another school of thought which favours reservations. The supporters of this school maintain that there is a wide gulf between the social order that the people of India were promised by a political party led by Gandhiji and the one that has actually been established since Independence. The oppression of the weaker section of society (including lower and backward castes and tribes) by the stronger (upper castes) section has not ended. In fact, it has been aggravated. A new era of social justice and equality still remains a dream to be achieved. The benefits of development have been appropriated by about 20.0% of the population at the top. The English-speaking educated middle class has come to control and operate levers of state power. It has emerged as the ruling class of the country. By accepting the reservation policy, the government will only be working for the establishment of a new social order that would secure to the underprivileged sectors of our society, justice in social relations and equality of opportunity to rise in social scale.

The two institutions of democracy and planning were expected to serve as instruments for building a new India. But they failed to produce the intended results. For this failure, it is not the institutions themselves which are to be blamed, it is the way they have worked, or the way their working has been distorted by those in power. It was because of the vested interest of the middle-class upper caste which is the ruling elite that our country has a dualistic pattern of growth in which those with access to the holders of power flourish and the population at the lower level (socially and economically) is denied all the tangible gains from the development process. The Janata Dal government which included people who were committed to the welfare of the cultivators in particular and rural people in general and the backward people, attempted to remove the dissatisfaction of these people by accepting not only the Mandal Commission's report but also by announcing programmes which gave new hope to the agricultural community of our country. The new political leaders (329 members of Lok Sabha coming from rural areas and a good number from the backward and underprivileged groups) have, thus demonstratively proved their commitment to the cause of their constituents. One member, belonging to this new political force in power, even described

the measures of the Janata Dal government to face the agitation of anti-reservationists as "second phase of our freedom struggle where sharing of power is going to be a major issue".

There is one school of thought which favours reservations but wants economic need and not caste as the basis of reservation. Almost all political parties, except the Janata Dal, implicitly or overtly have supported this idea of reservation on the economic-need basis. They hold that this will help the deserving poor of all classes and castes to rise in society. The disadvantaged groups do need protection but it cannot be extended *en masse* and for all time to come. The poor should get special weightage but a watchdog body should keep an eye on their progress. As soon as it is found that they no longer need the crutches of reservations, all jobs should be declared open to all.

Whatever may be the theoretical arguments against the reservation policy, in practice reservation policy will continue to be supported by all political parties because of the electoral advantage they derive from this issue. Those political parties and political leaders who are merely fretting and fuming about the acceptance of the Mandal Commission's report by the Janata Dal government are doing so only because they think that they will not derive the electoral benefit to the same extent as their rivals. The vote banks are more important to them than the future of the country. When the ministers are making statements invoking the other backward classes to come out on the streets, will it not be an open invitation to caste war? Can these ministers and ex-ministers be considered as responsible persons capable of ruling the country?

What are the youth and the students to do then? One alternative is that instead of raising the issue of forward versus backward castes, they should raise the issue of vested interests of the political parties and leaders versus the logical interests of the youth in the society. They can propose certain amendments in the reservation policy to ensure that instead of benefit being drawn only by a few tribes, castes and families, it should benefit a large number of deserving people belonging to the backward castes. Second, there should be no compromise on quality and efficiency. Third, they have to take the students/youth of the backward classes with them on this issue and be able to convince them of their stance.

Conclusion

If weaker sections in India are to rise in revolt because they feel that only violence permits their voice to be heard, the nation will have to

pay a very heavy price for this. Our government and our people have to give these docile people the chance of a fair deal to live with honour and self-respect. Similarly, little will be achieved by a debate on the pros and cons of reservations. It will only aggravate the problem and lead to the fragmentation of the country. The power elite, the government, the political parties and the people have to delve deeper into the very reasons why reservation has seemingly become necessary and what needs to be done to eliminate this pernicious practice.

Youth Unrest and Agitations

Along with caste, religious and linguistic stereotypes, there exist many other stereotyped images in our country. One such image is about our youth. The stereotyped image is that youth are militant, rebellious, revolutionary, irrational and immature. It is true that the youth are susceptible to outside influences and imitate others but this does not mean that the youth only believes in destruction, killing, assault, and terrorism. When there is a total disillusionment in the society with the existing social structures and institutions, with the contradictions in the social system, with the politics and the politicians, with the decisions and decision-makers, and when everybody is conscious of the falling standards in all walks of life, social discrimination, prevailing corruption, and the search for monetary gains through illegitimate means, why should the youth alone be expected to conform to traditional moral values and lofty ideals? How can they look up to so-called self-proclaimed leaders for inspiration?


The youth tend to become angry when they notice the widening chasm between what the leaders preach and what they practice; when the leaders call for sacrifice but they themselves live in luxury; when the leaders talk of morality but they themselves maintain liaison with smugglers, criminals and anti-social elements; when they appeal for peace and harmony but they themselves revel in factional squabbles, when they shed crocodile tears for the poor but always live with and support the rich. Disappointed and disillusioned by this, the frustrated youth start some agitation to lodge a social protest. Some politicians start taking an interest in these agitations and in some cases, they use the help of anti-social elements to keep these agitations alive. When

these anti-social elements indulge in loot and arson, it is the youth who come to be blamed for these destructive activities. The frustrated youth, thus, become more frustrated and the unrest among them further increases.

Concept of Youth Unrest

What is unrest? What is social unrest? What is youth unrest? 'Unrest' means 'disturbed condition'. It is 'the state of disillusionment and dissatisfaction'. Social unrest is the manifestation of collective disillusionment, discontentment and frustration of the group, community or society. If there is unrest among the students of one university, it is not perceived as the problem of 'student unrest' as such. It is only when students all over the country feel frustrated on common issues like admissions, content of courses, the examination system and the representations in academic bodies, can we say that there exists the problem of student unrest in our society. Similarly, it is not the unrest among the workers of one industry that is termed as 'industrial unrest' but it is the collective discontentment among all workers in different industries in the country on issues of minimum wages, safety measures, security of employment, and certain intra-mural and extra-mural facilities that is referred to as the problem of 'industrial unrest'. The same is true of the peasant unrest, tribal unrest and women unrest. The emphasis in the concept of social unrest is on "collective frustration and disillusionment on common issues of the groups in the society".

On this basis, youth unrest may be defined as the "manifestation of collective frustration by the youth in the society". It is manifested when the existing norms in the society are perceived by the youth as ineffective or harmful to the extent that they offend them, and they feel so disillusioned that they recognise the need for changing these norms.



Characteristics of Youth Unrest

On the basis of the above definition, it may be said that the youth unrest is characterised by (i) collective discontent, (ii) dysfunctional conditions, (iii) public concern, and (iv) the need for change in the existing norms.

Youth agitation on the other hand is characterised by (i) action based on the feeling of injustice, (ii) growth and spread of a generalised belief among the youth which identifies the source of discontent, frustration and deprivation, (iii) emergence of leadership and mobilisation for action, and (iv) collective reaction to stimuli.

It will not be out of place to explain the concept of student indiscipline at this stage. Indiscipline is disobedience to authority, or disrespect to elders, or deviation from norms, or refusing to accept control, or rejecting goals and/or means. Student indiscipline is the 'use of undesirable methods' by students. A committee appointed by the University Grants Commission (UGC) in 1960 included three types of behaviour in student indiscipline: (i) disrespect for teachers, (ii) misbehaviour with girls, and (iii) destroying property. Further, it included the indiscipline of not one or a few students but of a large group of students. Some scholars described this definition as defective. They maintain that three situations create indiscipline among students (a) Students lose interest in the goals of the (educational) institution. In such a situation, they remain members (of the institution) but do not follow its norms. (b) Students accept the goals but doubt whether the institution can achieve them. They, therefore, try to 'improve' the institution by deviating from its norms (c) Norms of institutions fail to achieve goals and students, therefore, want a change in norms.

Youth unrest may be viewed in three perspectives: (1) unrest among youth, (2) unrest due to the youth, and (3) social unrest in the country and its effect on the youth. We will focus our discussion in this chapter on the first and the third aspects, though in passing we may refer to the second aspect also.

Youth Protests, Agitations and Movements

Social protest is an expression of disapproval to something a person is powerless to prevent or avoid. It is a mode of communicating discontentment rather than direct action. It is an expression of outrage against injustice. The important elements of social protest are. (i) action expresses grievance, (ii) it points out to a conviction of injustice,

(iii) protesters are unable to correct the condition directly by their own effort, (iv) action is meant to provoke ameliorative steps by the target group, and (v) protesters depend upon the combination of coercion, persuasion, sympathy and fear to move the target group.

If the protesters indulge in looting, it is not to acquire property; if they indulge in breaking windows, it is not to seek vengeance; if they shout slogans against a person, it is not to insult him. All these methods are resorted to merely express resentment against their unfulfilled demands and towards the adoption of a callous attitude to their grievances.

Youth Agitations

Social protest may lead to aggression, agitation, and movement. *Aggression* is unprovoked attack. It is behaviour whose goal is the harm/injury of some person (Dollard, 1939) David Myres (1988 : 395) defines aggression as "physical or verbal behaviour that hurts, harms or destroys". This excludes accidental hurts or unintentional hitting; but it certainly includes gossipy 'digs' about a person which hurt him. Feshbach (1970) has given two types of aggression—*hostile* aggression and *instrumental* aggression. The former springs from anger and its goal is to injure. It is resorted to as an end in itself. The latter also aims to hurt but only as a means to some other end. The term 'aggression' is used more in wars, while the term 'agitation' fits more to the youth's collective behaviour.

Agitation is to bring grievance and injustice to the notice of people in power. It is to shake up, to move, to stir up, to cause anxiety, and to disturb the power-holders. *Social movement* is the activity of diffused collectivity oriented towards changing the social order. According to Turner and Killian (1972 : 246), social movement is a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist change in the society or group of which it is a part. It is characterised by (i) collective action which is initiated, organised and sustained, (ii) ideology, and (iii) orientation toward social change. The *pressure group* is one which wants the existing norms to be interpreted to benefit it. In agitation, there is always pressure group tactics but in social movement, it may or may not be there. The difference between agitation and social movement is that social movement may take the form of agitation but every movement does not do so. Many movements are peaceful, for example, the women's liberty movement, the prohibition movement or the anti-nuclear movement. These peaceful movements are the result of cultural drift.

Youth agitation is the behaviour of the youth whose goal is neither injury of a person nor destruction of public property but social protest. It is neither the result of innate destructive drive nor it is an inborn reaction to frustrations. It is learned. The various forms of youth agitations are: demonstrations, slogan shouting, strikes, hunger-strikes, road blocks (*rasta roko*), *gheraos*, and boycott of examinations. The preconditions for youth agitations are: (i) structural strain, (ii) identifying source of strain, (iii) precipitating factor, and (iv) mobilisation of action by a leader. The important functions of youth agitations are: (i) to create collective consciousness and group solidarity, (ii) to organise the youth to work for new programmes and new plans, and (iii) to provide opportunities to the young individuals to express their feelings and make some impact on the course of social change.

Agitations could be violent or non-violent. In 1988, of the 5,838 incidents of students' agitations in India, only 18.0% were violent, in comparison to 15.0% violent agitations in 1987, 43.0% in 1986 and 19.0% in 1985. Further, of the total students' agitations in 1988, 56.0% related to non-academic issues, (within the campuses, like changing the name of the university), 19.0% to academic issues, and 25.0% to some social issues (reducing bus-fare, communal tension). In August and September, 1990, many universities/colleges in Northern India faced the problem of students' agitations on the reservation issue and remained closed for about two months.

Students' agitations may also be classified as (i) student-oriented agitations, and (b) society-oriented agitations. The former include problems at college/university level and at national level while the latter refer to taking interest in state/country's politics and policies and programmes. Student-oriented agitations are generally discontinuous and problem-oriented rather than value-oriented. For example, students will agitate for removing a particular vice-chancellor of a university but they will never fight for a change in the system of selecting vice-chancellors in universities in India. Similarly, they will fight to postpone examinations for a particular year but they will not agitate for restructuring the examination system as such.

Process of Growth of Agitation Due to Youth Unrest

A life-cycle which many youth agitations follow can be explained. The stages include. (1) the *discontent* stage, which is the stage of dissatisfaction and growing confusion with the existing conditions;

(2) the *initiation* stage, in which the leader emerges, the causes of discontent are identified, excitement increases and proposals for action are debated; (3) the *formalisation* stage, in which programmes are developed, alliances are forged, and support is also sought of some crusaders; (4) the *public support* stage, in which youth trouble is transferred into public trouble. This not only creates awareness among public but also seeks public support on the issue concerned. Initially, the action starts in one area but then it spreads in other areas. The youth fail to get the public support where (a) the claim is too vague, (b) the issue is incorrectly focussed, (c) the issue is not powerful to gain attention, (d) ineffective strategies are adopted by the youth for pressing claims, and (e) there is opposition from other groups; and (5) *official action* stage in which the agencies in power realise the importance of the issue, officially acknowledge the discontentment and agree to adopt strategies to solve the issue. Sometimes, the strategy adopted by the group in power is rejected by the youth leaders and the youth start a movement to counter the strategies of the people in power

Important Youth Agitations in India

After Independence, three important youth agitations may be cited in our country which, though functional in their own way, had some tragic consequences. These were the anti-reservation agitation in Gujarat in 1985, the All Assam Students Union agitation in Assam in 1984, and the anti-Mandal agitation in northern India in 1990. This is apart from the role the youth played in the anti-reservation caste riots in Gujarat in 1981, in terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir between 1985 and 1991, and in Jharkhand agitation in Bihar.

Gujarat Agitation

The anti-reservation youth agitation in Gujarat in 1985 had started when following the recommendations of the Rane Commission (which was appointed in April, 1981 and had given its recommendations in October, 1983), the Gujarat Government hastily enhanced the reservation quota in March, 1985, just before the Assembly elections, for the students of the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC). The quota was increased from 10% to 28.0%, the maximum allowed by the Rane Commission. The Rane Commission had laid emphasis on income and occupation rather than caste as a criterion for backwardness, using Rs 10,000 a year as a yardstick. The Gujarat

government had already reserved 14.0% seats for the STs, 7.0% for the SCs, 3.0% for the handicapped, 1.0% for the children of the ex-servicemen and 10.0% for the SEBC. The increase of 18.0% more seats for the SEBC meant a total reservation of 53.0% seats in colleges. Since 70.0% of the State's population (of 3.4 crore) was covered by the reservation (of 53.0% seats), it meant that only 47.0% seats were open to the 30.0% population of the state. Further, out of every 100 seats in colleges, 30 seats were reserved for other states. Adding these 30 seats to the 37 reserved seats for STs, SCs and the SEBC (out of every 100 seats) meant that only 33 seats were available to rest of the students. Naturally, the students reacted and started an anti-reservation agitation. Unfortunately, the peaceful Gujarat *bandh* organised by the students on March 18, 1985, was followed by Hindu-Muslim clashes on March 19, 1985 when the Muslims refused to join the anti-reservationists against the Harijans. When six student leaders were arrested under The National Security Act (NSA), the agitationists intensified their stir. They were joined by government doctors which forced the government to suspend some striking doctors. The suspension of the doctors added fuel to the fire and the agitation flared up.

The students were now joined by their parents who formed a small body in Ahmedabad and decided to work shoulder to shoulder with their wards in their efforts to get the reservation policy scrapped. For calming down the communal riots which had simultaneously started, the police beat up people indiscriminately in some lower middle class residential areas in Ahmedabad. Soon the government started talks with student leaders, opposition leaders, and leaders of the parents' body and accepted all demands put up by the agitationists. It also agreed to review the policy of reservation. With the release of student leaders and the reinstating of the suspended doctors, another round of violence by the agitationists started. The stir gained momentum in other parts of the state too. Several persons had died and many were injured and arrested in the violence. When the agitating students killed one constable (on April 22, 1985), the constabulary revolted and stopped work. In an unexpected move, the constables in the funeral procession of the constable killed, attacked the journalists covering the incident. They also set fire to a building of a Gujarati daily. Many shops, houses, banks, vehicles and public offices were set aflame by the agitationists. The opportunist politicians clamouring for power not only instigated the agitationists but also demanded the resignation of the chief minister. Thus, what had started as an anti-reservation agitation by students soon

took the shape of Hindu-Muslim altercations, Harijan versus upper caste communal clashes and political bickering. The stir continued for two months till the government retreated and promised to review the reservation policy.

Similarly, we may take the case of the anti-reservation agitation by the youth in Madhya Pradesh in 1985. In this state, 23.0% seats were reserved for STs, 14.0% for the SCs, 25.0% for the backward classes, 5.0% for the defence personnel and ex-servicemen, 5.0% for the freedom fighters, 4.0% for the poor candidates and 3.0% for the candidates with a technical degree. Thus, since 77.0% seats were reserved for various groups, only 23.0% seats remained for other persons. When students agitated, the Chief Minister appealed to them to 'appreciate' the government's reservation policy of providing crutches to weaker sections of the society. The government did not take sufficient care to calm down the hostility simmering among the 'efficient' upper caste students. It only agreed to discuss the issue with the students on March 3, 1985, a day after the election. No wonder, the state remained traumatised by violent incidents between different sections of its populace for quite some time.

Assam Youth Agitation

The youth of Assam started agitation in 1983-84 on the issue of refugees from East Bengal and ultimately were joined by a majority of the population in the state. The people of Assam had always felt discriminated and neglected by the Centre. They had a feeling that the three big industries—tea, oil and timber—of the state, had not succeeded in forming an integral, enervating and sustaining part of the Assamese economy. They cited instances of internal colonisation and the syphoning off of local resources to stimulate economic development elsewhere in their arguments. This constituted a source for political distress. Then there were ethnic rivalries too between the Assamese and the non-Assamese, and between the tribals and non-tribals. The intensity of the ethnic strife could have been controlled and the process of homogenisation launched and speeded up, if the Centre had made the resources available for rapid economic development. But, Assam remained neglected. It was claimed that the total revenue generated in Assam amounted to Rs. 7,000 crore out of which only Rs. 500 crore (7.1%) was made available to Assam. So the people always remained economically backward. The decision of the central government to permit refugees from the neighbouring state to enter

Assam precipitated the situation and the youth revolted and, thus, began the AASU movement. The agitation culminated in the student community winning the Assembly elections in 1985 and forming the government. For the first time in the history of the country, the students became political rulers.

However, the state government continued to feel the pinch of being neglected by the central government. The youth felt so agitated that the ULFA came into existence. The ULFA activists not only challenged the state authority but sowed seeds of separation, silenced opposition at gun-point, extorted money and erected a parallel government in the state. Since the state government failed to suppress the insurgency of the ULFA youth, the Centre removed the state government from power and President's rule was established and Operation Bajrang was mounted on November 28, 1990 to suppress the ULFA movement and mop up the secessionists.

When the people in a region suffer economically, socially, culturally and politically because of the sudden pressure of lakhs of refugees from the neighbouring country and because of the policy of neglect of the central government, they have a right to protest against the political in-decisions of the ruling party. But one cannot tolerate blackmail of the whole nation on this issue. We all know that because of the AASU agitation in Assam and because of the strike in oil companies, the nation suffered a loss of crores of rupees. But the question remains—should the right of protest be denied to a region which wants to develop and achieve its goals and ideals?

In a democracy, where crores of rupees are spent on elections, the society has to bear some loss due to social protests. The people of the state cannot be branded as anti-nationalists only because they strongly protest on some issue. The Nagaland movement was not started by the youth but it was actively supported by the youth. One came across many road signs in Nagaland planted by the youth proclaiming national unity. "India is a bouquet; Nagaland one bright flower". However, insurgency and secessionism surely cannot be tolerated.

Anti-Mandal Youth Agitation

The agitation and self-immolation cases of the youth in 1990 could hardly be forgotten in recent years. The Janata government suddenly announced on 7th August, 1990 the acceptance of the Mandal Commission's recommendations of reserving 27.0% government jobs for Other Backward Classes candidates. With this politically-motivated

announcement, the government, in fact, showed a matchstick to the tinder box of accumulated social unrest and people's disenchantment with the existing political system. The agitation started in Delhi and soon spread to various states in Northern India. Some young students immolated themselves as a protest and many attempted self-immolation. Jolted by the scale and intensity of the agitation against the thoughtless acceptance of the Mandal Commission's scheme of caste-based reservation, the government came out with some proposals to *defuse the crisis. It announced that the reservations would be confined* to central government jobs and in public sector units. It would not be applicable to admissions in colleges and universities. States like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and almost all states in South India accepted these reservation policies. The new Janata(S) government which came to power in December, 1990 had initially adopted a cautious approach to this policy. But, unfortunately, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh forced the Janata(S) Party to commit itself to implementing the Mandal Commission report in its three-day national convention held at Ballia in Uttar Pradesh between 30th January to 1st February, 1991. The youth already agitated on this issue were bound to react adversely to such commitments, but their frustration was somewhat suppressed by the new reservation policy of the Congress government announced in September-October, 1991.

Role of Youth in Other Agitations

The militants' agitation for Khalistan in Punjab and for an independent Kashmir in Jammu and Kashmir and the tribals' demand for a Jharkhand state in Bihar have also be explained in terms of the frustration of the youth in the concerned states.

In Punjab, the figures compiled by the Directorate of Employment point out that till December, 1984, as many as 59,360 persons were registered in the Employment Exchanges in Amritsar and 65,619 in Gurdaspur. Adding figures of other cities to the registered cases, one gets the *idea of the prevalent unemployment among the youth*. Large scale unemployment has surely helped in the growth of extremism. Even the political leaders have confessed that the problem of extremism in Punjab has its roots in the economic hardships faced by the youth. It was on this basis that at least two governors of Punjab insisted on focussing on the solution of unemployment problem of the youth in the state along with concentrating on the political solution of the problem.

In Kashmir also, the real power now rests with the young men. Many persons arrested by the police for getting training in Pakistan are young persons in the 18-25 age group. A lot of Kashmiris asking for Independence are angry youngmen, who have sworn vengeance. And there is no method in their madness

The movement of the tribals of Chotanagpur and the Santhal Pargana areas of Bihar, popularly called the Jharkhand movement, for a separate state is half a century old. But this movement has recently entered a new phase with All Jharkhand Students Union (AJSU) organising a successful 72-hour economic blockade in the first week of February, 1991, by disrupting the movement of minerals from South Bihar. The Centre appears to be prepared to concede an autonomous council on the Gorkhaland pattern but the Jharkhandis are insisting on nothing less than a separate state for preserving their cultural heritage and distinct identity. The tribal youth believe that the Hinduisation (because of settlement of outside low caste Hindus in the interior areas) and the spread of Christianity have had a deleterious effect on their centuries old social cohesiveness. They think that the emerging cross-cultural milieu (because of the urbanization and industrialization processes) has only exposed them to assimilation.

The Chhotanagpur tribals have been resisting the inequitous system of dams, factories and exploitation of mineral wealth. The State Reorganisation Commission had dismissed the demand for Jharkhand as impractical and ill-founded but the Adivasi Mahasabha, the precursor of the Jharkhand party, used this slogan of separate state and captured all the tribal majority seats in the area in first elections. Since then, the movement has been gaining momentum, though the lack of proper leadership and a united organisation has been the main drawback of the movement. The AJSU formed a United Jharkhand Party (UJP) on the AASU pattern in Assam. The tribal youth, thus, now seem to be determined to prove their strength in Bihar, though it is doubtful that the agitation would gain in strength in Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal.

Taking all these agitations and frustrations of the youth in different states, it may be said that it appears that most Indian youths have become so frustrated and pessimistic that they believe that it would not be possible to improve the lot of the people in the country even after one or two decades with the current policies and programmes of the government. According to an all-India survey done of a sample of 2,100 youth in 38 towns across the country by the Operation Research

Group (ORG)—a multidisciplinary research organisation—in April, 1988, on youth perceptions, the youth voiced their concern at the dwindling job opportunities (*The Hindustan Times*, 15 May, 1988). More than 62.0% respondents said that the employment situation has worsened. About 52.2% were convinced that India was not set on the right track for progress and development. Another 36.7% felt that there would be no improvement in the lot of Indians even ten years hence. About 26.0% thought that the conditions would, in fact, worsen. The survey also revealed a mixed response to the government's new education policy. Less than 37.0% felt the policy was good or necessary for the country. In contrast, more than 27.0% asserted that the policy would be of little consequence. Thus, when the majority of the youth in the country are pessimistic not only about their own future and security but also about the country's economic future and social advancement, can youth agitations be contained ?

Types of Youth Agitations

Youth agitations are not always violent or coercive. Many a time they use persuasive technique too. We may classify youth agitations into the following groups:

(1) *Persuasive Agitations*: In these agitations, the youth attempt to change the reactions of the power-holders by discussing their problems with them across a table and making them accept their viewpoint. These agitations range from the relatively trivial issues (postponing the examinations, extending the admission date) to significant issues (increasing the number of seats) to the serious issues (giving representation in academic bodies, associating students with decision making processes). Protest demonstrations, shouting of slogans, persuading the power holders to meet the representatives of the students/youth to try and understand their views and demands are some of the methods used in this kind of agitation. The anger and injustice expressed through this method not only serves to arouse and mobilise popular support of passive students/youth but also helps drain off discontent into 'harmless' emotional outlets.

(2) *Resistance Agitations*. The main object of this type of agitation is to keep the power-holders in their place. Many changes intended to be introduced by the authorities appear to be disturbing to students/youth who feel that either their precious years are being wasted or that legitimate opportunities are being denied to them or their careers are going to be adversely affected. For example, the decision of the

university to show reduced marks on revaluation of an answer book (if the candidate's marks are reduced, these reduced marks will be shown in his mark-sheet) has been resisted by the students through agitations which ultimately forced the Academic Council of the university to decide that marks will not be reduced on revaluation. Or say, the university decides to introduce semester scheme or internal assessment scheme or scheme of making 75 0% attendance compulsory. Resistance agitations express the dismay of the students at the direction in which the university is moving.

(3) *Revolutionary Agitations* These agitations aim at bringing sudden sweeping changes in the educational or the social system. For example, forcing the authorities to decide that no student will be declared as failed but will be promoted to higher class and given the opportunity to appear in the failed paper/subject till he clears it. Revolutionary leaders see basic change as possible only after the existing system is overthrown and a new system is sweepingly introduced. Instances of revolutionary agitation can be illustrated by the youth agitation in China in 1987, the AASU agitation in Assam in 1984 and Bodo agitation in Assam in 1989-91. The last agitation is characterised by a growing discontent, increasing disorder, an attempt to overthrow the government of moderates, decision-making by the extremists, a reign of terror and an attempt to smuggle weapons from abroad.

Youth Receptive to Agitations

Five types of youth who take to agitational activities have been identified:

(1) *Socially isolated* youth who feel alienated and cut off from the larger society

(2) *Personally maladjusted* youth who have failed to find a satisfying life role, for example, those who have not developed an adequate interest in studies, are unemployed or under-employed or unsuccessful. They join agitations because of an emotional need to fill the void in their lives.

(3) *Unattached to family* youth who lack intimate ties with their families are encouraged to participate in agitations. Young persons with warm and satisfying family ties have no emotional need to join agitations.

(4) *Marginals* youth who are not fully accepted and integrated with their caste/religious/linguistic group feel uneasy, insecure and resentful.

They find it difficult to resolve the discrepancy in self-image and public image which necessitates them to join agitations to get some recognition.

(5) *Mobile/migrants* migrants have little chance of getting integrated into the larger community. Joining agitations acts as refuge for them.

B.V. Shah (1968 : 57-63) conducted one study of university students some years back in Gujarat. He classified students on the basis of their social status into four groups to point out the type of students who are more indisciplined or in whom we find more unrest:

(1) *High status, high ability* These are the students who are eligible for admission in any course, who have full confidence in self, who can adjust to all situations and who take keen interest in studies. They remain confident of achieving goals because of their abilities, work hard, do not create any problems and remain away from strikes and demonstrations.

(2) *Low status, high ability.* These are the students who have high ability and are mature, who try to differentiate between right and wrong, work hard, aim at good percentages and grades, remain away from activities which harm them since they have to depend on themselves for getting jobs and promotions and do not participate in strikes and demonstrations. However, there are some youth in this group who in spite of their abilities fail to get recognition as they belong to poor class or to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Backward Classes/Castes. These students participate in agitations because of their frustrations.

(3) *High status, low ability.* These are the students who can get admission in the desired course because of their influence. However, they cannot compete with good students of high academic standards because of their low ability and, therefore, develop new non-academic values and behaviour patterns. For example, they find nothing wrong in using unfair means, remaining absent from class, creating noise in the classroom, spending more time in college canteens, using pressure tactics on teachers, attempting to bribe examiners and participating in agitations and instigating others to indulge in such activities.

(4) *Low status, low ability* These are the students some of whom take interest in agitations but some keep themselves aloof from such activities. It depends on their peer group as well as their personal aspirations. Thus, more unrest is found among students of second and third categories.

It may, therefore, be concluded that three things are important in students' unrest and agitations: (i) students' family background, (ii) students' abilities, and (iii) educational system, that is, teachers' abilities, teaching techniques, and the content of courses (whether these courses are job-oriented or not). Lipset gives importance to one more factor, namely, the number of years a student has spent in college/university. The more the years spent, the more he participates in agitations.

Limitations of Youth Agitations

However, rational or irrational a youth agitation may be, it is limited by at least four considerations: (1) the number of persons participating, (2) the feelings of agitators, (3) the leadership, and (4) the external controls

If the number of persons who have joined the agitation is small, it may not last long, but if the number is large and adequate enough to attract the attention of the power-holders, it may get some stability and also arouse enthusiasm and dedication of the members.

Second, the feelings, resentments and prejudices of the agitating members also provide stimulus to agitation. If the members are volatile, they will express their hostility without much restraint, but if they are more passive, they will refrain from expressing their emotions and impulses. Young people in agitations can be vocal without guilt feelings. At the same time, they can also be less responsive and can respond unenthusiastically to a good leader/speaker. If a large number of members of the aggressive group share common feelings, the group is likely to edge forward, but if only a few members share common emotions, the group is likely to progress slowly.

The mores of the agitators equally affect their behaviour. Will the students shout slogans against the teachers? Will they destroy the university property? Will they bodily harm the vice-chancellor? Will they seek the help of anti-social elements? Will they use coercive methods in getting donations from the public? All this will be decided by the mores and the moral values of the agitators.

The function of the leader of the agitating group is not to paralyse the moral judgements of the agitating members but to neutralise and isolate their moral judgements. The youth leader also affects the intensity and the direction of agitation. Given a medley of frustrated, discontented and resentful young people, a skillful leader can convert them and direct their aggression at any 'enemy' whom they already

hate. Likewise, a leader can also divert the agitation by a strategic suggestion or command. Since most youth agitations are unstructured with no designated leaders, the leadership position is "up for grabs". Anyone may be able to become a leader by simply being active in giving suggestions in an authoritative manner.

Lastly, an agitation faces certain limitations because of the external controls. The vice-chancellor may call the police in the campus but only a few policemen may be sent. The agitators in such a situation will not face many constraints. But when the youth agitators in the city are surrounded by large number of policemen or policemen with lathis and guns in their hands, they may have to face defeat. Similarly, cold weather, rains, heat and unsympathetic onlookers near the place of agitation, may prevent the agitators from pursuing their efforts.

Causes of Youth Unrest and Agitations

The UGC Committee of 1960 pointed out the following reasons for student agitations: (1) economic causes, like reducing fees, increasing scholarship, (2) demanding changes in existing norms, pertaining to admissions, examinations, and teaching, (3) poor functioning of colleges/universities with non-purchase of chemicals and instruments for laboratories, or books and journals for libraries, (4) conflicting relations between students and teachers (teachers being accused of frequently cutting classes and remaining non-committed to teaching, (5) inadequate facilities in the campus, like inadequate hostels, poor food in hostels, lack of canteens and poor drinking water facilities, and (6) leaders being instigated by politicians.


Joseph Dibona studied agitations in one university in Uttar Pradesh and gave three causes of student agitations: (1) *Economic* causes, which included a sense of insecurity for the future and gap between economic needs of the country and the educational system, that is, education being viewed as non-job-oriented, (2) *Socio-psychological* causes, which included defective educational system, gap between aspiration and achievement (getting 80.0% marks yet failing to get admission in college of one's interest), social distance between teacher and students, non-committed teachers, policy of status-quo, corruption and inefficiency, and large number of students in the class or inadequate number of sections in the department/college, and (3) *Political* causes, which included, political interference, and instigation by political leaders. All these factors indicate that the main cause of student unrest and agitations in particular and youth agitations in general lies in social system rather than the personality of the youth.

Theories on the Causes of Youth Agitations

Two kinds of theories may be suggested to explain youth agitations: psychological and sociological. The former emphasises on the personality of the individual and the latter on the society. The two important psychological theories are: (a) Discontent theory, and (b) Personal maladjustment theory, while the two important sociological theories are: (a) Relative deprivation theory, and (b) Resource mobilisation theory.

The *Discontent Theory* holds that agitations are rooted in discontent. Youth who have either no high aspirations or are contented and comfortable with what they have or what they are likely to have will have no interest in agitations. But, those angry youth who feel victimised by outrageous injustice, or those who feel even mildly annoyed with existing structures and opportunities will collectively act to pressurise the power-holders to bring some change (Fig 1)

Figure 1 : Discontent Approach in Youth Agitations



It is probably true that without discontent amongst the youth, there will be no youth agitations. But discontent is an inadequate explanation. There is no convincing evidence of any close association between the level of grievance and discontent amongst the youth and its level of agitational activity. Young people may endure great discontent and refrain from agitating. Since Independence, youth in India have endured corruption, inequality, exploitation, political manipulations,

police brutality, bureaucratic callousness, religious fanaticism without serious social protest. In fact, all modern societies always have enough discontent to fuel many agitations and movements (Turner & Killian, 1972 : 271). Discontent may be a *necessary* condition but not a *sufficient* condition for youth agitations.

Personal Maladjustment Theory sees agitations as a refuge from personal failure. Agitators find their supporters among the unhappy, frustrated young persons whose lives lack meaning and fulfilment. Hoffer (1951) has also said that the kinds of people who are drawn to agitations and social movements are the bored, the misfits, the creative who cannot create, the guilty, the downwardly mobile, and those who are seriously dissatisfied with their lives. They add meaning and purpose to their empty lives through agitational activity. Horton (1984 : 500) has also said that it is plausible that young people who feel unfulfilled and maladjusted should be more attracted to agitational activities than those who are complacent and feel adjusted. Those who find their personal lives absorbing and fulfilling are less in need of something to give them feelings of personal worth and accomplishment, for they already have these. The agitation-supporters are mainly the frustrated misfits of society.

Even though, the misfit theory is plausible, it is not well substantiated. It is difficult to measure a person's sense of non-fulfilment. All student agitations in universities and colleges cannot be explained only in terms of personal failures of student leaders and activists. Youth agitations in different parts of the country on the occasion of implementing Mandal Commission's report in August, 1990 cannot be described in terms of young persons' personal maladjustment.

Relative Deprivation Theory was propounded by Stouffer in 1949. It can be properly explained by distinguishing between discontent, deprivation and relative deprivation. A group feels 'deprived' if it lacks a goal/object it regards as attractive or desirable, but it feels 'discontented' when it had been anticipating the pleasure to be achieved from this object and then cannot fulfil this expectation. Relative deprivation is the perception that one (as a group) is less well-off than others to whom it (the group) compared itself (David Myres, 1988 : 402 and 408). It, thus, talks of the gap between expectations and realizations. The group which wants little and has little feels less deprived than the one which has much but expects still more.

Relative deprivation is increasing throughout most of the underdeveloped world. Youth in India also feel that lack of opportunities, unemployment, reservations on caste basis, limitations on higher education, particularly technical and professional education, are not necessary and are avoidable. They long for better jobs, economic security, promotional opportunities, social mobility and all those things that many others enjoy. They hunger for these treasures but have little real understanding of what it takes to produce them. Even where the youth are beginning to get some of the things they covet, these satisfactions come with an unbearable slowness. A weakening of traditional controls accompanies this enormous inflation of desires. The existing social structures and the power elite have little hope of keeping up with the youth's expectations. Thus, when young people become most miserable, agitations seem most likely to occur. Davies (1962) and Geschwender (1968) have also maintained that the outbreak of agitations most often happens after a downturn has interrupted a period of improvement, creating an intolerable gap between rising expectations and falling realizations.

Relative Deprivation Theory is plausible but not proved. Feelings of deprivation in youth are easy to infer but difficult to measure and still more difficult to plot over a period of time. It may, therefore, be said that relative deprivation of youth, even when unmistakably severe, is only one of many factors in youth agitations.

Resource Mobilisation Theory stresses techniques rather than causes of (youth) agitations. It attributes importance to the effective use of resources in promoting agitations, since a successful agitation demands effective organisation and sage tactic. Resource mobilization theorists see (youth) leadership, organisation and tactics as major determinants of the success or failure of (youth) agitations (Oberschell, 1973 ; Wilson, 1973 ; Galson, 1975 ; McCarthy, 1979 ; Walsh, 1981). These scholars concede that without grievances and discontent, there would be few agitations but add that mobilisation is needed to direct this discontent into an effective agitation.

The resources to be mobilised include: support of the masses, rules/laws that can provide leverage, organizations and officials that can be helpful, and target groups whom these benefits might attract. These are weighed against costs of agitational activity, opposition to be anticipated, other difficulties to be overcome, and tactics of operation to be developed.

As an example, the AASU agitation in Assam in 1984-85 occurred when the movement for giving more rights to states by the centre was gaining momentum and when people in different parts of the country challenged the wisdom of the central political leaders giving refuge to Muslims from Bangladesh. Similarly, the anti-reservation agitation by students in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh in August, 1990 started because of reserving 27.0% seats in central government jobs for Backward Castes and Classes occurred when a large number of people and various political parties criticised the government for this action and the youth got a sympathetic backing from the masses. The discontent was spread wide and the mobilization of resources was enough.

The Resource Mobilisation Theory does not explain all kinds of youth agitations. If we classify agitations as persuasive, revolutionary and resistance agitations, the resource mobilization theory does not fit into resistance agitations. These agitations succeed without organisation and tactics. Further, evidence for resource mobilization theory is largely descriptive and is challenged by scholars like Goldstone (1980).

It may be concluded that it is likely that discontent, personal maladjustment, relative deprivation, and resource mobilization are all involved in youth agitations but in undetermined proportions. Each theory is, thus, plausible but each lacks clear proof and evidence. So many variables are involved in youth agitations that possibly no one theory will ever be conclusively established.

Youth Leadership

The leadership profoundly affects the intensity and direction of youth agitations and movements. The important functions of a youth leader are: (1) establishing a responsive, trusting, attentive relationship with the members of his group. He senses their feelings and speaks their language, (2) building an emotional rapport with the members by an impassioned reminder of their problems and grievances. He stimulates them to direct activity from one objective to another, and (3) suggesting action to achieve goal(s). It could take the form of demonstrations, road blocks, *gheraos*, strikes or even boycott of classes. These functions could be successfully performed only by leaders who have certain qualities and background. Chanchal Sarkar's (1960) study of the office-holders and the king-makers of student unions in different universities has revealed that union leaders are mainly those: (1) who have money,

(2) who do not have high academic aspirations, (3) who have some political backing, (4) who are good orators, and (5) who are manipulators.

Robert Shaw's study of Osmania University student leaders in the early 1960s pointed out (Albatch, 1968 : 90-95) that: (1) their average family income is higher than the average income of Indian family; (2) two-thirds belong to upper-middle class and one-third to the upper class, (3) a very large number belong to upper castes and families of high social status, (4) one-third (34.0%) had spent less than three years in the university, one-third (33.0%) three to six years, one-tenth (11.0%) six to nine years, and one-fifth (22.0%) more than nine years; (5) three-fifth (57.0%) were below average in studies, one-fourth (23.0%) average and only one-fifth (20.0%) brilliant; (6) two-thirds had no political aspirations but one-third had some aspirations to enter politics and contest assembly elections, (7) a little less than three-fifths (56.0%) believed in ideology of some political party, one-tenth (11.0%) had an independent ideology and one-third (33.0%) did not believe in any political ideology, and (8) in one-fifth cases (20.0%), their family members or kin were active in politics but in four-fifth cases (80.0%), no member of their family had any political leanings. It may, thus, be held that student or youth leaders are generally those who are economically not handicapped, academically are average, politically are ambitious, and socially are not warped.

Youth Agitations and Police

The role of the police in youth agitations starts when the youth indulge in violence, destroy public property, *gherao* administrative officer(s), declare *bandh* and force shopkeepers to close market, sit on hunger strike, or block the road and stop movement of the traffic

The traditional methods which are usually adopted by the police in such situations are: arresting the trouble-shooters, ordering onlookers to move on, using tear-gas and lathi-charge, bringing enough police and creating fear, isolating riot-area by throwing a police cordon around it, and diminishing the crowd by directing persons to go, thus, depriving the core (of agitated group) of its mass support. Generally the police succeeds in containing youth agitation by these methods. If it fails, it is only because of its own indecision and hesitation, or because it covertly sympathises with rioters, or because it is not able to arrest the real trouble-makers because of the political or bureaucratic interference.

What the police needs is: (i) to secure a preliminary tuning with agitators. On their arrival at the agitation-spot, they need not immediately threaten the agitators or start beating them. On the contrary, it should give a feeling that it is there only to maintain law and order and not to vindicate; (ii) to establish a rapport with the agitationists either by talking to the leader or the activist members; (iii) to break 'one-to-all' relationship, that is, relationship between the leader and the followers; and (iv) neither to use logic nor appeal to the intellect of the agitators but to appeal to their emotions.

All this can be made possible by either (a) manipulating the situation, or (b) manipulating the individuals (agitators). The manipulation could be positive or negative as shown in the following figure.

Figure 2: Handling agitational situation (manipulation) by police

<i>Type of Manipulation</i>	<i>Manipulation of situation</i>	<i>Manipulation of individuals' (agitators') intentions</i>
Positive	Inducement	Persuasion
Negative	Coercion	Activation of commitment

The police can adopt measures like this only if it believes in (a) neutrality, (b) loyalty, (c) moral duty, and (d) accountability. The decision of the decision-maker (police) in a decision-making situation depends upon: (i) degree of involvement of self in solving the problem, and (ii) perception of uncertainty to handle the situation (agitation) by following precedents (used earlier by other officers) or by using new approaches. Low degree of involvement of self (L.I.S.) and high perception of uncertainty (H.P.U.) lead to poor decision (P.D.) on the part of the decision-maker (police), while high involvement of self (H.I.S.) and low perception of uncertainty (L.P.U.) lead to correct or adequate decision (A.D.).

$$P.D = L.I.S. + H.P.U$$

$$A.D = H.I.S. + L.P.U$$

That police officer will have a low involvement of self in solving problem or containing an agitation who takes decisions not on the basis of his moral convictions or values but by external pressures, who depends on others for evaluating his decision, who feels satisfied with his own decision only if others feel satisfied, who considers agitation as a routine task and not as a challenge, who has low personal stake in

containing the agitation or solving the problem, and who avoids certain decisions for fear of their consequences.

The perception of uncertainty by the decision-maker (police officer) in the decision making situation may also be because of his lack of past experience, that is, he may not have met with such a situation earlier, or he may have been unable to get the right amount of information, that is, there may be too little information about the decision-making situation, or the situation itself may be poorly defined in terms of objectives, time and direction, or the police officer may lack the ability to evaluate situation as well as the decision-choices

Our ruling political elite, unfortunately, have never given proper attention to revamping the police system. What is needed more today is more professionalism in this field (P.D. Sharma · 1977) which is characterized by *decentralization* (a separation of administration of law-violence from administration of preserving order, as these two kinds of jobs are not similar), *autonomy* (preventing the undesirable intervention of political leaders and bureaucratic executives), *specialization* (having separate police for dealing with agitations, juvenile delinquency, communal riots, and so forth), *modernization* (equipping police with modern technology as well as developing modern ideology (correctional and protective rather than bossist), and *accountability* (to the public, to ideology, to law instead of to the politicians in power)

Controlling Youth Agitations

We have examined the prominent causes as well as scrutinised the important theories of youth agitations. Obviously, the forces producing unrest and agitations cannot be eliminated. How, then, might youth agitations be minimised? Do theory and research suggest ways to control agitations?

1 An average young man is individualistic, imaginative and competitive. He only wants guidance so that his enthusiasm and zest could be contained. Youngsters should be taught to vent their anger. If a person bottles up his rage, he has to find an outlet which may give him an opportunity to let off steam. In psychiatrist terminology, this means that one's accumulated aggressive energy, be it from frustrations or from the building up of instinctual impulses, needs a release. Parents have also to encourage their children's release of emotional tension in various kinds of activities

Some scholars have, however, rejected this catharsis hypothesis. Social psychologists like Geen and Quanty (1977) maintain that the catharsis view of the aggression and agitation has not been confirmed. Robert Arms and his associates report that Canadian and American spectators of football, wrestling, and hockey exhibit more hostility after viewing the event than before (Arms et al., 1979; Goldstein and Arms, 1971; Russel, 1981, 1983). In more direct laboratory tests of the catharsis hypothesis, Jack Hokanson and his colleagues (1961, 1962, 1966) found that when Florida State University students were allowed to counterattack someone who had provoked them, their arousal (as measured by their blood pressures) returned to normal quickly. This calming effect of retaliation seems to occur only in very specific circumstances—when the target is one's actual tormentor, not a substitute, and when the retaliation is justifiable and the target non-intimidating so that one does not afterward feel guilty or anxious. On the other hand, in other experiments, aggression has actually led to heightened aggression. It is, therefore, necessary to help the youth to bottle up their anger and aggressive urges. Instead of using agitations to express one's grievances, it is more essential to use non-agitational ways to express one's feelings and to inform others (particularly decision-makers and power-monopolizers) how their behaviour and their decisions adversely affect others. Perhaps stating that "when you take such decision, we feel irritated and angry and feel like taking to agitative methods" might communicate the youngsters' feelings in a way that leads the power elite to make amends rather than further escalate the aggression. Myres (1988 : 437) has also said that one can be assertive without being aggressive.

2. The adult world has to accept the fact that youth problems cannot be solved for them but with them. Therefore, cooperation of students/youths need to be sought by parents, teachers and administrators. Youth/students, parents, teachers, educational administrators, politicians and political parties should cooperate in understanding problems/grievances of the youth and giving them logical guidelines.

3. Efforts should be taken to remove minor irritants in students'/youths' day-to-day contacts with teachers and educational administrators. Each educational institution must have an efficient machinery to identify and settle student grievances. Such arrangements must not only start tackling problems after they flare up but must continuously strive to prevent incidents which lead to complications. Such bodies (students/teachers etc.) should be continuously in session.

The effective measures for the redressal of the grievances could be: (1) accessibility of senior functionaries, (2) ensuring action on grievance in shortest possible time or with a definite time-frame, (3) establishing monitoring system and getting regular reports from teachers and subordinate administrative staff, and (4) sudden check-up by vice-chancellor or dean or person-in-power.

4 All political parties have to agree on a common code of conduct regarding students' participation in politics. It will prepare them for shouldering responsibilities in future for national development. There is no point in exhorting students to keep away from politics and yet expect them to get enthusiastically involved in the process of building up our society.

5 The question of the extent and pattern of student participation in the process of educational administration will have to be decided at the earliest.

6. Definite rules should be framed regarding police intervention in educational institutions. We can think of instituting a special University Police Force.

We can also have specially trained police personnel for dealing with students in particular and youth in general. It is now high time that the vast youth power, which hitherto has been neglected and ignored, is harnessed for development, removing social injustice and achieving national collective goals. The need for creating a climate of hope, confidence and trust rather than coercion and confrontation has to be realised and this initiative has to be taken for mobilising the young.

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Child Abuse and Child Labour

Despite hectic planning, welfare programmes, legislation and administrative action in the past four decades, a majority of the Indian children continue to remain in distress and turmoil. In most families, the parents neglect them, caretakers batter them and employers sexually abuse them. Though this problem of emotional, physical and sexual abuse of children in India is increasing, it has failed to capture the attention of sociologists and psychiatrists in our country. The public and the government also are yet to recognise it as a serious problem. Public indignation and professional concern is yet to be translated into positive and realistic action.

Child Population and the Working Children

Of the total population of 685 million in India (1981 census), 38.4% or 263 million were children below the age of 15 years. Those in the age-group of 5-15 years were 26.2% or 179 million (*The Hindustan Times*, June 25, 1986). Since the country's population has increased from 685 million in 1981 to 843.93 million in 1991, the child population in the country (0-14 years) at present should be about 310 million. The break-up of children in different age-groups and the projections for 1991 to 2001 are estimated in Table 8.1 (Sharda, 1988: 101).

Millions of children from poor families are compelled by economic considerations to join the labour force. India has the dubious distinction of having the largest number of the world's working children (one-fourth of the world's child labour-force). According to the 1971 census, 4.66% of the total child population in India was a working population.

The number of employed children below 14 years of age in various economic activities increased from 10.8 million in 1971 to 14.5 million in 1981 (*The Hindustan Times*, June, 25, 1986). One estimate puts the number of working children in our country at 44 million—5.5% of the total population (*The Hindustan Times*, April 24, 1989). An estimate made in 1983 indicated that there are 17.4 million working children in India while a survey conducted by the Operations Research Group (ORG), Baroda (Vadodara) in 1985 had put the figure at a staggering 44.5 million. One writer pointed out four years ago that out of 310 million population of children by the end of 1986, the number of working children would easily be around 110 million (Josh, Uma, 1986). The Planning Commission's recent assessment is that in the ten years between 1981 and 1990, there is at least an 800% increase in the number of child workers, which has gone up from 13.5 million to 116 million. However, the ORG findings have gained credibility as they are based on a nationwide survey. A survey conducted by a research group sponsored by the Ministry of Labour, Government of India, has reported, (Josh, 1986) that of the estimated 102.3 million households in the country, 34.7% had working children. Seventy-nine per cent working children are in the rural areas. Two-thirds of the working children belong to the 12-15 years age-group and the rest are below 12 years.

Table 8.1 : Break-up of Children in Different Age-groups

Year	Age-groups						Total Child Population
	0-4		5-9		10-14		
	No	Percentage	No	Percentage	No	Percentage	
1981	83	31.6	94	35.7	86	32.7	263
1991	110	35.7	103	34.3	95	30.0	308
2001	114	34.2	111	33.3	108	32.5	333

The first Act to regulate the employment of children and their hours of work was the Factory Act of 1881. A commission was appointed in 1929 to fix the minimum age of child employment. On its recommendation, the Child Labour Act, 1933 was passed prohibiting employment of children below 14 years of age. The Factory Act of 1948 provided some safeguards to child labourers. In 1986, the parliament enacted the Child Labour Act (Regulation and Prohibition).

planning the employment of children in certain jobs and regulating the conditions of work in hazardous occupations. The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 which superceded the existing 25 Children's Acts in different states and union territories and came into force from October 2, 1987, provides for the creation of Advisory Boards and the establishment of State Children Funds for preventing the abuse of children, for the protection and care of children, for the mobilization of resources and for the provision of facilities for education, training and rehabilitation of the neglected children. But in spite of all these measures, children continue to be employed, harassed and abused.

Concept and Types of Child Abuse

Some studies limit the term 'child abuse' to "children who have received serious physical injury caused wilfully rather than by accident" (Garden & Gray, 1982: 5). This definition has not been accepted by the social scientists because of the ambiguities in the word 'serious' and diversities in physical injury. Kempe and his colleagues (1978) have defined child abuse as "a condition having to do with those who have been deliberately injured by physical assault". This definition is limited in scope as it restricts abuse only to those acts of physical violence which produce a diagnostic injury. Thus, acts of neglect and maltreatment of children which do not produce an injury but are equally harmful cannot be included in this definition. No definition of child abuse can be considered as valid unless it includes non-physical acts like mental injury and neglect and ill-treatment of a child. Burgess (1979 : 143) has given a wider definition of child abuse. According to him, child abuse refers to "any child who receives non-accidental physical and psychological injury as a result of acts and omissions on the part of his parents or guardians or employers...". Verbal abuse, threats of physical violence, and excessive physical punishment which do not require medical attention are also included in the definition of child abuse

Child abuse is usually divided into three major types: physical, sexual and emotional. Each have recognisable characteristics. The indicators of *physical abuse* in the school-age child described by Irving Sloan (1983 : 2-3) are: bruises, burns, fractures, lacerations and abrasions, abdominal injuries, and human-bite marks. The behavioural indicators of physical abuse are: the abused child is wary of contact with adults, he/she becomes apprehensive when other children cry, he/she shows aggressiveness in behaviour, he/she seems frightened of the

parents/caretakers, and he/she is afraid to go home or cries when it is time to go home.

Child *sexual abuse* has been defined as "the involvement of dependent and immature children in sexual activities they do not fully comprehend, to which they are unable to give informed consent" (Henry Kempe, 1978: 127). The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, defines child sexual abuse as "interaction between a child (under the age of 18 for girls and 16 for boys) and an adult (who is significantly older than the victim and is in a position of power or control over the child, or may even be an acquaintance or an unknown person) in which the child is being used for the sexual stimulation of the perpetrator or another person". Sexual abuse is not often identified through physical indicators alone. Frequently, a child confides in a trusted person (mother, friend, neighbour, kin or sister) that she/he has been sexually assaulted. There are, however, some physical signs of sexual abuse. These are (Sloan Irving, 1983: 6) : difficulty in walking or sitting, torn, stained or bloody underclothes, complaints of pain or itching, bruises or bleeding, venereal disease, and pregnancy (in early adolescence). There are some behavioural indicators too of sexual abuse. The sexually abused child may appear withdrawn or retarded, may have poor peer relationships, may be unwilling to participate in activities, may indulge in delinquent behaviour, may run away, or may display bizarre or unusual sexual knowledge.

Emotional abuse is the neglect or maltreatment of children. 'Neglect' is difficult to define exactly since it may involve a disregard of the physical, emotional, moral or social needs of the children. *Physical neglect* has been defined as "the failure to provide the essentials for normal life, such as food, clothing, shelter, care and supervision, and protection from assault." *Emotional neglect* includes both the lack of expressed love and affection and the deliberate withholding of contact and approval. *Moral neglect* includes exposure to situations (alcoholism, obscenity, illicit sex relations) that present a pattern of moral conduct at variance with the norms of society. *Social neglect* includes failure to train or discipline a child (Kratcoski, 1979: 120). Thus, emotional neglect or 'maltreatment' may be described as "negligent treatment of a child under the specific age prescribed for the children by the given society (18 for girls and 16 for boys in India) by a person who is responsible for the child's upbringing, care and welfare under circumstances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby". This definition characterizes 'omission'

and not 'commission' as abuse. Emotional maltreatment of the child includes blaming, belittling, rejecting, constantly treating siblings unequally, and persistent lack of concern by the parent/caretaker for the child's welfare. Emotional maltreatment is rarely manifest in physical signs. A few physical indicators of emotional maltreatment are speech disorders, lag in physical development and failure-to-thrive syndrome (Irving Sloan, 1983: 7). The behavioural characteristics of emotional maltreatment are (Maxwild Denver, 1961: 6-7): habit disorders (biting, thumb-sucking), conduct disorders (destructiveness, cruelty, stealing), neurotic traits (sleep disorders, inhibition of play), psycho-neurotic reaction (hysteria, phobias, obsession), behaviour extremes (appearing overly complainant, extremely passive or aggressive, very demanding or undemanding), lag in emotional and intellectual development, and attempted suicide.

Incidence of Child Abuse

In the absence of public and government interest in the problem of child abuse, no statistics has been compiled in India to indicate the incidence of abuse. In the United States, Gil (1970) estimated that there were between 2.5 and 4.1 million cases of child abuse per year. In 1977, Scott reported that between one and 12 children per 1,000 were abused by their parents or guardians. Considering the poverty, illiteracy, and large size of families in India, it could be said that five to 15 children per 1,000 children are abused by parents and employers in our country.

Theoretical Explanations of Child Abuse

A number of explanations have been given by scholars to explain the motivational factors in child abuse. Of these, the important are: (i) psychiatric explanation; (ii) socio-cultural explanation which includes (a) social-situational explanation, (b) social habitability explanation, and (c) social control explanation; (iii) resource explanation; (iv) social-interactional explanation; and (v) social learning explanation.

The *psychiatric* explanation was propounded by scholars like Kempe (1972), Steele and Pollock (1968), Gelles (1973), and Parke and Collmer (1975). It links with child abuse factors such as mental illness and personality defects or intra-individual abnormalities. It also links abusive parents' own childhood experiences to the individuals' weak personality development and poor self-control (Wolfe, 1987: 45). The

thesis that personality disorder is responsible for child abuse was further advanced by reports that abusers often had a propensity for impulsive and/or antisocial acts that extended beyond the preventing role. A parent, according to this explanation, may abuse his/her child due to unmet emotional needs (that signify discontentment, anger or irritability), an inability to balance the child's needs and capabilities with own (parental) expectations, or emotional scars from their own abusive or deprived family background affecting their ability to care for their own offspring (Wolfe, 1987: 45).

This explanation initially drew support from many fields, including law-makers and public-interest groups because it directed most of the responsibility for abusive behaviour squarely at the individual involved, and absolved society from blame in contributing to the risk of child abuse through lack of education, adequate housing, family support programmes, employment opportunities, and so on. However, recent researches have disproved the role of psychopathology in child abuse.

The *socio-cultural* explanation, given in the 1970s, maintained that external forces or socio-demographic variables within the society caused child abuse. This explanation includes three sub-explanations: social situational, social habitability and social control.

The *social-situational* explanation proposes that abuse and violence arise out of two factors: structural stress and cultural norms. As the social structure in which a parent lives becomes more stress ridden (or is perceived as more stressful), the greater becomes the possibility that family violence will surface as an attempt to gain control over irritating, tense events. Cultural sanctioning of violence as an appropriate conflict resolution technique further provides a foundation for the use of corporal punishment in child rearing. If a parent was frequently exposed to harsh physical punishment as a child, he/she may have greater propensity toward viewing such behaviour as normative and inhibition against physical force may be lessened (Bandura, 1973). Steinmetz and Straus (1974) have maintained that factors such as low income, unemployment, isolation, unwanted pregnancy and conflict with spouse/in-laws, cause structural stresses which, combined with the cultural acceptance for violence to resolve conflict, lead to the use of force and violence against children at home. Talking of social factors which cause stress, Gil (1970) has referred to social class and family size. Light (1973 : 556-598) has referred to unemployment, and Garbarino (1977 : 721-735) has referred to social isolation.

The major problem in this explanation according to Fieldman (1982) is that it is unable to account for the finding that given the same set of deprivation or adverse conditions, many parents do and others do not abuse their children.

The *social habitability* explanation was proposed by James Garbarino in 1977. According to him, the nature of child maltreatment depends upon the quality of the environment in which the person and family live, or the level of family support in the environment. The lesser the family support, the greater the risk of maltreatment of children.

The *social control* explanation was propounded by Gelles in 1973. According to him, parents use violence against their children because they have no fear of being hit back, nor of being arrested (unless some neighbour lodges a complaint with the police). Thus, violence is used when (i) the cost of being violent is to be less than the rewards, (ii) the absence of effective social control over family relations decreases the cost (of one member being violent towards another), and (iii) family structures reduce social control in family relations and, therefore, reduce the costs and increase the rewards of being violent (Gelles and Cornell, 1985, 121). Laslett (1978 : 480) has also said that: (a) inequality in home reduces both social control and the costs of being violent, and (b) the privacy in the family serves to reduce the degree of social control exercised over family relations. Gelles (1973) has maintained that certain types of children—like the handicapped, ugly, demanding, premature—are at a greater risk of being abused by their parents. This is because either they make great demands (economically, socially or psychologically) on their parents or they are perceived as not providing sufficient gratification in return for the parents' investment of time and energy. Thus, when a parent perceives the costs of parenthood to outweigh the rewards, he uses violence against his children. Ivan Nye (1979) had also earlier accepted the application of Peter Blau's theory, like Gelles, in explaining child abuse. He has proposed that child beating is less common in families that have relatives and/or friends nearby. Recasting Nye's proposition, Gelles and Cornell (1985) have proposed that child-beating is more common when relatives, friends and neighbours (that is, non-family members) are unavailable, unable or unwilling to be part of the daily system of family interaction, and thus unable to serve as agents of formal and informal social control. Gelles has further maintained that the greater the disparity between perceived investment in a family relationship

(that is, parenting) and the perceived returns on the investment, the greater the likelihood that there will be violence. This also explains why children of five to seven years of age are more likely victims of child abuse than children of 14 to 16 years of age. Parents of younger children perceive a rather large investment in their children and feel that they get little in the way of actual return than parents of older children.

This explanation has been criticised on the grounds that: (1) It is preposterous to assume that relations between parents and children are based on reciprocity and that parents' treatment of children is determined in terms of calculations of rewards and costs. (2) Assuming it is so, why do all the parents not make such calculations and only a few do it, that is, why do all the parents not beat their children and only some parents indulge in child-beating? Does this not ignore the personality factor in the use of violence? (3) Why are children who work and earn also beaten by their parents (like non-working children) when there is some 'return' of 'parenting'?

The *resource* explanation was given by William Goode in 1971. According to it, the use of force by an individual depends upon the extent to which he can command or master the resources—social, personal and economic. The more resources a person has, the less he/she will use force in an open manner. Thus, a father who wants to be a dominant person in the family but has little education, low prestige job, low income and lacks inter-personal skills, may choose to use violence against his children to maintain the dominant position.

The *social-interactional* explanation was given by Burgess in 1979. It approaches the etiology of child abuse in terms of the interplay between individual family and social factors in relation to both past (for example, exposure to abuse as a child) and present (for example, a demanding child) events. The parents' learning history, inter-personal experiences, and intrinsic capabilities are regarded as predisposing characteristics presumed to be important contributors to an abusive pattern. In this explanation, the potential role of the child in provoking abuse is also acknowledged. The conditions under which the child is reared and the methods used by the parents, particularly their punitive methods, may help to explain why some adults are predisposed to abusive behaviour, given certain setting conditions.

Although this explanation is primarily concerned with the current behaviour of the abusive parent in the context of the family or community, psychological mechanisms such as perceptions and

interpretations of events, are also recognised as important factors in influencing the parent-child interactions (Wolfe, 1987 : 49). The interactional explanation, thus, is not necessarily limited to observable behaviour alone (like parental criticisms or displays of anger...) but includes cognitive and effective processes too (like intelligence, attitudes) that may mediate behavioural changes.

The *social learning* theory lays emphasis on the learned nature of parenting and the fact that many parents have insufficient knowledge and skill to equip them to carry out the highly complex task of child-rearing. They not only lack fundamental skills (of rearing children) but there may also be an absence of coping strategies to deal with stress, giving rise to a spiralling effect of increased stress and less effective coping.

The Victims of Abuse

One empirical study was conducted in Rajasthan in 1990 on child abuse by G S Kewalramani to assess the nature, extent, patterns and causes of abuse, to delineate the characteristics of perpetrators and victims of abuse, and to analyse the effect of abuse on a child's role performance and his development. The study was focussed on 167 children in the age-group of 10-16 years. Of the 167 cases studied, 124 were cases of physical abuse, 23 of sexual abuse and 103 of emotional abuse. Further, of the total cases studied, 61.7% were boys and 38.3% were girls. Amongst boys, 42.7% were working and 57.3% were non-working; while amongst girls, 46.9% were working and 53.1% were non-working. The age groups of the interviewed children were - 10-11 years—20.4%, 12-13 years—25.7%, 14-15 years—24.6%, and 16 years—29.3%.

The important findings of this study on the three types of child abuse, namely, physical, sexual and emotional, were as follows:

Physical Abuse

(1) Boys are more battered than girls (ratio being 1.3 : 1). (2) School-going children run greater risk of being physically abused than those who do not go to school. (3) Older children (14-16 years) are more abused physically than younger children (10-13 years). (4) Non-working children are beaten more than the working children. (5) The ratio of children who are occasionally abused (twice or thrice a month) to those who are frequently abused (once or twice a week), or very

frequently abused (three or four times a week) is 1 : 5.5. (6) A large number of the abused children (about 60.0%) belong to poor families with a monthly income of less than Rs. 500 per month. Only a small number (about 2.0%) belong to well-to-do families, that is, with an income of Rs. 1,500 or more per month. This shows that there is a significant relationship between poverty and physical abuse. (7) In a very large number of cases (93.0%), the perpetrators of physical abuse are members of the family (father, mother, sibling). (8) Perpetrators of either sex abuse children of their own sex more than of the opposite sex. (9) Mothers abuse children physically more (60.0%) than the fathers (40.0%). However, males abuse children more severely than females. (10) The great majority of the abuser parents are in their thirties and forties, while the siblings are mostly in their twenties. (11) The main modes of battering children are slapping and beating with fists (40.0%), hitting with different objects (35.0%), kicking (19.0%), choking and/or strangulating (10.0%), binding with rope (3.0%), and tearing hair (2.0%). (12) In most of the cases (85.0%), the beating does not cause an injury to the child. (13) The physical violence against children is of various types. *Routine* beating is different from the *non-routine* beating. The former is one which the parents believe their children 'deserve', and the children also believe that they 'asked for it'. The latter is one which is instigated by the child. *Secondary* violence is one which one parent believes is just and legitimate but the other parent believes is unjust.

Non-routine violence has been sub-categorised as: volcanic violence, alcohol-related violence, sex-related or jealousy-oriented violence, expressive violence, power-oriented or instrumental violence, and victim-precipitated violence. *Volcanic* violence is one which is used neither for achieving a desired end nor for legitimizing the act. It occurs when the victimiser (parent, employer . . .) has run out of patience as the result of externally caused stress, such as losing the job or being insulted by somebody or incurring a loss. *Alcohol-related* violence is one where violence is the result of alcohol-consumption. Alcohol releases aggression as well as makes a person irrational and serves as a disinhibitory agent that releases violence impulses. This type of violence is exclusively male violence. *Jealousy-oriented* or *sex-related* violence is one in which the parent of one sex beats the child of the other sex out of jealousy. Step-father beating his daughter, or step-mother beating her son are examples of this type of violence.

Expressive violence is one in which the use of physical force is an end in itself. *Instrumental or power-oriented violence* is one in which violence is intended not only as a means of inducing the child to alter his behaviour but also to establish parental authority. *Child precipitated violence* is one in which the victims of violence contribute to their own victimization either through actions defined as deviant by the aggressor parent or through provoking their (parents) antagonism.

Sexual Abuse

(1) Girls are more victims of sexual abuse than boys (the ratio being 2.3 : 1). (2) A high proportion of children become victims of sexual abuse when they are 14 or above 14 years of age. The ratio of victims below 14 years to victims above 14 years is about 1 : 5. (3) There is a strong association between sex and the number of abusers. Males are usually abused sexually by one person while girls are generally assaulted by more than one person. (4) There is rarely an application of force or bodily harm. Victims are usually psychologically enticed by the assaultors by loyalty to, affection for, and the dependence upon them (abusers). (5) The victims of sexual abuse are generally from the lower socio-economic families. (6) Sexual abuse of children does not demonstrate a relationship with religion and caste membership. There is some evidence that the lower caste women are more frequent victims of sexual assault than the higher caste women but this refers more to rape cases than childhood sexual abuse. (7) Whereas the victims' age distribution is more homogeneous, the assaultors' age distribution is more heterogeneous (very young, young, early middle-age, late middle-age). (8) In about two-third cases (66.7%), the perpetrators have secondary relationship with the victims (employers, coworkers, teachers, tenants, and acquaintances). Persons having blood relationships constitute a small category of perpetrators. In other words, a significant percentage of child sexual abuse (93.0%) occurs outside the family. (9) Boys are generally the victims of 'employment-related' abuse while girls are generally the victims of 'acquaintance-related' abuse. (10) Of the 'employment-related' sexual abuse, two-thirds is by the coworkers and one-third is by the employers.

Emotional Abuse

(1) Boys are more emotionally maltreated than girls, the ratio being 1.3 : 1. (2) Working children are as much neglected as non-working

children. (3) School-going children are a little more maltreated than non-school-going children. (4) Of the various forms of emotional abuse, constant lack of supervision is as high as 62.0% belittling is to be found in 50.0%, false blaming among 33.0%, lack of concern for studies and welfare in 28.0%, rejection among 18.0% and unequal treatment with siblings in 17.0% cases. (5) The ratio of parents taking 'no' interest, 'less' interest and 'average' interest in children is about 5 : 3 : 1. (6) In a large number of cases 76.0%, the parents who neglect the child are those whose income is low and liabilities are many; who are middle-aged, illiterate or less educated; and who are engaged in low-status jobs. (7) A large number of parents who ill-treat their children are those who are aggressive, irritable and domineering in their behavioural characteristics; fickle-minded, inflexible and less tolerant in their emotional characteristics; and have low-esteem, feeling of alienation, and lack of ability to empathise in social characteristics.

Causes of Child Abuse

The major cause of child abuse is adaptational failure or maladjustment in environment (both in family and work-place) mostly on the part of the adult perpetrators (parents, employers...) but to some extent on the part of adults responsible for family socialization as well. (Kewalramani, 1990: 199) Before discussing this thesis, let us first analyse the causes of the three different types of child abuse separately.

Causes of Physical Abuse

Different scholars have suggested different causes of physical abuse. Some consider the *psycho-pathology of the individual perpetrators* as the primary cause factor, others view the *psycho-social pathology of family interaction* as the main cause, and still others put major emphasis on *situations of acute stress*. The empirical study of Kewalramani conducted in Rajasthan, however, revealed that "stress factors associated with families" give a sufficient causal explanation for child abuse. The situational stresses pointed out four models of dominant causes of a child's physical abuse (a) relations between spouses, (b) relations between parents and children, (c) structural stresses, and (d) child-produced stress.

The dominant causes of battering children were found as: Children constantly disobeying parents (35.0%), quarrels between the parents and the child beaten as scapegoat (19.0%), child not taking interest in

studies (9.0%), child spending most of his time outside the home (8.0%), child refusing to go to earn a livelihood (7.0%), child frequently fighting with siblings (5.0%), child frequently playing truant from school (5.0%), child refusing to hand over his total earnings to his parents/guardians (5.0%), receiving complaints of misbehaviour from outsiders (4.0%), and child indulging in deviant behaviour like theft, smoking... (3.0%) All these factors (disobeying parents, quarrels between parents, spending most of the time outside the home, child not taking interest in studies or work) do not point so much to the personality defects in the individual perpetrators as to the major factors leading child abuse. It may, therefore, be said that though the role of the personality traits of the abusers cannot be ignored but family environment and stress ridden family situations are more crucial factors in child battering.

Causes of Sexual Abuse

The four causes of sexual abuse mostly given are adjustment problems of the perpetrators, family disorganisation, victim's characteristics, and the psychological disorders of the abusers. Kewalraman's study on child abuse, however, approached the problem of sexual abuse with a 'System Model' and perceived it as behaviour influenced by factors at several different levels, that is, a behaviour which is the result of cumulative influence of a set of factors. In fact, this study used the system approach not to study sexual abuse but also physical and emotional abuse. The four variables related to sexual abuse were: family environment, family structure, individual predispositions and situational factors.

The analysis of *family environment* revealed that congestion in family was not related to sexual abuse but conflict between parents and weakening of inhibitions leading to neglect of the children, absence of affectionate parent-child relationship within the family that fails to give support and protection to child, alcoholism of the earning male member, his lack of accountability, lack of adequate control on the children, illicit relations of the mother with some man and paramour's hold on his mistress, dominance of stepfather, and social isolation of the family (that is, family not participating in social networks or community activities) were factors which were more important in sexual abuse.

The environment in the work-place also contribute to sexual molestation. Several cases of assault by employers and molestation by

coworkers of the young victims when they were all alone in the house/work-place/school were found in Kewalramani's study. The loneliness of young girls make them more susceptible to the overtures of the perpetrators.

Causes of Emotional Abuse

Four important causes of emotional abuse can be identified: poverty, 'deficient' parental control and non-cordial relations within family, maltreatment faced by parents in their own childhood or inter-generational transmission of child maltreatment, and alcoholism of parents. Kewalramani also found these factors important in emotional abuse. More than half of the abuser parents (55.0%) had low income (less than Rs. 1,000 per month) and 5-12 family members to support. Strauss (1979) and Deschner (1984) have also pointed out the effect of poverty on child abuse. However, it has now come to be believed that child abuse is not exclusively a lower SES (socio-economic status) situation, though it is predominantly a lower SES problem. 'Deficient' parental control was found by Kewalramani in 52.0% cases and inter-generational transmission of maltreatment was discovered in 79.0% cases. Pagelow (1984) has also referred to the role of inter-generational transmission in child maltreatment. However, Burgess and Youngblade (1985) have questioned this belief. Lastly, Kewalramani did not find alcohol as an important factor in child abuse. He found only 26.0% parents (fathers) as alcohol-abusers, of whom 44.0% took alcohol every day, that is, were addicts. Matlins (1981) has, however, described the alcoholic parent as having an important role in child abuse.

Integrated Model of the Causes of Child Abuse

The major premise of this model is the interdependence between parent, child and situation. This model focuses on four factors in child abuse: (i) family environment, (ii) structural stresses, (iii) individual characteristics of parents, and (iv) sub-cultural learning. The model requires knowledge in five different areas: (i) child development, (ii) socialisation processes, (iii) family interactions, (iv) learning principles, and (v) sources of arousing anger, aggression, hatred, and so forth.

These areas point out that:

(a) Child abuse can be viewed in terms of the degree to which a parent uses negative or inappropriate control strategies with his/her child. Using of 'normal' methods (meeting all the child's needs,

adequate control, positive disciplining, and clear communication) contributes to a child's (social, emotional and intellectual) development, whereas using of 'abnormal' methods (neglecting child's needs, inadequate control, negative disciplining, unclear communication, and over-reliance on coercion) in child rearing inhibits a child's development and causes child abuse.

Authoritative parenting (the commanding type of parents), *authoritarian* parenting (requiring complete obedience to their authority), *indulgent* parenting (gratifying all desires/fancies), and *negligent* parenting (being indifferent and unresponsive and not paying due attention) influence a child's characteristics and behaviour. The *authoritarian* parental style is most harmful and is conducive to child abuse

(b) *Stresses* also give rise to maladaptive coping responses, since abusive parents are clearly not violent under all circumstances. Factors like unemployment and dissatisfaction with job affect an individual's behaviour which lead to child abuse.

(c) Individual characteristics of parents like inherent traits (irritable nature, self-centeredness, rigidity ..), lack of parenting skill, and lack of resources (low prestige, little education and low income) also cause child abuse

(d) The sub-cultural learning, that is, socialisation in a violent home, or experiencing violence in childhood, is yet another cause of child abuse.

All these factors together explain how they affect the behaviour of the perpetrators which ultimately leads to child abuse.

Effects of Abuse on Children

What are the effects of abuse—physical, sexual and emotional—on children. Bolton and Bolton (1987 : 93-113) have identified eight possible effects of abuse on children, namely, self-devaluation, dependency, mistrust, revictimization, withdrawal from people, emotional trauma, deviant behaviour, and inter-personal problems. Kewalramani's study of child abuse lays down the effect of abuse on children in five significant areas

The first is the loss of *self-esteem*. Abused children develop a negative view of themselves. Elmer (1987) has called it 'self-devaluation' while Egeland, Sroufe and Erickson (1983 : 460) have called it 'low self-esteem'. Kinard (1980 : 686-696) has mentioned it as 'poor self-concept' and Hjorth and Ostrow (1982 : 71-72) as 'poor self-

image'. Children have no choice but to accept the perpetrators' abuse. The parent who maltreats them is their own parent so they cannot run away. Similarly, they have to tolerate their caretakers' and employers' hostility because of their poverty and their dependence on them.

Kewalramani used three indicators to test his hypothesis that child's self-esteem is devalued by his abuse. These indicators were: child's own evaluation of his/her performance at school (in the case of the school-going children), evaluation as worker (in the case of the working children), and evaluation as a helper at home. He framed five questions pertaining to these indicators and found that: (i) A high percentage of children (75.0%) who were physically/emotionally abused felt that they were weak at studies and/or had to make more than one attempt to pass the examination. (ii) A high per cent (84.0%) considered themselves to be indifferent towards their work and/or felt dissatisfied with the work they were engaged in. (iii) A high percentage (86.0%) thought of themselves as shirkers than as helpers to their parents/care-takers in the routine household chores. From these, it may be inferred that abuse always devalues a child's self-esteem.

The second effect is on *dependency*. It was found that a child's dependency is shifted from parents/caretakers to teachers for the gratification of all his/her needs. The three indicators to operationalise dependency were: gratification of physical needs (food, clothes and medicare), emotional and social support, and need of working somewhere to earn money. It was found that: (i) a good number of child victims (50.0%) had a feeling that their physical needs were not being met to their satisfaction; (ii) a high percentage of victims (55.0%) found themselves dependent on others for their emotional and social support; and (iii) a high percentage (63.0%) of abused children were forced to take up a job to meet their needs. However, significantly, despite the abuse, a good number of victimized children continued to depend on their parents/caretakers than on others.

The third effect is on *deviant behaviour*. It was found that abuse had a great effect on a child's conformity to socio-cultural expectations and a large number of the victimized children were compelled to indulge in activities that violated the social norms or which are labelled as 'deviance'. The five indicators used by Kewalramani to study the effect of child abuse on deviance were: absence from school, absence from work, drug addiction, stealing money, and hostile reactions towards perpetrators. The study revealed that: (i) A high percentage of emotionally and sexually abused victims (58.0% to 80.0%) missed their

school frequently. (ii) About three-fourths of the victims (74.0% to 77.0%) frequently remained absent from work. (iii) About one-tenth of the victims (8.0% to 10.0%) had either become drug addicts or had started smoking or taking tobacco or consuming alcohol. (iv) About one-fifth of the victims (18.0%) had started stealing money. (v) A large number of the victims (48.0% to 78.0%) had developed hostility and aggressiveness towards the perpetrators. From all this, it may be inferred that child abuse causes deviance amongst the victims which varies with regard to its magnitude and type.

The fourth effect is on *social and interpersonal problems*. Kewalramani's study revealed that child abuse results in poor communication and coping ability, failure in developing intimacy and social relationships, mistrust, isolation and withdrawal from interactional settings. For verifying these effects, the questions asked from the victims related to their free time activities, relations with parents and siblings, what constitutes embarrassing situations, their confiding in friends in times of stress and their desire to abandon their families. It was found that: (i) Most of the victims (68.0% to 83.0%) avoided situations in which interaction would have been expected, that is, they preferred to live in solitude and passed their leisure time all alone. (ii) Only a low percentage of the victims wanted to dissociate themselves from or abandon the family. (iii) A high percentage of the victims (76.0%) had indifferent or antagonistic relations with their parents/caretakers and/or siblings. (iv) Only a small number of the victims (24.0%) had a friend/relative whom they could trust and share their sorrows with. (v) Abuse caused embarrassment but its range differed in relation to the type of abuse. All these observations point out that victims of child abuse always develop certain types of social and interpersonal problems.

The last effect (of child abuse) is on *revictimization*, that is, the child once abused will essentially be abused time and again. The three indicators used by Kewalramani in this context in his study were: frequency of abuse, number of abusing perpetrators, and number of ways or forms of child abuse. The three questions related to these three indicators were how frequently were the victim abused, whether he was abused by one or more persons, and whether he was abused in one way or in more than one way.

The study revealed that: (i) a high percent of children (65.0% to 84.0%) were abused regularly or frequently, (ii) a high percentage of victims (53.0% to 58.0%) of physical and emotional abuse (but not

sexual) were abused by more than one person, and (iii) a high percentage of victims of physical and emotional abuse (66.0% to 80.0%) were victimized in more than one way. From all this, it may be inferred that a child who is a victim of abuse once is not only abused frequently and by more than one person but is also at a greater risk of being victimized in more than one way, that is, physically, emotionally and sexually.

The Problem of Child Labour

Child labourers are exploited, exposed to hazardous work conditions and paid a pittance for their long hours of work. Forced to forego education, shouldering responsibilities far beyond their years, becoming worldly-wise when their peers have yet to leave the cocoons of parental protection, these children never know what childhood is. The Constitution enshrines that:

- No child below the age of 14 years shall be employed to work in any factory or in any hazardous employment (Article 24).
- Childhood and youth are to be protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment (Article 39(f)).
- The state shall endeavour to provide within a period of 10 years from the commencement of the Constitution free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of 14 years (Article 45).

Nature of Child Work

A majority of the working children are concentrated in the rural areas. About 60.0% of them are below the age of 10. Business and trade absorb 23.0% while work in households covers 36.0%. The number of children in urban areas who work in canteens and restaurants, or those engaged in picking rags and hawking goods, is vast but unrecorded. Among the more unfortunate ones are those who are employed in hazardous industries. For instance, the fireworks and match box units in Sivakasi in Ramanathapuram district in Tamil Nadu employ 45,000 children. The glass factories of Ferozabad in Uttar Pradesh have more than 45,000 children on the rolls. A large number of children work in the stone polishing units in Jaipur, the brassware industry in Moradabad, the lock-making units in Aligarh, the slate industry in Markapur (Andhra Pradesh) and Mandasaur (Madhya Pradesh) and the carpet-making in Jammu and Kashmir.

In a study on the impact of development on the rural women in Western Uttar Pradesh, as many as 83 out of 245 girls in 6-11 age-group (about 33.5%) were found to be engaged in some economic activity. Over 52.0% of the girls in the age group 11-18 were similarly engaged. It was estimated that around Bhadohi in Uttar Pradesh, 25.0% of the 50,000 workers engaged in carpet-weaving were children, while in Mirzapur 8,000 of the 20,000 workers were children. In Kashmir, the carpet weaving industry employs small girls in back-breaking work. In another flourishing craft of this region—the fine hand embroidery—children are required to maintain the same posture for long hours and strain their eyes on intricate designs. This often leads to permanent physical deformities and eye damage. In and around Surat (Gujarat), boys in their early teens are engaged in large numbers in diamond-cutting operations which can have very harmful effects on the eyes.

The surveys of the metropolitan cities make shocking revelations. Bombay has the largest number of child labourers. In Saharanpur, 10,000 child workers are engaged in the wood carving industry, working for 14 hours a day and getting just a rupee a day. In Varanasi, 5,000 children work in the silk weaving industry. Even in Delhi, 60,000 children work in *dhabas*, tea stalls and restaurants on a daily wage of Rs 2 or Rs. 3. In the mining sector, 56% of workers are children below 15. In most cases children are favoured as they are docile and hence can be exploited.

Child labour is inextricably linked to bonded labour. In Andhra Pradesh, 21.0% of the bonded labourers are under 16. In Karnataka, 10.3% and in Tamil Nadu 8.7% belong to this age-group. A study shows that at the time of entering bondage, many labourers are as young as five years old. In Orissa, one common way of clearing debt is to sell daughters, eight to 10 years old, as maid servants to the creditor. In several parts of the country, bonded fathers, over 40 years old, free themselves by deputing their sons into bondage.

In the tea gardens of Assam where employment of children below 12 years is prohibited, girls who bring food to their working mothers are encouraged to stay back and help with the work. Children, mostly boys, have an important role to play in mining operations. While men do the digging inside the pits, boys carry coal to the surface. Children below 12 are preferred because their height allows them to walk without bending in the tunnels. Preference for child workers is most common in the unorganised sector because here it is relatively easy for employers to circumvent laws. Children are concealed from factory

inspectors during inspection, their ages are raised arbitrarily to make them eligible for employment, or those eligible for adult wages are denied their legitimate share because the employers adroitly lower their age in the forms.

Causes of Child Labour

In a country like India where well over 40.0% of the population is living in conditions of extreme poverty, child labour is a complex issue. Children work out of necessity and without their earnings (however meagre they may be), the standard of living of their families would decline further. A large number of them do not even have families or cannot count on them for support. In these circumstances, the alternative to work may be idleness, destitution, or worse, crime.

Employers give interesting justifications for employing children to suppress their guilt feelings. They say that the work keeps children away from starvation. They are prevented from committing crimes which they would have indulged in if they had no jobs. The bureaucrats hold that the total eradication of child labour is impractical because the government cannot provide substantial alternative employment to them. The social scientist say that the main cause of child labour is poverty. The children either supplement their parents' income or are the only wage earners in the family. Another reason is that child labour is deliberately created by vested interests to get cheap labour. The third reason forwarded for the existence of child labour is that they benefit industries. For example, the carpet industry of Uttar Pradesh which employs 75,000 children earns about Rs. 150 crore a year in foreign exchange. In 1990, the export earnings were estimated to be about Rs. 300 crore.

Working Conditions of Child Labourers

Children work in dangerously polluted factories whose brick walls are scarred with soot and there is an oppressive smell in the air. They work near furnaces which burn at a temperature of 1400° centigrade. They handle dangerous chemicals like arsenic and potassium. They work in glass blowing units where the work exerts their lungs and creates diseases like tuberculosis.

Among the working children, many are the main or major wage-earners in the family who always remain worried about feeding their dependents. The migrant child workers whose parents live in some far

off city or village are generally in despair. Some work for 12 hours including night shifts. When the factories are fully functional, they are paid upto Rs. 500 per month, all of which they hand over to their 'guardians' who do not give them even a rupee a day for tea during the night shift. There are times when their bodies ache, minds fog, hearts cry, spirits bleed, but on orders of the employer they work for 15 hours at a stretch.

A visit to several factories in Delhi, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, reveals that a large number of child workers have sunken chests and thin bone frames which give them a fragile look. They look like rag dolls, limp, unwashed and scraggy. They wear coarse and badly tailored clothes. Many of them have scabies on hands, arms and legs. The heads of a few are shorn probably because the skin on their skull has developed severe infections.

A large number of the child workers are virtually confined in small rooms under inhuman conditions and in the most unhygienic surroundings. Most of these children come from extremely poor households. They are either school drop-outs or have not seen any school at all. They earn a very meagre wage and work in most unsafe conditions. The hazardous conditions take their toll. Children suffer from lung diseases, tuberculosis, eye diseases, asthma, bronchitis and backaches. Some are injured in fire accidents. Many become unemployable even at the age of 20. If injured or incapacitated, they are discarded mercilessly by their employers.

Government Measures and National Policy of Amelioration

The government believes that it is not easy to completely wipe out child labour. It, therefore, has only tried to improve their working conditions—reduce working hours, ensure minimum wages and provide facilities for health and education. It could be said that the national policy has three main ingredients—legal action focusing on general welfare, development programmes for the child workers and their families, and a project-based action plan. Initially ten projects were proposed to cover the areas where child labour is prevalent. They included factories in Surat, Jaipur, Ferozabad and the brassware industry of Moradabad. It was also contemplated in the policy to utilise the ongoing projects for the child workers and their families in order to cover their education, health, job prospects and a study of the socio-economic conditions which compelled these children to work at such an early age.

The unfortunate part is that the children in the unorganised sector are unprotected. And it is in the unorganised sector (like domestic servants, hawkers, rag-pickers, paper venders, agricultural labourers, and even industrial concerns like the lock-making industry) where the children are most shamelessly exploited.

An Evaluation

Despite the hope aroused of some improvement in the lot of the child workers, the enactment of the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986, has not goaded either the state governments or the Centre to any sort of purposive action even on a limited front. Nothing illustrates this apathy as the fate of the plan of action announced by the Labour Ministry in August, 1987 as an essential component of the national policy on child labour. Of the ten projects drawn up under the plan to enforce the Act and provide welfare inputs in such vulnerable areas as the glass industry in Ferozabad, carpet-weaving industry in Mirzapur, diamond polishing industry in Surat and match-box making in Sivakasi, only one has been taken up on an experimental basis. Considering that this lone project in the match industry is an on-going one that has since been dovetailed into the action plan, the enunciation of the policy as such has achieved nothing beyond delineating the responsibility of the states and the Centre. If this is the fate of a pilot scheme devised to benefit just 30,000 of the 18-million child labour force, the lot of the rest covered by the Act will be no better than that of the vastly greater numbers slogging for a pittance in the unorganised sector, who are outside the purview of the Act. The idea in formulating the action plan apparently was to make a beginning with the implementation of the new law and related provisions of other legislations affecting children in such sectors where the incidence of child labour is quite endemic. The failure of the projects to get off the ground does not inspire much hope about the success of the plan to shift the thrust of the anti-poverty programmes to those segments of society that contribute the bulk of child workers.

To this extent, the enactment of the legislation may have proved ineffective in affording a measure of protection to children forced to earn a living because of the rising rural impoverishment and the struggle for existence in urban areas. The legislation was drafted on the sound premise that since the root cause of poverty cannot be eliminated overnight, the pragmatic approach was to regulate the practice of child labour. Accordingly, the employment of children below 12 years has

been allowed in selected areas of the organised sector, with suitable safeguards against their exploitation and provision for educational and recreational facilities. But a serious omission in the legislation relates to the enforcement machinery, the laxity of which has enabled employers to circumvent the provisions of the law with impunity. Even if punishment for the violation of the new law has been made stiffer, the cheap, flexible and non-complaining labour provided by children creates a vested interest in perpetuating the practice. In the absence of an efficient and rigorous inspection machinery, nothing prevents the employers from flouting the legal provisions in the full knowledge that the child workers themselves will become willing accomplices in covering it up. Another lacuna in the Act is the failure to define what constitutes hazardous jobs, while the committee set up to identify permissible jobs has not made much progress.

The only way to ensure compliance with the Act is to make punishment for violations more stringent and incorporate a provision for surprise checks and establish a separate vigilance cell. With regard to the workers' interest, it should be made mandatory for all employers to take steps for the intellectual, vocational and educational well-being and upliftment of a child worker, whether one is employed as a factory hand, a domestic servant or a shop assistant.

In this context, the impact of policies which may not be specifically addressed to children but which try to alleviate poverty and inequality can have a significant and even decisive impact. Such policies may include agrarian reforms, employment-creation schemes, dissemination of improved technology among the poor, promotion of the informal sector and creation of cooperatives and social security programmes. Laws and regulations must be backed by effective enforcement machinery. This calls for the strengthening of labour-inspection and related services. In order to facilitate the verification of ages, an effective system of birth registration should be maintained by the public authorities. It should be made mandatory for employers to maintain registers and documents indicating the names and ages of all the employed children.

That children have to work is sad, but that they should work in conditions dangerous to their health and safety is totally unacceptable. Nor can the problem of child labour be left untackled until economic conditions and social structures are fundamentally improved.

Toiling long hours for a pittance, these little breadwinners accept exploitation as a way of life. They only know their sorrows. Silent

acceptance is writ large on their faces. Each day adds more to their growing numbers. Though it is true that labour helps children in their survival, but should the children be made to pay for the government's inability to provide alternative employment or inability to curb poverty? Should they be forced to inhabit an adult world, bear adult responsibilities, and suffer abysmal exploitation ?

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9

Violence Against Women

Few topics today consume the attention of researchers in social sciences, governments, planning groups, social workers and reformers as the problems of women do. Approaches to the study of women's problems range from the study of gerontology to psychiatry and criminology. But one important problem relating to women which has been greatly ignored and shunned is the problem of violence against women.

Women's Harassment

The problem of violence against women is not new. Women in the Indian society have been victims of humiliation, torture and exploitation for as long as we have written records of social organisation and family life. Today, women are being gradually recognised as important, powerful and meaningful contributors to the life of men; but till a few decades back, their condition was pitiable. Ideologies, institutional practices and the existing norms in society have contributed much to their harassment. Some of these behavioural practices thrive even today. In spite of the legislative measures adopted in favour of the women in our society after Independence, the spread of education and women's gradual economic independence, countless women still continue to be victims of violence. They are beaten, kidnapped, raped, burnt and murdered. Who are the women who are victimised? Who are their victimizers or the perpetrators of violence? Where do the seeds of violence against women lie? Some scholars who

have studied some of these aspects in western society have used the 'personality' approach and the 'situational' approach to explain this problem. But both types of approaches have, however been criticised on varied counts.

Nature, Extent and Characteristics of Violence Against Women

Violence against women may be categorised as:

- (i) Criminal violence—rape, abduction, murder...
- (ii) Domestic violence—dowry-deaths, wife battering, sexual abuse, maltreatment of widows and/or elderly women...
- (iii) Social violence—forcing the wife/daughter-in-law to go for female foeticide, eve-teasing, refusing to give a share to women in property, forcing a young widow to commit *sati*, harassing the daughter-in-law to bring more dowry...

The analysis here is focussed on the first two types of violence using the data from my own empirical study on "Crimes Against Women" conducted in 1982-84 in Rajasthan (Ahuja, 1987). The cases of criminal violence against women can be obtained from the records compiled by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Police Research Bureau, and the National Institute of Social Defence. But we know that all cases are not reported and recorded for various reasons. The cases of domestic violence like wife-battering and forced incest with the women of the household are never reported at all. But by referring to the compiled cases, we get some ideas of the nature and extent of violence against women. We analyse the extent and characteristics of six individual cases below.

Rape

Though the problem of rape is considered serious in all countries, in India it is statistically not as serious as it is in the western society. For example, in the United States, the annual rate of rape offences is about 26, in Canada it is about eight and in the U.K. it is about 5.5 per one lakh of population. In comparison, the rate in India is 0.5 per one lakh population. Taking into account the number of rape cases in our country in between 1983 and 1988, it may be said that there are three rapes in every four hours or there are 7,500 cases in one year (*Crime in India*, 1988: 12-13).

Age-wise, the percentage of victims of rape is highest in the age-group of 16 to 30 years (64.1%) while victims below 10 years account

for about 2.6%, victims between 10 and 16 years account for about 20.5%, and victims above 30 years account for about 12.8% (*Crimes in India*, 1988: 178-79). It is not only the poor girls who become rape victims but even the employees belonging to the middle class are sexually humiliated by their employers. Women inmates in jails are raped by the superintendents, women crime suspects by police officers, women patients by hospital personnel, maid-servants by their masters, and women daily wage earners by contractors and middle-men. Even deaf and dumb, lunatic and blind, and women beggars are not spared. Women who come from the lower-middle class and who are the main bread earners of their families bear sexual abuse silently and without protest. The victims face social stigma and disgrace and suffer serious guilt-pangs and personality disorders if they register protest.

My empirical study of 42 rape victims revealed the following important characteristics in the crimes committed against women: (1) rape does not always occur between total strangers; in about half of the cases the rape victim is known to her assailant; (2) nine out of every 10 rapes are situational, (3) about three-fifth rapes (58.0%) are single rapes (involving only one offender), one-fifth (21.0%) are pair rapes (that is women raped by two men), and one-fifth (21.0%) are group rapes; (4) nine out of every 10 rapes do not involve physical violence or brutality, that is, in a large number of cases, only temptation and/or verbal coercion are used to subdue the victim; (5) little less than three-fourth rapes (70.0%) occur in the victims or victimizers' homes and about one-fourth (25.0%) in non-residential buildings; and (6) the age-group of 15-20 years has the highest rate among victims while the offenders are mostly in the age group of 23-30. Youth is, thus, the main consideration in selecting victims.

Abduction and Kidnapping

Kidnapping is taking away or enticing of a *minor* (female of less than 18 years and a male of less than 16 years of age) without the consent of the lawful guardian. Abduction is forcibly, fraudulently or deceitfully taking away of a woman with an intent of seducing her to illicit sex or compelling her to marry a person against her will. In kidnapping, the victim's consent is immaterial but in abduction, the victim's voluntary consent condones the crime.

Taking an average of six years (1983 to 1988), it could be said that in our country, about 42 girls/women are kidnapped/abducted in a day or about 15,000 women are abducted in a year. The volume of

abduction in India is 2.0 per one lakh population (*Crime in India* : 1988, 13). Of the total victims abducted/kidnapped every year, 86.5% are females and 13.5% are males. Further, of the total persons arrested for kidnapping/abduction every year (21,000), 96.0% are males and 4.0% are females; 54.8% are between 18 and 30 years of age, 35.3% between 30 and 50 years, 4.5% below 18 years, and 5.4% above 50 years (*Crime in India*, 1988: 112-113).

The important characteristics of kidnapping/abduction as revealed by my study of 41 cases are: (1) unmarried girls are more likely to be victims of abduction than married women, (2) abductors and victims are acquainted with each other in a large number of cases; (3) the initial contact between the abductor and his victim frequently occurs in their own homes or neighbourhoods than in public places; (4) most often, only one person is involved in abduction. As such, a threat on the part of the offender and resistance on the part of the victim is not very common in abduction, (5) the two most important motives of abduction are sex and marriage. Abduction with an economic motive constitutes hardly one-tenth of the total abduction; (6) sexual assaults go with abduction in more than 80.0% of the cases; and (7) the absence of parental control and disaffectionate relations in the family are crucial factors in contacts between the abductor and the victim and girl's (victim's) running away from the home with some acquainted person (labelled later as abductor under pressure).

Murder

Homicide is mainly a masculine crime. Though the All-India figures pertaining to murders and their victims on the basis of sex are not available, it is well known that number of female victims of homicides in comparison to male victims is low. Whereas in the United States, female victims constitute between 20% and 25% of the total victims of homicides (about 25,000 to 30,000 every year), in India of about 27,000 murders committed every year, women constitute about 10% to 15% of the total victims. Of the total persons arrested every year for committing murders (67,500), 96.7% are males and 3.3% are females (*Crime in India*, 1988: 112-13).

The important characteristics of murderers (of females) and their victims as found in my empirical study of 33 murder cases are: (1) in a large majority of cases (94.0%), murderers and their victims are members of the same family; (2) in about four-fifth cases (80.0%) murderers belong to the young age group of 25-40 years; (3) about half

of the victims are women with long-standing relationships (more than five years) with the male murderer. The mean period spent by the victims with their husbands/in-laws was found to be 7.5 years; (4) about half of the murdered women have children. The mean number of children (of victims) in the empirical study was 3.2 and mean age of the child was 14.8 years; (5) murderers mostly belong to low-status occupation and low-income groups; (6) two-third murders (66.0%) are unplanned and committed in the heat of passion or in a state of high emotionalism; (7) four-fifth murders (80.0%) are committed without any body's help. Accomplice in planned murders are also usually family members; and (8) petty domestic quarrels, illicit relations, and women's chronic illness are the main motivations in women's murder.

Dowry Deaths

Though the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has banned the practice of dowry but in reality all that the law does is to recognise that the problem exists. It is virtually unheard of for a husband or his family to be sued for insisting on taking a dowry. If anything, the demands for dowry have escalated over the years along with dowry deaths. As a modest estimate, the figure of deaths in India that occur due to non-payment or partial payment of dowry could be placed around 4,000 for one year. Most dowry-deaths occur in the privacy of the husband's house and with the collusion of the family members. Courts, therefore, admit their inability to convict any one for lack of proof. Sometimes, the police are so callous in conducting investigations that even the courts question the efficiency and integrity of the police authorities.

The important characteristics of dowry deaths as identified by my empirical study are: (1) middle-class women suffer a higher rate of victimization than lower-class or upper-class women; (2) about 70.0% victims belong to 21-24 years age group, that is, they are mature not only physically but socially and emotionally also; (3) the problem is more an upper-caste phenomenon than a lower-caste problem; (4) before an actual murder, several forms of harassment/humiliation are used against the young brides which show the chaotic pattern of social behaviour of the members of the victim's family; (5) the most important sociological factor in the causation of dowry death is the offender's environmental stress or social tensions caused by factors endogeneous and exogeneous to his family, and the important psychological factor is the killer's authoritarian personality, dominant nature, and his personality maladjustment; (6) no correlation exists

between the level of education of the girl and her murder committed for dowry; and (7) the composition of a family plays a crucial role in bride-burning cases.

Wife Battering

Violence towards women in the context of marriage becomes more significant when a husband who is supposed to love and protect his wife beats her. For a woman, being battered by a man whom she trusted most becomes a shattering experience. The violence can range from slaps and kicks to broken bones, torture, and attempted murder and even murder itself. Sometimes, the violence may be related to drunkenness but not always. In the Indian culture, we rarely hear of a wife reporting a case of battering to the police. She suffers humiliation in silence and takes it as her destiny. Even if she wants to revolt, she cannot do it because of the fear that her own parents would refuse to keep her in their house permanently after the marriage.

The important characteristics of wife battering pointed out by my empirical study of 60 self-identified cases are: (1) wives under 25 years of age have higher victimization rates; (2) wives younger to their husbands by more than five years run a greater risk of being battered by their husbands; (3) low-income women are more victimized, though family income is more difficult to associate with victimization, (4) family size and family composition have little correlation with wife-beating; (5) assaults by husbands generally do not involve severe injury; (6) the important causes of wife battering are sexual maladjustment, emotional disturbances, husband's inflated ego or inferiority complex, husband's alcoholism, jealousy, and wife's passive timidity; (7) exposure to violence of the assaulter in his childhood is an important factor in wife battering; (8) though illiterate wives are more vulnerable to husband's beating than the educated wives, there is no significant relationship between beating and the educational level of the victims; and (9) though wives with alcoholic husbands have higher rates of victimization, it has been observed that most of the husbands beat their wives not in a state of drunkenness but while they are sober.

Violence Against Widows

All widows do not face similar problems. A widow may be one who has no issue and who has been widowed one or two years of her marriage; or she may be one who becomes a widow after a period of 5

to 10 years and has one or two small children to support, or she may be one who is above 50 years of age. Though all these three categories of widows have to face the problems of social, economic and emotional adjustment, the first and the third category of widows have no liabilities while the second category of widows has to perform the role of a father for her children. The first two categories of widows have also to face the problem of biological adjustment. These two types are not as welcome in their husband's family as the third type. In fact, while the family members try to get rid of the first two categories of widows, the third category of widow becomes a key person in the son's family as she is made responsible for caring for her son's children and cooking food in the absence of her working daughter-in-law. The self-image and the self-esteem of the three categories of widows also vary. A widow's economic dependence is a severe threat to her self-esteem and her sense of identity. The low status accorded to them by their in-laws and others in the family roles lowers their self-esteem. The stigma of widowhood itself negatively affects a woman and she falls in her own esteem.

If we take all types of widows together, we could say that violence against widows includes physical battering, emotional neglect/torture, verbal abuse, sexual abuse, deprivation of legitimate share in property, and abuse of their children. The important characteristics of violence against widows are: (1) young widows are more humiliated, harassed, exploited or victimised than the middle-aged widows; (2) ordinarily, widows know little about their husband's business, accounts, certificates, insurance policies, and bonds, and become easy victims of fraudulent schemes fostered by unscrupulous members of their family (of procreation) who try to acquire their inherited property or life-insurance benefits; (3) perpetrators of violence are mostly the members of the husband's family; (4) of the three most important motives of victimization—power, property and sex—property is a crucial factor in victimization in middle-class widows, sex in the lower class widows, and power in both the middle class and the lower-class widows; (5) though the authoritarian personality of the mother-in-law and the maladjustment of siblings-in-law are important etiological factors in the widow's victimization, the most important factor is widow's passive timidity; and (6) age, education, and class appear to be significantly correlated to the exploitation of the widows but family composition and family size have little correlation with it.

Victims of Violence

If we take all the cases of violence against women together, we find that the victims of violence are generally those:

- who feel helpless, depressed, have a poor self-image and suffer from self-devaluation, or those who are 'emotionally consumed' by the perpetrators of violence, or who suffer from 'altruistic powerlessness';
- who live in stressful family situations, or who live in families which, in sociological terms cannot be called 'normal' families, that is, families which are structurally complete (both parents being alive and living together), economically secure (satisfying basic and subsidiary needs of members, functionally adequate (have rare quarrels) and morally conformative;
- who lack social maturity or social inter-personal skills because of which they face behavioural problems;
- whose husbands/in-laws have pathological personalities; and
- whose husbands are frequent alcohol users.

Perpetrators of Violence

Seven types of victimizers of women may be identified. They are those:

- who have depressions, inferiority complex and low self-esteem;
- who have personality disorders and are psychopaths;
- who lack resources, skills, and talents and have sociopathic personality;
- who have possessive, suspicious and dominant natures;
- who faces stressful situations in family life;
- who were victims of violence in childhood; and
- who are frequent users of alcohol.

Types of Violence

If we were to develop a typology of violence against women, we may give six types of violence :

- violence which is money-oriented;
- violence which seeks power over the weak;
- violence which aims at pleasure-seeking;
- violence which is the result of the perpetrator's pathology;
- violence which is the result of stressful family situations; and
- violence which is victim-precipitated.

Motivations in Violence

Violence against women may be explained on the basis of three factors: (i) situations which bring about violent behaviour, (ii) characteristics of victims, and (iii) characteristics of victimizers. Four causes may be identified in violence against women: (a) victim's provocation, (b) intoxication, (c) hostility towards women, and (d) situational urge.

The Victim's Provocation

Sometimes the victim of violence by her behaviour, which is often unconscious, creates the situation of her own victimization. The victim either generates or triggers off the violent behaviour of the offender. Her actions transform him into an assaulter/aggressor making him direct his criminal intentions against her. In my own survey of rape, wife-battering, abduction, ill treatment of widows, and murders, the focus was on victims, yet some offenders/assaultors/aggressors were also interviewed. Surprisingly, only a few seemed to suffer from any feelings of shame or anxiety. A large number did not suffer from any emotional turmoil or from what psychologists call the problem of 'troubled masculinity'. The assaultors in wife battering cases instead accused their wives of back-biting, talking to person(s) they disliked, ill-treating their sisters or parents or brothers, neglecting their home, talking rudely to relatives, having illicit relations with some person, refusing to obey their in-laws, irritating them with their quarrelsome or nagging nature, or interfering too much in their affairs. Similarly, in criminal assault (rape) cases, there were assaultors who described the behaviour of the victim as a direct invitation to sexual relations or a sign that she would be available if he persisted. It is significant to determine whether the victim actually intended to invite such behaviour or not or whether it was merely the victimizer's own interpretation/perception that led him to exploit her. This may be called an 'act of omission' (failing to react strongly) on the part of the victim, if not an 'act of commission'.

Thus, the 'passive' victim contributes to the commission of violent act to the same extent as the 'active' victim. In murder cases too, we came across a few cases where, according to the assaultors, the homicide situation started when in arguments and altercations, the victims precipitated such circumstances which motivated them to attack them. In abduction cases too, some abductors pointed out that their 'victims' had willingly agreed to run away with them and marry but,

when they were arrested on the complaint of parents, the 'victim' had accused them of abduction on being coerced by their parents. On an average, 39.0% cases were found *willing abductions*, 24.0% were *forced abductions*, 17.0% *accessory abductions* (in which victims neither gave their consent of going with the 'accused person' nor opposed it but succumbed to the relationship of 'power' of the accused over her), and 20.0% were *stress abductions* (in which the victim initially agreed to leave the house willingly but later on repented when the 'offender' raped her or sold her ornaments or left her in the hotel).

This analysis enables us to classify victims as active, passive and accidental. At least two kinds of victims create a situation in which 'offender' becomes the 'victim' of the situation and/or compulsion and behaves with the 'victim' (female) in such a way that he comes to be labelled as the 'assaultor' or 'victimizer'

Intoxication

Some cases of violence occur when the aggressors are intoxicated and in a wildly excited and belligerent state of mind, scarcely understanding the consequences of their actions. For example, in a few cases of rape, the offenders assaulted the victims when they had taken so much alcohol that they were in a state of inebriation and emotional excitement. Their normal restraints had disappeared and their aggressive fantasies were intimately intermingled with sexual lust which then took the shape of irresponsible actions. Alcohol-related sex crimes illustrate a reckless disregard of time, space and circumstances.

A similar relationship between alcoholism and violence was demonstrated in a few cases of wife-battering and murder. While in my own study, I had found that wife-battering was accompanied by the use of alcohol in 31.7% of the cases, (Ahuja, 1987: 130), Hilberman and Munson (1978 : 460-71) had found it in 93.0% of the cases, Wolfgang (1978) in 67.0% cases, and Tinklenberg (1973) in 71.0% cases.

We must admit that when we interrelate violence with alcoholism, we rely only on the reported use of alcohol rather than on the measurements of alcohol levels in the blood. In fact, it is the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) which ought to be the basis of associating battering with the influence of alcohol. A very high BAC reduces the capability of the subject to cause bodily harm to others. However, we assume that the level of BAC must be such that the offender loses control over himself only to the extent that he fails to think of the

consequences of his actions. It is only in this state of mind that he becomes violent.

It is not clear whether alcohol induces violent behaviour directly or whether it acts primarily as a disinhibitor of pre-existing aggressive tendencies. The latter hypothesis is perhaps supported by the notion (Blumer, 1973: 73-87) that some perpetrators of violence drink for courage prior to using violence against persons. But not a single case was reported in my study in which the assaultor became intoxicated for the specific purpose of assaulting his victim. However, we cannot provide any proof that the ingest of alcohol alone elicits violent behaviour. There are many people who take alcohol yet they do not become violent. The use of alcohol in violence against women may, therefore, be accepted as a 'cooperative' factor rather than the 'chief' factor.

Hostility towards Women

Some of the reported cases of violence against women are of a nature that no amount of rationalization could convert the aggressors into doing any thing other than hostile acts of a cruel kind. A few of them had deeply entrenched feelings of hate and hostility for women that their violent act could be said to be primarily directed towards the humiliation of the victim. If the mere situation had been the motivating factor, it is hard to see why a violent act should have been necessary considering the fact that most of the 'offenders' are described as 'normal' persons. Perhaps a desire to gloat over the victim's humiliation was more stronger.

Situational Urge

In this category, those cases may be included where the crime is committed neither because of the victim's behaviour nor because of the offender's psychopathological personality but rather because of the *chance factors which create such situations which lead to violence*. For example, in a wife-battering case, it may be that conflict over money matters or on the ill-treatment of husband's parent(s) may provoke the husband to assault his wife; or in a rape case, a man accidentally meets a female acquaintance from his neighbouring village in a field and begins a conversation, ultimately attempting to have his way with her, or the male employer taking advantage of his young female employee finding her alone in his office/factory in the late hours of the evening, or a

young girl runs away from her father's house and accepts a lift in a truck and the truck-driver takes advantage of the situation and criminally assaults her. In all these cases, the 'offenders' had not planned the violent acts but when they found the situation conducive or provocative, they used violence. Apart from these violent acts, these offenders had not been living a life of deviant behaviour.

Personality Traits

Some identifying traits of the violence-prone personalities are: extremely suspicious, passionate, dominant, irrational, immoral, easily emotionally upset, jealous, possessive and unjust. Traits developed in the early life affect the aggressive behaviour of a person in adulthood. Aggressor's being abused as child, and/or his exposure to violence during childhood, therefore, must be examined to delve into his violent behaviour. For example, in the case of some wife-batterers, their childhood, adolescence and early adulthood experiences reveal that they learnt to respond to all emotionally distressing cues with angry and violent behaviour. Unhappy family life amounting to exposure to physical brutality or severe emotional rejection has been found to be the rule in the case of most of the aggressors. Some adult aggressors have faced such situations in their family in their childhood/adolescence where they always found their parents screaming and getting at each other, and their father beating them (children) on the slightest pretext. Often, their fathers would come home drunk and would charge around the house shouting and breaking things. Growing up in a violent home inevitably leads to violent behaviour in individuals, who become aggressive persons in their adult life. Alfaro (1978), Potts, Herzberger and Holland (1979), and Fagon, Stewart and Hansen (1981) have also pointed out a similar correlation in their empirical studies on violent men and their children. Thus, we can say that a good number of aggressors are victims of child abuse and familial violence, and exposure to violence as a child strongly influences the probability of one being generally violent as an adult.

Theoretical Explanation of Violent Behaviour

We have already presented a theoretical explanation of deviant/violent behaviour in one of the earlier chapters (Chapter 8 on "Child Abuse") by examining the different schools of thought as well by expounding our own conceptual framework. The theoretical propositions on

violence typically encountered, whether violence is a normal response of provocation, or whether it involves the acting out of some psychopathology, or whether it acts as an instrument to obtaining some end or reward, or whether it is a response consistent with norms supporting its use, are explained. Our own conceptual framework is based on a holistic approach and is presented as the 'Social Bond Theory' which explains violent behaviour to a large extent.

The psychiatric or psychopathological school focuses on the aggressor's personality characteristics as the chief determinant of criminal violent behaviour. The socio-psychological school assumes that criminal violence can best be understood by analysing the external environmental factors that exercise an impact on the individual aggressor. This model also examines the types of everyday interactions (say, stressful situations or family interactional patterns...) which are precursors to violence. Theories such as the Frustration-Aggression Theory, the Perversion Theory, the Self Attitude Theory, and the Motive Attribution Theory also fall within the purview of socio-psychological level of analysis. The sociological school provides a macro level analysis of criminal violence. Besides these, the Theory of Sub-culture of Violence, the Learning Theory, the Anomie Theory and the Resource Theory also fall under the socio-cultural analysis.

For developing a new theoretical approach in my empirical study on violence (crimes) against women, I had two alternatives before me: either to take 'inter-family violence' and 'violence exogeneous to family' separately or combine all types of violence together and develop one theory on 'violence against women'. I used the last approach borrowing certain concepts from sociologists and criminologists like Hirschi, Schultz etc.

Violence against a person is necessarily 'violence by somebody' and 'violence against somebody'. As such, violence against women has to be understood as 'violence by an individual against an individual' in contrast to 'violence by a group against an individual' or 'violence by a group against a group'. In violence by the individual, its origin or form must be determined in the individual himself and the situation around him. In this approach, not only individual's innate behaviour but also his acquired behaviour has to be taken into account. Our 'Social Bond Approach' takes into consideration both types of behaviour as well as the social structural conditions. This has been discussed in the earlier chapter. It explains the kind and patterns of violence against women in terms of variations among individuals (offenders) in their social

adjustments, frustrations and relative deprivations, their social structural conditions, and the 'resistance potential' of the victims.

The Depersonalisation Trauma and Humanisitic Approach

What measures should we adopt to prevent women's abuse and to reduce violence against women in our society? The suggestion that improving the general status of women through education, effective legislative measures, providing training and employment opportunities will reduce violence against women may be valid and logical but is too broad a suggestion. Similarly, it is suggested that too much prominence should not be given to cases of violence against women in the mass media. Although, there are ethical and humanitarian reasons for censoring violence against women in the mass media, we have no evidence that such a move will necessarily lead to reduction in violence. The same is true of providing deterrent punishment to perpetrators and social ostracisation by one's kin, neighbours and friends. These measures may be desirable for their social effects but we cannot be certain that they will lessen the exploitation of women to any extent. While there is lack of evidence to identify which general policies deserve priority, there are nevertheless a number of measures which could be adopted to contain women's harassment.

First, we take up the issue that is already receiving attention from many women's organisations as well as government and private/public institutions. This is to meet the needs of *protection, support and advice* of the victims. What some, if not all, women need most is the shelter. Women living with authoritarian in-laws and alcoholic husbands would leave their homes, temporarily or permanently, if some shelter is available to them. Voluntary organisations providing such accommodation to women have to publicize their schemes. It has to be borne in mind that even the existing Homes for Women—single and/or married—are not able to meet the required demands. They are often over-crowded, lack financial support and fail to meet safety regulations. Providing short-term accommodation to women, particularly married women who are in distress, or victims of violence like rape, abduction, attempt to murder, and ultimately helping them find a permanent house by the women's organisations will contribute to the alleviation of the distress suffered by many women. There is an urgent need to evaluate and compare the different types of short-term accommodation that could be provided to the victimized women, including widows.

Second, assistance in finding employment and child-care facilities and temporary financial support is also the need of the suffering women. Advisory centres for this purpose could be located centrally but away from the Women Homes so that they can be well advertised without affecting the safety of the residents in the Homes

Third, establishment of cheaper and less formal courts could also be a measure to help women who are victims of exploitation. It is not being suggested that these courts will handle only the female cases. Their scope has to be wider. We have at present the system of Family Courts in some states in our country. But these courts are mainly concerned with preventing the break-up of the marriages. The scope of these courts could be extended to deal with all types of domestic and non-domestic problems of women. The establishment of courts with judges, magistrates and lawyers chosen for their knowledge and interest in female matters would be an improvement and it will increase the number of women entering the legal profession. To many women, the courts and the laws would seem less frightening and more approachable, if they are less dominated by men. Female judges and lawyers may not differ significantly from their male counterparts in their attitudes and beliefs and in their interpretation of laws, but female victims might be happier to appear before other females in the expectation that they would be more understanding about the problems faced by women.

Fourth, strengthening and increasing voluntary organisations which could take up individual women's problems with their in-laws or the police or the courts or the concerned individuals is equally necessary. This is because the voice of an individual woman carries no weight. In fact, she is accused of being outspoken if she demands her rights or holds radical views or expresses her views and releases her frustrations. But if a group of women join together and raise their voice against woman's suffering, they can assert their views and make an impact.

Fifth, publicity has to be given to those organisations which provide free legal aid to women so that the needy women could approach them and seek their help.

Last, a change in parents' attitudes is also necessary in women's cases. Why do parents force their daughters— married or widowed— who are frequently beaten by their husbands or ill-treated by their in-laws to live in their husbands' house against their own wishes? When parents come to know of their daughter's harassment, why should they not permit their daughters to live with them for a short time till they are

able to fend for themselves ? Why should they remain so concerned about the social stigma and sacrifice their daughters for the sake of their family ?

Why should women submit to oppression ? Why do they not realise that they have the potential to look after themselves and their children ? Why do they not comprehend that their torture creates an emotional trauma for their children also ? Women have to learn to be assertive and accept new roles for themselves. They have to develop an optimistic and hopeful approach to life.

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10

Illiteracy

Illiteracy in India has, since long before Independence, been regarded as an obstacle to development. It is commonly believed that without substantially eliminating illiteracy, India cannot become a cohesive nation and give to all its citizens the quality of life they have long yearned for. No wonder that education in general and literacy in particular have been accorded a high priority in the country's development process.

How is literacy defined? Who is literate? That person is 'literate' who can read and write some language. The Census Commission in India in 1991 has defined as 'literate' any person who can read and write "with understanding," in any Indian language, and not merely read and write. Those who can read but cannot write are not literate. Formal education in a school is not necessary for a person to be considered as literate.

In a resolution on National Policy on Education adopted in 1968, radical reconstruction of education was proposed so that it involved : (i) a transformation of the system to relate it more closely to the life of the people, (ii) a continuous effort to expand educational opportunity, (iii) a sustained effort to raise the quality of education at all stages, (iv) an emphasis on the development of science and technology, and (v) cultivation of moral and social values. In 1986 stress was laid on the educational policy and the provision of equal opportunities of education to all classes was emphasised.

There has been some progress in the field of education since the 1950s. The number of recognised educational institutions has increased more than three times, that is, from 2.31 lakh in 1951 to 7.55 lakh in

1985. The enrolment of students in the educational institutions has increased more than five and a half times, that is, from 24 million to 132 million in the same period. A little more than a three fold increase has also been registered in the total number of literates, that is, from 16.7% in 1951 to 52.11% in 1991 (*The Hindustan Times*, March 26, 1991). The change in the literacy rates in different years is shown in Table below (literacy rates relate to population aged seven years and above in 1991, but to the total population of the country upto 1981).

Table 10.1: All India Literacy Rates

Year	Population (Millions)	Illiterates (Millions)	Literates (Millions)	Literacy Rate (Percentage)		
				Male	Female	Total
1901	235.1	222.5	12.6	9.8	0.6	5.3
1911	248.2	233.5	14.7	10.6	1.1	5.9
1921	246.7	229.0	17.7	12.2	1.8	7.2
1931	273.4	247.4	26.0	15.6	2.9	9.5
1941	312.0	261.8	50.2	24.9	7.3	16.1
1951	353.1	294.2	58.9	25.0	7.9	16.7
1961	428.0	325.5	102.6	34.4	13.0	24.0
1971	533.5	376.2	157.3	39.5	18.7	29.4
1981	665.3	424.3	241.0	46.9	24.8	36.2
1991	843.9	481.9	362.0	63.8	39.4	52.1

Source: *Frontline*, April 27-May 10, 1991, p. 55 & *The Hindustan Times*, March 26, 1991

If the old definition of the literacy is adopted and the entire population considered, the literacy rate is 42.94% for 1991 compared to 36.23% in 1981 and 29.48% in 1971.

Together with the quantitative expansion of education facilities, there is now a greater emphasis on qualitative as well. Before 1976, education was exclusively the responsibility of the states, the Central Government being concerned only with the coordination and determination of standards in technical and higher education. In 1976, through a Constitutional amendment, education became the joint responsibility of both the Centre and the States. Determined efforts are now being made to achieve the goal of universal elementary education and eradication of illiteracy in the age group 15-35 by 1985. On the one hand, community participation has been planned, and on the other hand a programme named "Operation Blackboard" has been implemented to provide the basic amenities in education in primary schools. Non-

formal education and open learning systems are being encouraged at all levels. However, in the field of removing illiteracy in the country, not much progress could be made due to its huge population. This is evident from the vast magnitude of illiterate persons still found in the country.

Magnitude of Illiteracy

According to the preliminary estimates of the 1991 census, 47.89% people of the total population of India or about 404 million persons are illiterate (*The Hindustan Times*, March 26, 1991). Today, 44 years after Independence, 5 out of every 10 Indians, three out of five women, and eight out of ten tribals and the Scheduled Caste people still cannot read or write. Of the total illiterate people, about 100 million illiterates are in the 15-35 age group which is considered to be the most productive age group, crucial to the task of national reconstruction. This number is constantly on the increase and by the turn of the century the country will have the single largest number of illiterates in the whole world.

The 1991 figures also reveal that Kerala retains its position in literacy by being at the top, Bihar stands at the bottom, with Rajasthan standing close to it. According to the 1991 census, the literacy rates in different states are : Andhra Pradesh : 45.11, Assam : 53.42, Bihar : 38.54, Gujarat : 60.91, Haryana : 55.33, Himachal Pradesh : 63.54, Karnataka : 55.98, Kerala : 90.59, Madhya Pradesh : 43.45, Maharashtra : 63.05, Manipur : 60.96, Meghalaya : 48.26, Mizoram : 81.23, Nagaland : 61.30, Orissa : 48.55, Punjab : 57.14, Rajasthan : 38.81, Sikkim : 56.53, Tamil Nadu : 63.72, Tripura : 60.39, Uttar Pradesh : 41.71, and West Bengal : 57.72 (*Frontline*, April 13-26, 1991).

In terms of the all India ranking in literacy rate, Kerala enjoys the first rank followed by Mizoram, Tamil Nadu, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Gujarat, Nagaland, Tripura, West Bengal, Punjab, Sikkim, Karnataka, Haryana, Assam, Orissa, and Meghalaya. From the other side (that is in terms of the lowest literacy rate), Bihar gets the first rank followed by Rajasthan, Arunachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, (*Frontline*, April 13-26, 1991).

Even though the literacy rate in India has increased from 36.2% in 1981 to 42.9% in 1991 (in accordance with the old definition of literacy), yet in absolute terms, the number of illiterates has increased from 29.42 crore in 1951 to 48.19 crore in 1991. If this high percentage

of illiterates in India is compared with the number of illiterates in other countries, our country appears to be extremely backward. In 1986, the number of illiterates in Russia was almost nil, in United States it was 1.0%, in Italy 3.0%, in China 31.0%, in Egypt 47.0%, in Nigeria 57.0%, in Libya 34.0%, in Brazil 21.0%, in Sri Lanka 13.0%, in Singapore 14.0%, in Yugoslavia 8.0%, and in India, it was 57.0% of the total population (*Saptahik Hindustan*, January 15-21, 1989).

The attainment of the goal of universal elementary education appears to be almost impossible because we are spending only 1.9% of our total annual budget on education in comparison to 19.9% spent by America, 19.6% by Japan, 11.2% by Russia, and 17.8% by France. More details are given in Table 10.2.

The problem of illiteracy among women in our country is worse. It is estimated that in 1991, there are 247.6 million illiterate women in India. The illiteracy percentage among females today is 60.58 in comparison to 36.14 among males. In the urban areas, female illiteracy

Table 10.2: Percentage of Budget Spent on Education (1981)

Country	Budget Spent on Education	Literacy
1 U.S.S.R.	11.2	98.5
2 U.S.A.	19.9	99.5
3 Japan	19.6	99.0
4. England	13.9	99.0
5 France	17.8	97.0
6 Australia	14.8	98.5
7. Canada	17.3	99.0
8. Germany	10.1	99.0
9 India	3.6	36.2
10. Pakistan	2.1	20.7
11. Bangla Desh	2.1	25.8
12 Sri Lanka	3.5	86.5
13 Burma	1.6	65.9
14 Nepal	3.0	23.3
15. Bhutan	1.9	18.0
16. Singapore	N.A.	84.2
17. Egypt	5.5	68.6

Source : Myron Weiner (1991), *The Child and the State in India*, Princeton University Press, p. 159, and *Frontline*, April 27-May 10, 1991, p. 55.

is 52.0% against 34.0% among males. In the rural areas, the female illiteracy rate is 82.0% against 59.0% among males. Rajasthan has the lowest female literacy rate in the country. According to the provisional projections of the 1991 census, the female literacy figure in Rajasthan stood at 20.84%, followed by Bihar with 23.10%, Uttar Pradesh with 26.2%, and Madhya Pradesh with 28.59%. Since in 1981, the female literacy rate in Rajasthan was only 13.99%, during 1981-91 it registered a 6.85% improvement. Bihar improved by 6.59% over the 1981 female literacy percentage of 16.51, Uttar Pradesh by 8.84% over the 1981 figures of 17.18% and Madhya Pradesh by 9.40% over the 1981 figure of 18.99% (*The Hindustan Times*, March 29, 1991). Table 10.3 below gives the comparison of literacy rates among males and females in different states (in 1991 in accordance with the new definition of literacy, that is, population aged seven years and above).

Table 10.3: Literacy Rate in Different States in India (1991)

(in percentage)

States (with population exceeding one crore)	Literacy rate (1991)		
	Total	Males	Females
1. India	52.11	63.86	39.42
2. Andhra Pradesh	45.11	56.24	33.71
3. Assam	53.42	62.34	43.70
4. Bihar	38.54	52.63	23.10
5. Gujarat	60.91	72.54	48.50
6. Haryana	55.33	67.85	40.94
7. Karnataka	55.98	67.25	44.34
8. Kerala	90.59	94.45	86.93
9. Madhya Pradesh	43.45	57.43	28.39
10. Maharashtra	63.05	74.84	50.51
11. Orissa	48.55	62.37	34.40
12. Punjab	57.14	63.68	49.72
13. Rajasthan	38.81	55.07	20.84
14. Tamil Nadu	63.72	74.88	52.29
15. Uttar Pradesh	41.71	55.35	26.02
16. West Bengal	57.72	67.24	47.15

Source : *Census of India*, 1991, Paper I Statement 16, page 67.

The position of illiteracy among children is equally bad. Between 1961 and 1981, roughly five million unschooled children joined the ranks of illiterates every year, swelling to a total which in 1981 stood at

437 million. Considering only those seven years of age and above, the number of illiterates stood at 302 million in 1981 and 324 million (provisional figure) in 1991. The primary school survival rate (that is, per cent completing fifth grade) in India is 38.0% in comparison to 70.0% in China, 64.3% in Egypt, 97.2% in Malaysia, 90.8% in Sri Lanka, and 90.0% in Singapore (Weiner, 1991: 159).

National Policy on Education

The Parliament approved in 1986 the National Policy on Education. It sought a national system of education laying down : (i) a curricular framework to establish comparability of competence at the end of various stages of education all over the country, (ii) reinforcing the integrative aspect of society and culture, and (iii) establishing a value system necessary for an egalitarian, democratic and secular society. The new policy lists the specific steps in such detail that it has been described as nothing less than a charter not only for equality of access to education but also for equalization with regard to the status of the disadvantaged sections of society. It lays down that educational transformation, reduction of disparities, universalization of elementary education, adult education, and scientific and technological research would be accepted as national responsibilities for which adequate resources would be provided.

The concept of the National System of Education implies that upto a given level, all students, irrespective of caste, sex or location, have access to education of a comparable quality. It envisages a common educational structure of 10+2+3 for all parts of the country. The break-up of the first 10 years comprises five years of primary education, three years of upper primary, and two years of high school. Regarding elementary education, the National Policy proposed to ensure that all children who attained the age of 11 years by 1990 will have had five years of schooling through the non-formal stream. Likewise, it proposed that by 1995 all children will be provided free and compulsory education upto 14 years of age.

Regarding eradicating illiteracy, the National Educational Policy 1986 proposed that in the 15-35 age group, a vast programme of adult and continuing education will be implemented through various channels like : (a) establishment of centres in rural areas for continuing education, (b) worker's education through the employers and concerned agencies of the government, (c) radio, television and films as mass and group learning media, (d) creation of learners' groups and

organisations, (e) programmes of distance learning, and (f) organising assistance in self-learning.

The programme of action stipulated that about 40 million persons would be covered under the National Programme of Adult Education by 1990 and another 60 million persons by 1995. The 'careful consideration' of the question of continued illiteracy and the educational policy of the government is evident from the statement given on October 19, 1987 by the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi before a Harvard University audience: "I don't think literacy is the key to democracy. Wisdom is much more important. We have seen—and I am not now limiting myself to India, I am going beyond to other countries— literacy sometimes narrows the vision, does not broaden it". It is difficult to say whether the leader of the political party which ruled the country for about four decades was offering a rationale for the policies of doing nothing in the educational arena or was justifying the new educational policy.

Measures Adopted for Eradicating Illiteracy

Broadly speaking, three measures have been adopted for the eradication of illiteracy in our country: (i) National Adult Education Programme, (ii) Rural Literacy Programme, and (iii) National Literacy Mission.

National Adult Education (NAE) Programme

The NAE programme was launched on October 2, 1978 with the aim of providing education and promoting literacy among all illiterate persons, particularly in the age group of 15-35 years. The programme is a joint and collaborative effort of the central government, state governments, union territory administrations, voluntary agencies, universities, colleges and youth centres. The education under the NAE programme is a package which envisages: (i) imparting literacy skills to the target illiterate population, (ii) their functional development, and (iii) creation of awareness among them regarding laws and policies of the government for the efficient implementation of the strategy of redistributive justice. Special emphasis is being placed on the education of women, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections of society, who constitute the bulk of illiterate population in India.

UNESCO had declared the year 1990 as the International Literacy Year (ILY). The objective was to generate public awareness about the

need for the relevance of literacy. At the national level, the ILY was launched by the Prime Minister of India at a special function in New Delhi on January 22, 1990. The student and non-student volunteers were asked to muster their collective strength in the noble pursuit of spreading the message of literacy as well as the actual imparting of literacy.

Rural Functional Literacy (RFL) Programme

The RFL programme is a sub-programme of the Adult Education Programme which is fully funded by the Central Government and implemented by the States and union territories. The broad objectives of this programme are, (i) to develop abilities in the learners to read and write, and (ii) to create awareness among the learners about their rights and duties and the benefits they can draw from various schemes of socio-economic development being implemented by the government.

The RFL programme was launched in May, 1986 by involving the NSS and other student volunteers in colleges and universities on the principle of "Each One Teach One". Starting on a modest scale of 2 lakh volunteers, it has gone upto 4.50 lakhs in 1990 covering over 4.20 lakh learners. During 1987, an ambitious programme was adopted involving both students and teachers of schools and colleges with inputs for research studies on the success of the programme. The programme has been designed keeping in view the needs and languages of the learners. The government has selected 40 districts to improve the quality of adult education. It is only after evaluation of the impact that the programme will be taken up in a big way to spread literacy in the minimum possible time.

The process of the Mass Programme of Functional Literacy involves a number of stages. These stages are: selecting master trainers who are to train the student volunteers; selecting, motivating and mobilizing the student volunteers who are genuinely and sincerely committed to literacy work; identifying literate persons in the age group of 15-35 who may be staying in the neighbourhood of an educational institution; forging a link between the student volunteers and the illiterate persons and assigning an area of operation for each volunteer; monitoring of the programme of the student volunteers by senior teachers/headmasters of schools; coordination with various development departments/agencies by way of visits of functionaries to the place where the volunteer is imparting literacy, telling the learners about the advantages of being literate, making available charts, posters and other materials to the

learners and identifying genuine difficulties of the learners; and providing post-literacy activities for the non-literates through libraries and reading rooms. Coverage and support by the media and evaluation of the overall impact of the programme through University Departments of Adult and Continuing Education is of crucial importance.

National Literacy Mission

In accordance with the directives of the National Policy on Education and the implementation strategies envisaged in the Programme of Action, the government formulated a comprehensive programme known as National Literacy Mission (NLM) in the field of adult education. The NLM was launched by Rajiv Gandhi (at that time Prime Minister of India) in May 1988 to achieve the goal of imparting 'functional literacy' to 80 million illiterate persons in the 15-35 age group—30 million by 1990 and an additional 50 million by 1995. The Mission, thus, aimed at achieving 80.0% literacy in 1995 in comparison to 36.0% in 1981. The NLM aimed at involving the youth and voluntary agencies in the programme. In 1990, there was 513 projects in operation in various states and union territories. Likewise, presently there are 500 voluntary agencies working in the field. In addition, *Shramik Vidyapeeths* and 16 state resource centres are functioning in different states to cater to the workers' education and to provide technical resource support to the programme.

Evaluation of Measures Undertaken

The attempts made by the government upto 1965 for eradicating illiteracy could not succeed possibly because the nation then was pre-occupied with problems of food, employment and self-reliance. Besides, due to the increase in population also, the number of illiterates in the country progressively increased from 30 crore in 1951 to 44 crore in 1981. In 1991, however, the number came down to 40.41 crore. The Functional Literacy programme was expected to lower the rate of infant mortality, reduce the number of school drop-outs, improve health, produce better environmental conditions, create awareness of rights, help neo-literates acquire skills to improve their economic standing, motivate them to adopt small family norms and better the status of women. But have we been able to make any dent in the situation?

The main criticism is that the adult education movement does not have the support from the grassroots. The planning is more at the state level and there is nothing yet like a detailed programme of action district by district, village by village, and area to area, with weak areas and difficult problems carefully identified and provided for and resources firmly assured. Much time has been spent on pedagogy and local and regional invocations and freedom of choice have been effectively discouraged (Tarlok Singh : March, 1991). Instead of welcoming all the available options, including the so-called 'centre' approach, 'each one teach one' or 'each one teach many', the concerned central agency puts increasing obstacles in the way of voluntary and local agencies bringing learners together into 'centres' and imparting to them both literacy and other skills and socially useful knowledge. Our country does not have a coherent and well-worked out plan of action which will unite the centre and states, local bodies and voluntary organisations and constructive workers in a cumulative, all-embracing national effort.

As if the past failures are not warning enough, the Ramamurti Committee has also put the clock further back. In its Perspective Paper on Education presented in September, 1990, the Committee observed: "In the case of adults, inability to read and write has not necessarily meant lack of education" The intention perhaps is not to romanticise illiteracy but rather to underscore the need to redesign adult education programme meaningfully. But the committee, in its full report entitled "Towards an Enlightened and Human Society" submitted in December 1990, has not offered any meaningful scheme of work. It merely recommended that after the Eighth Five Year Plan, an independent study group should evaluate the programme now under way and propose appropriate strategies to remove adult illiteracy in the quickest possible time. The Committee further recommended that "the evaluation may also look into the various alternative models and study their relevance with respect to diverse socio-cultural and political conditions in different parts of India. The minimum objective of this study should be to find out on objective basis what approaches do not yield results, so that, at least those models may not be encouraged". Does this not show that the Ramamurti Committee's report leaves one with a feeling of utter dismay?

The Ramamurti Report further recommended that adult education programmes could be successful only when the other basic needs were linked simultaneously. These needs were defined as: health, nutrition,

housing and employment. In fact, the report stressed upon the suggestion that instead of starting literacy programmes, other basic needs be made 'aware' of. The second suggestion was that adult literacy models which failed to have the desired impact in five years ought to be scrapped. Knowing fully well the importance of work and nutrition, could it be said that the adult literacy programme should be postponed till we achieve the targets of employment, nutrition ...?

And, now we have a fresh controversy. A suggestion was given by the University Grants Commission's ex-Chairman, Professor Yashpal to close down universities and colleges for one year so as to involve teachers and students in a campaign for literacy. This suggestion was discussed by the vice-chancellors of various universities in a meeting held at Delhi on March 8, 1991 organised by the Association of Indian Universities in cooperation with the Planning Commission. They suggested that literacy be made a component of college and university curriculum and students be involved in literacy programmes during summer holidays. This suggestion deserves to be seriously considered.

Students remain free after their examinations for three to four months from mid-April to mid-July. During *Dassehra* vacations in August and winter vacations in December, school and college/university work is not so demanding and rural adults also have relatively free time. There are some 80 holidays in a year in schools and colleges. Adding 60 to 75 days of vacations, the total period in a year for which the students remain free comes to about 150 days or five months. If the holidays are made flexible to suit the convenience of the rural populace and if students devote about two months out of these five months in making illiterates literate and if credits are awarded to students for involving themselves in literacy programmes, removing illiteracy in a period of five years or so may not be difficult. Of course, suspending teaching for a year for national regeneration is an impractical and wasteful suggestion. When academic sessions in several universities are already behind schedule because of one or the other agitation, foregoing a year's academic life to participate in literacy programmes will be unacceptable to students and their parents. A shorter time frame like the summer vacation would be more feasible.

Besides the above critical evaluation of the literacy programmes, we may also identify the following hurdles in the successful implementation of the adult education programme (Sood, 1988: 4).

(1) Though the literacy programme was supposed to have the three dimensions of literacy awareness and functionality but in practice the programme has tended to become mainly a literacy programme, as most of the adult education centres are the least equipped to deal with the other two basic components of AEP. The adults find no incentive in going to these centres as they do not consider these programmes useful in the context of their environmental needs.

(2) The important factors which prevent adult illiterates from going to centres are: time constraint, economic pressures, fatalistic attitude nurtured by centuries of enslavement and exploitation, lack of leisure, family resistance geographical distance, absence of material incentives, negative attitude towards women's literacy and unawareness of the programme.

(3) Lack of commitment, interest and missionary zeal among key functionaries entrusted with the task of implementation of the programme pose a major challenge to the successful implementation of AEP.

(4) The threat posed by the vested interests has also negatively affected the programme, as it may deprive them of the cheap labour or potential vote banks. Therefore, veiled resistance and implicit indifference to the programme from a sizeable section of the community are stumbling blocks in the path of popularizing the programme.

(5) The programme's effectiveness is also impaired due to some practical difficulties like over-emphasis on rules, voluntary agencies not receiving cooperation from state governments, absence of coordination among various agencies, lack of effective support from mass media, poor quality of training of functionaries, absence of proper evaluation, and lack of support by Panchayati Raj institutions in a sustained manner.

Tapping the Student Power

Using the students in literacy campaign is tapping the student power for pulling the country out of its existing stagnation. The largest chunk of illiterates is in the Hindi belt (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh) where according to the latest Operation Research Group (ORG) report, more than 80% adults (15 years plus) are illiterate (against the present national average of 48%). If on an experimental basis, student services are used during the vacations in these states and if in return weightage is given to the

students in the admission to engineering, medical and technical institutions, the experiment might provide a model to the universities to adopt a 'neighbourhood approach' in carrying out literacy campaigns. The task is daunting and requires the most ingenuous efforts and dedication, but it can be managed by human competence. The programme has to be time-bound and it should be low cost. The students have to devote 2-3 hours a day for two months in teaching the illiterates. The cost per learner for the entire instruction (including teaching and learning material) should not exceed Rs. 15, which can easily be afforded by a poor country like ours. The motivation for the student instructors has to come in the form of weightage in passing examinations and in getting admissions in educational institutions of their choice. Knowing the vast number of students in higher secondary schools, in colleges and in universities, millions of students can be used for teaching groups of 10 learners each, and, thus, carrying the torch of literacy to millions of illiterate adults. The young students with drive and commitment can move mountains, if given responsibility and a feeling of trust and confidence.

Efforts by Voluntary Organisations

The government alone cannot solve the vast problem of illiteracy in the country. It is not possible to achieve the objective of total eradication of illiteracy entirely through governmental efforts. The government can undoubtedly take cognizance of the situation, can identify the agencies, institutions and individuals, can act as a catalytic agent to provide human, material and financial resources, but the government cannot promote literacy all by itself. The efforts of the government—both central and state—therefore, will have to be supplemented and strengthened by voluntary organisations and individuals who have a positive perception and commitment.

World Literacy of Canada (WLC) is one such voluntary organisation engaged in promoting adult literacy in the developing world with the help of local community-based organisations. Till date, the WLC has supported 26 literacy projects in India including the famous Literacy House in Lucknow. The South Asian Partnership (SAP) along with WLC has also proposed projects for women's adult education in backward states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh. The SAP, in collaboration with 36 NGOs involved with sustainable development, is hopeful that one million women will be literate by 2000 A.D.

If adult literacy is necessary, a child's education is an urgent national priority. Article 45 of our Constitution refers to "endeavour to provide by 1960 free and compulsory education for all children until they reach 14 years of age". While many state governments claim to have enacted compulsory education laws but in practice, no state has implemented such a law, that is, requiring local authorities to compel school attendance. In fact, instead of talking of 'compulsory' education, the decision-makers now talk of 'universal' education. Even the New Educational Policy of 1986 gives concrete expression to the shift away from the goal of compulsory schooling. Elementary education is now 'universalized' and not 'compelled'. The educational restructuring and the 'new' policy now focuss on 'incentives' like free school meals, free uniforms, free books and skill-oriented teaching. Of the estimated 82 million Indian children in the 6-14 age-group, less than half attend school. Of every 10 children who enter the first grade, only four complete four years of schooling. By shrugging off its duty to educate children, our society and our government are in effect denying the experience of childhood, that is, of play, experimentation, and self-discovery to millions of children. Retreat from the formal commitment to mandatory full-time schooling has unmistakably been a retrogressive step in economic development as well as in reducing the problem of child labour in the country.

It may be concluded that the tasks of making some 400 million people literate, of persuading the parents of about 42 million children in the 6-14 age group to send their children to schools and of giving incentive to the parents of 74% children who enter primary school to complete the fifth grade (only 26% children complete primary education in India before leaving the school) are indeed daunting and require ingenious efforts and a high degree of motivation on the part of both the learners and the instructors. Such a serious problem of illiteracy calls for drastic measures rather than the half-hearted approaches we have so sedulously pursued all these years without tangible results. Mass illiteracy and child education have to be tackled on a war footing because of the sheer magnitude of the problem.

11

Urbanization

Along with the growth of population in the last few decades, there has been a shift in the population from rural to urban areas. The increasing urbanization has led to problems like crime and juvenile delinquency, alcoholism and drug abuse, housing shortage, over-crowding and slums, unemployment and poverty, pollution and noise, and communication and traffic control among others. But if cities are places of tensions and strain, they are also the centres of civilization and culture. They are active, innovative, and alive. They provide opportunities to achieve one's aspirations. If the future of our country is linked with the development of rural areas, it is equally linked with the growth of cities and metropolitan areas. But before analysing these problems, let us understand the basic concepts.

Concepts of Urban, Urbanization and Urbanism

Urban

What is an 'urban area' or a city or a town? This term is used in two senses—demographically and sociologically. In the former sense, emphasis is given to the size of population, density of population and nature of work of the majority of the adult males; while in the latter sense, the focus is on heterogeneity, impersonality, inter-dependence, and the quality of life. The German sociologist, Tonnies (1957) differentiated between rural and urban communities in terms of social relationships and values. The rural *gemeinschaft* community is one in which social bonds are based on close personal ties of kinship and

friendship, and the emphasis is on tradition, consensus and informality, while the urban *gesellschaft* society is one in which impersonal and secondary relationships predominate and the interaction of the people is formal, contractual and dependent on the special function or service they perform. The emphasis on *gesellschaft* society is on utilitarian goals and competitive nature of social relationships. Other sociologists like Max Weber (1961 : 381) and George Simmel (1950) have stressed on dense living conditions, rapidity of change and impersonal interaction in urban settings. Louis Wirth (1938 : 8) has said that for sociological purposes a city may be defined as 'a relatively large, dense and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals'. Scholars like Ruth Glass (1956) have defined city in terms of factors like : size of population, density of population, main economic system, type of administration, and some social characteristics.

In India, the census definition of 'town' remains more or less the same for the period 1901-51; but in 1961, a new definition was adopted. Upto 1951, 'town' included (1) collection of houses permanently inhabited by not less than 5,000 persons, (2) every municipality/corporation/notified area of whatever size, and (3) all civil lines not included within the municipal units. Thus, the primary focus in the definition of town was more on the administrative set up rather than the size of the population. In 1961, certain tests were applied for defining a place as 'town'. These were : (a) a minimum population of 5,000, (b) a density of not less than 1,000 persons per square mile, (c) three-fourths of its working population should be engaged in non-agricultural activities, and (d) the place should have a few characteristics and civic amenities like transport and communication, banks, schools, markets, recreation centres, hospitals, electricity, and newspapers, etc. As a result of this change in the definition, 812 areas (with 44 lakh people) declared as towns in 1951 census were not so considered in 1961 census. The 1961 basis was adopted in the 1971, 1981 and 1991 censuses too for defining towns. Now demographically, areas with population between 5,000 and 20,000 are considered as small towns, those with population between 20,000 and 50,000 are considered as large towns, those with population between 50,000 and one lakh are considered as big cities, and areas with more than 10 lakh people are considered as metropolitan areas.

Sociologists do not attach much importance to the size of the population in the definition of city because the minimum population standards vary greatly. For example, in the Netherlands a minimum

population of 20,000 is required for a place to be designated as urban; in France, Austria and West Germany, it is 2,000; in Japan it is 3,000; in U.S.A. it is 3,500; and so on. As such, they give more importance to characteristics other than the population size. Theodorson (1969 : 451) has defined 'urban community' as "a community with a high population density, a predominance of non-agricultural occupations, a high degree of specialisation resulting in a complex division of labour, and a formalised system of local government. It is also characterised by a prevalence of impersonal secondary relations and dependence on formal social controls." According to Robert Redfield (A.J.S., January, 1942), 'urban society' is characterized by a large heterogeneous population, close contact with other societies (through trade, communication, etc.), a complex division of labour, a prevalence of secular over sacred concerns, and the desire to organise behaviour rationally toward given goals, as opposed to following traditional standards and norms.

Urbanization

Urbanization is the movement of population from rural to urban areas and the resulting increasing proportion of a population that resides in urban rather than rural places. Thompson Warran (*Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*) has defined it as "the movement of people from communities concerned chiefly or solely with agriculture to other communities, generally larger whose activities are primarily centred in government, trade, manufacture, or allied interests". According to Anderson (1953 : 11), urbanization is not a one-way process but it is a two-way process. It involves not only movement from villages to cities and change from agricultural occupation to business, trade, service and profession, but it also involves change in the migrants' attitudes, beliefs, values and behaviour patterns. He has given five characteristics of urbanization: money economy, civil administration, cultural changes, written records and innovations.

Urbanism

Urbanism is a way of life. It reflects an organisation of society in terms of a complex division of labour, high levels of technology, high mobility, interdependence of its members in fulfilling economic functions and impersonality in social relations (Theodorson, 1969 : 453).

Characteristics of Urbanism or Urban System

Louis Wirth (1938 : 49) has given four characteristics of urbanism:

- *Transiency* an urban inhabitant keeps on forgetting his own acquaintances and develops relations with new people. Since he is not much attached with his neighbours, members of the clubs, he does not mind their leaving these places.

- *Superficiality* an urban person has the limited number of persons with whom he interacts and his relations with them are impersonal and formal. People meet each other in highly segmental roles. They are dependent on more people for the satisfactions of their life needs.

- *Anonymity* urbanites do not know each other intimately. Personal mutual acquaintanship between the inhabitants which ordinarily inheres in a neighbourhood is lacking.

- *Individualism* people give more importance to their own vested interests.

Ruth Glass (1956 : 32) has given the following characteristics of urbanism: mobility, anonymity, individualism, impersonal relations, social differentiation, transience and organic type of solidarity. Anderson (1953 : 2) has listed three characteristics of urbanism: adjustability, mobility, and diffusion. Marshal Clinard (1957) has talked of rapid social change, conflict between norms and values, increasing mobility of population, emphasis on material things and decline in intimate interpersonal communication as important characteristics of urbanism. K. Lewis (1953) has highlighted eight characteristics of the urban social system: social heterogeneity (people of different religions, languages, castes, and classes live in urban areas. There is also specialisation in occupation), secondary association, social mobility, individualism, spatial segregation, social tolerance, secondary control and voluntary associations. Louis Wirth (1938 : 1-24) has given four characteristics of urbanism: heterogeneity of population, specialisation of function, anonymity, impersonality and standardization of life and behaviour. Though these characteristics present an exaggerated picture of the urban man and his life, yet their analysis here is necessary.

(a) *Heterogeneity of population* The large population in cities can be largely attributed to migration from different areas which leads to people of different backgrounds and beliefs living together. This mixture of people affects the working of informal controls—mores and institutions—and reliance on formally designed mechanisms for regulating the behaviour of individuals and groups increases. People no

longer share the common sentiments, and being exposed to new ideas imported from other cultures through contacts with migrants, they challenge the outmoded beliefs and practices and adopt such new attitudes and lifestyles which help them in improving their economic status and coping with problems of adjustment. The influence of family and neighbourhood decreases and people come into conflict on the question of what is the 'right' way to behave.

(b) *Specialisation of function and behaviour.* The heterogeneity and the large size of population of a city favour the development of specialisation. Since the city has many facets of life and an individual can participate only in some of them, he becomes choosy and takes interest only in a few fields. Specialisation in function encourages a diversity of life patterns. Doctors, engineers, businessmen, lawyers, bureaucrats, factory workers, teachers, clerks, policemen, for example, have different life patterns, different interests, and different philosophy of life. Each specialist group makes its own contribution to the community and thus a division of labour is created. The cloth merchant sells only cloth, say, and depends on many other specialists to manufacture, process and distribute cloth so that it reaches his shop. Such a division of labour permits an individual to benefit from a broader range of services than his own knowledge and capabilities provide. Each inhabitant in the city becomes dependent on specialists such as physicians, masons, mechanics, shopkeepers, tailors, washermen, and so on. He has not to learn the techniques of each profession.

Specialisation provides to the individual diverse opportunities to act, to express himself and to develop his potentialities. However, the contacts become secondary and formal and the sense of living a common life and having common concerns is destroyed. The relationship between two persons remains for a short duration till they gratify each other's purpose.

In a social order characterised by a heterogeneous population and diversity in behaviour patterns, there is a greater likelihood of confusion among several alternatives for proper behaviour in a given situation. For example, one student finds other student using unfair means and getting first division. He then thinks, should he do the same thing? One person finds another person giving Rs. 10,000 and getting a job of a police sub-inspector. He becomes confused whether he should report the case and get the bribe-taker arrested, or should he adapt an attitude of indifference? These moral, social, and legal dilemmas are overwhelming in the city life.

(c) *Anonymity and impersonality*: High population density in the city erodes a sense of personal identity leading to loneliness and a loss of a sense of belonging. Hundreds of people watch a movie in a picture-house, enjoy and laugh together but when the film ends, the common emotions disintegrate into anonymity and impersonality. On the other hand, this very anonymity is the crux of personal freedom. The lack of interest in others releases the individual from heavy pressures towards conformity. In many cases, his responsibility to others ends with payment. Even when he becomes a member of a voluntary group like a club for instance, his participation could be minimum. He does not have to win the acceptance of other members or to engage in the accommodative process of fitting himself into their expectations. He may observe others but he may not necessarily be carried away by their stimuli.

One advantage of anonymity is that individuals are not judged according to their parents' lower class status but are evaluated on the basis of their appearance and behaviour in casual contacts. The anonymity and impersonality of urban life gives an individual, who aspires for a higher status, a greater opportunity to take advantage of symbols of higher status, like wearing attractive clothing, improving his mode of speech and manner so as to gain the acceptance and to impress persons of high positions, maintaining contacts with them and ultimately achieving the goals he seeks through these contacts.

(d) *Standardisation of behaviour*: The urban life necessitates the individual to standardise his behaviour which ultimately helps him and others (with whom he interacts) to understand each other and make interaction simpler. For example, a shopkeeper finds the same questions being asked by a succession of customers. The customers are then seen as types—the person who haggles over price, the fellow who goes for quality, the man who is merely looking without any intention of buying, and so on. The experienced shopkeeper quickly judges the type of customer he is dealing with and uses the sales strategy he regards as most effective for a particular type of customer. This helps both the shopkeeper and the customer to handle the sales transaction in a simple and quick fashion. Such standardised expectations and behaviour are part of an urban life. Markets, clubs, restaurants, buses, newspapers, TV, radio, and schools/colleges present a largely standardized picture. A person who is unable to fit into such a life finds himself out of step and faces the problem of adjustment. The large size of the city population lends particular force to the standardization of

behaviour. This does not mean that the divergence of individual orientations is not possible.

Sorokin and Zimmerman (1962: 56-57) have identified the following characteristics of the urban social system:

(a) *Non-agricultural occupation*: While agriculture is the main basis of the rural economy, trade, industry and commerce are the chief supports of the urban economy. It is this difference in occupation that ensures that rural people work in natural environments. Urban people on the other hand work mostly in artificial and unnatural environment in which the heat, cold and humidity are controlled by innovative skills. According to James Williams (1958), working in unnatural environment affects people's attitudes and behaviour patterns. It is, thus, because of the occupational differences that in urban areas we find liberals as well as conservatives, modern as well as traditionalists, and unsociables as well as sociables.

(b) *Size of population*: Urban communities are much bigger in size than rural communities. The availability of job opportunities on the one hand and the materialistic as well as educational, medical and recreational facilities on the other hand attract people to cities.

(c) *Density of population* In villages, people have to live near their fields to supervise the agricultural pursuits but in urban areas, people's residence depends on the location of their offices, market, children's school/college and so forth. This leads to a high density of population in areas which abound in these facilities. In India, the average density of population per square mile in metropolitan cities varies between 3000 and 5000 persons. This high density has its own benefits as well as disadvantages. The advantages are that social contacts multiply, all necessary facilities are easily approachable and selection of friends becomes easier. The disadvantages are that inhabitants have very formal and impersonal relations with each other and their mental stresses increase.

(d) *Environment*: Bernard (1971) has talked of four types of environment: material (climate), biological (animals and plants), social, physio-social (machines, gadgets, instruments) and psycho-social (customs, traditions, institutions, etc.) and composite (economic, political and educational systems). The urban environment is more polluted. Besides, because of being surrounded by educational institutions and hence being more educated, an urban dweller is more rational, secular, and competitive.

(e) *Social differentiation* In urban areas, people are differentiated on the basis of occupations, religion, class, living standards and social beliefs. Yet, they are dependent on each other and act as a functioning whole.

(f) *Social mobility* Urban areas provide opportunities for change in social status because of which, as compared to villages, there is more upward mobility in cities. The mobility may be horizontal or vertical. Besides social mobility, we find geographical mobility too in urban areas.

(g) *Social interaction*: Relations among urban inhabitants are secondary and impersonal. People are more concerned with the status and skills of other persons than with their beliefs and ideologies. Control is also so formal that it many a time creates deviant behaviour.

(h) *Social solidarity*: In comparison to mechanical solidarity in rural areas, there exists organic solidarity in urban areas. In such a solidarity, though each person has his own individuality and personality, yet he depends more on others for their specialised roles.

The above description of the characteristics of urbanism as a way of life gives a feeling as if personal relations, primary groups and social intimacy do not exist in the cities. If consciously developed organisations serve the interests of the individuals, the primary groups also admit members through birth. Primary-group members are tied together by a fusion of concerns for one another. Their relations are more emotional and intensive. Within the group, a member performs variety of functions unlike specified functions in secondary groups. For example, in a family, the mother serves as cook, nurse, moral instructor and a manager of tensions for the children and the family members. Although the social change has weakened the bonds of family, neighbourhood and peer groups yet the old kind of functioning of these groups has not completely stopped nor have the primary relations vanished. Performing obligatory roles in the family, maintaining social participation within the neighbourhood, sharing common interests of castes and, acting as a source of support to one's kin and friends continue to be important and significant features of urban life. A number of studies in India (like those of Kapadia, Sachchidanand, R.K. Mukerjee and M.S. Gore) have shown that rural people who migrate to cities continue to maintain links with their families and kins in the village. In cities too, they not only share their problems with persons belonging to the same and adjoining villages but also with members of their caste. This makes their adapting to city life easier.

Growth of Urban Areas

While cities have existed since ancient times, until recently they represented only a relatively small proportion of the population. The lives of the great majority of the people were predominantly shaped by the rural community or village. The massive growth of cities and metropolitan areas, and the shift of a significant proportion of the population to urban areas has been a characteristic feature of past five decades or so. Urbanization was an off-shoot of the industrial revolution which created a demand for a large number of workers at centralised locations.

The growth of cities not only depends on birth and death rates and migration but it also depends on political, religious historical and economic factors. Political centres can be the capital of states (Bhopal, Jaipur, Bombay, Calcutta, etc) or the areas of political activities (Delhi), or the training centres for the military (Kharagvasla), or centres for defence production (Jodhpur); economic centres are areas which predominate in trade or commerce (Ahmedabad, Surat); industrial towns are places with factories (Bhilai, Singrauli, Kota, Ludhiana); the religious cities are those where people go on pilgrimage (Hardwar, Varanasi, Allahabd); and educational centres have educational institutions (Pilani).

In India, the urban population in 1971 was 109.11 million, in 1981 was 160.1 million, and in 1991 was 217.18 million. While in 1921 the urban population was only 11.3% of the total population of the country; in 1951 it increased to 17.6%, in 1971 to 20.2%, in 1981 to 23.8% and in 1991 to 25.7% (*Census of India*, 1991, Series 1, 2). Again in the 1911-21 decade, the urban population increased by 8.3%, in 1921-31 it increased by 19.1%, in 1931-41 by 32.0%, in 1941-51 by 41.4%, in 1951-61 by 37.0%, in 1961-71 by 38.2%, in 1971-81 by 35.4%, and in 1981-91 by 40.4%. Thus, during the five decades between 1941 and 1991, the growth rate of urban population was between 3.4 and 3.8% every year.

The share of agricultural employment in the total employment of main workers reduced from 72.0% in 1961 to 68.0% in 1981 (*Census of India*). This was likely to further reduce to 64.0% by 1991. By the year 2001, anything between 18 to 20 crore of people would be added to the rural population and of this addition, at least 10 crore of them will come to urban areas in search of jobs. Further, when in 1931, the total number of cities with more than one lakh population was 32, it increased to 107 in 1961, 216 in 1981 and 317 in 1991 (excluding

Jammu and Kashmir). The number of bigger cities with more than ten lakh population increased from two in 1941 to nine in 1971, 12 in 1981, and 23 in 1991. (*Census of India*, 1991, Series 1, Paper 2 : 251). Such growth affects the social, economic and political life of the people.

Of the total number of 4,689 urban settlements (in 1991) in India, Uttar Pradesh has the largest number of towns (704), followed by Tamil Nadu (434), Madhya Pradesh (327) and Maharashtra (307). According to the 1991 census, 65.2% population was living in cities with more than one lakh population, 10.9% in cities with population between 50,000 and one lakh, 13.2% in cities with population between 20,000 and 50,000, 7.8% in cities with population between 10,000 and 20,000, and 2.6% in towns with population between 10,000 and 5,000 (*Census of India*, 1991, Series 1, Paper 2). Four major cities of India with more than 50 lakh population, according to 1991 figures are: Calcutta (109 lakh), Bombay (126 lakh), Delhi (84 lakh), and Madras (54 lakh) (*The Hindustan Times*, May 30, 1991).

Social Effects of Urbanization

The social effects of urbanization may be analysed in relationship to family, caste, social status of women, and village life.

Urbanization and Family

Urbanization not only affects the family structure but it also affects intra and inter-family relations, as well as the functions the family performs. Several empirical studies of urban families conducted by scholars like I.P. Desai, Kapadia, and Aileen Ross, have pointed out that urban joint family is being gradually replaced by nuclear family, the size of the family is shrinking, and kinship relationship is confined to two or three generations only. In his study of 423 families made in 1955-57 in Mahuva town in Gujarat, I.P. Desai (1964) found that 5.0% families were nuclear (residentially as well as functionally), 74.0% were residentially nuclear but functionally and/or substantially (in property) joint, and 21.0% were joint in residence and functioning as well as in property. Of the 95.0% joint families (joint in functioning and/or property, and/or residence), the degree of jointness was *low* in 27.0% cases (that is, they were joint only in functioning), *high* in 17.0% cases (that is, they were joint in functioning and property), *higher* in 30.0% cases (that is, they were joint in functioning, property and residence but were two-generation families), and *highest* in 21.0%

cases (that is, they were joint in residence, functioning and property and were three-generation families). This shows that though the structure of urban family is changing, the spirit of individualism is not growing in the families.

Kapadia (1959) in his study of 1,162 families in rural and urban (Navsari) areas in Gujarat in 1955 found that when in rural areas, after every two nuclear families there were three joint families; in urban areas, nuclear families were 10% more than joint families. Aileen Ross (1961) in her study of 157 Hindu families belonging to middle and upper classes in Bangalore in 1957 found that (1) about three-fifth families are nuclear and two-fifth are joint; (2) of the joint families, 70.0% are small joint (couple+unmarried children+married sons without children, or two or more married brothers with children) and 30.0% are large joint families (parents of unmarried children+unmarried children+married sons with children); (3) the trend today is towards a break away from the traditional joint family form into the nuclear family unit; (4) small joint family is now the most typical form of family life in urban India; (5) there is a cycle of family types; (6) a growing number of people now spend at least part of their lives in single units; and (7) relations with one's distant kin are breaking or weakening.

R.K. Mukherjee (1973) also, on the basis of his study of 4,120 families in West Bengal in 1960-61, has said that replacement of joint family by nuclear family units is *fait accompli*.

Though intra and inter-family relations are also changing, but it does not mean that youngsters no longer respect their elders, or children completely ignore their obligations to their parents and siblings, or wives challenge the authority of their husbands. The important change is that the 'husband-dominant' family is being replaced by 'equalitarian' family where wife is given a share in decision-making processes. The parents also no longer impose their authority on the children nor do the children blindly obey the commands of their parents. The attitude of youngsters is motivated by respect than by fear. I.P. Desai has also maintained that "in spite of strains between the younger and older generations, the attachment of the children to their families is seldom weakened". M.S. Gore (1968) too writes: "even in joint family, the eldest male consults his children and this consultation is not formal". Ross (1961), however, thinks that "the feelings of family obligation and emotional attachment to family members will almost certainly weaken and the authority of the patriarch break down.

When this happens, there will be little left for identity within the larger kinship group". Our own feeling is that family in urban India (and for that matter in whole India) will never disintegrate but it will remain a strong unit.

Urbanization and Caste

Caste identity tends to diminish with urbanization, education and the development of an orientation towards individual achievement and modern status symbols. Urbanites participate in networks which include persons of several castes. According to Rajni Kothari, the structure of particularistic loyalties has been overlaid by a more sophisticated system of social and political participation with cross-cutting allegiances. Andre Beteille (1966 : 209-10) has pointed out that among the westernised elite, class ties are much more important than caste ties.

The educated members of some castes with modern occupations sometimes organise as a pressure group. As such, a caste association competes as a corporate body with other pressure groups for political and economic resources. This type of organisation represents a new kind of solidarity. These competing units function more as social classes than as caste structures.

Yet other change we find today is the fusion of sub-castes and fusion of castes. Kolenda (1984 : 150-51) has identified three kinds of fusion: (i) on the job and in newer neighbourhoods in the city, persons of different sub-castes and of different castes meet. They are usually of approximately equal rank. Neighbourhood or office group solidarity develops. This has been found common in the government colonies in big cities; (ii) inter-sub-caste marriages take place, promoting a fusion of subcastes. This is because it is many-a-time difficult to find a sufficiently educated bridegroom for an educated daughter within her own sub-caste, but one may find it in neighbouring sub-caste; and (iii) democratic politics foster the fusion of sub-castes and of adjacent castes in order for parties of substantial size to form. One example is the Dravida Munnetra Kazagam (DMK) and the Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagam (ADMK) parties of Tamil Nadu composed of the members of higher non-Brahmin castes.

Urban dwellers do not conform to caste norms strictly. There is a change in commensal relations, marital relations, social relations, as well as in occupational relations. One study of caste system in Bihar has revealed that urbanization has not affected all characteristics of the

caste system uniformly. On the basis of the study of 200 persons belonging to five different castes (Brahmins, Rajputs, Dhobis, Ahirs and Chamars), it was found that all respondents had married in their own castes, though 20.0% of the respondents living in cities (against 5.0% in rural areas) were in favour of inter-caste marriages. As regards occupation, not a single respondent in the city was engaged in his traditional caste occupation, though 81.0% respondents in rural areas were still engaged in their traditional occupations. Likewise, caste solidarity was not as strong in urban areas as in the rural areas. Caste panchayats were very weak in cities. Ghurye (1952), Kapadia (1959), Barnabas, Yogendra Singh, R.K. Mukerjee, Srinivas, Yogesh Atal, and S.C. Dube, have also referred to the impact of urbanization on caste.

Urbanization and Status of Women

The status of women in urban areas is higher than that of rural women. Urban women are comparatively more educated and liberal. Against 25.1% literate women in rural areas, there are 54.0% literate women in urban areas in 1991. Some of them are working too. As such, they are not only aware of their economic, social and political rights but they even use these rights to save themselves from being humiliated and exploited. The average age of girls at marriage in cities is also higher than the average marriage age in villages.

However, in the labour market, women are still in a disadvantaged situation. The labour market discriminates against women and is opposed to equality of opportunity—understood in a comprehensive sense to include equality of employment, training and promotional opportunities. In this sense, change is not possible in the sex segregated labour market whose structures ensure that the career patterns of women will normally be marked by discontinuity, unlike the normal male career patterns which assume continuity. Because of the constraints of the sex segregated labour market, women tend to cluster in a limited range of occupations, which have low status and are poorly paid. Women normally prefer teaching, nursing, social work, secretarial and clerical jobs—all of which have low status and low remuneration. Even those women who have surmounted the hurdle to professional education are disadvantaged as they find it difficult to reconcile to the competing demands of a professional career and home.

It is difficult for women to remain single or to combine marriage with career. Apart from the general expectations that all wives must be housewives, it has been noted that women are called upon to sacrifice

their career when the need arises, thereby subordinating their own career to that of their husbands'. This often creates frustrations among women, leading to psychotic illness in a few cases. Rural women, however, do not have to face such problems.

It has been further found that in the cities of India, the high level education among girls is significantly associated with the smaller family size. Though education of women has raised the age of marriage and lowered the birth rate, it has not brought about any radical change in the traditional pattern of arranged marriages with dowry. Margaret Cormack (1961 : 109) found in her study of 500 university students that girls were ready to go to college and mix with boys but they wanted their parents to arrange their marriage. Women want new opportunities but demand old securities, as well. They enjoy their newly found freedom but wish to carry on with old values.

Divorce and remarriage are the new phenomena we find among urban women. Today women take more initiative to break their marriages legally if they find adjustment after marriage impossible. Surprisingly, a large number of divorces are sought by women on ground of incompatibility and mental torture.

Politically also, urban women are more active today. The number of women contesting elections has increased at every level. They hold important political positions and also possess independent political ideologies. It may, thus, be concluded that when rural women continue to be dependent on men both economically and socially, urban women are comparatively independent and enjoy more freedom.

Urbanization and Village Life

For the past half century, the urban development in our country has led to the centrifugal movement of village people to the urban areas that were located within fairly easy access of public utilities. Many migrated to cities because of the availability of jobs there. Those who continue to live in villages also enjoy many of the conveniences of city life, although they are miles removed from the urban centres. The excellent highways, automobiles, radios, televisions and newspapers keep the villagers in contact with the city culture and civilization. The combination of rural residence and urban employment, and urban residence and rural-contact has resulted not only in certain modifications of social patterns but also in adjustments to a new way of life. The villagers are now more aware of the city lifestyle and they have been influenced by it in such a way that they no longer lay undue

emphasis on caste, creed... They have become more liberal in their approach. They no longer live in isolation. Many cultivators have accepted the new farm practices. Not only have their values and aspirations changed but there is a change in their behaviour too. The *Jajmani* system is weakening and intercaste and interclass relations are changing. There is a change even in institutions of marriage, family and caste panchayats. Instead of depending on traditional methods of treating the diseases, they now use modern allopathic medicine. In elections similarly, they give importance not to the ritual or the social status of the candidate but to his individual potentialities and his political background.

But this also does not mean that traditions are no longer important in villages. Individualism has not been able to replace familism, nor has secularism been able to replace the bond which have with the sacred.

Problems of Urbanization

Urban problems are endless. Drug addiction, pollution, crime, juvenile delinquency, begging, alcoholism, corruption, and unemployment are a few of them. Let us analyse the incidence and prevalence of six crucial ones that are not covered in other chapters of this book. They are: (i) housing and slums, (ii) crowding and depersonalisation, (iii) water supply and drainage, (iv) transportation and traffic, (v) power shortage and (vi) pollution.

Housing and Slums

Housing people in the city or abolishing 'houselessness' is a serious problem. Government, industrialists, capitalists, entrepreneurs, developers, contractors, and landlords have not been able to keep pace with the housing needs of the poor and the middle class people. According to the recent UNI report (*The Hindustan Times*, 9th May, 1988), between one-fourth and half of the urban population in India's largest cities lives in makeshift shelters and slums. At least 15.0% of the nation's families are 'housing deprived', more than 60.0% of the houses have inadequate lighting and air facilities, and 80.0% of the rural and 30.0% of urban population live in mud-houses. Millions of people are required to pay excessive rent, that is, one which is beyond their means. In our profit-oriented economy, private developers and colonisers find little profit in building houses in cities for the poor and the lower middle-class people, though they concentrate instead in

meeting the housing needs of the rich and the upper-middle class. The result has been higher rents and a scramble for the few available houses. Almost half of the population are either ill-housed or pay more than 20.0% of their incomes on rent. In some states, the Housing Boards and the City Development Authorities have tried to remedy the city housing problem with active financial support from the Life Insurance Corporation, HUDCO and such other agencies. They even charge the total housing cost in monthly instalments on an interest varying from 9% to 11.0%. But engineers and contractors profit a lot from these government efforts. They use poor-quality material in construction and finish the houses contravening the laid down specifications. The buyer soon finds that the roof leaks, the plaster peels off, there are cracks in the walls, and the electric fittings break down. Such ventures blacken the name of housing boards and even of a few honest bureaucrats associated with such housing schemes. No wonder, the housing problem in the cities even today continues to be a gigantic problem next only to food and clothing.

The estimated shortage of houses at the beginning of the Seventh Plan was about 250 million units, out of which about 60 million were required for the urban areas. By 1990, the shortage was expected to grow to 9.7 million units in urban areas. In Delhi alone, which has seen a population increase from 2.0 to 9.0 million between 1957 and 1990, there is an addition of 60,000 people each year who need to be provided with new housing. Almost 70.0% of Delhi's population, according to an UNI report, lives in sub-standard conditions. With the country's slum population of present (1990) standing at nearly 40 million, slum dwellers form 44.0% of the population in Delhi, 45.0% in Bombay, 42.0% in Calcutta, and 39.0% in Madras. The situation is no better in the eight other metropolises of Bangalore, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, Kanpur, Pune, Nagpur, Lucknow and Jaipur (*The Hindustan Times*, May 9, 1988). The slum population, governmental efforts notwithstanding, is expected to show a sizable increase by the next decade (that is, by 2000) adding further to the housing problem and the squalor conditions. The order of development in squatter settlements is people, land (sites), shelter and services. The people first select a site which meets their social and economic needs, build shelters and then wait for the services to move in over a period of time. Although the settlements fulfil the needs of the people, they violate city planning regulations. It is, therefore, believed that the current order of development ought to be land (site), people, shelter and services. Now

the government, apart from encouraging the poor for going in for low-cost non-formal housing technologies, has formulated several plans and given many concessions to promote more and better housing. This includes contribution of Rs. 100 crore to the National Housing Bank, setting up a separate Social Security Fund with a corpus of Rs. 100 crore, and creating a National Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Finance and Development Corporation.

Crowding and Depersonalisation

Crowding (density of population) and people's apathy to other persons' problems (including their neighbours' problems) is another problem growing out of city life. Some homes are so overcrowded that five to six persons live in one room. Some city neighbourhoods are extremely overcrowded. Overcrowding has very deleterious effects. It encourages deviant behaviour, spreads diseases, and creates conditions for mental illness, alcoholism, and riots. One effect of dense urban living is people's apathy and indifference. City dwellers do not want to 'get involved' in other's affairs. Persons are involved in accidents, molested, assaulted, abducted, and even murdered while others merely stand by and watch.

Water Supply and Drainage

We have reached a stage where no city has water supply round the clock. Intermittent supply results in a vacuum being created in empty water lines which often suck in pollutants through leaking joints. Cities like Madras, Hyderabad, Rajkot, Ajmer, and Udaipur get water from the municipality for less than an hour a day. Many small towns have no main water supply at all and are dependent on tube wells. Even a relatively planned and serviced city like Delhi has now to reach as far as 180 km to the Ramganga for augmentation of water supply. Bangalore pumps water from far away with a lift of about 700 metre. Most towns and cities which normally get good rain every year, have been undergoing the agony of acute water shortage in the last two three years. What seems to be sadly lacking is a national water policy which would assess the total water resources and then allocate water. This is inspite of the State Chief Ministers' meeting at Delhi in September 1987 which approved the National Water Policy which aimed at giving priority to drinking water requirements.

When we look on the other side of the water supply, that is, drainage, we find the situation equally bad. One of the little known facts about India is that there is not a single city which is fully sewered. Not even Chandigarh can claim this distinction because the unauthorised constructions in and around it lie outside the perview of the main system. Because of the non-existence of a drainage system, large pools of stagnant water can be seen in every city even in summer months. Just as we need a national water policy, we also need a national and regional drainage policy.

Transportation and Traffic

The transportation and traffic picture in all Indian cities is unhappy. A majority of the people use buses and tempos, while a few use rail as transit system. The increasing number of scooters, motorcycles, mopeds and cars make the traffic problem worse. They pollute the air with smoke and noise. The number of buses plying in metropolitan cities like Delhi, Bombay, Madras and Calcutta is not adequate and commuters have to spend about one to two hours to get into the bus, which means leaving the house two hours in advance in the morning to reach their place of work and reaching home two hours late in the evening. The main reason for being in this mess is that the low income of the commuters forces them to live in areas with cheap accommodation which necessitates extensive travel. Further, since our citizens cannot afford to pay high fares for the use of a public transport system, the fares have to be kept very low because of which all city bus services sustain such annual losses that they cannot really expand or maintain a fleet adequate to meet city needs.

Power Shortage

Closely linked with transportation is the question of power shortage. On the one hand, the use of electrical gadgets has increased very much in the cities, and on the other hand, the establishment of new industries and the expansion of the old industries has also increased the dependence on electricity. Most of the states are not in a position to generate the power that they need with the result that they remain dependent on neighbouring states. Conflict over supplying of power between two states often creates severe power crisis for the people in the city.

Pollution

Our cities and towns are major polluters of the environment. Several cities discharge 40% to 60% of their entire sewage and industrial effluents untreated into the nearby rivers. The smallest town contributes its share of garbage and excreta to the nearest waterway through its open drains. Urban industry pollutes the atmosphere by smoke and toxic gases from its chimneys.

Causes of Urban Problems

Following McVeigh and Arthur Shostak (1978 : 198-205), who have linked urban problems in the United States to four factors, we can identify following five major causes of problems of urban life in India: (i) migration in and out of the city, (ii) industrial growth, (iii) apathy of the government, (iv) defective town planning, and (v) vested interest forces.

Migration

As already indicated, people migrate to towns because of the relatively better employment opportunities available there. In India, the migration has four patterns: rural to rural, rural to urban, urban to urban and urban to rural. Though rural to rural migration is by far the most prevalent form of movement but rural to urban and urban to urban migration is equally crucial. The 1981 census figures point out that in 71.3% cases, migration was from rural to rural, in 15.0% cases, it was from rural to urban, in 8.8% of cases it was from urban to urban, and in 4.9% cases, it was from urban to rural (Bose, 1979 : 560). The analysis of intra-district migration (short-distance migration), inter-district or intra-state migration (medium distance migration) and inter-state migration (long distance migration) shows that about 68.0% migrations are short distance, 21.0% are medium distance and 11.0% are long-distance migrations (Bose, 1979 : 187).

The entrance of the rural poor into the city depletes sources of revenue. On the other hand, the rich people today prefer to live in sub-urban areas. This movement of the rich causes financial loss to the city. This migration to the city and away from the city aggravates problems.

Industrial Growth

When urban population growth rate is 4.0% in India, the industrial growth rate is about 6.0% per annum. The Seventh Five Year Plan

postulates an industrial growth rate of 8.0% per annum. This growth takes care of the additional job requirements in the cities. The tertiary sector also provides refuge to the migrants, though their earnings remain at low level.

Apathy of the Government

The administrative mismanagement of our cities is also responsible for the mess in which city-dwellers find themselves. Municipal governments have not kept pace with city growth, either spatially or in terms of management infrastructure. There is neither the will nor the capacity to plan for the future. There is also no skill and capability to manage what exists. Until we improve the capacity of our cities to govern themselves, we cannot emerge from the urban mess. On the other hand, the state governments also put many restrictions on local governments in raising necessary funds for dealing with particular urban problems

Defective Town Planning

A more alarming factor in the general deterioration in the standard of civic services is the growing sense of helplessness of our planners and administrators. From the Planning Commission downwards, there seems to be a fatalistic acceptance of the uncontrolled growth in our metropolitan cities. One member of the National Commission on Urbanization actually stated in one of the meetings of the commission (*The Hindustan Times*, 3 September, 1987) that nothing could be done about cities such as Kanpur.

Vested-Interest Forces

The last cause of urban problems is the vested interest forces that work against people but enhance private commercial interests and profits. The city residents are usually powerless to affect decisions that elites make to enhance their own interests, power and profit. When these powerful elites can make more money, they adopt plans and programmes no matter how many people are hurt in the process.

Solutions to Urban Problems

Some measures have to be adopted if we want to remedy urban problems. We suggest following eight measures:

Systematic Development of Urban Centres and Creation of Job Opportunities

One important solution to our urban problems is the systematic development of the fast growing urban centres and planning an investment programme which, over the next 20 years or so, could give rise to a large number of well distributed, viable urban centres throughout the country. So far we have been focussing attention on programmes for providing wage employment in rural areas through IRDP, NREP and the RLEGP programmes to hold people back in the villages. While there is ample justification for providing rural employment, this by itself is not enough. It is not possible to provide gainful employment in the agricultural sector beyond a certain point. For this purpose, we have to emphasise on programmes which can permit multifunctional activities to sustain people in cities.

Regional Planning along with City Planning

Urban planning is almost city-centred. We have always been talking of town and city planning but never of the planned development of the whole region so that population is logically dispersed and activities are properly distributed. City planning is an ad-hoc solution but regional planning could be a more permanent solution. For example, instead of providing houses to slum-dwellers in cities through city development authorities, if through regional planning migrants could be diverted to other areas which may provide attractive employment, the pace of growth of existing cities could be checked. It is time that at least beginning from the Eighth Five Year Plan (1992), the Government of India helps the states in setting up regional planning organisations and evolving meaningful regional settlement plans.

Encouraging Industries to Move to Backward Areas

Land pricing policy which gives land in large chunks at throwaway prices has to be replanned to encourage industries to move to backward areas/districts. This will also take care of linear development of metropolitan and big cities. A policy of the state taking over potential high value land in and around large cities with a view to exploiting its full cost at a later date also needs serious consideration.

Municipalities to Find Own Financial Resources

People do not mind paying taxes to the municipality if their money is properly utilised to maintain roads, provide sewage system, reduce

water shortage and provide electricity. It is a well known fact that cities suffer from crippling resource constraints. If deterrent punishment is given to the corrupt municipality officials, there is no reason why the municipal corporations should find it difficult in collecting money from the residents of the city. A city must bear the cost of its own development. High financial support from state government is becoming difficult. By revising property, water and electricity taxes, money can be collected and more money per head per annum can be made available for providing necessary amenities. When any new industry or business is located in a city or on its periphery, it could be heavily taxed so that additional money becomes available to the local body.

Encouraging Private Transport

Why should city transport be a public monopoly? When the transport is handled by state employees it has been noticed that they become too rude and callous. Backing of the trade union encourages them to go on strikes frequently. It is necessary then that private transportation be encouraged. Privately operated bus and tempo services will charge a little more fare but commuters would not mind paying this in view of the better services.

Amendment of Rent Control Acts

Laws which inhibit the construction of new houses or giving of houses on rent must be amended. Which landlord would like to spend Rs. one lakh or so on a two room tenement and give it on rent for Rs. 300 a month or so for the next 10 to 20 years without having the authority to increase the rent or get it vacated on appropriate grounds. Maharashtra has taken a lead in amending the Rent Control Act which has made thousands of houses available for rent. A similar step in other states would be welcome.

Adopting Pragmatic Housing Policy

In May 1988, the Central Government presented the National Housing Policy (NHP) to the Parliament which aimed at abolishing 'homelessness' by the turn of the century and upgrading the quality of accommodation to a fixed minimum standard. Such policy looks to be too ambitious and appears to be a Utopian. It is a dream impossible to accomplish in a span of 12 years by which time the twentieth century

will end. The government policy and planning has to be more down to earth. This is not to say that the concept of NHP is irrational. The NHP strategy is broadbased. It seeks to provide easy access to finance as well as land and materials for building houses at reasonable rates. It also seeks to encourage manufacturers to use new type of building materials. Moreover, it seeks to review the entire gamut of laws relating to land tenure, land acquisition and ceiling to apartment ownership, municipal regulations and rental laws. But these are all thorny issues. The NHP is oriented towards rich developers, landlords and contractors. The NHP has to discourage luxury housing and promote cooperative and group housing societies. It has to develop special schemes for the poor and low-income people. It has also to favour providing incentives to employers to build houses for the employees. It has to increase its authorised capital of Rs. 100 crore which cannot go anywhere near to meeting the financial needs. Unless, a more pragmatic NHP is adopted, it will be impossible to achieve the set goals.

Structural Decentralisation

One proposal by innovative planners and some radicals envisions a structural decentralisation of local self government itself. This could entail the creation of 'neighbourhood-action groups', to be called 'community centres' consisting of representatives of residents and municipality officials. These centres will identify and act upon neighbourhood needs. For example, many new colonies have come to be established in many cities in which as many as 10,000 to 50,000 people reside. Thus, these colonies are small towns by themselves. Some taxes like house tax, road tax, light tax, etc. could be passed on directly to these community-centres instead of giving them to municipalities. The centres would direct the affairs of the neighbourhood without reference to the city municipal corporation and use the collected money in maintaining roads, lights and so forth. The argument for this kind of decentralised structure within the city is that the same system that allows lakhs of people a substantial control over their civic destiny denies them any effective role in shaping the institutions that shape their lives. Community centres will allow them to create their own exclusive environment.

To conclude, it may be pointed out that the effects of urbanization and urbanism and the problems of cities can never be solved until urban planning is modified and radical measures are taken. These should not

be based on the profit motive which would benefit a few vested interests. The use of land, technology, and taxes should be for the benefit of the people and not for the benefit of a few powerful interest groups. City-dwellers have to become politically active and have to organise and agitate to change the existing economic and social systems in the cities.

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12

Crime and Criminals

In India, in one hour about 175 cognizable crimes under the IPC and 435 crimes under local and special laws are committed. In one day, the police grapples with 890 thefts, 265 riots, 405 robberies and burglaries, and 2,445 other criminal offences (*Crime in India*, 1988 : 12). Between 1970 and 1980, crime had registered a rise of 57%, while between 1980 and 1988, crime increased only by 7.0% (1988 :8). The rising wave of crime might cause alarm among the public but our police and politicians remain unruffled about the deteriorating law and order situation. The non-ruling political parties are concerned with these figures only in one way—they use them to criticise the policies of the ruling party so that it could be defamed and depowered, yielding place to a new governing elite.

Sociologists and criminologists have been broadly concerned with locating the causes of crime and analysing the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. Recently, some scholars have moved beyond these narrow twin concerns and have raised questions about the enactment of laws, improving the police system, judicial activism, protecting the interests of victims, improving the condition in prisons and humanising the deviant.

The Concept of Crime

But let us first look at the concepts of crime and criminals and also identify the various types of crimes and criminals. Since official statistics are based on the legal definition of crime, since the system of criminal justice is perceived from a legal approach, since all empirical

studies on criminals focus on crime defined by law, and since legal definition of crime is considered to be precise, unambiguous and capable of measurement, let us examine this legal definition (of crime) first.

Paul Tappan (1960 :10) has defined crime as "an intentional act or omission in violation of criminal law committed without defence or justification". Five elements are important in this definition: (1) it should be an act or omission of an act, that is, a person cannot be punished for his/her thoughts; (2) the act must be voluntary and committed when the actor has control over his actions; (3) the act should be intentional, whether the intent be general or specific. A person may not have a specific intent to shoot another person and kill him, but he is expected to know that his action might result in injury or death of others; (4) it should be a violation of a criminal law (as distinct from a non-criminal law or civil and administrative law). This is necessary so that the state can take action against the accused; and (5) it (the act) should be committed without defense or justification. Thus, if the act is proved to be in self-defence, or committed in insanity, it will not be considered a crime even if it causes harm or injury to others. Ignorance of law is usually not a defense.

Hall Jerome (1947 : 8-18) has defined crime as "legally forbidden and intentional action, which has a harmful impact on social interests, which has a criminal intent, and which has legally prescribed punishment for it". Thus, according to him, no action is to be viewed as crime unless it has five characteristics : (1) it is legally forbidden, (2) it is intentional, (3) it is harmful (to society), (4) it has criminal intent, and (5) some penalty is prescribed for it.

Crime has also been defined in non-legal or social terms. Mowrer (1959) has defined it as "an anti-social act". Caldwell (1956 : 114) has explained it as "those acts or failures to act that are considered to be so detrimental to the well-being of a society, as judged by its prevailing standards, that action regarding them cannot be entrusted to private initiative or to haphazard methods but must be taken by an organised society in accordance with tested procedures". Thorsten Sellin (1970 : 6) has described it as "violation of conduct norms of the normative groups". Marshall Clinard (1957 : 22) has, however, maintained that all deviations from norms are not crimes. He talks of three types of deviations: (i) tolerated deviation, (ii) deviation which is mildly disapproved, and (iii) deviation which is strongly disapproved. He perceives the third type of deviation as crime. Let us take one

example in order to understand it. Gandhiji not only himself deviated from caste norms but also prompted others not to follow them. Yet, Gandhiji was not considered a deviant because his deviation was for the good of the society. The deviation that harms the society is strongly disapproved.

Criminologists with a sociological perspective have not claimed that there is no place for the legal definition of crime in criminology. They have only drawn attention to situations in which people who engage in 'criminal' behaviour are either not caught or are acquitted by courts because of inadequate evidence or legal loopholes or pressures. Taking the reconciliatory position between legal and social definitions of crime, Reid (1975 :5) has said that the legal definition may be used for compiling statistics on crime and for assigning the label 'criminal', but the studies undertaken for studying causation of crime should include such persons also in their sample of 'criminals' who admit their crime but are not convicted by court.

Crime, Criminal and Criminology

Six questions are important in Criminology today (Jock Young, 1974 : 249-252). These are:

- (1) how is an individual's criminal behaviour explained ? At the point of committing crime, is the offender perceived as acting out of free-will or is he seen as compelled by some forces beyond his control?
- (2) how is the functioning of social order perceived ? Is order in society understood as based on the consent of the vast majority or is it largely based on the coercion ?
- (3) how is crime defined ? Is crime seen as the violation of the legal code or as a behaviour that offends the social code of a particular community ?
- (4) how is extent and distribution of crime viewed ? Is crime viewed as a limited phenomenon committed by a small number of people, or as the extensive phenomenon engaged in by a large proportion of the population ?
- (5) how are the causes of crime explained ? Are the causes of crime located primarily within the individual (that is, his personality, or is crime seen as the product of the wider society within which the individual lives ?
- (6) what is the policy regarding criminals? Is the policy of punishing the offender appropriate or is the policy of treatment of the criminal accepted ?

These questions can be framed on the basis of dichotomies as follows:

- Individual's behaviour : free-will versus determinism
- Functioning of social order : consensus versus coercion
- Definition of crime : legal versus social
- Extent and distribution of crime : limited versus extensive
- Causes of crime : individual versus social
- Policy towards criminals : punishment versus treatment

Following Fitzgerald (1975 : 248-307) and Jock Young (1974), the following chart (Table 12.1) can be presented to point out the dichotomous reactions of seven different paradigms on these six questions.

Salient Characteristics of Crime in India

Given the limitations of official criminal statistics, it is perhaps unwise to attempt to set forth the seemingly most important facts about crime in Indian society. It is conceivable that with adequate and valid methods, many of these 'facts' would change drastically. Nevertheless, there seems to be enough evidence to support at least the following brief description of crime in our country.

- (1) Of the total crimes committed in India every year, about 14.5 lakh are cognizable crimes under IPC (including theft, burglary, robbery, dacoity, murder, riot, kidnapping, cheating, breach of trust...) and about 37.7 lakh are offences under local and special laws (like violation of Motor Vehicle Act, Prohibition Act, Gambling Act, Excise Act, Arms Act, Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act, Opium Act, Railway Act, Explosive Substance Act.). Thus, the crime rate is not very high in our country. Whereas crime rate in the United States is apparently among the highest in industrialized societies, it being 4% or 5% of the total population in one year (Howard Becker, 1966 : 211), in India it is only 0.25% of the total population.
- (2) Of about 58 lakh cases of crimes investigated by the police every year (including pending cases of last year), about 30% are cases of cognizable crimes and about 70% are cases of offences committed under local and special laws.
- (3) The rate of cognizable crime per one lakh of population is about 180.
- (4) Of the total (cognizable) crimes, about one-third (33.0%) are the economic (property) crimes relating to theft (22.0%), burglary

Table 12.1 : Reactions of Different Paradigms on Important Questions of Crime and Criminals

Questions and Dichotomous Reactions	Classicism	Positivism (Bio, Psy, Social Theories)	Conservatism	Strain theory	New Deviancy theory	Liberalism Reformism theory	Marxism
1. How is individual behaviour determined? (Free-will v/s determinism)	Free will	Determinism	Free will	Determinism	Determinism	Determinism	Determinism
2. How is functioning of social order perceived? (Consensus v/s coercion)	Consensus	Consensus	Coercion	Consensus	Coercion	Coercion	Coercion
3. Definition of crime (Legal v/s social)	Legal	Social	Social	Social	Legal	Legal	Legal
4. Extent of crime (Limited v/s extensive)	Limited	Limited	Extensive	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited
5. Causes of crime (Individual v/s social)	Individual	Social	Individual	Social	Social	Social	Social
6. Policy toward criminal (Punishment v/s treatment)	Punishment	Treatment	Punishment	*	*	Treatment	*

* They emphasise on changing the functioning of social structures and social systems.

(9.0%), robbery (1.5%) and dacoity (0.5%). In other words, crime is greater for property offences than for offences against persons (murder, abduction...). The same is true about the U.S. too, where 77.0% crimes are property crimes (burglary, larceny, auto-theft...), and 23% are crimes against person (Becker, 1966 : 211).

- (5) Of the total persons arrested for offences under the local and special laws, a little more than three-fifths (62.0%) are arrested under four Acts : Motor Vehicle Act—23.0%, Prohibition Act—22.0%, Gambling Act—13.0% and Excise Act—4.0%. The remaining two-fifths (38.0%) are arrested under Arms Act, Railways Act, S.I.T. Act, Opium Act, and so on.
- (6) Of the total (cognizable) crimes, about two-fifths (38.0%) are committed in the four Hindi-speaking northern states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan, and about one-fourth (25.0%) in four southern states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala.
- (7) For about 14.5 lakh (cognizable) crimes committed every year, about 24 lakh persons are arrested, that is, on an average 17 persons are arrested for every 10 crimes committed. On the other hand, for every nine offences committed under the local and special laws, 10 persons are arrested.
- (8) More than four-fifths of the offenders (85.0%) commit (cognizable) crimes for which they get less than 6 months imprisonment, that is, their crimes are misdemeanours.
- (9) Crime rate is much higher for males than females. Out of every 100 offenders, 97 are males and three are females.
- (10) The ratio of urban offenders is much less than the rural offenders.
- (11) Crime rate is highest among those in the lowest socio-economic groups.
- (12) Crime rate is highest (49%) in the age group of 18-30 years. The percentage in other age-groups is: less than 1% in age-group below 16 years, 2% in 16-18 years age-group, 39% in 30-50 age group and 9% in 50+ age-group.
- (13) The last characteristic feature of the Indian criminal scene is the increase in the organised crime—the development of large-scale organisations for criminal activities. What is being organised more is the control and distribution of illicit goods and services—drugs (narcotics), girls for prostitution in India and in

Arabian countries, smuggling of gold... In addition, there are the organised efforts of the mafia groups to control various legitimate business activities, such as coal mines, unions in industries and the like. Although the total number of major crimes charged to 'organised crime' is probably small, its cost and its pattern in cities provides a distinctive element.

In presenting these facts and features, the idea is to point out the weakening of motives for conformity to social norms and the disruption of social relationships and social bonds. The unrest is increasing almost in all sections of our society. There is unrest among youth, peasants, industrial workers, students, government employees and the minorities. This unrest increases frustrations and strains which leads to the violation of legal and social norms. It is, thus, the organisation and the functioning of the existing sub-systems and structures in our society that are more responsible for the increase in crime. The influential sets of ideas about crime causation have been developed by a number of scholars, stemming primarily from Durkheim, moving to scholars like Merton, Cohen, Miller, Cloward and Ohlin. We shall attempt to analyse some of these viewpoints.

Theoretical Explanations of Criminal Behaviour

The theoretic explanations of criminal behaviour have been classified into six groups: (i) biological or constitutional explanations, (ii) mental subnormality, illness and psycho-pathological explanations, (iii) economic explanation, (iv) topographical explanation, (v) (human) environment explanation, and (vi) 'new' and 'radical' explanation.

Reid (1976 : 103-251) has classified the theoretical explanations as: (1) classical and positive theories, (2) physiological, psychiatric and psychological theories, and (3) sociological theories. He has further sub-classified the sociological theories in two groups: (i) social structural theories (including Merton's, Cohen's, Cloward and Ohlin's, Matza's, Miller's, and Quinney's theories), and (ii) social process theories (including Sutherland's and Howard Becker's theories).

We will discuss these theories by dividing them in four groups: (1) classicist, (2) biogenic, (3) psychogenic, and (4) sociogenic.

Classicist Explanation

Classicist explanations of crime and punishment were developed in the second half of the eighteenth century. In fact, these theoretical explanations developed as the reaction to the enlightened thinkers and

Table 12.2: Theoretical Explanations of Causes of Crime

S.No.	Theoretical explanation	Propounder	Year	Main thesis that crime is result of
1.	<i>Classical</i>	Beccaria	1764	1) Man's rational motivation. ii) Hedonism or pain/pleasure principle
2.	<i>Biogenic</i>			Inherited traits
i)	Evolutionary Atavism Theory	Lombroso	1876	Physical stigmata or defective organisms
ii)	Goring's Theory	Charles Goring	1919	Defective anatomical factors
iii)	Hooton's Theory	Hooton	1939	Biological inferiority
iv)	Physiological Make-up	Sheldon	1940	Mesomorphic physique
3.	<i>Psychogenic</i>			Defective personality
i)	Psychological Theory	Goddard	1919	Inherited feeble-mindedness
ii)	Psychiatric Theory	William Healy	1915	Mental disorders or emotional disturbances
iii)	Psycho-analytical Theory	Adler, Abrahamson, etc.	1930, 1952	Instincts, or undeveloped ego, or guilt-feelings, or inferiority complex
4.	<i>Sociogenic</i>			Learned and conditioned by social environment
(A)	<i>Processual Explanation</i>			Associations with and social influences of criminalistic norms.
i)	Differential Association Theory	Sutherland	1939	

Table 12.2 Contd ..

Labeling Theory	Howard Becker	1963	Consequences of application by others of rules and sanctions to an 'offender'.
(B) <i>Structural Explanation</i>			
i) Economic Theory	Fornasari & Bonger, etc.	1894, 1916	Economic conditions, or poverty and richness
ii) Geographical Theory	Dexter, Quetlet etc.	1904	Geographical factors like climate, temper- ature, humidity, etc.
iii) <i>Sociological Theory</i>			
a) Anomie Theory	Merton	1938	Strains caused by disjunction between goals and means
b) Differential Opportunity Theory	Cloward & Ohlin	1960	Differentials in legitimate and illegiti- mate means to success-goals.
c) Delinquent subculture Theory	Cohen	1955	Rejection of dominant values and development of delinquent values
d) Containment Theory	Walter Reckless	1967	Unfavourable self-concept

political reformers against the arbitrary systems of justice and the barbarous codes of punishment which prevailed upto the eighteenth century. They demanded a legal system that would defend the interests of the criminals and protect their rights and liberties. They believed in the 'contract theory' of the origin of state (propounded by Rousseau), that is, regulating the conduct of free individuals who were bound to one another within the society by a free and 'legal' contract between free and equal individuals. Thus, individuals were conceived as free, rational and sovereign individuals, capable of defining their self-interests and rationally thinking of the consequences of their actions. They, therefore, thought of state/society not as something sovereign but as something which individuals had contracted to establish for their individual and mutual benefit. Thus, they sought to limit the power of the state to defence of the rights and liberties, as well as safety and security of the individual.

The propounder of the classicist explanation was an Italian thinker, Beccaria, who was influenced by the writings of scholars like Bentham and John Howard. Beccaria and his classical school maintained that (a) human nature is rational, free, and governed by self-interest, (b) social order is based on consensus and social contract, (c) crime is the infringement of the legal code and not of social norm, (d) distribution of crime is limited and is to be ascertained through a 'due process', (e) crime is caused by an individual's rational motivation, and (f) in punishing the offender, the principle of 'restraint' should be observed.

The main postulates of Beccaria's classical explanation (Schafer Stephen, 1969 : 106) developed in 1764 were :

- (1) Man's behaviour is purposive and rational and is based on hedonism or pleasure-pain principle, that is, he consciously chooses pleasure and avoids pain.
- (2) Punishment should be assigned to each crime so that the pain would outweigh any pleasure from the commission of crime.
- (3) Punishment should not be severe and deterrent but it should be proportionate to crime and also be predetermined, prompt, and public.
- (4) The law must apply equally to all citizens.
- (5) The legislatures should clearly enact the law and prescribe specific punishment for its violation. The judges should not interpret the law but should only decide whether a person committed the crime (violated the law) or not. In other words, courts should only determine innocence or guilt and thereafter prescribe the set punishment.

The major weaknesses in the classical explanation were: (1) all criminals were to be treated alike without differentiating them on the basis of age, sex or intelligence; (2) no importance was given to the nature of crime (that is, whether the crime was a felony or misdemeanour) or the type of the criminal (that is, whether he was a first offender, a casual offender, a habitual offender, or a professional offender; (3) explaining an individual's behaviour merely on the doctrine of 'free-will' and suggesting punishment on the principle of 'utilitarianism', is only an armchair philosophy which considers crime in the abstract and lacks a scientific approach in the objective and empirical measurement; (4) there was no provision for justifiable criminal acts; and (5) Beccaria and Bentham were more concerned with reform in the criminal law (like mitigation of severity of punishment, removal of defects in the Jury system, abolition of transportation and capital punishment and in the adoption of a prison philosophy and regulating morality, than in controlling crime or development of criminological theories.

The British neo-classicist criminologists revised the classical theory in 1810 and 1819 and provided for judicial discretion and introduced the idea of minimum and maximum sentences (Vold George, 1958 : 25-26). Describing the concept of equal justice as unreal, they suggested giving importance to age, mental condition and extenuating circumstances in fixing punishment to criminals. Children under seven years of age and mentally diseased persons were to be exempted from the law. However, in spite of these changes, the neo-classicists accepted the principles of free-will and hedonism. As such, this school also has not been considered as a scientific school of criminology.

Biogenic Explanation

The positivists rejected the concept of 'free-will' advocated by the classicists and the neo-classicists and emphasised on the doctrine of 'determinism'. Lombroso, Ferri and Garofalo were the major positivists who emphasised on the biogenic or hereditary aspects of criminal behaviour. (Heredity is the parental contribution made through 46 chromosomes. Of these, two determine the sex of the infant and 44 affect other qualities of the body. The combinations and permutations among the genes determine the infant's particular genotype, that is, genetic contribution of an organism).

Lombroso, an Italian physician and professor of Clinical Psychiatry and Criminal Anthropology and described as the "Father of

Criminology", propounded the Theory of Evolutionary Atavism (also called Theory of Physical Criminal Type or Theory of Born Criminals) in 1876. He claimed that the criminal is of a different physical type than the non-criminal (1911 : 365). A criminal suffers from many physical abnormalities. As such, he can be identified by a number of characteristics or stigmata, like asymmetrical face, large ears, excessively long arms, flattened nose, retreating forehead, tufted and crispy hair, insensibility to pain, eye defects and other physical peculiarities. Lombroso not only pointed out differences in physical characteristics between criminals and non-criminals but he also gave characteristics that distinguished criminals according to the type of crime they committed

Charles Goring, an English psychiatrist and philosopher, criticised Lombroso's theory on the basis of his own study in which he measured the characteristics of 3,000 English convicts and a large number of non-criminals in 1913. He maintained that there is no such thing as a physical criminal type. However, he himself explained crime on the basis of hereditary factors (1919 : 11) using the statistical treatment of facts, or what is called the statistico-mathematical method. But Goring's work was also criticised because (Reid, 1976 : 120-21) (1) he committed the same errors in statistical analysis for which he had criticised Lombroso. He measured intelligence not by the available Simon-Binet tests but by his own impression of the mental ability of the criminals, (2) he completely ignored the impact of environment on crime, (3) the sample of non-criminals which included undergraduate university students, inmates of a hospital, mental patients and soldiers, was defective, and (4) he was violently prejudiced against Lombroso.

Though, Ferri and Garofalo too had supported Lombroso but he (Lombroso) modified his theory at the end of his life and said that all criminals are not 'born criminals'. There are 'criminaloids' (who are individuals of normal physical and psychological make-up), occasional criminals, and criminals by passion. The main criticisms against Lombroso's theoretical explanations are: (1) his collection of facts was confined to organic factors and he neglected the psychic and social factors; (2) his method was mainly descriptive and not experimental, (3) his generalisations about atavism and degeneracy left a gap between theory and fact. He adjusted facts to fit his theory; (4) his generalisation (about atavism) was drawn from a single case and is, therefore, unscientific, and (5) his use of statistics was actually not tested by the data. In spite of these criticisms, Lombroso's contribution to the

development of criminological thought has been recognised on the basis that he redirected emphasis from the crime to the criminal.

Interest on biogenic variables was revised by a Harvard physical anthropologist Hooton in 1939. On the basis of his 12 year study of 13,873 male prisoners compared to a small number of 3,203 male non-offenders, he concluded that the primary cause of crime is 'biological inferiority'. The four conclusions he drew from his study (1939) were: (1) criminal behaviour is the direct result of inherited biological inferiority as shown by characteristics like sloping foreheads, thin lips, straight hair, body hair, small ears, long thin necks and sloping shoulders, (2) particular types of crime are caused by particular types of biological inferiority. Tall and thin men tend to be murderers and robbers, tall and heavy men tend to be cheats, short statured and thin men tend to be thieves and burglars, and short heavy men are prone to commit sexual crimes, (3) criminals are organically inferior, and (4) elimination of crime can be effected only by the sterilization of the physically and mentally unfit persons.

He further held that in every society, there are a few geniuses, hordes of mediocres, masses of morons, and regiments of criminals. He gave three types of biologically inferior people: (1) who are organically inadaptable, (ii) mentally stunted, and (iii) sociologically warped.

His theory was, however, criticised by Albert Cohen, Alfred Lindesmith and Karl Schuessler (See Sutherland, 1969 : 118-19; Vold, 1958 : 59-64; Gibbons, 1977 : 139-40) on the arguments that : (1) his control groups of non-offenders were small in size and represented types that could be expected to be superior intellectually (university students) and physically stronger (firemen), (2) the sample of criminals was unrepresented as it was drawn only from an imprisoned population; (3) his research methodology was defective; (4) he had no explicit criterion of 'biological inferiority'; and (5) he offered no evidence that physical inferiority is hereditary.

Sheldon related crime with physiological make-up or body constitution in 1940. He classified individuals on the basis of their physique (or body types) into three groups: endomorphic, ectomorphic and mesomorphic. Individuals with the first type of physique (with small bones, short limbs, and soft smooth and velvety skin) love comfort and luxury and are essentially extroverts; those with the second type of physique (with lean, fragile, delicate body, small delicate bones) are introverts, full of functional complaints, sensitive to noise, who complain of chronic fatigue, and shrink from crowds and

individuals; and those with the third type of physique (with strong muscles and bones, heavy chest and large wrists and hands) are active, dynamic, assertive and aggressive. Sheldon developed scales for measuring the body-type dimensions in which individuals were scored on each component between 1 to 7 scores. However, Sheldon's hypothesis that there is a relationship between delinquent behaviour and body-types and that the delinquents are somewhat more mesomorphic in body structure than are the non-delinquents has not been convincingly proved. Crime is a social process and not a biologically determined pattern of behaviour.

If we were to compare the main points of the classical school with the positive school, we could say that (1) the former emphasised the legal definition of crime, the latter rejected the legal definition; (2) the former believed in the doctrine of free-will, the latter believed in determinism; (3) the former did not use empirical research, the latter used empirical research; (4) the former emphasised on crime (in suggesting punishment), the latter on the criminal; (5) the former suggested death penalty for some offences, the latter recommended abolition of death penalty; and (6) the former was in favour of a definite sentence, the latter was in favour of an indeterminate sentence.

Besides the above theories, some studies on identical twins have also emphasised on heredity as an important factor in crime. For example, Lange (1931) compared the behaviour of male twins in several prisons with the non-institutionalised twins. He found that in the case of identical twins (born of a single fertilized ovum), 10 of the 15 pairs were concordant (both members of a twin pair having the same characteristics) while in the case of fraternal twins (born of separate ova), 15 of the 17 pairs were discordant (both twin members having different characteristics).

Kranz (Rosenthal, 1970) in his 1936 study of twins and criminality found 66% twins concordant among identical twins and 54% among fraternal twins. Christiansen (1968) in his study of 6,000 pairs born between 1880 and 1890 in Denmark found that with respect to criminal behaviour, identical twins were concordant in 66.7% cases as compared to 30.4% of the fraternal twins.

The criticism against explaining criminal behaviour in terms of inherited factors is that the similarities of the behaviour of identical twins could be the result of living in the same environment and be totally unrelated to heredity. Secondly, if heredity is the cause of crime, there should be no cases of identical twins where one is a criminal and

the other is not. On similar lines, the studies of family lines (Jukes by Dugdale in 1877; Kallikaks by Goddard in 1911, etc.) as evidence of inherited criminality have also been rejected.

Psychogenic Explanation

The psychogenic theories trace crime as some defect in the personality of the offender or 'in the inside of the person'. The psychological theory emphasises on feeble-mindedness (low Intelligence Quotient or I.Q.), the psychiatric theory on the mental disorders, and the psycho-analytical theory on the undeveloped ego, or drives and instincts, or guilt-feelings or inferiority complex.

Psychological Explanation

Henry Goddard reported results on intelligence tests in 1919 and maintained that (1919 : 8-9) the greatest single cause of delinquency and crime is feeble-mindedness (very low I.Q.). He said that feeble-mindedness is inherited and is very little affected by life events. He emphasised that a criminal is not born but made. But Goddard did not believe that every feeble-minded person is a criminal. He may be a potential criminal but whether he becomes one would be determined by two factors: his temperament and his environment. Thus, though feeble-mindedness may be hereditary but criminality is not hereditary.

In 1928-29, Sutherland (1931 : 357-75) analysed 350 reports on studies on intelligence tests covering little less than two lakh criminals and delinquents to examine the relationship between crime and mental deficiencies. He discovered that: (1) 50% criminals were diagnosed as feeble-minded in the studies conducted between 1910-14, but only about 20% were found criminals in studies in the period 1925-28; (2) there was a negligible difference in the mental age of criminals and non-criminals; (3) the discipline among low-mentality prisoners was the same as among high-mentality prisoners; and (4) conformity to parole conditions of the feeble-minded and the ordinary parolees was almost equal. He, thus, concluded that low mentality of the feeble-minded is not a significant cause of criminality

Psychiatric Explanation

William Healy, a psychiatrist in Chicago, disagreeing with his physician colleagues that juvenile delinquency is caused by defective

organisms or anatomical factors emphasised on personality defects and disorders, or 'psychogenic traits' as the cause of crime. In broader terms, psychogenic traits cause those ways of behaviour which are established in the infant or the young child through emotional interaction within the family. These traits refer to extroversion or introversion, dominance or submission, optimism or pessimism, emotional independence or dependence, self confidence or its absence, egocentrism or sociocentrism, and so on (Johnson, 1978 : 155). In narrower terms, however, the term 'psychogenic' is referred to 'mental disorder' or 'emotional disturbances'. Analysing psychological factors, Healy found a greater frequency of personality disorders among delinquents than among non-delinquents.

Psychiatrists have given three types of mental disorders or psychoses (that is, individuals manifesting severe decomposition, distortion of reality and loss of contact with reality) : (i) schizophrenia (exhibiting tendency to retreat from reality through delusions and hallucinations), (ii) manic-depressive disorder (exhibiting fluctuations in mood), and (iii) paranoia. The estimate is that only 1.5% to 2.0% criminals are psychotic, of which the schizophrenic is the most common among such offenders.

A study of 10,000 felons in New York between 1932 and 1935 also pointed out that only 1.5% were psychotic, 6.9% were psycho-neurotic, 6.9% were psychopathic and 2.4% were feebleminded. Thus, 82.3% of offenders were diagnosed as 'normal'. Another study of Paul Schilder (*Journal of Criminal Psychopathology*, October, 1940 : 152) in 1937 in New York pointed out that 83.8% offenders were 'normal'. Dunham's (1939 : 352-61) study of 500 males in Illinois hospital showed that schizophrenia is a negligible factor in the causation of crime. Thus, all these investigations show that the psychiatric theory has proved untenable (Bromberg & Thompson, 1939 : 70-89).

Serious methodological errors have been pointed out in Healy's researches too (1) his samples are small and unrepresentative; (2) his terms are either not defined or vaguely defined, for example, 'normal emotional control' and 'good living conditions'. How are these factors to be measured, and (3) research fails to explain why some children who have the traits believed to be characteristic of delinquents do not become delinquents and why some children who do not have those traits do become delinquents. By now, we might conclude that psychiatric theory stands rejected.

Psycho-Analytical Explanation

Sigmund Freud, who developed the psycho-analytical theory at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, did not advance a theory of criminality. But his approach and the three elements of Id, ego, and super-ego have been used by others like Adler, Abrahamsen, Aichhorn and Friedlander to explain criminal behaviour. Id is an individual's raw instinct or desire or drive or urge; ego is the reality; and super-ego is an individual's conscience or moral pressure. Super-ego constantly tries to suppress the Id while the ego is the acceptable balance between the Id and the super-ego. The Id and super-ego are basically *unconscious* while the ego is the *conscious* part of the personality.

The three propositions of psychoanalytic thought are: (1) behaviour is largely the product of unconscious psychological-biological forces (drives or instincts); (2) criminality arises out of conflicts related to these basic drives; and (3) to modify undesirable (criminal) behaviours, the person must be guided towards insight into the unconscious roots of his responses so that he can develop control over such impulses. In a well-balanced personality, Id, ego and super-ego work in relative harmony. But in abnormal cases (neurotic individuals), imbalance and disharmony occurs. When the super-ego is not sufficiently developed, the released repressed instincts may lead to anti-social behaviour. Conflict in the unconscious mind gives rise to feelings of guilt with a consequent desire for punishment to remove the guilt feelings and restore a balance of good against evil. The individual then commits the criminal act, leaves clues for apprehension in order to be caught and punished (Vold, 1958 : 93).

Aichhorn (1955 : 30) was the first scholar to use Freud's psycho-analytical approach in studying delinquents. He found several kinds of delinquents : some neurotic, some aggressive and lacking in super-ego development, some with little capacity for repressing their instinctual drives, and some having distorted cravings for affection.

Alfred Adler explains crime in terms of 'inferiority complex'. An individual commits crime to 'get attention' which helps him to compensate for his sense of inferiority. But Adler's theory is criticised for placing greater emphasis on the 'rational' side of an individual's behaviour and for oversimplification.

David Abrahamsen (1952) has explained crime in terms of an individual's resistance to tendencies and situations. He developed a formula $C = \frac{T+S}{R}$ where 'C' stands for Crime, 'T' for Tendencies, 'S'

for Situation, and 'R' for Resistance. Criminal behaviour will result if the individual has strong criminalistic tendencies and low resistance.

Sociologists have not favourably reacted either to Abrahamsen's explanation or to psychoanalytic explanation that causes of crimes are unconscious. They say, it is an oversimplification to reduce causative factors to three factors in mathematical terms. Likewise, the explanation that the criminal commits crime because he subconsciously desires to be punished as a result of his guilt feelings cannot be accepted for all crimes because in some cases, the individual commits crime, feels guilty, and is then punished. Mannheim has also said that punishment is no deterrent for the criminal. Thus, arguments against the psychiatric theory are: (1) there is methodological and logic-of-science error in psychiatric theory; (2) the terms are vague as no operational definitions of Id, ego, super-ego or unconscious are given, (3) projective techniques are open to subjective interpretation of the analyst; (4) the researches are based on small samples and inadequate control groups; (5) so long as an individual is the focus of the approach, generalizations cannot be made regarding patterns of behaviour; and (6) this theory in fact does not explain anything in terms of the causation of criminal behaviour.

Sociogenic Explanation

While the physiological, psychiatric and psychological theoretical explanations emphasize that crime is either inherited and results from a physical or a mental factor, or is the consequences of suppressed childhood experiences, sociologists argue that criminal behaviour is learned and it is conditioned by the social environment. Sociologists have used two approaches in studying the causation of crime: the first approach studies the relationship between crime and the social structure of society; and the second approach studies the process by which an individual becomes a criminal. Thus, sociological explanations may be classified in two categories : (1) structural explanations which include economic explanation, geographical explanation and sociological explanations of Merton and Clifford Shaw and subculture explanations of Cohen and Cloward and Ohlin, and (2) processual explanations which include explanations of Sutherland, Howard Becker and Walter Reckless.

Economic Explanation

This explanation analyses criminal behaviour in terms of the economic conditions in society. It holds that the criminal is a product of the

economic environment which provides him his ideals and his goals. It was the Italian Scholar Fornasari who talked of the relationship between crime and poverty in 1984. He maintained that 60% of the population of Italy is poor, and of the total crimes in Italy, 85% to 90% criminals belong to this section of the poor. In 1916, a Dutch scholar Bonger also emphasised on the relationship between crime and the capitalistic economic structure. In a capitalistic system, man concentrates only on himself and this leads to selfishness. Man is interested only in producing for himself, specially in producing a surplus which he can exchange for profit. He is not interested in the needs of others. Capitalism, thus, breeds social irresponsibility and leads to crime.

In 1938, a British criminologist Cyril Burt analysing juvenile delinquency found that 19.0% juvenile delinquents belonged to extremely poor families and 37.0% to poor families (1944 : 147). He concluded that though poverty is an important factor in crime but it is not the only factor. In 1915, William Healy studied 675 juvenile delinquents and found that 5.0% belonged to the destitute class, 22.0% to the poor class, 35.0% to the normal class, 34.0% to the comfort class, and 4.0% to the luxury class. Thus, since 73.0% delinquents belonged to classes which were economically normal or well-off, poverty cannot be considered to be a very important factor in delinquency.

Karl Marx's view of economic determinism advocated that private ownership of property results in poverty which distinguishes those who own the means of production from those whom they exploit for economic benefit. The latter turn to crime as a result of this poverty. Thus, though Marx did not specifically develop a theory of criminal causation but he believed that the economic system was the sole determinant of crime.

In India, two studies may be referred to in this context. Ruttoonshaw studied 225 juvenile delinquents in Poona and found (1947 : 49) that 20.0% belonged to families whose income was less than Rs. 150 per month, 58.0% belonged to families with an income of Rs. 150-500 per month, 12.2% belonged to families with an income of Rs. 500-1000 per month, 4.8% belonged to families with an income of Rs. 1000-2000 per month, and 2.7% belonged to families whose income was more than Rs. 2000 per month. This study, thus, shows that poverty cannot be given too much importance in crime. Sutherland (1965) has also said that : (1) we find more criminals in poor families because it is easy to

locate them, (2) criminals belonging to upper classes use their influence and pressures in escaping arrests and convictions, and (3) reactions of administrators are more biased towards the upper class people. Thus, today, most behavioural scientists reject the theory of economic determinism in criminal behaviour

Geographical Explanation

This explanation evaluates crime on the basis of geographical factors like climate, temperature and humidity. It is supported by scholars like Quetlet, Dexter, Montesquiu, Kropotokin, Champneuf and many others. According to Quetlet, crimes against persons predominate in the south and increase in summers, while crimes against property predominate in north and increase in winters. Champneuf supported this hypothesis of relationship between the nature of crime and the climate on the basis of his study conducted in France between 1825 and 1830. He found 181.5 property crimes against every 100 crimes against persons in north France, and 98.8 property crimes against every 100 crimes against persons in south France. On the basis of his study of property crimes conducted between 1825 and 1880, the French scholar Laccasagne also found the highest number of property crimes in December, followed by January, November and February. In this study on the effect of weather on an individual's behaviour made in 1904, the American scholar Dexter found that crime and geographical environment are highly related with each other. In 1911, a Russian scholar Kropotkin established that the rate of murder in any month/year can be predicted by calculating the average temperature and humidity of the preceding month/year. For this, he gave a mathematical formula $2(7x+y)$, where 'x' is temperature and 'y' is humidity. Multiplying the average temperature 'x' of last month with 7 and adding the average humidity of the last month 'y' to it, if we multiply the total figure with 2, we will get the number of murders to be committed in the given month.

The geographical explanation has been criticised on the ground that geographical factors may affect individual behaviour but the direct relationship between crime and geographical factors cannot be accepted as given by the scholars. Had such relationship existed, the number and nature of crime in a given geographical environment would have been the same at all times, which is not so. Hence, the invalidity of this theory.

Sociological Explanation

Sutherland's Theory of Differential Association

Sutherland propounded the "Differential Association Theory" in 1939. He says, two explanations have mainly been forwarded for criminal behaviour: situational and genetic or historical. The former explains crime on the basis of situation that persists at the time of crime, and the latter explains crime on the basis of a criminal's life experiences. He himself used the second approach in developing the theory of criminal behaviour. Suppose a hungry boy comes across a shop and finds the shopkeeper absent. He steals a loaf of bread. In this case, it is not because the shopkeeper was absent and he was hungry that the boy committed the theft but it is because he had learnt earlier that one can satisfy his hunger by stealing things. Thus, it is not the situation which motivates a person to commit theft, it is his learnt attitudes and beliefs.

Sutherland's main thesis (1969 : 77-79) is that individuals encounter many inharmonious and inconsistent social influences in their life-time and many individuals become involved in contacts with carriers of criminalistic norms and as a consequence become criminals. He called this process 'differential association'.

The theory states that criminal behaviour is learned in a process of communication with other persons, principally in small, intimate groups. This learning includes the techniques of committing the crime. The specific direction of motives, drives, rationalisations and attitudes is learned from definitions of the legal codes as favourable or unfavourable. A person becomes criminal or delinquent because of an excess of definitions favourable to violation of law over definitions unfavourable to violation of law. This is the principle of differential association. Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority and intensity. The process of learning criminal behaviour by associations with criminal and anti-criminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other learning. While criminal behaviour is an expression of general needs and values, it is not explained by those needs and values since non-criminal behaviour is an expression of the same needs and values.

Sutherland's theory was supported by James Short Junior on the basis of his study of 176 school children (126 boys and 50 girls) in 1955 (Rose Giallombardo, 1960 : 85-91). Short measured the degree of presumed exposure to crime and delinquency in the community, the

frequency, duration, priority and intensity of interaction with delinquent peers and knowledge of and association with adult criminals.

But Sutherland's theory has been attacked by many scholars like Sheldon Glueck, Mabel Elliott, Caldwell, Donald Cressey, Tappan, George Vold, Herbert Bloch, Jeffery Clarence, Daniel Glaser and others. The major criticism is that it is difficult to empirically test the principles and measure 'associations' and the priority, intensity duration and frequency of relationships. According to Tappan, Sutherland has ignored the role of personality or role of biological and psychological factors in crime. George Vold (1958:194) has maintained that he has ignored the role of secondary contact and formal groups in criminality. Clarence Ray Jeffery holds that Sutherland's theory fails to explain the origin of criminality, since criminality has to exist before it can be learned from someone else. (Johnson, 1978 : 158) Mabel Elliot (1952 : 402) says, Sutherland's theory explains the systematic crimes but not the situational ones. According to Cressey, Sutherland does not fully explore the implications of the learning process itself as it affects different individuals. Herbert Bloch (1962 : 158) is of the opinion that it is virtually impossible to measure associations in comparative quantitative terms. Glueck (1951:309) maintains that an individual does not learn every behaviour from others; many acts are learnt naturally. Caldwell says that individuals become what they are largely because of the contacts they have but both the constitutional or inborn hereditary structure and the intensity of the environmental stimuli must be appraised as well.

Daniel Glaser (1956 : 194) modified Sutherland's theory a little to explain from whom an individual learns crime. He called this new theory as 'Differential Identification Theory' and said that a person pursues criminal behaviour to the extent that he identifies himself with real or imaginary persons from whose perspective, his criminal behaviour seems acceptable. He further says that one of the persistent problems in the Theory of Differential Association is the obvious fact that not everyone in contact with criminality adopts or follows the criminal pattern. What, therefore, is the difference in the nature or quality of the association that in one case leads to acceptance of the attitudes and behaviour of a group of one individual but in the case of another individual leads to only acquaintance with but not an acceptance of the behaviour characteristics of the group.

Merton's Theory of Anomie

Merton, reacting against the biological and psychiatric theories (that crime is the result of inherited traits) first attempted to explain deviant behaviour in 1938 in a paper published in the *American Sociological Review*. He elaborated his thesis further in 1949 and 1957 and distinguished between social and cultural structures. Cultural structure, according to him, refers to goals and interests men pursue, while social structure refers to means or approved methods which regulate and control the pursuit of goals and interests. The cultural system of society enjoins all men to strive for goals by means of normatively regulated or approved forms of behaviour. However, opportunities to reach these goals through socially approved means are unequally distributed. Deviant behaviour ensues when social structure restricts or completely closes a person's access to the approved modes of reaching these goals. In other words, the disjunction between goals and means causes strains which in turn leads to a weakening of men's commitment to the culturally prescribed goals or institutionalized means, that is, to a state of anomie. Thus, Merton's thesis is that some social structures exert a definite pressure on some persons to engage in non-conformist rather than conformist conduct.

Merton (1968 : 192-193) has identified five modes of adaptation available to those who react to goals and means of society : conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion. *Conformity* describes the acceptance of goals and also of the means of the society. *Innovation* represents the acceptance of the goals but the rejection of the means, for example, a student accepts the goal of passing the examination and obtaining a degree but uses unfair means to pass. Thus, Merton points out that poverty does not cause crime but when poverty is linked with a cultural emphasis on monetary success as a dominant goal and a poor individual cannot compete because of his poverty for the culture values, then criminal behaviour is the normal outcome. *Ritualism* is the rejection of the goals but acceptance of the means. For example, a student goes to the college but does not attend his classes and spends time instead in the college canteen. *Retreatism* involves the rejection of both goals and means. For example, when an individual fails to achieve his goals by legitimate means and at the same time cannot adopt illegitimate means because of his prior socialization, he rejects both goals and means and becomes a drunkard, drug addict or a vagrant. *Rebellion* is characterized by the rejection of the goals and the means and an attempt to adopt new goals and means.

Merton's theory has been criticised by Cohen, Cloward and Lemert. Their main arguments are : (1) Merton's theory is incomplete because he has not explained who will reject the goals and who will reject the means, (2) only structure has been given importance; an individual's personality has been ignored; (3) strains do not necessarily lead to deviant behaviour; (4) the theory neglects the important role of social control, (5) Merton's assumption that deviant behaviour is disproportionately more common in lower classes is not correct; (6) anomie may be the cause rather than the effect of circumscribed life chances; (7) Cohen has argued that Merton has not explained what the determinants which determine the mode of adaptation of the individual are, (8) Cohen has also said that Merton has failed to account for the 'non-utilitarian' crime and juvenile delinquency, which people engage only for fun and not to meet specific goals of the society, for example, vandalism or a car-theft for joy-rides; and (9) finally, the theory does not take into account the social-psychological variables or the social structural elements which might explain the adoption of one adaptation over the other by the individuals.

Cloward and Ohlin's Theory of Differential Opportunity

Cloward and Ohlin integrated Sutherland's and Merton's theories and developed a new theory of criminal behaviour in 1960. Whereas Sutherland talks of illegitimate means and Merton talks of differentials in legitimate means, Cloward and Ohlin talk of differentials in both legitimate and illegitimate means to success-goals. The important elements of this theory are: (1) an individual occupies a position in both the legitimate and illegitimate opportunity structures, (2) relative availability of illegitimate opportunities affects the resolution of an individual's adjustment problems, and (3) faced with limitations on legitimate avenues of accessibility to goals and unable to revise his aspirations downward, he experiences intense frustration, resulting in exploration of non-conformist alternatives.

Clarence Schrag (1972 : 167) systematically organised Cloward's theory and gave its four postulates : (1) middle-class goals, specially economic goals, are widespread, (2) every organised community provides legitimate opportunities for attaining these goals, (3) access to legitimate means varies from class to class, and (4) within given community, illegitimate opportunities may or may not be available. But Schrag himself has criticised the theory of Cloward and Ohlin based on the above postulates on two counts : (1) the theory fails to explain why

a young person who belongs to a lower class does not become involved in the activities of delinquent gangs, and (2) who will use illegitimate means to achieve goals ? Schrag has answered the second question himself. He says that three types of persons are susceptible to indulging in deviant behaviour or join delinquent gangs : (1) those who blame the system for their failures and/or adjustment problems, (2) those who think, they possess the official criteria but not the pragmatic criteria, and (3) those who are alienated from conventional norms or a legitimate system.

Cloward and Ohlin have identified three types of delinquent sub-cultures; the criminal, the conflict, and the retreatist. The first emphasises orderly activity oriented to economic gain; the second emphasises violence and gun-fighting; and the third emphasises drug use and other 'kicks'. The first tends to arise in areas where successful and big-time criminals reside and they have a high status in the conventional community and mutually acceptable relations with political machines and law enforcement officials. This sub-culture does not manifest violence. The second is found in areas where there is no alliance between the criminal and the conventional elements. This subculture features violence and/or threat of violence as a method of getting status. In such neighbourhoods, young people tend to organise themselves in a community of gangs contending with one another for "rep" through the show of violence and toughness. The third is found in areas where either repressive police measures make street-fighting too dangerous or where moral and other inhibitions against the use of violence exist. Individuals denied access to criminal and 'conflict' opportunities tend to withdraw into a world of narcotic drugs.

Short, Tennyson and Rivers have supported Cloward and Ohlin's theory on the basis of their study on the perception of legitimate and illegitimate opportunities pertaining to education and occupation among 500 negro and white lower-class gang boys and middle-class non-gang boys from the same neighbourhood. Walter Reckless also undertook a project to examine Cloward's theory. Some of the questions pertaining to the perception of opportunities were: (1) I probably won't be able to do the kind of work that I want to do because I don't have enough education, (2) if a kid like me works hard, he can get a lead, (3) my family can't give me the opportunity that most kids have, (4) most people are better off than I am, (5) I am as well off as most people are, and (6) a guy like me has a pretty chance of going to a college.

On the basis of the responses received, Reckless found that Cloward's theory is partly correct, that is, it explains some crimes but not all crimes.

The important criticisms against Cloward and Ohlin's theory are: (1) the main contention in the theory that there are kinds of opportunities—legitimate and illegitimate—is not so simple as it seems. The distinction, although real, is 'analytical' rather than 'concrete', that is, there are not *some* things that are legitimate opportunities and *other* things that are illegitimate opportunities, but the *same* things are always both, for example, notes prepared by students on small pieces of paper can be used as unfair means in examinations as well as legitimate simple means for remembering points a day or two before the examinations. Similarly, a gun can be used for killing as well as defending oneself, (2) Cloward and Ohlin maintain that the lower-class youths have two orientations: (a) orientation toward membership in middle-class, called 'lifestyle' orientation, and (b) orientation toward economic improvement, called 'economic orientation. Cloward's thesis is that candidates for delinquent subculture are those who wish to retain lower-class membership but aspire to improve their economic status (Johnson, 1978 : 179). But Gordon says, these two orientations do not exist separately; (3) Cloward has not specified the initial conditions for the emergence of various types of subculture; (4) there is class-bias in this theory; (5) some concepts cannot be operationalised, for example, opportunity structure, perception of opportunity, denial of legitimacy or double failure; and (6) the personality factor has been completely ignored.

Cohen's Theory of Value Orientation or Delinquent Sub-Culture

Albert Cohen's theory mainly deals with the problems of status adjustment of working-class boys. He holds (1955 : 65-66) that the young people's feelings of themselves depend largely upon how they are judged by others. The situations in which they are judged, most notably the school situation, are largely dominated by middle class values and standards, which in fact is the dominant value system. These standards include such criteria as neatness, polished manners, academic intelligence, verbal fluency, high level of aspirations, and a drive for achievement. Young people of different origins and backgrounds tend to be judged by the same standards in the society, so that young people of lower classes find themselves competing for status and approval under the same set of rules. However, they are not equally well-

equipped for success in this status game. For this and other reasons, the lower-class children are more likely to experience failure and humiliation. One way they can deal with this problem is to repudiate and withdraw from the game and refuse to recognise that these rules have any application to them. But, this is not quite that simple because the dominant value system is also, to a degree, their value system. They have three alternatives before them: (i) to adopt the 'college-boy response' of upward mobility (thrifty, hardwork, cuts himself from activities of peers), (ii) to adopt the 'stable corner-boy response' (does not surrender the upward mobility idea but is neither thrifty nor cuts himself from peers nor incurs hostility of either middle-class persons or delinquent boys), and (iii) to adopt 'delinquent response' (completely repudiates middle-class standards). Of these alternatives, most of the children adopt the third response. They resort to reaction formation. They reject the dominant value system and develop new values which are *non-utilitarian* (because they do not benefit economically), *malicious* (because they enjoy at others' cost and suffering), and *negativistic* (because they are opposed to the accepted values of the larger society).

The propositions in Cohen's theory may be stated briefly as follows (Kitsues & Dietrick, 1966 : 20) : The working-class boy faces a characteristic problem of adjustment which is qualitatively different from that of the middle-class boy. His problem is one of 'status-frustration'. His socialization handicaps him for achievement in the middle-class status system. Nevertheless, he is thrust into this competitive system where achievement is judged by middle-class standards of behaviour and performance. Ill-prepared and poorly motivated, he is frustrated in his status aspirations by the agents of middle-class society. The delinquent sub-culture represents a 'solution' to the working-class boy's problem, for it enables him to 'break clean' with the middle-class morality and legitimizes hostility and aggression without moral inhibitions. Thus, the delinquent sub-culture is characterised by non-utilitarian, malicious and negativistic values as an attack on the middle-class where their egos are most vulnerable. It expresses contempt for a way of life by making its opposite a criterion of status.

Cohen's above theory has been critically examined both as a theory of the delinquent sub-culture and as a theory of delinquency. Sykes and Matza, Merton, Reiss and Rhodes, Kobrin and Finestone, Kitsuse and Dietrick and Wilensky and Labeaux have questioned various

propositions and implications of his thesis. The main criticisms are : (1) a gang member does not reject middle-class values and standards but adopts techniques of neutralization to rationalize his delinquent behaviour (Sykes & Matza , 1957), (2) if Cohen's theory is accepted, the delinquency rate of lower-class boys should be higher in areas where they are in direct competition with middle-class boys and their rate should be lowest in areas where lower-class is universal. But Reiss and Rhodes (1961) found that the more the lower-class boy was in minority in school and in his residential areas, the less likely was he to become a delinquent, (3) Kitsuse and Dietrick have challenged Cohen's statement that the working-class boy measures himself by middle-class norms; (4) his description of delinquent sub-culture as non-utilitarian, malicious and negativistic is inaccurate; (5) Cohen's description of the working-class boy's ambivalence toward the middle-class system does not warrant the use of the 'reaction formation' concept; (6) the methodological basis of the theory renders it inherently untestable; and (7) the theory is ambiguous concerning the relation between the *emergence* of the sub-culture and its *maintenance*.

Howard Becker's Labeling Theory

Becker propounded his theory in 1963. Before him, Frank Tennenbaum (1938), Edwin Lemert (1951), John Kitsuse (1962) and K. Erikson (1962) had also used an approach called the 'Social Reaction Approach' or the 'Social Interaction Approach' as different from the 'Structural Approach' used by Merton, or the 'Cultural Approach' used by Cohen and Cloward and Ohlin. This theory does not deal with the question as to why a person becomes a criminal but tells why the society labels some people as criminals or deviants. Some men who drink heavily are called alcoholics while others are not ; some men who behave oddly are committed to hospitals while others are not. Thus, according to this theory, what is important in the study of deviance is the *social audience*, not the individual *person*. Becker also maintained that what is important in crime is not the act of the individual but the reaction of the society in terms of rules and sanctions. Kai Erikson has also said that what distinguishes a delinquent from a non-delinquent is not the characteristic *found* in him but the characteristic *assigned* to him by others. According to Becker (1963 : 9), deviance is not a quality of the act a person commits but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an 'offender'. The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behaviour is

behaviour that people so label. An experiment was performed in the United States (Reid, 1976 : 232) in which eight sane persons of varied backgrounds got themselves admitted for feigned mental illness to psychiatric wards of 12 hospitals in various parts of the country. All gave the same account of their life situations. All but one were labeled Schizophrenic. Once labelled insane, they were presumed insane by the staff who interacted with them daily. This shows that it is the reaction of others which labels an individual in a specific way. In the case of criminals also, it is the society which brands some people but not others as criminals. If a lower-class boy steals a car, he is branded a 'thief', but if an upper-class boy does so, he is described as a 'mischievous pleasure-seeker'.

In another experiment conducted by Richard Schwartz and Jerome Skolnick in 1962 in U.S.A., one person with a criminal record was introduced to 100 potential employers with four different versions—he was found a criminal and convicted; he was not found a criminal and acquitted; he was found a criminal but acquitted; he was not a criminal but was convicted. It was found that employers would not offer a job to a person with a criminal record. Thus, the labelling theory shifted the focus to those who label, that is, the process of rule-making and rule-enforcement.

According to Becker, whether or not labelling occurs depends upon (1) the time when the act is committed, (2) who commits the act and who is the victim, and (3) the consequences of the act. Thus, whether a given act is deviant or not depends in part on the nature of the act and in part on what other people do about it. Becker suggests that a distinction be made between *rule-breaking behaviour* and *deviance*. Deviance is not a quality that lies in the behaviour itself, but in the interaction between the person who commits an act and those who *respond to it*. Becker has also suggested that certain types of groups are more likely to be labeled deviant than others, for example, groups that do not have political power and, therefore, cannot put pressure on the officials for not enforcing the law, groups which are seen to threaten the persons in power, and groups which have low social status.

What are the effects on the individual who is labelled. The official response to the behaviour in question may initiate processes that push the "delinquent" individuals toward further delinquent conduct, and at least, make it more difficult for them to re-enter the conventional world. If on the other hand, the individual does not receive official response to his delinquent acts, he may continue committing them.

while receiving no help in changing his behaviour (Wheeler and Cotterell, 1966 : 22-27).

Criticism against the labeling theory is that it gives a good logic but does not explain the cause of crime. It entirely avoids the question of causation. Jack Gibbs (1982 : 219) has posed four questions : What elements in the scheme are intended to be definitions rather than substantive theory ? Is the ultimate goal to explain deviant behaviour or to explain reactions to deviation ? Is deviant behaviour to be identified exclusively in terms of the reaction to it ? Exactly, what kind of reaction identifies behaviour as deviant ?

Walter Reckless's Theory of Self-Concept and Containment

Walter Reckless (1967 : 522) has said that the important question that must be answered in explaining criminal behaviour is why, given the alternatives of law-abiding and law-violating behaviour, do some people turn to one or the other behaviour. He advocates that self-concept is the key factor in explaining the choice among alternatives of behaviour. A favourable self-concept directs an individual toward law-abiding behaviour, and an unfavourable self-concept directs him toward delinquent behaviour. Reckless has further said that there are two important aspects of control: inner control and outer control, and that depending upon the balance of these control systems, the individual can take either a deviant or a conformist route. His assumption is that strong inner and reinforcing outer containment constitutes an isolation against normative deviancy, that is, violation of the socio-legal conduct norms.

In 1955, Reckless and Dinitz studied white 'good' boys (who, their teachers thought, would not get into trouble with the law) of sixth grade of about 12 years age, selected from high delinquency areas. The schedule, administered in the boys' homes, contained 50 items designed to measure self-concept. Likewise in 1956, they interviewed 101 'bad' boys (who, their teachers thought, would become delinquents) and studied their self-concept. They concluded, on the basis of this study, that a good self-concept is an evidence of favourable socialization and the development of a 'strong inner self' (self-control, well-developed super-ego, high frustration tolerance, resistance to diversions, ability to find substitute satisfactions and tension-reducing rationalizations) which directs a person towards middle-class values. Poor-self concept is indicative of unfavourable socialization and 'weak inner direction,' which in turn does not deflect the boy from bad

companions and street corner society, does not enable him to embrace middle-class values, and gives him an awareness of being cut off from the upward movement in the legitimate opportunity system.

The evaluation of this theory has pointed out that though this is the only research by sociologists in the area of delinquency which handles variables of personality and self, nevertheless the measure of self concept has been questioned and the lack of control groups has been noted. The samples have also been questioned. Was the selection of 'good' boys related to their performance in schools? What about boys with 'bad' self concepts who might not be delinquents?

Confinement and Correction of Criminals

Two methods are mainly used in our society in punishing/treating the criminals: imprisonment and release on probation, though some serious offenders are given capital punishment, and fines are imposed on some minor offenders.

Prisons

The conditions in Indian jails were horrible upto 1919-20. It was after the recommendations of 1919-20 Indian Jails Reform Committee that changes like classification, segregation of prisoners, education, recreation, assigning productive work and opportunities for maintaining contacts with family and society were introduced in maximum-security prisons (that is Central jails, district jails and sub-jails). Later on, three medium-security jails or model jails were also established in three states with an emphasis on *panchayat raj*, self-managed canteens, and the wage-system; but these jails were ultimately converted into central jails. Minimum-security prisons or open jails were started in Uttar Pradesh in 1952 and since then 31 open jails have come to be established in 17 (out of 25) states till today (1991). Prisoners have to fulfil certain conditions before being admitted to an open jail, like spending one-third term of imprisonment in an ordinary jail, having a record of good behaviour, possessing physical and mental fitness, and being in age group of 20 and 50 years. The capacity of open jails varies from 100 to 3,000; the highest capacity (3,000) being found in Sitarganj Camp in Nainital district in Uttar Pradesh and the lowest (less than 100) in Tamil Nadu, Assam, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat Open Jails. Some open jails provide training only in agriculture, some only in industries and some both in agriculture and industries. The average stay of a prisoner in an open jail varies from two to three years.

As regards the maximum security prisons, there are about 1,200 prisons in India, of which 6.0% are central jails, 18.0% are district jails, 75.0% are sub-jails and less than 1.0% are special jails. About 5.0 lakh out of about 24.0 lakh offenders arrested for about 14.5 lakh crimes are sent to jails every year. The average daily population of jails in India is about 1.5 lakh, of which 60.0% are under-trials and 40.0% are convicted offenders. Of the total prisoners in Indian jails, about 1.0% are below 16 years, 17.0% are between 16 and 21 years, 40.0% are between 21 and 30 years, 28.0% are between 30 and 40 years, 12.0% are between 40 and 60 years and 2.0% are above 60 years. About 45.0% prisoners have an agricultural background, 33.0% are literate and 85.0% get an imprisonment of less than six months and 10.0% between six months and two years.

The prison is a unisex world where every inmate is stigmatised and has to carry on tightly scheduled activities in the company of strangers. The inmates are deprived of liberty, privileges, emotional security, and hetero-sexual relations. To face these psychological and social problems, inmates follow the 'inmate code' of the 'inmate system' which is just contrary to the formal code of the prison system. Some examples of the inmate code/norms are . do not work hard, do not cooperate with the officials, do not quarrel/argue with other inmates, do not reveal secrets to officials, always keep on expressing dissatisfaction with food, clothes, work, and so forth. Donald Clemmer has described the internalization of these values and norms as the process of 'prisonization'. His contention is that every prisoner is prisonized, prisonization takes place in stages; the degree of prisonization could be low, medium or high; prisonization depends upon factors like age, term of imprisonment, nature of crime, relations with outside world, cell-mates and work-colleagues; and the length of time served in jail. The prisonized inmate could be de-prisonized as well as re-prisonized. Studying the effects and the effectiveness of the prison system on the basis of an empirical study of 252 prisoners in three central jails in Rajasthan in 1967-68 (Ahuja, 1981), it was found that: though the process of prisonization is found in Indian jails too, but every prisoner is not prisonized as claimed by Clemmer. Studying conformity to prison/inmate norms on the basis of three factors, namely, *contact* with inmates/officials, *identification* with staff/inmates norms, and *loyalty* to inmates/officials, it was found that 24.0% inmates were conformists (who identified with prison norms, were bound by loyalty to staff and had great contacts with prison officials), 42.0% were non-conformists.

27.0% were partial conformists and 7.0% were isolationists. Further, analysing the absorption of inmate/prison norms by assigning scores to answers of 15 questions, it was found that 48.0% inmates conformed to inmate norms, 45.0% to prison norms and 7.0% were neutral. This shows that the rate of absorbing inmate norms is about the same as that of absorbing prison norms and most of the inmates remained in an ambiguous position in accepting or rejecting prison/inmate norms. It was also found that prisonization is not related to age, nature of offence, term of imprisonment, and the phase of imprisonment as claimed by Clemmer. However, it is related with the type of inmates with whom a prisoner lives/works. Thus, rejecting Clemmers' model, a new model was developed, called "Self Image Model," for explaining the process of adjustment of inmates in a jail. This model is based on four elements : Self-image, value conformity, actual conformity and prisoners' prestige.

On the basis of this study of three prisons, it is maintained that a balanced policy of liberalization and strictness regarding the inmates in the prison should be adopted for punishing/ treating the offenders through imprisonment. Other measures needed to make the prison system more effective and in correcting the deviants are: under-trials should not be kept with convicts in the same prison; inmates should be provided access to their files; there should be proper diagnosis before assigning barrack/work to the prisoners; inmates should be given freedom of choosing the work of their choice; release on parole should be made more easier and effective; private industries should be encouraged to come to prisons; effective channels should be provided to the inmates for expressing their grievances; a system of indeterminate sentence should be introduced; sending offenders to prison for a short term (less than six months) should be discouraged (at present 85 per cent of our prisoners are short-termers); a Bureau of Prison Industries should be established at the state level, and the prisoners should be associated with the management of prisons through the Advisory Committees (this system will be different from the *panchayti raj* system in the prisons). Knowing that there is no connection between the severity of prison conditions and incidence of crime, why should we not try to devise programmes which may induce prisoners to turn over a new leaf? What we need today is an alternative to a prison.

Probation

Probation is an alternative to a prison. It is suspension of sentence of an offender by the court and releasing him on certain conditions to live in

the community with or without the supervision of a probation officer. The system was introduced in India in 1958 by passing the Central Probation Act. Though Section 562 in 1898 Cr PC permitted release of an offender on probation but it applied only to juvenile delinquents and first offenders. There was no provision for supervision and only first class magistrates were empowered to grant probation. The British government permitted states in 1934 to enact their own laws permitting probational release. Madras and Madhya Pradesh enacted such an Act in 1936, Bombay and Uttar Pradesh in 1938, Hyderabad in 1953 and Bengal in 1954. But all these Acts were meant only for the probational release of juvenile delinquents. The 1958 Act applied to all offenders. It permits the release on probation for a maximum period of three years and also has a provision for revoking the term. Some states (like Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Assam and Himachal Pradesh) have linked probation with social welfare and others (like Bihar, Bengal, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala) with the Prison Department. Madhya Pradesh has linked it with the law Department while Karnataka has its separate Directorate. The probation officer has been assigned two functions: social investigation and supervision of probationers. There are about 500 probation officers in the whole of India. On an average, one probation officer investigates 10 cases and supervises four cases a year.

The probation system has certain advantages over the prison system. These are: no stigma is attached to the offender released on probation, there is no break in the probationer's economic life; his family does not suffer; the offender does not feel frustrated; and economically it is less expensive. The disadvantages are that the offender is put in the same environment in which he committed the crime; there is no fear of punishment; and no individual attention is paid to probationers. However, these criticisms are not logical. Further, probation can be made more effective through new measures. These could be: changing the concept of probation and treating it not as a suspension of sentence but as an alternative to imprisonment (with this, the probationer will not be imprisoned for the original offence for which his sentence was suspended but will only be penalised for violating the conditions), making social investigation compulsory in all those cases where the offender is released on probation; not making supervision compulsory for all probationers; making conditions for release flexible; introducing indeterminate sentence system and, not linking probation services with any other department but establishing a separate directorate for it at the state level.

Summarising the problem of correction, it may be concluded that criminologists have always been tied to two explicit interests : first, the *managerial* interest in making the correctional system more efficient and second, the *humanitarian* interest in reforming the system. These two interests are often considered incompatible but they might not be so when perceived in terms of 'rehabilitative ethics'. Treatment can be seen both as more *efficient* and more *humanitarian*.

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Juvenile Delinquency

The notions about juvenile delinquency held by laymen and social scientists are inadequate, faulty and misleading. For one thing, they often assume that juvenile delinquents are simply under-aged criminals, that is, non-adult criminals or juveniles who engage in offences that constitute crimes when carried on by adults, and are between the age of seven and 16 or 18 years, as prescribed by the law of the land. The maximum age today for juvenile delinquents according to the Juvenile Justice Act of 1986 is 16 years for boys and 18 years for girls, but earlier, according to the Children Acts, it was different in different states. In states like Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, Maharashtra, Punjab and Madhya Pradesh, it was 16 years but in states like Bengal and Bihar, it was 18 years. In states like Rajasthan, Assam and Karnataka, it was 16 years for boys and 18 years for girls. However, the nature of offence is equally important.

Youths who are involved in 'status offences' such as truancy, vagrancy, immorality and ungovernability also fall within the definition of juvenile delinquency. Neumayer, Ivan Nye and James Short Jr., Richard Jenkins and Walter Reckless have also emphasized on the 'type of behaviour' in the concept of juvenile delinquency. According to Walter Reckless (1956), the term juvenile delinquency applies to the "violation of criminal code and/or pursuit of certain patterns of behaviour disapproved of for children and young adolescents". Thus, both *age* and *behavioural infractions* prohibited in the statutes are important in the concept of juvenile delinquency.

The difference between a delinquent child and an adult criminal is important from the case-work approach. The difference between the

two is made by the conduct involved, the methods employed by the court, the philosophy and methods applied in treatment, and the individuals' status, reputation and civil rights in the community after adjudication.

Classification of Juvenile Delinquents

Juvenile delinquents have been classified by different scholars on different basis. For example, Hirsh (1937) has classified them in six groups on the basis of the kinds of offences committed: (1) *incurability* (for example, keeping late hours, disobedience...), (2) *truancy* (from home or school), (3) *larceny* (ranging from petty theft to armed robbery), (4) *destruction of property* (including both public and private property), (5) *violence* (against community by using weapons), and (6) *sex offences* (ranging from homosexuality to rape).

Eaton and Polk (1969) have classified delinquents into five groups according to the type of offence. The offences are : (1) minor violations (including disorderly conduct and minor traffic violations), (2) major traffic violations (including automobile thefts), (3) property violations (4) addiction (including alcoholism and drug addiction), and (5) bodily harm (including homicide and rape).

Robert Trojanowicz (1973 : 59) has classified them as accidental, unsocialised, aggressive, occasional, professional and gang-organised.

Psychologists have classified juvenile delinquents on the basis of their individual traits or the psychological dynamics of their personality into five groups: mentally defective, psychotic, neurotic, situational and cultural.

Nature and Incidence

Of the total delinquencies committed by the juveniles, hardly 2.0% come to the notice of the police and the courts. The statistics compiled by the Police Research Bureau, Delhi give some indication of the incidence of juvenile delinquency in India. Upto 1987, every year about 50 thousand delinquencies were committed under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and about 85 thousand under the local and special laws. But the new definition of a juvenile after the enforcement of the Juvenile Justice Act in October, 1987 (passed in 1986) excludes males in the age-group of 16 to 21 years and females in the age-group of 18 to 21 years. Crime cases attributed to juveniles naturally have been reduced now. This is why juvenile delinquency in and after 1988, compared to

1987 and earlier years has decreased both under the IPC and the local and special laws. In 1988, about 25 thousand (exactly 24,827) delinquencies under the IPC and about 25 thousand (exactly 25,468) delinquencies under the local and special laws were committed. Similarly, (after 1987) about 54 thousand juveniles were apprehended (38 thousand or 70.0% under the IPC and 16 thousand or 30% under the local and special laws) for different crimes (*Crime in India*, 1988, 138-145). The percentage of juvenile crime to total cognizable crime in India today is about 2.0% (in 1988, it was 1.7%). Before 1988, this percentage (of juvenile delinquency to total cognizable crime in India) was about 4.0%. Juvenile crime increased by about 25.0% between 1978 and 1987 but in 1988, it decreased by 53.0% under the IPC as compared to 1987 and by 70.0% under the local and special laws.

The highest number of crimes committed by the juveniles are against property, that is, theft, burglary, robbery and dacoity. These four crimes account for 36.0% of the total cognizable crimes under IPC committed by the juveniles (theft—22.5%, burglary—11.0%, robbery—1.6% and dacoity—0.9%). This is 3.0% more as compared to the percentage chart of same crimes committed by the adult criminals. After the property crimes, 12.0% juveniles are apprehended for riots, 3.0% for murder, 1.3% for rape and 1.3% for kidnapping and abduction.

The largest contribution, under the local and special laws from 1988 onwards, is from offences under the Prohibition Act (34.0%) and the Gambling Act (16.2%) (upto 1987, it was 27.0% and 21.0% respectively). The incidence of juvenile delinquency varies widely in different states. The four states—Maharashtra (43.0%), Madhya Pradesh (13.0%), Bihar (7.0%) and Andhra Pradesh (5.0%)—account for about 68.0% of the total juvenile delinquencies in the entire country under the IPC. For crimes under the local and special laws, two states—Maharashtra (47.0%) and Tamil Nadu (26.0%)—account for about 73.0% of the total offences (*Crime in India*, 1988: 132-136).

Out of about 38 thousand juveniles apprehended and sent to courts every year for delinquencies under the IPC from 1988 onwards, about 11.0% are sent to their homes after advice/admonition, 25.0% are released on probation, 2.0% are sent to special homes, 13.0% are fined and 10.0% are acquitted. About 39.0% cases remain pending (1988 : 149).

Characteristics

Following are some of the important characteristics of juvenile delinquency in India :

(1) The delinquency rates are much higher among boys than among girls, that is, girls commit less delinquencies than boys. The percentage involvement of girls in the juvenile delinquency upto 1987 was about 6.0% to 7.0%. This suddenly increased to 13.4% in 1988 due to the change in the definition of juveniles by which, in the age group of 16-18 years only, girls are considered as juveniles. If we take the figures pertaining to the earlier years and work out the percentage of girls within the newly defined range of age, it comes to 13.1% which compares well with 13.4% in 1988. Thus, the present figures suggest an overall arrest ratio of 64 boys for each girl.

(2) The delinquency rates tend to be highest during early adolescence (12-16 years age group). Since the new definition of the age of juvenile delinquency in 1988, about four-fifths delinquents (81.0%) fall in this age group of 12-16 years. Earlier (between 1978 and 1987), it was observed that a large number of delinquents (71.0%) belonged to 18-21 years (late adolescence) age-group, 15.0% belonged to 16-18 years age-group, 9.0% to 12-16 years age group, and 5.0% to 7-12 years age-group. Now the percentage share of two age-groups has changed. About 9.0% belong to 7-12 years age-group and 10.0% to 16-18 years age-group (1988 : 141). The share of 12-16 years age-group has increased from 10.0% in 1978-87 to 81.0% in 1988 because since 1988, 18-21 years age-group has entirely gone out of the ambit of the juvenile consideration.

(3) Juvenile delinquency is more an urban than a rural phenomenon. The metropolitan cities like Delhi, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Ahmedabad, Hyderabad and Bangalore produce more juvenile delinquents than small cities and towns.

(4) At the time of arrest, about two-thirds (64.0%) of the delinquents are found living with their parents, about one-fourth (23.0%) with their guardians and another one-fourth (13.0%) are homeless (1988 : 150). This shows the importance of family environment in juvenile delinquency.

(5) About two-fifths (42.0%) of the juveniles are illiterate, half (52.0%) are primary, middle and secondary passed, and a very small number (6.0%) are educated upto the high school level and above (1988 : 150). Thus, most delinquents come from illiterate and less educated families.

(6) About three fifths (57.0%) of the delinquents come from homes with an income of less than Rs. 500 per month (that is, very poor class) about one-fourth (27.0%) from homes with income between Rs. 501 and 1,000 per month (that is, poor class), about one-tenth (9.0%) from homes with income between Rs. 1000 and 2000 per month (that is, lower middle class), and a very small number (5.0%) from homes with income between Rs. 2001 and 3000 per month (that is, upper-middle class) or with income above Rs. 3000 per month (2.0%) (that is, upper class) (1988 : 151). This shows that juvenile delinquency is more a lower-class phenomenon. Almost all studies conducted in our country on juvenile delinquency and its relation to the socio-economic order show that those at the bottom strata have been found to have the highest rates. The extent to which this is true varies under different conditions, but one general point that has been made in almost all studies (Ruttonsha, Hansa Seth, Sushil Kumar and Verma) is that the impact of socio-economic status shows its effect most strongly the further one goes into the delinquency adjudication process.

(7) More than four-fifths of the juvenile delinquents are first offenders and only about one-tenth are recidivists or past offenders. The average between 1981 and 1987 shows that 87.0% were new offenders.

(8) Most of the delinquencies are committed in groups. In the United States also, Shaw and McKay in their study had found that 90.0% children had companions in their delinquencies.

(9) Though more delinquencies are committed in groups but the number of juvenile gangs having support of organised adult criminals is not much in our country.

Types

Delinquency exhibits a variety of styles of conduct or forms of behaviour. Each of the patterns has its own social context, the causes that are alleged to bring it about, and the forms of prevention or treatment most often suggested as appropriate for the pattern in question. Howard Becker, (1966 : 226-38) has referred to four types of delinquency: (a) individual delinquency, (b) group-supported delinquency, (c) organised delinquency, and (d) situational delinquency.

Juvenile Delinquency

Individual Delinquency

This refers to delinquency in which only one individual is involved in committing a delinquent act and its cause is located within the individual delinquent. Most of the explanations of this delinquent behaviour come from psychiatrists. Their argument is that delinquency is caused by the psychological problems stemming primarily from defective/faulty/pathological family interaction patterns. Researches of Healy and Bronner, Albert Bandura and Richard Walters, Edwin Powers and Helen Witmer, and Henry Meyer, Edgar Borgatta are based on this approach. Healy and Bronner (1936) compared delinquent youths with their non-delinquent siblings and analysed the differences between them. Their most important finding was that over 90.0% of the delinquents compared to 13.0% of their non-delinquent siblings had unhappy home lives and felt discontented with their life circumstances. The nature of unhappiness differed : some felt rejected by parents and others felt either inferior or jealous of siblings or suffered from mental conflict. They indulged in delinquency as a solution to these problems, as it (delinquency) either brought attention from parents or provided support from peers or reduced their guilt feelings. Later studies also identified important aspects of family relations leading to delinquencies. Bandura and Walters compared the aggressive actions of white delinquents with those of non-delinquent boys with no clear sign of economic hardship. They found that delinquents differed from non-delinquents a little in their relationship with their mothers but more in their relationship with their fathers. Thus, father-son rather than mother-son relations seemed more crucial in delinquency, as delinquent boys could not internalise moral values because of the absence of good role models in their fathers. In addition, their discipline was also more harsh and stern.

Group-Supported Delinquency

In this type, the delinquencies are committed in companionship with others and the cause is located not in the personality of the individual or in the delinquent's family but in the culture of the individual's home and neighbourhood. The studies of Thrasher and Shaw and McKay talk of this type of delinquency. The main finding in understanding why the young became delinquent was their association and companionship with others already delinquent. This was later put very clearly by Sutherland, who developed the theory of differential association. Unlike the psychogenic explanations, this set of ideas focuses on what

is learned and who it is learned from rather than on the problems that might produce a motivation to commit delinquencies.

Organised Delinquency

This type refers to delinquencies that are committed by developing formally organised groups. These delinquencies were analysed in the U.S. in the 1950s and the concept of 'delinquent subculture' was developed. This concept refers to the set of values and norms that guide the behaviour of group members, encourage the commission of delinquencies, award status on the basis of such acts and specify typical relationships to persons who fall outside the groupings governed by group norms. Cohen was the first person to refer to this type of delinquency. He was followed by Cloward and Ohlin and a few others.

Situational Delinquency

The above mentioned three types of delinquency have one thing in common. In all of them, delinquency is viewed as having deep roots. In individual delinquency (according to the psychogenic explanation), the roots of delinquency lie primarily within the individual; in group-supported and organised delinquencies (the sociogenic explanation) the roots (of delinquency) lie in the structure of the society with emphasis either on the ecological areas where delinquency prevails or on the systematic way in which social structure places some individuals in a poor position to compete for success. The situational delinquency provides a different perspective. Here the assumption is that delinquency is not deeply rooted, and motives for delinquency and means for controlling it are often relatively simple. A young man indulges in a delinquent act without having a deep commitment to delinquency because of less developed impulse control and/or because of lesser reinforcement of family restraints and because he has relatively little to lose even if caught. David Matza is one scholar who refers to this type of delinquency. However, the concept of situational delinquency is undeveloped and is not given much relevance in the problem of delinquency causation. It is a supplement to rather than a replacement of other types.

Factors Involved

Researchers generally agree that a number of factors play an important part in a youngster's delinquencies. We can divide these factors into

two groups: individual factors and situational factors. The former include personality traits like submissiveness, defiance, hostility, impulsiveness, feeling of insecurity, fear, lack of self-control and emotional conflict while the latter may be subdivided into five groups: family, companions, school environment, movies and work environment. We will here mainly discuss the family's contribution to delinquency.

Family

Many theorists consider family as the most significant factor in the development of juvenile delinquency. Class status, power group relations and class mobility, are also directly or indirectly related to the family environment. Psychological theorists like Irving Kaufman (1959 : 15), Sidney Burman (1964 : 142) and August Aichhorn (1969 : 16) are primarily concerned in the causation of delinquency with early childhood experiences, emotional deprivations and child-rearing processes, which influence the formation of the personality and the development of attitudes, values, and a lifestyle. The abnormal expression of behaviour expressed in an anti-social form is the result of these factors according to the psychologists. Whereas, the psychologist is concerned with the identification of individual variables, such as motivation, drives, values, and needs, the sociologist is concerned more with the social environment, the factors in the social system, and the functioning of the institutions that affect delinquency. Thus, the psychologists focus on internal control and the sociologists focus on external control.

Family environment producing delinquent behaviour may be analysed with reference to a broken home, family tension, parental rejection, parental control, and family economics. A *normal* family is described as one which is structurally complete (with both parents alive), functionally adequate (each member performing his expected roles which reduces conflicts), economically secure (gratifying important needs of the members) and morally strong (each member conforming to the moral values of the culture). The family is *abnormal* if it lacks any of these characteristics.

The *broken family* (where one parent is absent because of parental separation, divorce or death) fails to provide affection and control to the child. Sheldon and Glueck (1968 : 12) found in their study of delinquents and non-delinquents that more than half of the delinquents studied were reared by one parent, whereas only 10.0% of the non-


delinquents were reared by one parent. Monahan (1957 : 250-58), Browning (1960 : 37-44), Gold Martin, Slocum and Stone (1965), and Peterson and Becker (1965) also found that a significantly greater number of delinquents than non-delinquents were from broken homes.

Family tension is also a major contributing factor to delinquent behaviour. Abrahamsen (1960 : 43) found that family tension results from hostility and hatred. The youngster does not feel secure and content in the tension-filled family environment. Long-term tension reduces family cohesiveness and affects the parents' ability to provide a conducive atmosphere to satisfactory child-rearing and family problem-solving. McCords and Zola (1959) also found that cohesive homes produce fewer delinquents whereas homes where tension and hostility exist are good breeding grounds for future delinquents. Gluecks (1968 : 8) found that one in three delinquent families, as compared with one in seven non-delinquent families, were disrupted when one of the parents left the family because of a tension-filled and quarrelsome relationship.

Parental rejection or emotional deprivation has much to do with juvenile delinquency. If a rejected or neglected child does not find love and affection as well as support and supervision at home, he will often resort to groups of a deviant nature outside the family. Studies have found that mutual rejection of parent and child markedly affects positive relationship and can ultimately result in delinquent behaviour. Jenkins (1957 : 528-37) found that parental rejection had a direct effect on the child's development and growth of a conscience. He stated that lack of adequate conscience, combined with feelings of hostility for being rejected, led to aggression. Andry (1960 : 64) also has maintained that delinquents were the recipients of less parental love both in quantity and in quality than were the non-delinquents.

Just as a broken home, family tension and parental rejection can affect the capability of the family structure, methods of *parental control* or forms of discipline also can play a part in the development of delinquent behaviour. The type of discipline used by parents in rearing children varies from situation to situation and from child to child. An authoritarian approach to discipline affects the child in his peer group relationships as the child will not be able to interact freely with his peers. Conversely, a too lenient discipline will not provide the child with the necessary controls to guide his behaviour. Unfair or partial discipline fails to form an adequate conscience in the child, prevents the adults from serving as a model to be imitated by the child, and reduces the adolescent's wish to avoid hurting the parent and the

Table 13.1: Factors in Juvenile Delinquency



delinquent behaviour. Gluecks (1968 : 15-16) found that the parents of delinquents used physical punishment more than verbal discussion. Both the parents were less consistent in their disciplinary measures than were the parents of non-delinquents. If the methods of disciplining are classified as love-oriented discipline, punitive discipline, lax discipline, and erratic discipline (punitive and lax), the last three types can be related to delinquency

Emotional instability and behavioural disturbances in one or both of the parents also lead to a child's delinquent behaviour. The child of the parents who are constantly in conflict often exploits the situation and gets away with a great deal of misbehaviour.

Lastly, *family economics* is also an important contributing variable in delinquency. A family's inability to provide for the material needs of the child can create insecurity and affect the amount of control that the family exerts over the child, because he often seeks material support and security outside the home. Peterson and Becker (1965) have pointed out that the homes of delinquents are often physically deteriorated which can affect the boy's perception of himself and can act as a repellent, driving him away from the home. It should, however, be pointed out that economic status and material possessions do not explain middle and upper class delinquency. The economic condition of the family can be one of many contributing factors in a multiproblem family.

Neighbourhood

The impact of the neighbourhood on the child is more in urban areas than in rural areas. After the family, the child spends a good part of the day in company of children in his neighbourhood. The neighbourhood can contribute to delinquency by blocking basic personality needs, engendering culture conflicts, and fostering anti-social values. On the other hand, it can supplement the influence of the home in the maintenance of social values. Congested neighbourhoods with inadequate recreation facilities deny the natural play impulses of children and encourage the formation of delinquent gangs. Picture houses, cheap hotels and video-halls in the neighbourhoods become breeding places of vice and delinquency.

Cinema and Pornographic Literature

Movies and comic books featuring immorality, smoking, drinking and brutality leave a strong impression on the young minds of the children

and the adolescents. Many-a-time, they teach the techniques of crime and delinquency. Several children are arrested in different parts of our country for using the same techniques to commit thefts, burglaries and kidnapping. They claimed to have seen such procedures in the movies. These movies also develop attitudes conducive to delinquent behaviour by arousing desires for easy money, suggesting questionable methods for their achievement, inducing a spirit of toughness and adventurousness, arousing sexual desires, and by invoking day-dreaming.

Sociology of Juvenile Delinquency

The major sociological theorists who have contributed to the criminological knowledge of delinquency are Merton, Frederick Thrasher, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, George Herbert Mead, Albert Cohen, Cloward and Ohlin, Walter Miler, and David Matza. Since we have described their theories in details in the preceding chapter, we will only briefly summarise them here for ready reference.

Merton's Anomie Theory (1938 : 672-682) is that when there is a discrepancy between the institutionalized means that are available within the environment and the goals that individuals have learned to aspire for in their environment, strain or frustration is produced and norms break down and deviant behaviour may result. Merton, thus, does not discuss individual motivational factors in deviance, (that is, in selecting one of the five alternative modes of behaviour suggested by him) or he fails in explaining why all persons in similar situations do not choose deviance.

Frederick Thrasher's Gang Theory (1936 : 381) concentrates on group delinquency and explains positive peer influence as Cohen's, Cloward's, and Miller's theories did later on. Thrasher does not say that the gang is a cause of delinquency but he says that gang facilitates delinquency. Explaining the process whereby a group takes on certain behavioural characteristics and then transmits them to its members, he says that a gang originates during the adolescent years from spontaneous play groups and conflict with other groups, transforms it into a gang for protecting its members' rights and satisfying the needs which their environment and their family could not provide. Gradually, the gang develops distinct characteristics such as a mode of operation and disseminates criminal techniques, excites mutual interests and attitudes and provides protection to its members. Thrasher emphasized that not all gang activities were necessarily devious and that much of

the gang members' time was spent in normal athletic activities as well as in other teenage endeavours. His thesis, thus, mainly describes how environmental pressure is conducive to delinquent behaviour.

Shaw and McKay's Cultural Transmission Theory (1931 : 386) holds that delinquency is transmitted through personal and group contacts and that lack of effective social control agencies contributes to the high incidence of delinquency in some parts of the large cities. These 'delinquency areas' are the low-income and physically deteriorated areas whose members suffer from economic deprivations. Furthermore, the boys in these areas are not necessarily disorganised, maladjusted or anti-social. It is the exposure to delinquency traditions present in these areas which makes them delinquents. But for this exposure, they would have found their satisfaction in activities other than delinquency. Shaw and McKay acknowledge that other factors may cause certain youngsters to become involved in delinquent activities, but they feel that these factors are secondary to the economic and social factors that exist in the community. It is this learned phenomenon of delinquency which is developed in Sutherland's theory also.

George Herbert Mead's Role Theory and Theory of the Self (1934 : 577-602) explains why only a limited number of persons assume criminal identities while the majority of the people remain law-abiding. He says, becoming a delinquent and assuming a criminal identity involves more than merely associating with law violators. The associations have to be meaningful to the individual and supportive of a role and self-concept that he wants to become committed to.

Albert Cohen's Working-Class Boy and Middle-Class Measuring Role Theory (1955 : 119) maintains that delinquency is mainly a working class phenomenon. He states that the working-class boy finds himself at the bottom of a status hierarchy whenever he moves into the middle-class world. To the degree to which he values middle class status either because he values the good opinion of middle-class persons or because he has, to some degree, internalized middle class standards himself, he faces the problem of adjustment. A delinquent sub-culture deals with the problems of adjustment (that is, of status problems) by providing a criteria of status which these children can meet. Not having learnt the behaviour that will equip them to deal with the competitive struggle for their success, the working class boys feel frustrated, react against middle class values and standards, and adopt their very antithesis, that is, non-utilitarian, malicious and negativistic

values. Group or gang delinquent activity legitimizes and supports aggression against middle class institutions.

Cloward and Ohlin's Success and Opportunity Structures Theory (1960 : 86) copes with the discrepancies of Sutherland's, Merton's and Mead's theories and explains the types of alternatives available as a result of strain and lack of legitimate alternatives to satisfy the needs. Faced with limitations on legitimate avenues of access to their goals and unable to revise their aspirations downward, the lower-class youths experience intense frustrations which results in their exploring non-conformist and illegitimate alternatives. Cloward and Ohlin's theory is difficult to test and evaluate empirically.

Walter Miller's Lower-Class Boy and Lower-Class Structure Theory (1958 : 6) rejects 'delinquent sub-culture' and talks of 'lower-class culture' itself which comes about as a result of the process of immigration, migration and mobility. Those persons who are left behind as a result of these processes comprise the lower class. They develop a distinct pattern of behaviour (which is not necessarily reactive against any other class) based on distinctive (lower-class) traits like toughness, smartness, excitement, fate and autonomy. The street group provides the lower-class adolescent boy an opportunity to act tough and become involved in masculine activities. Many of his activities, thus, revolve round his desire to become a 'real man'. The major criticism of Miller's theory is that today with mass communication, it is difficult to believe that the distinct lower-class culture, which Miller describes, can exist in such a pure form. Lower class is bound to be influenced by the other classes.

David Matza's Delinquency and Draft Theory (1964 : 11) rejects the deterministic orientation of the Positive School that delinquent behaviour is caused almost entirely by emotional and environmental factors. Matza feels that man is neither totally free (as the Classical School assumes) nor is he totally constrained (as the Positive School assumes), but he is somewhere between being controlled and being free. Drift stands midway between freedom and control. The youngster, therefore, drifts between criminal and conventional action. Even though most of a youngster's activities are law-abiding, he can periodically drift into delinquency because the normal conventional controls that usually inhibit delinquent behaviour become neutralized as a result of the drifting process. Once he indulges in delinquency, he drifts back to conventionality. Matza, thus, emphasizes on the 'will to crime'. It is this 'will' which explains why some youngsters choose delinquent

behaviour while most of their peers within the same environment choose socially acceptable modes of adaptation. He also explains why delinquency is not an 'either-or' proposition. Most youngsters exist somewhere along the continuum between convention and crime. Total commitment to delinquency is uncommon.

If we now take all the sociological theories of juvenile delinquency together it may be said that all sociologists have emphasised on the environment of the social structure and on the learning process unlike the psychologists who consider the individual and his motivational patterns important in delinquency.

Methods of Treating Delinquents

Many approaches and methods can be used in treating the delinquent. Some important methods are: (1) psychotherapy, (2) reality therapy, (3) behaviour therapy, (4) activity therapy, and (5) milieu therapy. Punishment is not discussed as a treatment method because it is no longer viewed as a viable technique of treatment, though some do feel that pain serves as a deterrent to further criminal action. Restrictions and reprimands can be effective supplements to the major treatment approach utilized but punishment cannot become an end in itself.

The two basic approaches in dealing with youngsters are the *individual* and the *group* method of treatment. Of these, it is generally the individual method which is used by psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists and social workers, though psychologists sometimes do use the group method as well. Sociologists usually take a 'social engineering' approach to delinquency, that is, they deal with the conditions of the social structure that breed delinquency, while psychologists treat the individual and emphasise his interpersonal dynamics. Sociology is regarded as a theoretical discipline researching the causes and effects of crime and delinquency. The profession of social work is the 'practical arm' of the sociologists (Trojanowicz, 1973 : 229). As such, the above-mentioned six therapeutic methods are generally utilized by psychologists, psychiatrists and social workers. We will briefly discuss each method separately.

Psychotherapy treats emotional and personality problems by psychological means, that is, by changing the attitudes and feelings about significant persons (say, parents) in the client's (delinquent's) past. When the early relationship of the youngster with his parents was not satisfactory, his emotional development was often retarded, with the result that he was often impulsive in his attempt to satisfy his infantile

urges, not satisfied in the normal manner within his family. Satisfying these urges and impulses can take the form of anti-social behaviour. Through psychotherapy, the delinquent is allowed by the therapist to operate in an atmosphere of love and acceptance where the person does not have to fear severe rejection or physical punishment. This is due to the transference established in which the client and the therapist feel comfortable in exchanging communication. Thus, this therapy involves facilitating the solving of conflicts and providing positive alternatives to behaviour adaption by the client.

Reality therapy is based on the view that people, unable to fulfil their basic needs, act in an irresponsible manner. The object of the reality therapy is to help the delinquent person act in a responsible manner, that is, refrain from anti-social activity. For example, if the boy does not attend school classes due to the harshness of the teacher, he is made to understand that the teacher is not harsh but is interested in helping him shape his career. Here, the present is delinked with the past as the past cannot be changed. This therapy can be given by any one (police officer, counsellor, teacher, social worker, family member or a friend) because it does not emphasise nebulous psychiatric terms, extensive testing or time-consuming case conferences. This method differs from the psychotherapeutic method in the sense that the latter is concerned with the past behaviour while this is concerned with the present behaviour. Whereas the basis of psychotherapy is that a person cannot change his present behaviour unless he can clearly tie it to the events in the past, the basis of the Reality Therapy is that the past is insignificant. In this therapy, since a child is treated as a responsible person and not as an unfortunate youngster, it transmits strength to the youngster. The child is expected to obey rules but he is not rejected when he breaks one.

Behaviour therapy is modifying the learned behaviour of the delinquent through the development of new learning processes. Behaviour can be changed through positive or negative reinforcements, that is, rewards or punishments. Negative or unpleasant reinforcements (like restrictions) will reduce/eliminate negative behaviour (that is, delinquent activity), while positive or pleasant reinforcements (like rewards) will maintain/increase positive behaviour (like success on the job and in school). This requires determining each individual's 'reinforcers,' that is, those aspects which the individual (delinquent) will strive to achieve to gain personal satisfaction. Money, praise, attention, food, privileges, admission in school, freedom to play with

children and good clothes, can be considered as positive reinforcers, while threats, confinements, ridicule, physical punishment and depriving of money are negative reinforcers. For modifying behaviour, both the reinforcers can be employed.

In activity therapy, many children do not have the verbal ability to communicate effectively in a conventional individual or group situation. In this method, a group of 6-8 children are gathered/invited to meet at a specific time/place to engage in play or some artistic endeavour. The atmosphere is permissive and the youngsters can use their time as they wish. Thus, a moderately neurotic child finds great release in a permissive environment where he can express his hostility and aggression in creative work, play, or mischief. Because his behaviour does not call for retaliation, punishment, or disapproval, pent-up emotions find appropriate discharge.

Milieu or environment therapy attempts to produce an environment that will facilitate meaningful change and satisfactory adjustment. This is used for persons whose deviant behaviour is a reaction to unfavourable life conditions.

Besides using the above methods, three more methods are also used in the treatment of juvenile delinquents. These are: (1) *social case-work* that is, assisting the maladjusted youngster in coping with his problems. Although similar in many respects, technically social case-work is different from psychotherapy. Whereas a social case-worker could be a probation officer, prison counsellor, mental health worker, or hospital social worker, a psychotherapist is essentially a doctor by profession. The case-worker prepares the case history of the client to explore his background, environment and relationships with his family, friends and school-fellows and evaluates his personal strengths and weaknesses so that a treatment plan can be devised and carried out. This method, however, is often not successful with the delinquents because on the one hand, it is difficult to obtain the delinquent's cooperation as he has no trust in the case-worker and on the other hand, the delinquent's family also resists and feels threatened by the case-worker's 'probing'; (2) *individual counselling*, that is, re-educating a delinquent to enable him to understand his immediate situation and solve his problem. In this method, no attempt is made to affect a fundamental change of the client's personality; and (3) *vocational counselling*, its main purpose is to increase the delinquent's knowledge of his career choices, job specifications and qualifications and training needed for successful employment. The positive attitudes, skills and habits that the youngster

develops and refines in the work situation can be carried over to the community and can positively affect his relationships with others.

Custody in Juvenile Institutions

Remand Homes, Certified Schools, Reformatory Schools, Borstal Schools and Probation Hostels are the important institutions used for the custody and correction of the juvenile delinquents in India.

Children Acts were enacted long back in different states for the treatment and protection of young offenders, and the custody, trial and punishment of the juvenile delinquents. Madras (present Tamil Nadu) enacted such an Act in 1920, Bengal in 1922, and Bombay (Maharashtra) in 1924. After that, all states passed these Acts. Besides juvenile delinquents, these Acts also dealt with the neglected, destitute and socially handicapped children, victimized children and uncontrollable children. But these Acts have now been replaced by the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. The review of the situation shows that besides the Children Act 1960, passed by the Parliament for the Union Territories, all the states except Nagaland had enacted their laws. Around 55 districts of the country, however, were not covered by any of the Children Acts. With the new 1986 Act, which supersedes the 25 different Children's Acts in different states and union territories, the whole country has now been brought under it.

The Children Acts suffered from many deficiencies in the absence of a uniform law for the country as a whole. Some of these deficiencies were : (1) the upper age limit in defining a 'child' varied from state to state; (2) all states had not provided for Juvenile Courts; (3) the institutional facilities were devoid of any well-defined criteria and norms to regulate capacity, staff, and programmes; (4) no minimum standards for basic needs, living conditions or therapeutic services existed; and (5) in most of the states, neglected children are huddled together with juvenile delinquents.

An important feature of the 1986 Act is that it provides a differential approach in dealing with the 'neglected juvenile' as opposed to the 'delinquent juvenile'. The former category includes juveniles who are likely to be abused, exploited and inducted into criminogenic life and are in need of legal support to be weaned away from such situations. The juvenile delinquents under no circumstances are to be lodged in jails with other prisoners. The neglected children will have to be kept in Children's or Observation Homes. Under the Act, boys upto 16 years of age and girls upto 18 years will be dealt with under the juvenile law in

case of commission of crimes. While the neglected juveniles are to be produced before the Juvenile Welfare Board, the delinquents are to be dealt with by the juvenile court. The neglected juvenile is to be sent to a juvenile home only if his care with a parent, guardian, or a fit person or an institution is not found conducive. For juvenile delinquents, special homes are required to be set up to offer facilities for accommodation, education, vocational training, and character building. The Act requires the state governments to create a fund for exclusively utilizing it for the welfare and rehabilitation of juveniles dealt with under the Act and also to constitute Advisory Boards to advise on matters relating to establishment and maintenance of homes, mobilization of resources, and so forth.

Juvenile Courts have been established in some states to try and convict specifically the juvenile delinquents. The first juvenile court was established in Calcutta in 1922, followed by Bombay in 1927 and Madras in 1930. Since then some more states have also created such courts. The methods used by the juvenile courts are much different from those used by the adult criminal courts. Generally, the presiding magistrates of these courts are female magistrates. Police officers in official uniform are not permitted in these courts. In trial also complete secrecy is maintained. Members of the public are not permitted to be present at the sittings of the juvenile courts, except by special permission. Lawyers are not entitled to appear in any case before the juvenile courts. However, if a juvenile court is of the opinion that in the public interest, the appearance of a legal practitioner is necessary, he is authorised to appear in ordinary dress in particular cases. The conviction by this court does not affect the trial for the second crime in some other court. The main features of the juvenile courts are: informality of procedure, de-emphasis on deterrent or retributive justice, protection and rehabilitation of juveniles, and use of socialised treatment measures. Structurally, the juvenile courts are an integral part of the judicial hierarchy, as all appeals from juvenile courts are forwarded to higher adult courts. The methods used for the disposal of the cases by the juvenile courts generally are restoring to guardians, release after admonition, imposition of fine, release on probation, commitment to reformatories, schools and borstals, and imprisonment.

Remand Homes or Observation Homes

These homes are meant for the children during the pendency of trial in the courts, but they are also used for keeping the homeless, destitute

and neglected children. The stay here is used for evaluating their personality traits and behaviour. As such, these Homes are viewed more as observation homes than as places of detention.

The important characteristics of good Remand Homes are: segregation, education, training, recreation facilities, health care, controlled discipline and effective supervision. Since the child in the Remand Home comes into contact with the law for the first time, if the environment is not kept conducive, the child might become suspicious and defiant towards the court.

In India, Remand/Observation Homes do not exist in all states. According to 1987 figures, Remand Homes are found only in 11 out of the 25 states and in one union territory. The highest number of Remand Homes are found in Maharashtra, followed by Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, U.P., Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal. Of about 139 Remand/Observation Homes, a little more than half are run by the government and little less than half are voluntary. There are separate Homes for boys and girls. Of the total inmates in the Remand Homes, 15 to 20% are juvenile delinquents and the rest are homeless, destitutes, neglected and so forth. Of the total inmates, two-thirds belong to the 7-14 years age-group while the remaining one-third are either below seven years or between 14 and 18 years.

About 50.0% inmates are kept here for less than six weeks, 35.0% between six weeks and six months and 15.0% for more than 6 months. Doctors are appointed for health care on both full-time and part-time basis. When the average expenditure per inmate per month in a Remand Home in 1973 was about Rs. 60, at present (1991) it is believed to be Rs. 270 per month per inmate.

Certified or Reformatory Schools

Juveniles given detention order by the court are kept in Reformatory Schools for a minimum period of three years and a maximum period of seven years. Inmates about 18 years are transferred to Borstal Schools. These schools, meant only for the boys, remain under the supervision of prison department. Each school having a capacity of 80-100 inmates is divided into 4-5 dormitories and each dormitory has 4-5 cells. Each school has a superintendent, deputy superintendent, deputy jailor, assistant jailor, doctor, 3-4 instructors, 2-3 teachers and some wardens. Training is given in tailoring, toy-making, manufacturing leather goods, and agriculture. Each training programme is of two years. The inmate gets the raw material from the school and the things manufactured by

him are sold in the market and the profit deposited in his account. After the deposits have reached a fixed amount, the inmate has to produce things only for state use. The inmate even gets basic education upto the sixth standard and he has to appear in the examinations (at the end of the year) conducted by the Inspector of Schools. If the inmate wants to study beyond the sixth standard, he is admitted in the outside school. Since no work is forced upon the inmates here, they live like family members. However, no follow-up records are maintained by the Schools after the release of the inmates. Secondly, the training programmes are too old and traditional.

Borstal Schools

Provision was made in the 1920's for the segregation of adolescent offenders from the adults so that correction services, free from the authoritarian atmosphere, be made possible for the young offenders. Borstal Schools were thus established for youthful offenders in the age-group of 16-21 years. Upto 1987, there were Borstal Schools in nine states only in the country : Tamil Nadu (1926), Andhra Pradesh (1926), Bihar (1926), Punjab (1926), Madhya Pradesh (1928), Maharashtra (1929), Uttar Pradesh (1938) and Kerala and Karnataka (1943). The capacity of each school varies from 100 to 350 inmates. Though these schools, function under the general supervision of the Inspector General of Prisons, each school, however, has its own Visiting Committee consisting of one session judge, one district magistrate, district level school officer and four non-government members. No inmate is kept here for less than two years or more than five years. Thus, only those delinquents are sent to these schools who are awarded more than three years term. Each school is divided into Houses and each House has a House-Master. Each House is further divided into groups and each group has a Monitor. These monitors are selected from the inmates themselves. There is a grading system too in the school : ordinary, star and special star grades. Those inmates who violate the norms are demoted to penal grade, but in the ordinary cases, they are promoted from one to the other grade. No inmate is eligible to be released from the school unless he has reached the special star grade. On admission in the school, he is first observed for three months and given some ordinary work like, say, gardening. On being kept in the ordinary grade, he is assigned some training programme, depending on his education and potential. Each promotion entails more freedom and more privileges. The total number of inmates in the nine Borstal

Schools in the country was estimated to be 1,295 in 1987, of which 35.0% belonged to 16-18 years age-group, 60.0% to 18-21 years age-group and 5.0% to either 15-16 years or 21-22 years age-group. The inmates of last category are admitted as special cases. The expenses per inmate, per month are estimated at present to be about Rs. 600. This is about double the expenses in the Children's Home. The daily routine includes two hours' basic education and 5-6 hours vocational training. Every inmate gets 15 days leave in one year to visit his home. Normally, the inmate remains in continuous contact with his family members through correspondence and their visits. Some schools have created a *panchayat* system too and have thus associated the inmates with the management of the schools. In many cases, inmates are released from the schools before the expiry of the term also. For example, out of 1,167 inmates who left the various Borstal Schools in 1987 in the country, 47.0% were released after the expiry of the term, 13.0% were released on bail, 8.0% were let out on 'license,' 6.0% on appeal, 9.0% on some other basis and 2.0% of them escaped. Another 15.0% were transferred to some other institution. Before the release from the Borstal School, the Discharged Prisoners Aid Society is informed so that it can chalk out the after-care programme for the released inmate.

Probation Hostels/ Homes

These institutions established under the Probation of Offenders Act, are meant to provide residential care and treatment to the offenders released under probation under the supervision of a probation officer. The inmates are given complete freedom to go to the market and also to take up jobs of their choice.

An evaluation of all the types of juvenile institutions show that though inmates' life-style is satisfactory and they enjoy better freedom but the institutions suffer from being over-crowded, the management is centralised, the training programmes are too traditional and inmates are not given individual attention. The budget allocation for them is also too low. One study to evaluate the juvenile correctional institutions was made by the Indian Council of Social Welfare under the Directorship of S.D. Gokhle in 1968. In this study (1969 : 83-89), 229 inmates released between 1958 and 1963 were interviewed. It was found that the (1) training given in these institutions does not help the inmates get jobs, (2) institutions do not provide facilities for formal school/ college education, (3) counselling and case-work facilities are inadequate, (4)

individual attention is not paid to the inmates, and (5) institutions have limited budgets which prevents them from making adequate planning.

A study of 27 institutions for the socially handicapped children in Rajasthan (including Juvenile Reformatory, Observation Homes, Probation Home and Children Home) conducted by M.S. Bedi in 1975-76 also pointed out that : (1) institutional facilities are underutilized and occupancy rate of institutes is much below their capacity, (2) the quality and the content of vocational training is poor. It does not equip the inmate to rehabilitate himself economically after being discharged from the institute, (3) space and physical amenities for inmates fall short of the minimum standards laid down by the Central Social Welfare Board, (4) protection services during institutionalization (against tough and aggressive inmates, homosexual assaults, snatching of eatables and other things by fellow inmates) and after discharge (against old accomplices, police harassment, immoral traffickers....) are not provided, and (5) facilities to inmates for communicating with family members, kins and friends are inadequate.

Preventive Programmes

Juvenile delinquency being mainly an urban phenomenon, both private and public agencies have to be involved in delinquency prevention, particularly because of complexities of the urban society.

The three approaches to delinquency prevention are: (1) organising activities that contribute to healthy personality development and adjustment of children, (2) controlling environment of children contributing to delinquency, and (3) organising specific preventive services for children. The *first* approach links the delinquency prevention with (i) general improvements in the institutional structure of the society, for example, family, neighbourhood, school, (ii) raising the income levels of poverty-stricken families, (iii) providing job opportunities to children, (iv) establishing schools, (v) improving job conditions, (vi) providing recreational facilities in neighbourhoods, (vii) improving marital relations through family counselling services and family social work, and (viii) imparting moral and social education, among other measures. Preventive activities of the *second* type include community organisation and the efforts of welfare and child care agencies. Preventive activities of the *third* type include probation and parole services, Certified and Borstal Schools, Children Homes, Probation Hostels and so forth.

The preventive programmes have also been classified as (Trojanowicz, 1973: 188) : (1) pure prevention or primary prevention, which attempts to inhibit delinquency before it takes place, and (2) rehabilitative prevention or secondary prevention, which deals with youngsters who have been adjudicated delinquents by the court.

Peter Lejins (1967 : 3) has classified the prevention programmes as : (1) punitive prevention, (2) corrective prevention, and (3) mechanical prevention. The first is the threat of punishment based on the idea that punishment will forestall criminal acts ; the second refers to an attempt to eliminate potential causes before the criminal behaviour actually takes place; and the third emphasises placing obstacles (like increased security measures or increased police protection) in the way of the potential criminal so that he will find it difficult to commit an offence.

The agencies concerned with the prevention of delinquency between the 1950's and 1980's in India are the voluntary children's organisations administering child welfare, schools, social welfare departments, rescue homes, orphanages and psychiatric centres. The efforts of voluntary organisations are less coordinated, while those of government departments are more planned and systematically organised.

An overview of the functioning of the government institutions (Children Homes, Certified Schools...) for 'rehabilitative prevention' is given in the earlier pages (with a discussion on "Custody in Institutions"). We will briefly discuss here the 'pure prevention programmes'. The most important areas where the government needs to take up some measures like providing educational, recreational, and vocational training facilities for preventing delinquencies are the slum areas in cities. A big chunk of population lives in the slums in the big cities. If theories propounded by Thrasher, Shaw and McKay, Cohen, and Cloward and Ohlin, regarding learning of delinquencies from environment and lack of neighbourhood cohesiveness have some justification, it is necessary that the government takes up some measures for the welfare of the children in these areas and for their better integration into community life.

Family is another institution which needs greater attention. The role of functionally inadequate families, structurally incomplete or broken families, poor families, immoral families and indisciplined families in juvenile delinquency has already been elaborated. Unless these disorganised families are reorganised, unless an environment or milieu therapy is provided, frustrated and emotionally disturbed children cannot be prevented from developing a relationship with delinquents.

Police running recreation units for children is a new concept. Juvenile units in police department in cities like Bombay and Delhi have undertaken these tasks. The police-school liaison programme on similar lines will go a long way in removing hostility and mutual suspicion between the police and youngsters; in the police helping teachers in handling problem youth; and, in improving the police image in general.

Initiating community programmes for educating the youngsters regarding the detrimental affects of using drugs and becoming involved in devious social behaviour is yet another measure in the prevention of juvenile delinquency. Drug abuse in recent years has increased among school children and slum-dwellers. Providing counselling services to these children experimenting with drugs will be an effective means of combating illicit drug use in particular and juvenile delinquency in general.

Programmes for run-away children also need attention. Homes for these children to give them a chance to reflect on their own situations with the assistance and guidance of staff members need to be established in big cities and towns. These Homes can help in promoting a positive communication between run-away children and their parents and guardians so that serious problems can be resolved.

It may be concluded that the development of a sound public policy regarding all aspects of delinquency prevention and control requires both planning and evaluation by rigorous research methods. This requires coordination between the government agencies, universities, police, judiciary and social workers.

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14

Alcoholism

The problem of alcoholism, until a few decades ago, was considered a moral problem and a sign of social irresponsibility. After the introduction of the prohibition policy in some states in the 1960s, it was viewed as an illegal act. Now it is considered by some scholars more as a complicated, chronic and immensely costly disease than a type of a deviant behaviour. The victim needs not punitive treatment but treatment by specialists—psychiatrists, doctors, social workers and others who will help him in his personality reconstruction.

Alcoholism has much in common with the problem of drug abuse. Both consist essentially of the habitual use of chemical agents to produce a temporarily pleasant mental state. In either case, the results can be extremely dangerous. Addicts in both require therapy rather than penal action. However, in spite of these similarities, the two problems are sufficiently different and require separate discussion. Most drinkers in India are rare, infrequent and moderate drinkers and the compulsive drinkers or alcoholics are only a minority. Drinking is not as dangerous as drug habit is.

Alcohol is not a stimulant; it is a depressant or inhibitor on the central nervous system. Alcohol relaxes the customary controls on behaviour and the drinker becomes less restrained and feels more free. But taking alcohol even once in a while leaves the possibility of a habit-forming phenomenon open and the drinker may start taking it frequently and in large quantity which could have tragic and disastrous effects. It may affect him physically, destroy his ability to work and

earn, ruin his family life, and demoralise him utterly. An innocent recreation, thus, may come to spoil the whole life of the drinker. But, before analysing the causes and effects of alcoholism, let us understand some basic concepts.

The Concept

Alcoholism is a condition in which the individual has lost control over his alcohol intake in that he is constantly unable to refrain from drinking once he begins (Jhonson, 1973: 519). According to Keller and Efron (1955 : 619-644), alcoholism is characterised by the repeated drinking of alcoholic beverages to an extent that exceeds customary use or compliance with the social customs of the community and that interferes with the drinker's health or his social or economic functioning.

An alcoholic is different from an 'occasional drinker'. Any person who takes alcohol is a 'drinker', while a 'compulsive drinker' who cannot live without taking alcohol is called an 'alcoholic'. According to Richard Waskin (1964 : 362), an alcoholic is an excessive drinker whose dependence upon alcohol has reached such a degree that it results in a noticeable mental disturbance or an interference with his bodily and mental health, his interpersonal relations, and his smooth social and economic functioning ; or one who shows the early signs of such developments. Clinebell (1956 : 17) has defined an 'alcoholic' as one whose drinking interferes frequently or continuously with any of his important life adjustments and interpersonal relationships.

Broadly speaking, alcoholism has been characterised by four factors: (1) excessive intake of alcoholic beverages, (2) individual's increasing worry over his drinking, (3) loss of the drinker's control over his own drinking, and (4) the disturbance in his functioning in his social world.

Richard Blum (1973 : 508) has referred to drinking in two contexts: (i) in the context of prescribed social pattern where drinking is integrated in the culture of the society and it is perceived as part of everyday life, (for example, in Italy, United States) and people do not find any psychological potential in it; and (ii) in the context of perceiving alcohol-use as disruptive to culture and society and people find addictive potential in it (as in India) and view drinking as a means of seeking pleasure and escape. Drinkers have been further classified as 'non-addicts', 'addicts' and 'chronic alcoholics'. Non-addicts are categorised as 'experimenters' and 'regulars'. Don Cahalan has given a

five-fold classification of alcohol drinkers on the basis of the frequency of drinking (and not the quantity of alcohol taken) :

- (1) *Rare users*, who drink once or twice a year.
- (2) *Infrequent users*, who drink once or twice in two-three months, that is, less than once a month.
- (3) *Light drinkers*, who drink once or twice a month.
- (4) *Moderate drinkers*, who drink three or four times in a month.
- (5) *Heavy drinkers*, who drink every day or several drinks during the day.

The last category of drinkers are described as 'hard-core' drinkers.

Extent of Alcoholism

In India, about 10% to 15% of the people take alcohol. However, a large majority of these fall into the category of rare, infrequent and light drinkers. The number of moderate and also of heavy drinkers is very small. But as its use is increasing in the United States and other western countries, in India too, the use and abuse of alcohol has been spreading in the recent decades. Whereas in 1943, the percentage of drinkers in the United States increased by 2.2% of the total population, it increased by 3.3% of the total population in 1955, 6.5% in 1965, and 9.0% in 1986 (Ramsay Clank : 1988). In 1983, 76.0% of the people in the U.S. took alcohol. Of these, 74.0% were males and 26.0% females. According to one survey conducted by Don Cahalen (Jhonson, 1973: 520) in 1969, of the 76.0% people taking alcohol, 32.0% were rare users, 17.0% were infrequent users, 28.0% were light drinkers, 15.0% were moderate drinkers and 8.0% were heavy drinkers. In 1974, one out of eleven drinkers was an alcoholic (McVeigh and Shostak, 1977: 111).

In India, according to a report given in the Rajya Sabha by the Minister of State for Welfare, in Delhi alone, there has been an 88.69% increase in the consumption of Indian-made foreign liquor (IMFL) between 1982 and 1988. The sale of liquor (including IMFL, beer, and country liquor) earned the Delhi Administration a revenue of Rs. 82.83 crore during 1987-88 (when 168.12 lakh bottles of IMFL, 126.47 lakh bottles of beer and 198.90 lakh bottles of country liquor were sold). (*Hindustan Times*, May 14: 1988). The Andhra Pradesh Government earns a revenue of about Rs. 700 crore every year by way of excise duties, the bulk of which is collected from the sale of government-packed country liquor. In Gujarat, the annual collection from the liquor trade is said to be between Rs. 600 crore to Rs. 900 crore, good enough

to take care of the current budgetary deficit of the state. The figure is mind-boggling but it does not take into account the consumption of brewery liquor and officially-manufactured country liquor. The fact that the consumption of liquor is banned in Gujarat alone ensures commanding premium prices for any or all types of liquor, whether hooch or brewery made. The population of Gujarat, according to 1981 census, was around 3.40 crore (which increased to 4.23 crore in 1991) and with the availability of liquor being what it is, it would not be surprising if the consumption figure quoted proves conservative (*Probe India*, April, 1989).

If we compare the alcohol-users above twenty years of age (that is, adults) in different countries, the highest number are found (Laskin Richard, 1964: 365) in France (5,200 per one lakh population), followed by the United States (4,760 per lakh), Sweden (2,780 per lakh), Switzerland (2,685 per lakh), Denmark (2,260 per lakh), Norway (2,250 per lakh), Canada (2,140 per lakh), Australia, (1,640 per lakh), England (1,530 per lakh), and Italy (1,100 per lakh).

Process of Becoming an Alcoholic

A 'drinker' has to pass through various stages to become an 'alcoholic'. According to an American psychiatrist Jellinek (1946 : 368), an alcoholic has to pass through the sequence of seven phases : (1) *black-outs*, in which the individual is not able to find a solution to his individual problems, (2) *sneaking drinks*, in which he takes alcohol without being observed, (3) *increased tolerance*, in which he tolerates the increased effects of drinking, (4) *loss of control*, in which he fails to control the desire of not taking alcohol, (5) *development of an alibi system*, in which he gradually starts neglecting his social roles, (6) *going on periodic benders*, in which he keeps on drinking regularly, and (7) *regular matutinal drinking*, in which he regularly starts taking alcohol in the morning.

Jellinek has also explained the process of becoming an 'alcoholic' in the following four stages (Gold and Scarpitta, 1967: 469):

(1) *Pre-alcoholic symptomatic phase*: In this phase, taking advantage of social sanction, an individual starts drinking to reduce tensions and solve his personal problems. Linking drinking with relief, he keeps on searching for those opportunities in which he may drink. The frequency of drinking increases as he starts losing his capacity to face conflicts in life.

(2) *Prodigal phase*: In this phase, along with the increase in the frequency of drinking, there is increase in the quantity of the drink too. However, he develops a guilt-feeling and knows that gradually he is becoming an abnormal person.

(3) *Crucial phase*: In this phase, his drinking becomes conspicuous. He develops rationalizations to face social pressures and to assure himself that he has not lost control over himself. However, he does not lose his self-respect. Gradually, he starts alienating himself from others as his physical and social deterioration becomes obvious to them.

(4) *Chronic phase*: In this phase, he starts drinking even in the morning. He faces prolonged intoxication, impaired thinking, indefinable fears, tremors, and loss of certain skills. He always thinks of drinking and feels restless without alcohol.

Though every alcoholic does not necessarily pass through all these four stages and in the same sequence but most of the alcoholics have to go through this process.

Jellinek also studied the phases in the drinking history of alcoholics and developed a typical addictive pattern. He listed the characteristic alcoholic behaviour and the time sequence of its appearance. The mean age of the first occurrence of some of the characteristic behaviours of an alcoholic was found by him as (Landis, 1959: 214-15): starts drinking at 18.8 years of age, sneaks drinking at 25.9 years age, indulges in extravagant behaviour at 27.6 years age, starts losing friends at 29.7 years age, becomes indifferent to the quality of the liquor at 30 years age, starts losing working time at 30.4 years age, faces family disapproval at 30.5 years age, loses job at 30.9 years age, indulges in daytime drinking at 31 years age, takes to anti-social behaviour at 31.3 years age, faces tremors at 32.7 years age, starts fearing at 32.9 years age, takes sedatives at 35.5 years age, feels religious needs at 35.7 years age, seeks medical advice at 35.8 years age, is hospitalized at 36.8 years age, admits to self the inability to control at 38.1 years age, admits to others the inability to control at 39.5 years age, and reaches lowest point (that is, hits the bottom) at 40.7 years age. Analysing the above characteristics, one sees the increasing loss of social responsibility on the part of the individual; sees him gradually losing control over his personal behaviour and then in the later stages desperately seeking help from every possible source, ranging from religion to medicine and hospitalization.

Alcoholics may be classified in three groups: steady, periodic and plateau. The *Steady Alcoholic* is one who is constantly saturated with

alcohol. The *periodic drinker* abstains from drinking for considerable periods of time and then goes on binges. The *plateau drinker* is one who drinks more deliberately than either of the above two types and tends to seek the maximum effects from alcohol. He seems to need to maintain a certain level of saturation at all times but does have the capacity to spread the effect of his alcohol over a long period of time (Landis, 1959: 212).

In terms of social status, the alcoholics are classified as the *low bottom* and the *high bottom* types. The former refers to the person who has hit the bottom of social status, while the latter is one who still maintains a fairly respectable status in spite of his drinking.

What is sociologically important in alcoholism is the socialization to accept alcohol. Indian culture does not view alcohol drinkers as normal. As such, people are not mentally prepared to accept alcohol as an important part of social life. While in the Western society, phrases like "Have a drink" or "Would you care for a drink" are common in evening gathering, in India, on other hand we usually talk of "Have a cup of tea". Thus, alcoholism is a serious social issue in our culture. Though, in comparison to drugs, drinking is considered less harmful and even trivial by many parents who themselves drink, still however, liquor is not perceived as respectable. Occasional drinking may be tolerated but continuous drinking is condemned. We must, therefore, clearly distinguish between the person who uses alcohol in moderation and the one who is a 'problem drinker', or between a person who drinks responsibly and one who drinks in a manner that causes problems to himself, to his family, and to society.

Danger inherent in an alcoholic is measured in terms of the percentage of alcohol content in his blood stream. With one drink, a person contains 0.035% alcohol level in the blood but with two drinks, he contains 0.05% level. Though legally he is not considered drunk but he feels mild effects and his driving ability is impaired. With an alcohol level of 0.1% in the blood, a person is legally considered 'drunk' when involved in a driving accident. His judgement, vision and muscle co-ordination is impaired. With alcohol level of 0.25%, a person is viewed as 'quite intoxicated' while with 0.3% to 0.4% level, he is viewed as 'severely intoxicated'. It may cause coma in some individuals. Lastly, with alcohol level of 0.5% to 0.8%, a person's breathing and heart action slows down and death may occur (McVeigh & Shostak, 1978: 110).

One of the big problems of alcoholism is that the individual does not recognise himself as an alcoholic. An American psychiatrist Robert V. Seliger has developed a check-list of some twenty questions. If the answer to even a few of these questions is 'Yes,' the individual may well take it as a warning of serious trouble ahead. Here are some of the questions from the check-list : (1) Do you lose time from work due to drinking ? (2) Is drinking making your home-life unhappy ? (3) Is drinking affecting your reputation ? (4) Have you ever felt remorse after "drinking" ? (5) Have you got into financial difficulties as a result of drinking ? (6) Do you turn to lower companions as a result of drinking ? (7) Does your drinking make you careless of your family's welfare ? (8) Has your ambition decreased since drinking ? (9) Do you crave a drink at a definite time daily ? (10) Does drinking cause you to have difficulty in sleeping ? (11) Has your efficiency decreased since drinking ? (12) Is drinking jeopardizing your job or business ? (13) Do you drink to build up your self-confidence ?

Causes of Alcohol Abuse

In interpreting the causes of alcoholism, the important thing to bear in mind is that, of those who use alcohol, about 90.0% do not become alcoholics. The key to alcoholism is in the *motive*, for repeating the drinking. Therefore, explaining alcoholism only in terms of factors like personality structure will be inadequate. No wonder, a psychogenic view is described as an over-simplified explanation of alcoholism. One psychological view is that practically all alcoholics show the mark of deprivation of emotional needs during childhood. Clinebell (1956 : 45) reports four main types of parental attitudes which happen to be associated with alcoholism in adulthood. All of these tend to produce trauma and emotional deprivation in the child : (1) authoritarianism, (2) overt rejection, (3) moralism, and (4) success worship. That these factors are the key ones in the formation of an insecure personality who becomes a victim to alcohol is indicated by the fact that psychological studies of alcoholics repeatedly mention the following personality traits: a high level of anxiety in interpersonal relationships, emotional immaturity, ambivalence towards authority, low frustration tolerance, low self-esteem, feelings of isolation and guilt (Clinebell, 1956: 49). These psychological traits are not the result of alcoholism but are the causes of alcoholism. They are often present in many alcoholics *before* they begin excessive drinking.

According to some scholars, there seems to be a definite connection between alcoholism and personality maladjustment. Initially, a person drinks to seek refuge for his problems of life or to find a temporary respite from his troubles. Gradually he starts drinking more and more frequently until he becomes utterly dependent on it. However, psychologists maintain that only those people take to frequent drinking who are emotionally immature and lack self-confidence.

Around what personal problems of adjustment do anxiety, tension, guilt, frustration arise? According to Bacon (1959 : 208), the main problems are : an individual's opinion of himself; gaining and holding the respect and the affection of others; conflict with others through self-assertion, through criticism, through out-and-out aggressions, overall security as to ownership, prestige, personal safety as they are tied up with money; responsibilities accepted in the achievement of specific goals; and sexual matters.

The sociological reasons for taking alcohol are essentially the same as for taking drugs. However, a distinction can be made in the causes of drinking alcohol and taking illicit drugs. Since alcohol is more socially acceptable than illegal drugs, drinking reduces a person's fears, worries and anxieties. Besides, alcohol is more easily available than illicit drugs. It is also cheaper than many drugs like heroin, cocaine and LSD. The main sociological causes of taking alcohol are : (1) environmental pressures, (2) peer pressure, and (3) a dominant subculture.

The question is why do certain persons choose drinking as an answer to environmental pressure while others do not do so? Here, certainly, personality and cultural factors are the major conditioning elements in the individual's experience. Cultural taboos and the lack of availability of liquor due to the prohibition policy keep many people away from being exposed to its use. One may conclude from this that alcoholism can be explained only on the basis of a holistic approach rather than a single-factor approach.

A question is raised whether pressures can be located in the culture itself both to cause and to contain alcoholism. It is said that some cultures are better able to develop effective controls over the individual than others. A research in the United States shows that there are very few teetotalers among the Jews (13.0%) compared to Catholics (21.0%) and Protestants (41.0%). In France, Germany, and the United States, the use of wines has been very common. It is only recently that alcoholism has become a major crisis in the life of the people of these countries. Once people start using alcohol because of the cultural

sanctions, they use it frequently especially in situations of insecurity and anxiety.

The current approach is that alcoholism is to be understood in terms of *character and motivation*. An alcoholic is a sick man. He is not to be looked upon with ridicule, condemnation and blame. He has fallen a victim to a set of complexes, attitudes and habits which bind him until the process of self-destruction is inevitable.

Problems of Alcoholism

The problems of alcoholism—in terms of personal misery, family budget, family discord, loss of wages, failure of health, accidents and cost in damage claims, cost of hospital treatment, costs in custodial treatment in jail, monetary damage in courts and inducement to crime—are almost disastrous. Social deviance and social problems emerge from the use and abuse of alcohol. Though the number of annual arrests for public drunkenness is not much in our country, but it is a known fact that a large number of alcoholics are not arrested because of the fact that arrest is not considered a good solution to the problem. A good number of persons arrested for crimes like rape, burglary, murder and theft are those who committed them while under the influence of alcohol. Alcohol is a major factor in highway accidents. Besides, it contributes to thousands of deaths each year.

A high percentage of admissions to hospitals, particularly mental hospitals, related to persons with 'alcoholics disorders' or a 'drinking problem'. Other socially deviant acts related to alcohol/drugs are thefts, bribes, wife battering, and suicides. Studies on suicide point out that the suicide rate is 50 times higher among alcoholics/drug-users than non-alcoholics and non-drug-users.

Since alcoholics/drug-users directly affect four or five other persons (wife, parents, children, siblings, close friends, co-workers), the problem affects millions of people in the country. Families of alcoholics and drug-users suffer the most. Even family violence, family unrest and divorce is caused by them. Drinking affects the business, the office-efficiency and factory production also. Absenteeism, low out-put and poor judgment leading to work-related accidents costs the government billions of rupees. Most factory-owners indicate a lack of interest and deny the existence of these problems among their employees in the factories/offices to save themselves the botheration of adopting effective measures for prevention.

The drinker thinks that alcohol will reduce his tension, guilt, anxiety and frustration. But the fact is that it reduces his operational efficiency to below the minimum level necessary for social existence or even for a bare existence. A drinker harbours the mistaken notion that alcohol can make association and interpersonal activity easier in society. But in reality, alcohol breaks down an individual's participation in associations and thus socially weakens the individual. It impairs socially valuable ideas.

One problem of alcoholism is that it has increased illicit bootlegging. Since Independence, hundreds of tragedies have taken place throughout the country in which thousands of people have died on consuming liquor produced illicitly. The victims of spurious 'sura' invariably are poor people. About a month ago (on 6 November, 1991) about 200 persons living in four slums and the surrounding areas in north-west Delhi died on taking illicit liquor manufactured by a pharmacy of Muradnagar in Ghaziabad district of U.P. Such disasters will continue to take place in future too. No one has ever heard of people dying after consuming Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL). The country liquor has various brands though all of them are generally of the same quality and price. The alcohol content in the country liquor is about 28%, while in 'sura' it is 32%. Usually pyridine is used for denaturising rectified spirits. This is neutralised by citric acid. As the rectified spirit is licensed, sometimes it is adulterated with methylated spirit. The poisonous drinks damage the eyesight, liver and kidney in the long run. The administration will remain irresponsible to tragedies of taking illicit liquor and the government will have lackadaisical attitude in tackling this problem. At the most it will give an ex-gratia payment of Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 10,000 to the families of those killed in such tragedies. The perfidious role of bootleggers, their muscle and money power are a matter of record in communal riots. Many cities in the country are torn asunder by the bootlegger-police-politician tie-up. The margin of profit in bootlegging is estimated to be 9 to 12 times the actual investment. No wonder a number of anti-social elements make it their business to manufacture, collect, transport and distribute illicit liquor. Justice Miyabhoj Commission instituted by the Gujarat Government in 1981 to enquire into the prohibition policy of the state submitted his report in 1983 and pointed out the nexus between baron bootleggers and politicians and the fact that almost all the bootleggers in the state (Gujarat) were anti-social elements capable of terrorising anyone trying to expose them.

Treatment of Alcoholics

Alcoholism is more treatable than drug-addiction. There have been many successful treatment programmes. Since there is a continuum between use and abuse, there are various kinds of programmes for different degrees of drinking. Psychotherapy, environment therapy, behaviour therapy, and medical therapy are suggested and used for different types of drinkers. In medical therapy, hospitals and clinics give alcoholic patients the drug 'Antabuse' (technically called Tetra Ethylthiu Ramdisul Fide) (Walsh & Furfey, 1958 : 151). This drug is inexpensive and is taken orally. It produces no effect whatever unless the patient drinks alcohol; in that case, it quickly produces extremely violent and unpleasant but not dangerous symptoms. Thus, antabuse can guard the drinker against relapse:

In psychotherapy, resocialisation is reinforced through counselling and through group therapy. In environment therapy, the drinker is made to change the environment where his behaviour may be easily controlled. In behaviour therapy, his fears and inhibitions are removed to enable him to develop self-confidence and self-reliance. Thus, the following treatment measures are mainly used to treat drinkers and alcoholics:

(1) *Detoxification in Hospitals*: For alcohol addicts, the first step is 'detoxification'. Alcoholics need medical care and medical supervision. Tranquillizers are used for treating their withdrawal symptoms like convulsions and hallucinations. High potency vitamins and fluid electrolyte balance are also used in their physical rehabilitation.

(2) *Role of Family*: Involving an alcoholic's family in his treatment and rehabilitation enhances the chances of success by 75% to 80%. The family members do not preach; nor do they blame or condemn the alcoholic. They minimise problems, offer sincere and unselfish help and guidance, and never abandon him.

(3) *Alcoholics Anonymous*: One of the most effective social therapies which uses group interaction is Alcoholics Anonymous. It is an organisation of ex-alcoholics which started in the United States in the early 1940s and today has lakhs of persons as its members. In India, the branches have started in a few metropolitan cities only recently. The members of Alcoholics Anonymous share their experience with other alcoholics and give them strength and hope in an attempt to solve their common problems and recover from alcoholism. The man who is discouraged by his apparent inability to conquer the drink habit begins to take heart from the example and encouragement of others who have

triumphed over similar obstacles. The only requirement for membership is a desire to stop drinking. Alcoholics Anonymous are found mainly in metropolitan cities like Delhi, Bombay, and Calcutta. The gatherings are therapeutic in that the drinkers can unburden their problems to persons who work with them and who help them fight their weakness and build self-esteem and a sense of belonging.

(4) *Treatment Centres* These centres have been developed in some cities as alternatives to hospital treatment. Each centre has about 10-20 residents. Here, not only counselling takes place in a supportive environment but residents are made to follow certain anti-drinking rules too.

(5) *Changing Values through Education*: Some voluntary organisations undertake educational and information programmes to alert the alcoholics to the dangers of excessive drinking. Social workers help the drinkers in coping with life and changing the social values and attitudes about drinking.

Control on Alcoholism

At one stage, the Government of India wanted to resort to law and introduce prohibition as a means of solving the problem of drinking and alcoholism. However, a large number of leaders and bureaucrats were against it. In some states, prohibition laws were enacted but they could not be properly implemented. Some states also declared a few days as "dry" days. However, this scheme also could not succeed because drinking involves both a willing buyer and willing seller and the victim of prohibition is thrust into a criminal status. Therefore, illicit distillation and police abuses increased. Thus, the suppressive measure which employed vigorous police activity and stern judicial measures had to be withdrawn for the sake of community protection. With the collapse of the prohibition model, governmental control has withdrawn to the regulation of the liquor trade as primarily a state responsibility. The state governments, under the open license system, leave the alcoholic beverage trade to private enterprise under licensing and regulation, the nominal public objectives being to eliminate people with criminal or questionable financial histories and to control the physical location of licensed liquor shops. Every state government earns crores of rupees every year when it auctions the contract.

Radicals argue that as long as our social structure and economic system produce inequality, unemployment, poverty, injustice, and restraints and tensions, alcoholism will persist. Since the present social

systems operating in our society produce more frustrations and deprivations, the rate of drinking would only accelerate in future. What is, therefore, needed is a policy and programme to produce more jobs, permit fair competition and reduce corruption and nepotism in appointments and promotions. If the lives of people are made meaningful, rewarding and satisfying, the need for alcohol would not exist or it will be minimised. Secondly, education about the harm and hurt that alcohol can bring to a person's life and to society will help control the use of alcohol. Parents can impart education on the dangers of becoming an alcoholic as well as punish the deviants and create the necessary fear. Parents' education should be concerned with shaping the attitudes and behaviour conducive to non-drinking. Lastly, schools and colleges can also educate young students about the psychological and sociological effects of alcohol and alcoholism.

It may, thus, be concluded that the problem of alcoholism calls for a concerted attack which may embrace treatment, social measures, education and research.

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Terrorism

Terrorism is a problem we have been facing in India for more than two decades. Earlier, we had faced the problem of insurgency in north-east India while dealing with the Naga and the Mizo rebels and the terrorism of the Naxalites in Bengal. Today, terrorism is perceived as a problem capable of destabilizing not only national but also international politics. Terrorism in recent times has affected both the developed and the developing countries. What has made terrorism a significant instrument for achieving desired goals and ends by persons using the terrorist techniques are factors like conviction in the purity of the 'cause', fanatical loyalty, desire for self-sacrifice, a sense of absolutism, and financial and material support from abroad.

The Concept

The words terrorism, insurgency, civil war, revolution, guerrilla war, intimidation and extremism are most often interchanged and used very loosely. What is common in all is 'violence'. Terrorism is an organised system of intimidation. It is broadly defined as 'violent behaviour designed to generate fear in the community, or a substantial segment of it for political purposes'. It is also defined as 'a method whereby an organised group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence' (Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences).

Terrorist acts are directed against persons who, as individual agents or representatives of authority, interfere with the consummation of the objectives of such a group. A 'terrorist' is one who imposes the

punishment meted out by his organisation upon those who are held to interfere with the revolutionary programme. The terrorist does not threaten; but death or destruction is part of his programme of action. If he is arrested, he does not try to prove his innocence but he spreads his doctrines.

Though the long-term objectives of terrorism, insurgency and revolution are similar, that is, overthrow of the existing regime or order, but the short-term objectives and strategies or methodology may be quite different.

One view is that the above definitions refer only to that terrorism which is practised by the 'opponents of the state'. There is another terrorism which is practised by the 'state apparatus'. The above definitions do not include the later type of terrorism. The greatest practitioners of the art of terrorism, like Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Yahya Khan, Mussolini and Franco, cannot be termed as 'terrorists' with these definitions in mind. Terrorism practised by the state refers to violence based on extra-legal methods. It may, however, be clarified that all violence practised by the state is not terrorism. In fact, an organised state has sometimes to use violence for certain objectives. The democratic states generally use legal apparatus to achieve their objectives; it is only the totalitarian states which employ terror. But then all totalitarian states are not terrorists. Similarly, sometimes the democratic states can also use terror.

The common definition of terrorism does not include all types of violence used by the organised groups. That violence which is motivated by consideration of pure personal aggrandisement is excluded from terrorism. This excludes common organised crimes like dacoity and robbery. However, all murders and dacoities organised by ideological groups like the Naxalites fall within the purview of terrorism.

Terrorism has also been differentiated from intimidation and insurgency. In 'intimidation', the intimidator merely threatens injury to collect a ransom but in 'terrorism' and 'insurgency,' the terrorists and the insurgents actually use violence. Terrorism is not a fight between individuals but a struggle between social groups and political forces. It has little to do with intimidating individuals as individuals. The terrorists punish those individuals whom their organisation considers guilty of interfering with their programme aimed at the removal of the undesired social or governmental system. According to Paul Wilkinson (1974), terrorism in politics is a weapon of blackmail, coercion, and

imposition of minority will against and upon a majority decision.

Terrorism is different from 'mob violence' also. The latter is unplanned and uncontrolled, guided by some immediate motivation which may not even be rational and is not based on any precise programme. The former has a definite goal and is planned. It aims to demoralise a governmental authority and undermine its power. However, at times, terrorism may use mob violence as its method.

The difference between terrorism and insurgency is that an insurgent has the support of a large section of the local population while a terrorist need not have such support. Again, an insurgent is a national of a country which is in revolt against the constitutional government of his country and fights to overthrow the government by guerilla warfare. The terrorist may or may not be a national of the country in which he operates (Saxena, 1985: 14-35)

The above definitions enable us to give six basic *definitional components of terrorism*. These include: (1) terror purpose (that is, creating fear in the minds of the primary target), (2) instrumental or immediate victims, (3) primary targets (population or broad groups and others), (4) an outcome of death to instrumental targets and damage to or destruction of property, (5) violence, and (6) political purpose.

Terrorism appears in many forms—from planting a crude, home-made bomb, hand-grenade or other explosive in a shopping centre, a railway station, a bus-stand and a bus, to kidnapping and assassination of important personalities. The main aim of terrorists is to wreak vengeance of those whom they regard as obstacles or enemies or oppressors.

Characteristics

Terrorism is characterised by a technique of perpetrating random and brutal intimidation, coercion, or destruction of human lives and property, and used intentionally by subnational groups operating under varying degrees of stress, to obtain realistic or illusory goals. The main characteristics of terrorism are :

- it is against the state or community.
- it has a political purpose.
- it is illegal and unlawful.
- it aims at intimidating and creating impact of fear and panic not only for the victim but also for the people at large, caused for the purpose of coercing or subduing.

- it is accompanied by a feeling of impotence and helplessness on the part of the masses.
- it stops rational thinking.
- it leads to reaction of fight or flight.
- it contains arbitrariness in violence as victims' selection is random or indiscriminate.

Objectives

The goals of terrorists may vary from movement to movement but the main objectives of terrorism are same in all terrorist movements. These are: (1) cause the regime to react and also to over-react. Reaction is required to compel the government/community to concede the demand of the terrorists. Over-reaction or indiscriminate reaction is required to demonstrate the repression of the regime so that the people are alienated and their sympathy is achieved. The security forces used by the government (because of over-reaction) to protect the VIPs and the public installations will reduce the amount of security forces available to protect the general public, which will enhance their feeling of insecurity and helplessness and also increase terror amongst them; (2) mobilize mass support and urge potential sympathisers to greater militancy, or increase the involvement of more people. In a foreign territory, the objective of terrorist activity is to influence people rather than win friends. The chief objective in these places is a show of strength and demonstrate the incapacity of the regime to protect people and maintain order; (3) eliminate opponents and informers and remove danger to the movement and also ensure obedience of the followers; and (4) give publicity or magnify their cause and strength.

According to Baljit Singh (Alexander and Finger, 1977: 8), the overall objectives of terrorism are : (i) to gain popular support, (ii) to disrupt and destroy the military and psychological strength of the regime, and (iii) to break internal stability and check growth. If the premise is accepted that political terror primarily aims at the psyche rather than at military hardware, the killing of selected important but unpopular public officials and politicians may boost terrorists' morale, create sympathy among the populace and provoke the regime to adopt repressive measures that further alienate the populace.

Jay Mallin (1971 : 9) has suggested five basic short-term objectives of political terrorism: (i) morale building within the ranks, (ii) advertising the movement, (iii) disorientation and psychological isolation of the populace, (iv) elimination of opposing forces, and (v) provocation of the government.

Origin and Development

Political terrorism as an instrument of power came of age during the French Revolution of 1793. Terror incorporated two facets in this Revolution: a state of anxiety within a group, and the tool that induced fear and violent acts aimed at influencing political behaviour of the state. After the French Revolution, political terrorism did not score any significant success until 1921, when the IRA in Ireland used it against the British. Following the World War II (that is, after 1939), political terrorism re-emerged on the international scene. Besides India, it was used in Algeria, Cyprus and Kenya for political independence through activities including intimidation, sabotage, abduction and killing.

During the 1960s, political terrorism entered another phase. According to Baljit Singh (Alexander and Finger, 1977: 7), the two most significant quantitative changes in terrorism during 1960s were: its trans-national character and its emergence as a self-sufficient strategy, that is, terrorists attempted to operate independently of the larger political arena. This was made possible through a revolution in communication and modern urban civilization. Between 1969 and 1975, more than forty countries were involved in terrorist activities (Baljit Singh, 1977: 9)

Alexander and Finger (1977 : xi) are of the opinion that the major reasons for terrorism lie in the very nature of modern civilization itself and are inherent in the modern industrial system. They have given following few causes for the origin and development of terrorism :

- (1) the present complex technological society is extremely vulnerable to unsuspected and ruthless attacks of terrorism because transportation centres, communication facilities, factories and agricultural fields cannot always be protected against the random acts of dedicated and determined terrorists;
- (2) highly sophisticated weapons like missiles, and remote controls are now relatively easy to obtain for various terror movements. In future, the terrorist groups will probably have access even to chemical and nuclear weapons and instruments of death and destruction;
- (3) with modern warfare capabilities, the 'powerless' terrorist groups have been transformed into subnational groups with formidable strengths, capable of creating states within states, thereby undermining the ability of legitimate governments to rule or to survive (the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the Khalistan Commandos in India and the PLO in Israel are some examples of such strong subnational groups),

- (4) communication and transportation opportunities have enabled an international network of terrorism to develop with a certain degree of centralised organisational structure. Collaboration among ideologically linked groups and among those with common political interest has developed relationships involving financing, training, supply of combat materials, organizational assistance and joint attacks. This pattern of 'comradeship' is inevitably expanding the areas of international violence; and
- (5) through revolution in communications, terrorists are able to target their violence not only against immediate victims but also direct it at a wide audience as well for psychological intimidation and blackmail. The media coverage also exports the terroristic techniques and inspiration to other terrorist groups.

In addition to above factors, the other factors which have substantially contributed to terrorism are: the weak nations' will to weaken the strong nations, which motivates them to support the subnational groups of strong nations in their terroristic activities, financial support of rich non-residents to terrorist groups on religious and cultural basis ; feasibility of using smuggling and drug trafficking methods by the terrorists and, thus, getting money for purchasing modern weapons; confrontations between the East and the West as well as between the ideologies of the Left and Right ; the rise in religious, linguistic, ethnic and national consciousness of groups throughout the world; the feelings of deprivation and frustration among the minorities struggling for their liberation and a legitimate right to self-determination and, the growth of opposition by citizens to repressive regimes and dictators ruling their countries.

The strategies and tactics employed by political terrorists are generally directed at three groups: the populace, the regime in power and the terrorist organisation itself.

Perspectives

Terrorism has been perceived by different scholars with different perspectives. We may identify four such perspectives: historical, political, sociological and legal (Table 15.1).

Table 15.1: Perspectives In Terrorism

Historical	Political		Sociological	Legal
Origin, development and quantitative change in different phases	War	Low-intensity conflict	Focus on	Focus on :
			1 Functions	State laws as well as
			2 Participants	international law for dealing
			3 Situations	with
			4 Resources	international
			5. Strategies	terrorism
			6 Outcomes	

The *historical* perspective focuses on the origin, development and qualitative changes in different phases in terrorism. Baljit Singh (Alexander and Finger, 1977: 5-17) is one scholar who has used this approach to analyse terrorism.

The *political* perspective (James Muller) perceives political terrorism as a political violence movement organised by an organised political group(s) either at national or at international level.

The *legal* perspective concentrates on state laws as well as international law for cooperation among various states in dealing with international terrorism.

In the *sociological* perspective, in analysing terrorism, Jordan Paust (Alexander and Finger, 1977: 19) focuses on (i) the types of participants engaged in terrorism as terrorists, targets, victims, and so forth, (ii) the objectives of the participants, (iii) the situations of actual interaction, (iv) the type of resources at the disposal of each type of participant, (v) the strategies of terror utilized (killing, kidnapping, bombing, looting and hijacking) and, (vi) the outcome of the terroristic process (deaths, injuries, destruction of property...).

Mass Support

What is the nature and extent of mass support to the ideology, goal, and methodology of the terrorists? Many a time it happens that the masses accept a particular ideology but not the goal, or they accept the goal but not the strategies of the proponents of terrorism. Even when one agrees with the goal, he may not support the movement or may not go beyond a certain point. Thus, the quantity and quality of mass support varies from one terrorist movement to other terrorist movement. Verma

(Tiwari, S.C., 1930: 233) has given some indicators of the characteristics of mass support. These are : supporting the ideology or cause, agreeing with methodology, providing money and material, non-violent participation in rallies, supplying arms and ammunition, providing shelter or harbouring, vocal or written (in media, etc.) support, and active participation in movement (violent support). Verma has also arranged these indicators in ascending order and has given three types of civil strife: terrorism, insurgency, and revolution. According to him, terrorism is characterised by very little mass support but the participants go all the way from ideology to extreme violence. Insurgency or guerrilla warfare is characterized by the small number of insurgents or guerillas supported by a very large segment of population. This happens when the cause is removal of colonial rule or resisting a foreign ruler. Revolution is characterised by much larger number of participants and mass uprising.

Terrorism in India has attracted youngsters more, particularly the unemployed, the misguided and the idealistic youth. As long as there are causes which arouse intense emotions, the idealistic youth will be led to have romantic visions of terrorism for a cause. When a nation loses its purpose owing to a corrupt leadership with vested interests, frustrations and deprivations will lead the aggressive youths to extremist tendencies like naxalism, or parochial issues in Punjab, or religious issues in Kashmir. Some examples of terrorist groups which have attracted the youth outside India are : the IRA in Ireland, Black Septemberists in Jordan, Baader Meinhof in Germany, LTTE in Sri Lanka, and the Red Army in Japan.

Support Base

The success of terrorism depends to a large extent upon its support base which includes not only the political and social support but also support by money, weapons and training. Terrorists obtain money from different sources like "donations and taxes" from people, through bank robberies, by smuggling and selling drugs, and collecting ransom for hostages and hijacked planes. Weapons are often looted from people or snatched from police stations or purchased from abroad. For example, the PLO rebels acquire weapons from the Arab states, China and the USSR. The Khalistani terrorists and Kashmiri militants in India are getting both training and weapons from several neighbouring countries. Some states in South India have recently become active after 1983 riots in Sri Lanka. The ethnic linkage of the Tamils provides local sympathy

for the Sri Lankan Tamils in India. The militant activities of the LTTE have become a nuisance for one or two of our southern states. It has now been established that the LTTE militants were responsible even in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991.

Terrorism in India

The four types of terrorism we face in our country today are : Khalistan-oriented terrorism in Punjab, militants' terrorism in Kashmir, naxalite terrorism in Bengal, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, and the ULFA terrorism in Assam. Earlier we had faced this problem in Nagaland (1951), Mizoland (1966), Manipur (1976), Tripura (1980) and (of Gurkhaland) in Bengal (1986). The Khalistan-oriented Sikh terrorism is based on a dream of a "theocratic state through secession" ; the Nagaland and the Mizo terrorism was based on the "identity crisis" ; the Manipur and Tripura terrorism was based on "the grievance situation," and the naxalite terrorism in Bengal, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh is based on "class enmity" Had the Sikh terrorism in Punjab been based on "grievance situation," or "identity crisis of Sikhs," it could have been tackled by political negotiations and constitutional means, but so long it is based on the idea of a "theocratic state" through secession and partition of the country, the government has to deal with it through counter-terror tactics.

Terrorism in Punjab entered a dangerous phase in 1984-85. Earlier during 1982-83, scores of innocent people, mostly Hindus, were killed in a reckless spree. In the later phase, along with Hindus, Sikhs were also killed. Places of worship were turned by the militants into arsenals. In May 1985, there were many transistor bomb blasts in Delhi, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh which took a heavy toll of life. There were conspiracies to kill VIPs including Rajiv Gandhi and the Haryana Chief Minister during their visit to the USA. Sant Longowal, President of the Akali Dal, was murdered inside a Gurdwara on August 20, 1985.

The massacre of selected non-Sikh passengers travelling by bus, the blowing up the Air India Boeing 'Kanishka' and killing nearly 300 innocent Indians, the murder of political leaders, journalists, military and police officers and even innocent people in-between 1984 and 1991, the killing of 114 Hindu train passengers at the Buddowal railway station near Ludhiana in June 1991, the looting of banks both in and outside Punjab, the killing of 24 candidates contesting elections in June, 1991 (later on postponed to February, 1992) at the rate of one candidate a day, were all the activities of terrorists highly condemned by everybody.

The militants were against the elections to the State Assembly in June 1991. The Congress (I) and the Left parties had boycotted the elections. Only the Sikh organisations and the Bharatiya Janata Party were contesting. The Akali Dal in Punjab is divided in seven factions (Mann, Badal, Longowal, Capt. Amrinder Singh, Baba Joginder Singh, Pheruman and Raj Dev groups). The All India Sikh Students' Federation (AISSF) is again split into six groups, each opposed to the other (Manjit, Mehta-Chawla, Daljit Bitto, Bhuttar, Padri and Khalon). There are five Panthic Committees (Sohan Singh, Zaffarwal, Manochahal, Usmanwala, and Bhuttar). The voters were, thus, confused. The election was to be a fight between nationalist and secessionist forces. The free elections were impossible with the terroristic tactics of intimidating and killing the candidates. The government headed by Mr. Chandra Shekhar was adamant about holding the elections. But a day before the Congress government came to power at the Centre, the elections were postponed. The terrorists' demand of a self-governed autonomous State for the Sikhs where "Sikhs could experience a glow of freedom" could not be achieved.

In May and June, 1991, on an average 15 people were killed daily in Punjab. The death toll, including that of civilians, security forces and militants in 1990 was 3,784. The imperialist forces interested in balkanising India and in weakening, destabilising and even disintegrating our country, have been supporting, encouraging and abetting the demand of Khalistan. The internal factor which has helped the terrorists in Punjab is the spread of Hindu communalism. The RSS communalists have been holding the entire Sikh community responsible for the crimes of terrorists. They keep on harping on the slogan of revenge and retaliation. Their assertion that 'Sikhs are Hindus' provides the argument to the separatists that unless there is Khalistan, Sikhism will be absorbed in the Hindu religion. The anti-Sikh riots in Delhi at the time of the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi had resulted in killing of more than 300 Sikhs. The fact that no action was taken against those who were involved in these riots has been exploited by the extremists in Punjab to spread terrorism and gather mass support for their action.

The strategies and tactics adopted by the Khalistan-oriented terrorists are: (i) undermining the authority of the administration by issuing their own orders and demonstrating their strength by killing the deviants, (ii) projecting themselves as the defender of Sikhs and Sikh religion, (iii) killing innocent people, looting banks and shops and

creating terror, (iv) forcing the Hindus of Punjab to migrate to other states and providing opportunities to Sikhs from other states to migrate to Punjab, and (v) developing a nexus with smugglers for raising funds in Punjab. Today, the spirit of the people in Punjab has been fatigued by terrorism. There is no anger but just a gnawing fear that has become a state of mind. In 'Babey Raj' (the local parlance for militants), the people have internalised fear and have learnt to live with it. The word of the terrorists is like a command for the villagers. The poor villagers follow these commands for the sake of their safety, for the safety of their children, for the safety of their fields, and for the safety of their cattle, shops and property. The agony of people in Punjab is that not only have the terrorists progressively held the state to ransom but the administration by its corrupting tentacles has destroyed the faith of the people in the system and the hghandedness of the police raj seems to grow by leaps and bounds. In the face of such anarchy, the people's anguish has been silenced.

The naxalite terrorism appeared in Bengal in 1967. It got impetus in 1969 when CPI (ML) was born with instigation from China which was interested in weakening India. The theoretical backing for Naxalite thought came from the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China held in April, 1969, when Mao's thoughts were declared to be the highest stage of Marxism-Leninism. Using these thoughts, the Naxalite leader, Charu Mazumdar had declared "China's Chairman is our Chairman". From Bengal, the Naxalite movement spread to Bihar to fight for the landless labour. However, Charu Mazumdar's call of annihilation of class enemies did not get much response from the peasantry class and the educated middle class, though many idealistic young Naxalite men and women enjoyed killing landlords, money-lenders and police officers. Between 1969 and 1972, 1,711 persons were killed in Bengal by the Naxalite terrorists. There were 696 cases of looting of cash and 8,857 cases of other acts of violence (Tripathi, B.K., 1990: 151). With the vigorous operations of the government (that is, by the Central Reserve Police Force and the Border Security Force), 384 terrorists were killed and more than 6,000 were imprisoned in West Bengal. The movement also got discredited because professional criminals joined the movement. After 1972, the Naxalite movement spread from Bengal and Bihar to Andhar Pradesh, Kerala, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and Tripura. In Andhra Pradesh, during 1969-72, the terrorists committed 102 murders and indulged in 148 cases of looting. The situation in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar between 1988 and 1991 has

been much worse, though by and large, the exploited poor and the tribals still continue to follow Naxalite terrorism for protecting themselves from *ex-zamundars*, money lenders, and other exploiters. The government deals with this Naxalite terrorism purely as a problem of law and order.

The terrorism of militants in Kashmir has assumed a new shape since 1988. The militants want to capitalise on the political uncertainty at the Centre in the last three years. They have launched a bloody battle to underline their separate identity. The neighbouring countries, determined to see turmoil continuing in the Valley, are providing training and weapons to the militants. The people have also been so brain-washed that they have started talking of the excesses of police and the para-military forces. For example, the firing by security forces on a funeral procession of three militants in Khanyar on May 8, 1990 was criticised by the people. For the militants, the criticism of the government by the people means that the people are more than willing to support them. On the other hand, the Hindus have been forced by the militants to leave Kashmir. It is claimed in a Press Guild of India report that nearly two lakh Hindus have fled Jammu and Kashmir in-between 1988 and 1991. The Hindus claim that the fundamentalists and militants have infiltrated every sphere of the government in the Kashmir Valley and that what rules high is not the writ of the government but that of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front. They maintain that the pro-Pakistan forces have overtaken the Valley and in a way, there is a collapse of the administration and the terrorists want them to quit the valley. The Muslims claim that they are innocent and are being unnecessarily harassed. The government claims that 5,000 trained militants are ready to sneak into the valley. The militants have resorted to extortion and kidnapping for monetary gains and political motives. There is no dearth of guns in the Valley; nor is there any dearth of frustrated youths to operate them. Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen (HM) is claimed to have a cadre strength of 20,000 with at least 10,000 persons being trained in camps across the border and in the Valley. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation front (JKLF) still clings on to the concept of an independent state as opposed to a merger with Pakistan, which is the demand of other militant groups like the Muslim Janpaez Force and the Iqwan-e-Musalmeen. All militants have developed a feeling that they have to unite against a common enemy—the Indian Armed Forces.

Some sources claim that the militants are getting help from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and Libya. The kidnapping of a daughter of Union Home Minister in 1989, two Swedish engineers in April, 1991 (who ultimately managed to escape on 6th July, 1991) and demanding the release of imprisoned militants, and eight Israeli tourists on June 27, 1991 indicate the new strategies the terrorists are employing today. The present Congress (I) government, thus, is not only faced today with the problem of combating the militants but also of facing the wrath of the people for some of the excesses committed by the armed forces. It has to build bridges of trust by far-sighted political initiatives.

Terrorism in Assam emerged from 1980 onwards. Assamese already had raised the issue of removing 'foreigners' and deleting their names from the electoral rolls. When the government failed to take action, there were agitations in February 1983 elections in which 5,000 persons lost their lives. After the AASU movement when the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) came to power, it was felt that the state would develop. But the factions soon led to the split of the AGP. The United Minorities Front (UMF) and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) emerged as two militant organisations. The All Bodo Students' Union (ABSU) also demanded a separate state resulting in considerable violence. The ULFA stepped up its campaign of murder, loot and kidnapping. The terrorist activities spread panic not only among the non-Assamese but also amongst the Assamese people. The army action—named Operation Bajrang—against the secessionist militant organisation subdued it to the extent that the militant activities did not interfere even with the elections in June, 1991. It was hoped that the formation of the new Saikya Congress government on June 30, 1991 would rout out or weaken organisations like the AASU, the AGP, the UMF, the ULFA and the ASDC and that the new government would be able to contain the terrorist activities of the militant organisations in the state. But the abduction of 14 persons from different parts of the state, including six officials of the ONGC on July 1, 1991 has belied these expectations. Perhaps the government has to face the militants' terrorism for a long time to come.

Terrorism in Other Countries

The terrorist activities are found in different parts of the world. For example, terroristic activities of the IRA (Irish Republican Army) in Ireland are based on retaliatory action against the British reign of terror in Ireland. The terrorists seek termination of English control in Ireland

and establish Ireland's unification and people's right to national self-determination. Similarly, we find terrorism in Sri Lanka, Israel, Spain, Germany, Japan, Philippines, Canada, Argentina, France, Italy, Portugal and Latin America. Some of the important terrorist groups are the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the Red Army in Japan, the Palestinian Guerrillas in Israel, the Basque in Spain, the Red Bridge in Italy, the Kurds in Iraq, the Hukbalahaps and Moros in Philippines, the Baader-Meinhof in Germany, the Symbionise Liberation Army in the US and the Quebecois in Canada.

The legitimacy of the kind of terrorism used by these terrorist groups can be gauged by several socio-economic and political factors, as well as by the fact of whether it was considered as the last resort in their political struggle after unsuccessfully trying all other means of struggle. On the other hand, terrorism loses its legitimacy if it can be proved that the available legitimate means have been bypassed before resorting to the use of terrorism.

Of late, international terrorism has also gained currency. The support to terrorists of one country can come from individuals and groups sympathetic to their cause, or it can come from other state governments, like support given by some Arab states to the Palestinian groups, or support of President Gaddafi to the IRA in Ireland or the Moros in Philippines.

The examples of state terror are found in Russia, China and Cambodia. The three famous examples of Russian terrors are the Tsarist reign of terror in 1905-07, the Bolshevik terror rule in 1917-18, and the Stalin period of terror in 1934-35. In China, people faced the white terror of Chiang Kai Shekh in 1923, Mao's terror in 1950-53 in which 10 to 20 million people were killed, and terror during the Cultural Revolution in 1966-69 in which student power and People's Liberation Army were used to revive Mao's personal authority. The state terror in Kampuchea (formerly known as Cambodia) occurred in 1975 in which two million people out of a total population of eight million were massacred. The examples of state terror are also found in East Pakistan in 1971, in Iran in 1983-85, and in Nazi Germany in 1933-34.

The U.N. General Assembly also passed a resolution in December, 1985 condemning all methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed. It called upon all states to refrain from organising, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in other states or acquiescing in activities within their territories directed towards the commission of such acts. It also urged all states to co-

operate with one another through exchange of relevant information and by prosecution or extradition of the perpetrators of such acts and to enter into treaty obligation to that effect.

Theoretical Explanation of Causes of Terrorism

Following Gurr (1977 : 47), the causes of terrorism may be explained on the basis of the Theory of Relative Deprivation. According to this theory, political collective violence may be described as a consequence of gap developing between the value expectations of a given group of people and the value capabilities of the group. Gurr has talked of three types of deprivations

(1) *Declivity deprivation* occurs when the value capabilities of a given population decline, drastically but the value expectations remain the same. Bolsheviks' collective political violence in Russia in 1917 was due to this type of deprivation. The Russian people, after World War I, were a discontented lot, and the failure of the government to terminate the Russian involvement in the War led to a swing in popular sentiment in one group (Lenin and his party) that promised immediate peace.

(2) *Aspirational deprivation* occurs when the value capabilities of the given population remain the same but value expectations increase. Terrorism in the Kashmir Valley is due to this type of deprivation. Similarly, the ULFA terrorism in Assam is the result of the demands for immediate equality as opposed to the continuing discrimination and prejudice against them.

(3) *Progressive deprivation* occurs when value expectations increase and the value capabilities decline. The Khalistan-oriented terrorism is the best example of this.

The process of modernisation and the 'ethnicity explosion' lead to widespread feelings of relative deprivation.

Combating Terrorism

Terrorism is too serious a problem to be left to politicians alone. General awareness among the masses and pressures on people are the only way out. The one thing we have to understand is that terrorism is like a common cold. It runs its own course and there is need for patience.

Basically, there are three models of combating terrorism : the Indian, the American and the Israeli. A comparison of these three models is necessary for furthering our understanding.

The Israeli Model

Terrorism in Israel has been prevailing for the last four decades. Initially, for about one and a half decades (1953 to 1967), the Palestinians living in west of Jordan and in Gaza strip carried out their resistance through cross border raids by sneaking into Israel. The Israelis responded by carrying out airborne raids and by intruding into Jordan and destroying Palestinian camps with tanks. Since these attacks caused extensive damage to Jordanian army and property, the public opinion in Jordan turned against supporting the PLO. Along with Jordan, other Arab countries also prevented the PLO from carrying out its activities from their soil. Jordan launched a purge in September 1970 against the Palestinians and killed about 15,000 of them. The PLO base in Lebanon also was eliminated when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. Israel, thus, dealt with the PLO terrorists by eliminating their bases. The Palestinians then adopted the tactics of hijacking Israeli civilian aircrafts and also kidnapping the Israeli civilians and demanding the release of their jailed colleagues in Israel. The Israeli government never yielded to such terrorist threats and in retaliation attacked the Palestinian camps. Though the Israeli policy of non-negotiation with the terrorists was often criticised but Israel never budged from its position, maintaining that once they gave into hijackings and kidnappings, they would multiply manifold. Thus, the four primary components of the Israeli strategy in dealing with terrorist violence are: (1) refusal to negotiate with terrorists, (2) retaliatory raids on the bases of terrorists, (3) strict security measures, and (4) covert violence against Palestinians (even innocent) connected with terrorists and sympathisers of Palestinians. Thus, the Israeli model of combating terrorism is based on 'counter terror' and 'anti-terror' rather than passive defensive measures.

The American Model

The United States has global economic interests and is vulnerable to terrorism. The most potent weapon of America to fight terrorism has been its economic clout like cutting off trade and technology export. When this fails, the U.S. bombs the enemy country supporting terrorists. This method was adopted for Cuba in 1962 and for Libya in 1986 when its leader Col. Gaddafi supported terrorist movements like those of the PLO or of the IRA of Northern Ireland or of the HUK rebels of Philippines, or of the terrorist gangs in Latin America. The

same method was adopted by America when it invaded Cambodia for giving shelter to Vietcong during the Vietnam war. Thus, the American model of combating terrorism was 'counter terror campaign' and invasion.

The Indian Model

India has been facing severe problems of violence and terrorism since 1960s. The insurgency in the north-east in 60s and 70s was tackled by the government more through political methods. The violence in Jammu and Kashmir also falls more into the category of insurgency rather than pure terrorism. 'Operation Blue Star' of the military on June 6, 1984, in Punjab and 'Operation Black Thunder' in Assam used to counter terrorism totally failed. They were anti-terrorist measures (implemented mainly through the police forces and partially through the military forces) rather than counter terrorist measures. The hallmark of the policies in the former measures are : frequent road checks, sentries at vulnerable points and elaborate security for the VIPs. These measures are extremely costly. The prime minister's security alone is reported to cost our country Rs. 200 crore annually. The countries which supply the bulk of arms, or give shelter to terrorists or finance terrorism have not been called to account. Even there, the emphasis is on passive measures like border fencing or lodging mild protests. No wonder, that even after 10 years India has not been able to control terrorism. The government mostly succumbs to the demands of the terrorists as happened in Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar.

Thus, the three models (Israeli, American and Indian) of combating terrorism are different in content as well as in temperament. In a way, they reflect the power of the states. The American model is 'counter terror' model which is based on hitting at the very roots of terrorist support. The Indian model is anti-terrorist model. The Israeli model is 'blend of counter-terror and anti-terrorist measures'. The terrorist menace cannot be eliminated either through anti-terror or counter-terror approaches. Besides the police and the military measures, the socio-political issues have to be tackled. The bases in the countries, at least the neighbouring countries, supporting the terrorists have to be attacked and destroyed. The policy in dealing with such countries has to be deterrent.

The government of India cannot face the problem of terrorism merely by enlisting public sympathy or by blaming countries of giving support to terrorists. Helping terrorists in a hostile country is a fact of

life which no organised government in modern times can ignore. Our country has to evolve its own system of dealing with terrorists.

Some methods which may prove to be helpful to our government in this regard are (Saxena, N.S., 1985: 33-34) :

- seeking cooperation of the citizens by the police to get information against the terrorists.
- reducing the finance at the disposal of the terrorists to contain their operations.
- refusing to accept any demands of any group of terrorists.
- giving swift and judicial punishments to arrested terrorists. The greater the delay in prosecution and greater the detention in the jail as undertrials, the greater the possibility of their (terrorists') escape.
- adopting more effective intelligence methods in retrieving information about the terrorists, their associates, their modus operandi, and their sources of finance and weapons, etc.
- improving security measures continuously at important places.
- giving more scientific training to forces dealing with terrorists.

Sociology of Terrorism

How does terrorism disrupt the political system or social organisations? How does terrorism act as a method for hastening social change? How does terrorism explain the social relationship between a frustrated minority and the ruling political elites, or between a group which feels deprived and a group which has the monopoly on the use of force? A holistic sociological perspective of terrorism will be possible only when we discuss large-scale political events not only in aggregate numerical terms but also in impact terms, that is, we focus not only on quantitative macropolitics but also on qualitative micropolitics.

Terrorism demoralises and demobilizes populations and disintegrates societies, though it is also true that terrorism in some instances serves as an integrative mechanism binding people together in a common cause. Terrorism may involve the problem of law and order, that is, of killing or kidnapping of one group by other group because of its religious affiliations or sub-cultural differences, but it does not disrupt the social systems. Nor is terrorism a special method for hastening historical change. No terrorist movement has ever succeeded in achieving its goals. Terrorists, therefore, do not shape the course of historical events.

For understanding terrorism, it is necessary to measure the amount of violence engaged in by the terrorists to effect their desired ends, the quantum of force utilized by the police and the armed forces to prevent social change, and also to measure the types of violence. Using this perspective to terrorism in India, the number of people killed and kidnapped in Bihar in one year is much more than the killings and kidnappings in Punjab. When a terrorist takes a life in the name of social justice, he faces a problem of social accounting at one level and moral constraint at another. One might also speak of the results of the use of terror to overthrow state authority. Suppose we accept the temporary disruption of the normal administrative activities of politico-social systems, do we not face the same results whenever we are faced with any social or natural calamity? Does the killing of one or two, or even a few important political leaders by the terrorists change the structure of politics? By and large, the nature of political process in the society is not interfered with, nor it is interrupted by these killings. Quantitatively, thus, the assassinations by terrorists may not be significant but they do involve the qualitative traumas. This is the problem we faced in the assassinations of Indira Gandhi or Rajiv Gandhi by the terrorists. As a result, we may not label terrorist activities 'unsuccessful', but at the same time, we cannot view them as 'successful', too in terms of the limited numbers involved. Sociologically, therefore, terrorists may not be able to topple the social order but they do loosen that order symbolically by weakening the legitimating capacities of administrative officials and the power elites. To board an aeroplane, one might agree to get his luggage checked or go through the security measures for approaching an important person; nevertheless, one has a perfect right to raise questions about these new social costs. These symbolic changes as the result of consequences of terrorism may be irritable but their transitory nature is invariably important for social evaluation. The social impact of terrorism which may totally affect the society on a long-term basis, thus, should be the central focus in any system of analytic measurement. It may, therefore, be concluded that claiming that terrorism disintegrates society or affects the survival of the system will not be very correct.

Nevertheless, mechanisms have to be created to prevent acts of terror. Terrorism and political violence have become the bane of Indian society today. Both are leading the country towards anarchy and chaos. Terrorists kill in the name of religion and region, in the name of language and culture. It is true that the prevalent frustration and a sense

of deprivation amongst the people, particularly the youth, be checked. On the one hand, the government has to deal with the terrorists with a very firm hand, and on the other hand, the minorities have to be protected and right atmosphere created for the functioning of a genuine democracy. The terrorism of the terrorists of terrorising the terrorised has to be contained.

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Drug Abuse and Drug Addiction

“Say no to drugs” This is the message which is now being relayed by every man of importance to the deluded youth of India. Has drug abuse really become such a social problem in our country ?

Aberrant Behaviour

Drug abuse may be perceived both as aberrant behaviour and as a social problem. In the former sense, it is regarded as an evidence of individual's social maladjustment; in the latter sense, it is viewed as a widespread condition that has harmful consequences for society. In several western countries, drug abuse was regarded as an important social problem since long but in India, it is only since last few years that it has come to be considered a crucial social problem. It is said that India has become not only an important transit centre for drugs (from where drugs are smuggled from some countries and sent to other countries), but the prevalence of drug use is also alarmingly increasing. According to one estimate India has seven lakh heroin addicts alone. India's drug lords' monthly sale in the domestic and international markets varies between Rs. 90 crore and Rs. 100 crore. Likewise, the quantity of illicit drugs seized between 1984 and 1990 has increased over 1,000%. The use of illicit drugs today is not confined to the street urchins and the lower classes; more and more middle and upper class youth are succumbing to drugs.

In spite of this increase, drug abuse in India is still considered more as an aberrant behaviour than an anti-social or a non-conforming behaviour. By this one means that the aberrant person conceals his

transgression from social norms of society, violates norms without questioning their legitimacy, and attempts to escape the penalties for violating norms without proposing changes in them. The aberrant person is believed to be out to satisfy his private interests.

Merton (1979 : 829-32) has distinguished between 'aberrant' and 'non-conforming' behaviour to show the significance of various kinds of norm violations. The 'non-conformist' challenges the legitimacy of the norms (goals and/or means) and he publicly rejects and advocates the substitution of new norms, but the 'aberrant person' neither questions the legitimacy of norms nor seeks replacement of old norms with new norms. No wonder, sociologists perceive drug abuse in India as aberrant behaviour, and drug-users and addicts as aberrant persons, who unlike non-conformists, are not interested in improving social conditions or benefiting mankind.

Several researches have been conducted on drug abuse in India in the last one and a half decade but these studies are more by medical scientists and psychiatrists than by sociologists. This author conducted two studies on drug abuse among college/university students in 1976 and 1986 in Rajasthan to analyse not only the problem of extent of drug abuse but also to study its causes and suggest measures for controlling it. Before examining the findings of my own and other researches, let us first try to understand the basic concepts in drug abuse terminology.

Basic Concepts

The concepts of drug, drug abuse, drug dependence, drug addiction, and abstinence syndrome need some clarity. *Drug* is a chemical substance associated with distinct physical and/or psychological effects. It alters a person's normal bodily processes or functions. But this definition is too broad. In medical sense, a drug is any substance prescribed by a physician or manufactured expressly for the purpose of treating and preventing disease and ailment by its chemical nature and its effect on the structure and functions of a living organism. In the psychological and sociological contexts, drug is a term for habit forming substance which directly affects the brain or nervous system. More precisely, it refers to "any chemical substance which affects bodily function, mood, perception, or consciousness which has potential for misuse, and which may be harmful to the individual or the society" (Joseph Jullian, 1977). In terms of this definition, the frequent use of drug is considered so dangerous and sometimes immoral and anti-social, that it arouses a variety of indignant and hostile sentiments

on the part of general public. Some drugs are, however, relatively innocuous and are not addictive or accompanied by harmful physiological effects. The use of such drugs stands in marked contrast to the use of illegal drugs like heroin, cocaine and LSD or the consumption of legal drugs like alcohol, tobacco, barbiturates, and amphetamines, all of which are associated with distinctly harmful physical effects on the person engaged in them.

Drug abuse is the use of illicit drug or misuse of legitimate drug resulting into physical or psychological harm. It includes smoking *ganja* or *hashish*, taking heroin or cocaine or LSD, injecting morphine, drinking alcohol, and so forth. These are sometimes referred to as being 'high on speed' or 'trip' or 'getting kicks'.

Drug dependence denotes any habitual or frequent use of a drug. The 'dependence' can either be physical or psychological. Physical dependence occurs with the repeated use of the drug when the body has adjusted to the presence of a drug and will suffer pain, discomfort or illness if the use of the drug is discontinued.

The word *addiction* is generally used to describe physical dependence. Thus, 'addiction' or 'physical dependence' is "a state whereby the body requires continued administration of the drug in order to function". Body functioning is interfered with if the drug is withdrawn, and withdrawal symptoms appear in a pattern specific for the drug. The total reaction to deprivation is known as *abstinence syndrome*.

The chronic drug user develops a feeling that he must constantly increase the dose in order to produce the same effect as that from the initial dose. This phenomenon is called *tolerance*. It represents the body's ability to adapt to the presence of a foreign substance. However, tolerance does not develop for all drugs or in all individuals; though with certain drugs (for example morphine), addicts have been known to build up great tolerance very quickly. *Cross tolerance* refers to the fact that tolerance-development for one drug may also result in tolerance for similar drugs.

Psychological dependence occurs when an individual comes to rely on a drug for the feeling of well-being it produces. The word *habituation* is sometimes used to refer to psychic or psychological dependence. The difference between 'habituation' and 'addiction' is that habit is not compulsive as addiction is. Addiction to a drug means that the body becomes so dependent to the toxic effects of the drug that one just cannot do without it.

The *characteristics* of drug addiction are: (1) an overpowering desire or need (compulsion) to continue taking the drug and to obtain it by any means; (2) a tendency to increase the dose ; (3) a psychological and generally a physical dependence on the effects of the drugs ; and (4) an effect detrimental to the individual and to the society.

Nature and Impact of Abusable Drugs

The abusable drugs may be divided into six categories: alcohol, sedatives, stimulants, narcotics, hallucinogens, and nicotine. *Alcohol* is used by some people as a normal, pleasant and sociable activity, while others take it as a spur which enables them to work. It also acts as a sedative which calms down nerves or a kind of an anaesthetic which reduces the pain of living. Alcohol relieves tension and lessens aggressive inhibitions. It also impairs judgement and creates confusion.

Sedatives or *depressants* relax the central nervous system, induce sleep and provide a calming effect. Tranquilisers and barbiturates fall into this category. Medically, these are used in high blood pressure, insomnia, epilepsy and to relax patients before and during surgery. As depressants, they depress actions of nerves and muscles. In small quantities, they slow down breathing and heart-beating and make the user relaxed; but in higher doses, their effects resemble alcohol intoxication in which the user becomes sluggish, gloomy and sometimes irritable and quarrelsome. His ability to think, concentrate, and work is impaired and his emotional control is weakened.

Stimulants activate the central nervous system and relieve tensions, treat mild depression, induce insomnia (keep a person awake), increase alertness, counteract fatigue and expressive drowsiness, and lessen aggressive inhibitions. The most widely known stimulants are amphetamines (popularly called 'pep-pills') caffeine and cocaine. Moderate doses of amphetamine, when properly prescribed by a doctor, can check fatigue and produce feelings of alertness, self-confidence and well being. Heavier doses cause extreme nervousness, irritability, headache, sweating, diarrhea, and unclear speech.

The stimulant drugs are usually taken orally, though some (like methedrine) are taken by intravenous injection. These drugs do not produce physical dependence, though they are psychologically addicting. Long-term heavy use of the amphetamines causes varying degrees of intellectual, emotional, social and economic deterioration. Abruptly withdrawing the drug can result in mental illness and a deep suicidal depression.

Narcotics, like sedatives, produce a depressant effect on the central nervous system. They produce feelings of pleasure, strength, and superiority, reduce hunger, lessen inhibitions, and increase suggestibility. Included in this category are opium, marijuana, heroin (smack), morphine, pethidine, cocaine (all opiates) and cannabis, (*charas, ganja, and bhang*) Heroin is a white powder made from morphine; cocaine is made from the leaves of the coca bush and is odourless, cannabis is obtained from the hemp plant; and marijuana is a particular form of cannabis. Heroin, morphine, pethidine and cocaine are used either by inhaling (the powder), or injecting the liquified form. Opium and marijuana may be smoked, sniffed or ingested.

The withdrawal symptoms vary with the degree of physical dependence. The symptoms, after eight to 12 hours after the last dose, are shaking, sweating, chills, diarrhea, nausea, mental anguish, and abdominal and leg cramps. Thereafter, symptoms increase in intensity, reach a peak between 36 to 72 hours, and then gradually diminish over the next five to 10 days. However, weakness, insomnia, nervousness and muscle pain may persist for several weeks.

Hallucinogens produce distortions of perception (seeing or hearing things in a different way than they actually are) and dream-images. Their use is not advised by medical practitioners. The well-known drug in this group is LSD, which is man-made chemical. It is so powerful that one ounce produces three lakh human doses. An amount literally smaller than a grain of salt can produce gross psychotic reactions in human beings. LSD may be obtained as a small white pill, as a crystalline powder in capsules, or in liquid in ampules. Usually, LSD is taken orally but it may be injected. The effect of an average dose of LSD usually lasts from eight to 10 hours. Panic, depression and permanent severe mental derangement can result from an attempt to withdraw from its use.

Nicotine includes cigarettes, *bidi*, cigars, snuffs and tobacco. Nicotine has no medical use. The risk of physical dependence, however, may be there. It leads to relaxation, stimulates central nervous system, increases wakefulness and removes boredom. But the frequent or the heavy use of nicotine may cause heart attack, lung cancer, and bronchitis. The law does not classify this as a drug.

Stimulants, depressants, narcotics and hallucinogens are also called psychoactive drugs.

Extent and Nature of Drug Abuse

How widespread is the use of illegal drugs and the misuse of legal drugs in our country? Empirical studies of three different sections of population conducted in India indicate the extent of its prevalence. These studies are: (1) study of college/university and high school students, (2) study of industrial workers, and (3) study of people in rural areas.

Study of College/University Students

The studies on drug abuse among college/university students may be classified as (a) single studies, (b) joint studies, and (c) multi-centred studies. Single studies have been conducted by scholars like Banerjee (in Calcutta in 1963), Dayal (in Delhi in 1972), Chitnis (in Bombay in 1974) and Varma (in Punjab in 1977). Joint studies have been conducted by Sethi and Manchanda (in U.P. in 1978), and by Dube, Kumar, and Gupta (in 1969 and 1977). Multi-centred studies were conducted in 1976 (in seven cities) and in 1986 (in nine cities) and both were coordinated by D. Mohan of the AIIMS, Delhi. If we take all the studies on college/university students together, we find that the prevalence rate of drug abuse varies from 17.0% to 25.0% in different cities. But excluding alcohol, cigarettes and painkillers, the extent of drug consumption is only 4.0% to 6.0%. Other important findings of these studies are: (1) Drug consumption differs with respect to professional and non-professional courses. When Sethi and Manchanda found that medical students were using more drugs than non-medical students, my own study in Jaipur (both in 1976 and 1986) indicated that drug abuse among medical students is not high. In the 1976 study, I found the highest use of drugs among law students (26.1%) followed by commerce (23.6%), arts and social sciences (17.5%), medical (14.0%), science (13.6%), and engineering (4.6%) students. In the 1986 study, however, the highest use was found among commerce students (31.0%) followed by arts and social sciences (27.2%), science (20.3%), medical (7.3%), engineering (6.0%) and law students (4.8%). (2) Of the current users, about 90.0% are *experimenters* (who take drugs once a week or less often), 9.0% are *regulars* (who take drugs several times a week), and only 1.0% are *addicts* (who cannot live without drugs). (3) About 75.0% students use only alcohol and/or tobacco, about 15.0% take one or the other drug along with alcohol and/or tobacco, and only 6.0% to 10.0% take drugs other than alcohol and/or tobacco. (4) In

terms of nature of drugs used, if we exclude alcohol and cigarettes, about 20.0% use pain-killers, 35.0% use narcotics (heroin, cocaine, cannabis, etc.) 5.0% to 7.0% use stimulants, and less than 1.0% use hallucinogens (LSD). Thus, a little more than three fourths of the drug users take only *recreational drugs*, that is, for relaxation and fun, one-fifths take *medically prescribed* drugs to alleviate physical ills, and only about 2.0% to 3.0% take *drugs of abuse* to escape from reality. Since 'down' drugs are more popular than 'up' drugs, it could be inferred that the youth wish to go to sleep rather than 'wake up'. (5) The background of the users, is as follows: (a) undergraduates use drugs as much as the postgraduates, (b) education in public schools increases the use of drugs among students; particularly among girls, (c) educational institutions with hostels attached to them produce more drug users than those without hostels, (d) academic frustration is not the important cause of drug use, that is, high or low division in examination does not affect the incidence of drug usage, (e) there is a relationship between drug use and lack of interest in co-curricular and extra-curricular activities, (f) the affluent youth getting a higher amount of pocket money from their parents tend to experiment with drugs more than the youth from the lower income groups, (g) though incidence of drug abuse is found more among students with an urban background than those with a rural one, it cannot be hypothesized that urban upbringing is an important cause of drug use, and (h) drug-using deviant behaviour attracts students irrespective of religion, caste or language background

Taking all the characteristics of the drug users together, some high-risk categories in drug usage can be identified. These are : high income groups, age group of 16-21 years, public schools and hostel attached institutions

The researches also indicate that about 60.0% students take to drugs on the suggestion of friends, 5.0% on the suggestion of some family member or kin, 10.0% on the suggestion of physicians, and 25.0% of their own accord. Thus, on the basis of the 'initiative' factor, a large number of drug users may be identified as *submissive*, a small number as *self-directive*, and a few as *adaptive*.

Researches on High School Students

Two important studies on drug abuse among school children are by Mohan, Sundaram and Chawla conducted in Delhi in 1978, and by Rastogi conducted in 1979. Five years ago (1986), one more study was

conducted on high school students in four metropolitan cities of Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras by Mohan, Pradhan, Chakrabarthy, and Ramchandran but its analysis is yet to be published. Mohan's study of about 2,000 high school students in 1978 revealed that though 63.0% students were using drugs, a very large number of them took pain-killers, smoked cigarettes or consumed alcohol. Only 0.2% to 0.4% took sedatives, stimulants and narcotic drugs. This shows that drug abuse among high school students is very limited.

Researches on Industrial Workers

Gangrade and Gupta studied 4,000 industrial workers in 1970s in Delhi and found that the rate of drug prevalence was only 10.4% which in comparison to college students is very low. They also found that : (a) most of the users had started using drugs without medical prescriptions; (b) a majority of the users were in their 20s or early 30s ; (c) four-fifth workers had started using drugs after they had started working as workers; (d) two-thirds were introduced to drugs by friends or co-workers; and (e) sub-cultural background, high income, low level of education, and pressure of peer groups are the important factors that lead to drug use among industrial workers.

As regards the nature of drugs used, Gangrade found that alcohol was used by 95.0% of the sample studied, (or by 10.0% of the total workers' population), *charas* by 18.0%, *bhang* by 8.0%, *ganja* by 7.0%, and opium by 2.0%. A worker spent about Rs. 40 a month on drugs.

Researches in Rural Areas

The first research on drug abuse among people in rural areas was conducted in 1971 by Elnagar, Maitra, and Rao in a village in West Bengal, and then in 1972 by Dube and in the same year by Verghese and Beig. They found addiction to alcohol only in 1.0% to 2.0% of the cases. However, four studies conducted between 1974 and 1979 give a better picture of drug abuse in rural areas. Deb and Jindal's study conducted in 1974 in Punjab villages found alcohol abuse in 74.0% of the adults above 15 years. Gurmeet Singh's study conducted in 1978 in selected villages of Punjab found drug abuse in 29.0% cases (of 10 and above years age), tobacco use in 40.0% cases, alcohol use in 26.0% cases, opium use in 19.0% cases, and cannabis use in 20.0% cases. Sethi and Trivedi's study conducted in 1979 in eight villages covering a

population of about 2,000 persons (above ten years of age) found the prevalence rate of 25.0%. They found addiction in 6.0% cases, alcohol consumption in 82.0% cases, cannabis consumption in 16.0% cases, and opium consumption in 11.0% cases. Lastly, Mohan, Prabhakar and Sharma's study conducted in 1977 in six blocks in three border districts of Amritsar, Ferozpur and Gurdaspur in Punjab covered 1,276 households and a total population of 3,600 persons above 15 years age. Mohan's main findings were: (i) 18.0% households studied had no drug user, 60.0% had one user, 16.0% had two users and 6.0% had three or more users; (ii) the most commonly abused drug by males was alcohol (50.0%) followed by tobacco (19.0%), opium (6.0%), and cannabis (1.0%). Among (married) females (above 15 years of age), tobacco was used by 4.0%, alcohol by 1.0%, pain-killers by 1.0%, tranquilisers, by 0.5%, and opium by 0.5%. It can, thus, be suggested that drug abuse in rural areas is predominantly a masculine activity.

If we take all the four studies of Deb, Gurmeet Singh, Sethi and Mohan together, they point out that among the people in rural areas, the use of alcohol is very high followed by tobacco and opium, while the use of cannabis is only 1.0% to 2.0%.

If we take all the studies (pertaining to college/high school students, industrial workers, and rural people) together, we find that upto 1980, the use of drugs was not high. However, after 1980, the availability of heroin in our country has so increased that consumption of smack and other illegal drugs has increased among students, slum dwellers, truck-drivers, rickshaw-pullers and industrial workers. Even when these addicts are detoxified, that is, relieved of their dependence on drugs, 90 out of the 100 cannot 'kick' their habit, and they continue their petty crimes to support a very expensive addiction. Today, five drug deaths occur in Bombay every day; each night more than 100 teenagers take to drugs in the country.

A UN survey report compiled by the International Narcotics Control Board released in the second week of January, 1991 has pointed out that in 1990 drug abuse lessened in some developed countries but grew in parts of the Third World. The study found (*Hindustan Times*, 11 January, 1991) that the number of Soviet drug abusers, mostly of cannabis, almost doubled over the past five years, to reach an estimated 1,40,000. In Europe, the use of crack remained negligible but the use of cocaine increased. In North America and in Canada, cannabis and cocaine remained the drugs of choice. Drug abuse alarmingly increased among women between the ages of 18 and

29. In the United States, the social and economic cost of drug abuse was estimated in 1990 at 60 billion dollars annually. However, there was an apparent lessening in the use of crack and cocaine manifest in the drop in attributable deaths and hospital admissions. In Africa, drug abuse has spread to the entire continent over the past few years. Much of it is the use of heroin and cocaine. In South America, the easy availability of drug (heroin) led to its greater abuse. In East and South East Asia, illicit opium production doubled in 1988-89 from the previous year to about 2,000 tonnes and remained at the same high level in 1990-91. In China, heroin abuse in Southern border areas was spreading to other parts of China. In Japan, cocaine seizures increased five fold. In Malaysia, heroin was most abused, with an estimated one lakh addicts. In Bangkok, large-scale heroin abuse was compounded by the associated rapid spread of AIDS, but the number of newly registered abusers has been decreasing. In Australia, the estimated number of heroin addicts is between 90,000 to 1,30,000. In South Asia, in Bangladesh, drug abuse rose with an estimated 50,000 users alone in Dhaka, the capital. In India, drug abuse rose in major cities.

It may be pointed out that by and large those persons are predisposed to drug usage who (1) have difficulties in assuming a masculine role; (2) who are frequently overcome by a sense of futility, expectations of failure, and general depression; (3) who are easily frustrated and made anxious; and (4) who find frustrations and anxieties intolerable.

Motivations in Drug Usage

What are the causes of drug abuse ? The causes may be classified under four heads : (1) psychological causes, like relieving tension, easing depression, removing inhibitions, satisfying curiosity, removing boredom, getting kicks, feeling high and confident, and intensifying perception, (2) social causes, like facilitating social experiences, being accepted by friends, and challenging social values, (3) physiological causes, like staying awake, heightening sexual experiences, removing pain, and getting sleep, and (4) miscellaneous causes, like improving study, sharpening religious insight, deepening self-understanding, and solving personal problems, etc.

My study (of 4,081 college/university students) revealed that of the 1,469 students who consumed drugs, 85.5% took drugs because of psychological reasons, 15.2% because of physiological reasons, 10.9% because of social reasons, and 28.4% because of miscellaneous reasons.

The detailed analysis pointed out that : (1) the largest number of drug-using students comprised individuals who were devoted to pleasure, seeking new excitement and sensation, (2) a small number took drugs as an escape mechanism or to alleviate distress, and (3) a very small number of students receiving drugs in the course of medical treatment for the relief of pain continued to take them long after the treatment was over.

This enables us to question the view held by the psychiatrists that drug users exhibit a personality type involving strong dependency needs with pronounced feelings of inadequacy. It will not be out of place here to point out that Alfred Lindesmith (1940 : 120) too has provided a detailed critique of the theory of 'psychopathic personality' or 'psychopathic predisposition'.

My view is that drug abuse is a *learned* behaviour which is learnt by individuals in interaction with peers, acquaintances, family members and others in three ways : through persuasion, through unconscious imitation and through reflective thinking. In the analysis of the sources of getting drugs, it was found that (1) drugs were generally obtained from the non-medical sources (friends, acquaintances, family members, home cupboard), (2) medical sources were used more by girls than by boys, and (3) the non-medical source mentioned most often was 'friend'.

Like analysing causes of drug abuse, it is equally essential to analyse the causes of abstinence, that is, why the non-users abstained from taking drugs or the 'past-users' discontinued them. My study of students showed that the important causes of abstinence and discontinuation were: personal (49.3%), physiological (23.8%), social (22.4%), religious (22.3%), and economic (4.1%). The personal causes were: lack of interest/curiosity, personal dislike or hatred for the use of drugs, and non-availability or non-accessibility to drugs; the physiological causes were: risk of physical/mental dangers or deteriorating health, risk of dependence on the drug, and having a bad experience of 'being on a trip'; the social causes were: pressure of friends, influence of parents, risk of social disapproval; the religious cause was the moral principles; and the economic cause was that individual had either no money to purchase drugs or found drugs too expensive.

Role of Family and Peer Group in Drug Abuse

Family and peer group associations are the primary potent influences upon the direction which individual takes and maintains in his life. One

hypothesis in my own study of drug abuse among college/university students was that drug usage is influenced by the quality of *affectionate family relationships*. This term (affectionate family relationship) was operationalised on the following bases : (1) parents take an interest in the career of their children and are conscious of their parental obligations, (2) relations between parents of drug users, between drug users and their parents and between users and their siblings are based on harmony and solidarity, (3) parental control is neither very harsh nor very lenient so as to give an opportunity to the child for self-expression, (4) the size of family is so manageable in terms of family income that no child in the family suffers from an unfulfilment of the necessities of life, (5) parents broadly conform to social and moral norms setting examples for their children to follow, and (6) the child exhibits a feeling of trust and security in the parents by taking them into confidence and by seeking their advice and help in facing perplexing problems.

The study revealed that in a good number of cases, the families of drug-users were not 'normal' and family relationships were not 'affectionate'. In testing the relationship between drug usage and 'staying away from parents', it was found that residence with parents was as important in the incidence of drug usage as residence in hostel. In other words, family background is significant in drug usage. The nature of family control, the discipline imposed by the parents over the children, the parents' interest in their friends, leisure activities and their future career prospects and parents remaining conscious of their obligations towards their children were found to be important factors which determine the children's inclination to step into the world of drugs. The drinking/smoking and drug taking behaviour of family members also had a bearing on use of drugs. It may therefore, be maintained that family environment is an important factor in drug usage.

Like the family, peer group pressure was also found influential in drug usage. About 81.0% drug users had friends who were drug-users. Another 44.0% drug users were initiated into drug use by their friends. Approximately 31.0% drug users always took drugs in the company of their friends. As many as 63.0% drug users got first knowledge of drugs from their friends. And, 17.0% users had first taken drugs in their friends' house. All this shows that peer group culture has a significant effect on the drug use behaviour.

On the basis of the above analysis, it may be pointed out that the main causes of drug abuse are: family environment, mental condition, social factors like oppressive social system and power structure, subcultures (slum areas, college/hostel subcultures, etc.), peer pressures, personality factors (dependent personality), and pursuit of pleasure and fun.

Theories of Causation

The theoretical explanations of drug use may be grouped broadly under four heads: physiological, psychological, socio-psychological and sociological.

According to the *Physiological Theory*, people take drugs because of physiological aberrations and deficiencies or due to bodily adaptation to chemical properties of the drug. Mordones, Silkworth, Randolph and Nimwich, are the scholars who have explained drug use in terms of chemical reactions. But this theory, though widely accepted in the 1910s and 1920s, has been found inadequate ever since the psychological and sociological attributes of people who use drugs have been pointed out by the empirical studies.

The psychologists have explained drug use and drug dependence mainly in terms of Reinforcement Theory, Personality Theory, Power Theory, and the Weakened-Self Theory. In the *Reinforcement Theory*, Abraham Wilker (Strak Rodney : 1975, 102) has maintained that the pleasurable sensations produced by drugs reinforce their use. The *Personality Theory* has explained drug use in terms of satisfying certain psychological needs or compensating for certain psychological shortcomings. It refers to distinctive personality traits associated with drug dependence and emphasizes on 'dependent personality' as the cause of drug dependence. Chem (1969, 13-30), Knight (1937, 538), and Robert Freed Bales (1962 : 157), the main supporters of this theory, hold that people with dependent personalities require emotional support and attention from others and failure to get it is substituted by drug use. Chem in his study of narcotics in New York city found that persons with personality traits like passivity, low self-esteem, little ability for self-direction, distrust of other people, difficulty in handling frustrations and anxieties, inadequate masculine identification and failure to resolve childhood conflicts, take to drugs. David McClelland (1972) challenging the Personality Theory has propounded *Power Theory* and has explained drug use (alcohol) as an expression of a person's need for power. The light and occasional alcohol user gets a

feeling of enhanced social power while the heavy alcoholic gets a feeling of enhanced personal power. In the *Weakened Self Theory* or *Fear Theory*, Stanton Peele (1975) has maintained that drug addiction is a response to fear and insecurity to the conditions of modern life.

All these psychological theories are incomplete in three ways : (1) they fail to explain how the personality traits, exclusive to drug users, are developed by the users, (2) they fail to explain why this syndrome leads to drugs or alcohol rather than to some other behaviour like suicide, and (3) they failed to identify personality traits exclusive to drug addicts or alcoholics and why people with similar personality profiles do not take to drugs.

In the *Socio-Psychological Labelling Theory*, Howard Becker (1963) and Kai Erickson (1964 : 21) have maintained that a person becomes a drug dependent or an alcoholic under the pressure of being labelled as an addict or an alcoholic. But it fails to explain why people first engage in drug behaviour that gets them socially labelled as deviant addicts.

The *Sociological Theory* holds that it is the circumstances or social environment which make people drug addicts. Sutherland's *Differential Association Theory*, when applied to drug use, explains drug taking as behaviour learned from other persons, principally in small intimate groups. The *Social Learning Theory*, which is the expansion of Differential Association Theory and the Reinforcement Theory, has been propounded by Akers and Burgess. When the Reinforcement Theory merely assumes that drug dependence is conditioned learning, the Social Learning Theory examines the social sources of reinforcers that operate in the learning process. The reinforcement comes from association with persons favourably defining the drug use. The *Strain Theory* focuses on the intense pressures put on individuals that cause them to deviate from the internalised norms. According to Merton, the source of this pressure is the discrepancy between goals and means. Those who fail to achieve their goals through legitimate means become so frustrated that they turn to the use of drugs and alcohol. Merton calls them 'retreatists'. The *Subcultural Theory* holds that different groups within society are socialised into different sets of norms and deviance is a judgment imposed by an outside group. Thus, what may appear to be deviant behaviour is really conformity to a set of norms espoused by one group but rejected by another. When young people claim adults are hypocritical to ban cannabis in a society where alcohol drinking is socially permissible and when adults denounce cannabis as more dangerous substance than alcohol, two subcultures are fighting over

whose norms shall prevail. Thus, drug use is the result of clash in sub-cultural values of the young and the adults.

All the above sociological theories have their own perspectives. But each theory leaves a number of questions unanswered. In my own Social Bond Approach (1982 : 120) I have explained drug abuse in terms of weakening of social bond between individual and society due to maladjustment (in status), unattachment (to social groups), and non-commitment (to social roles). It is individual's attachment to others, commitment to his social roles, and adjustment to various situations that determine his values about what is good or desirable, his behaviour patterns and his motives in deviating from the dominant values of the culture. It is only by recognising the role and analysing the nature of these three factors in particular or social bond in general that we will be able to point out the structural or the institutional measures to control drug abuse.

Measures to Combat Drug Trafficking, Treat Addicts and Prevent Drug Abuse

Over the last few years, India has been facing the problem of increasing trafficking in drugs, particularly transit traffic in respect of heroin and hashish from the Middle East region destined to western countries. As a result of this transit traffic, metropolitan cities like Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta, and Madras have become vulnerable to drug trafficking. During the year 1988, nearly 3,020 kg of heroin was seized in India which was the highest quantity ever seized by any country. The quantities seized were 10% more than seizures in 1987, 60% more than in 1986, three times more than in 1985, 12 times more than of 1984, and 18 times more than of 1983. Heroin seized in 1989 (2,500 kg) and 1990 (2,000 kg) was less than that seized in 1988. (*India Today*, 15 November, 1991). Opium seized was 2,929 kg in 1987, 3,100 kg in 1988, 4,855 kg in 1989, and, 1,427 kg in 1990. Hashish seized was 14,796 kg in 1987, 17,523 kg in 1988, 8,000 kg in 1989 and 5,000 kg in 1990. Heroin in India is purchased from the local sources at say Rs. 70,000 per kg and the trafficker then sells this to foreigners at the rate of Rs. 3.9 lakh per kg (\$ 15,000 per kg). Having received this money in foreign currency, it is used for varied purposes.

The 'profits' generated by drug trafficking are. (i) money is used for financing politicians and developing lobbies in bureaucracy, judiciary, police, prisons, and media; (ii) money is invested in shell corporations that take over legitimate business organisations; (iii) money is

laundered in purchasing arms for terrorism; and (iv) intelligence agencies take help of drug traffickers to assist terrorist activity. But the fact is that all these 'profits' are nothing but subversion of democratic processes.

In order to combat trafficking in drugs, among the various measures adopted by the government, one was the enactment of an act in 1985, called The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. It came into force on November 14, 1985. It provides for a minimum punishment of ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1 lakh which may be extended to 20 years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2 lakh. In respect of repeat offences, the Act provides for a minimum punishment of 15 years rigorous imprisonment extendable upto 30 years and also a minimum fine of Rs. 1.5 lakh which may go upto Rs. 3 lakh. The courts have been empowered to impose fines exceeding these limits for reasons to be recorded in their judgement.

The Act relates to drug addicts too. It lays down imprisonment of one year or fine or both for illegal possession in small quantity for personal consumption of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance. It also empowers the court to release an addict for undergoing medical treatment for detoxification or de-addiction from a hospital or an institution maintained or recognised by the government. In keeping with this, the Act requires the government to establish as many centres as it thinks fit for identification, treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of addicts.

The Ministry of Welfare, Government of India has also evolved a policy for mobilizing voluntary action to create an awareness for the prevention of drug abuse. A large number of voluntary organisations are being supported to educate the people about the ill-effects of drug addiction. It also provides funds for the establishment of counselling and de-addiction facilities. The National Institute of Social Defence has been training functionaries of governmental and non-governmental agencies engaged in drug abuse prevention.

Some state governments have also undertaken programmes to impress upon the university authorities to mount a special vigil against drinking and drug abuse in hostels and campuses. In the voluntary sector too, a number of counselling and guidance centres have been established in different cities. These centres are engaged in supplying information regarding the sources of treatment, coordinating with rehabilitation agencies, data collection, dissemination of knowledge, liaison with enforcement agencies and psychological aid by way of individual and group therapy.

Control over Drug Abuse

The control over drug abuse can be made possible by adopting following measures.

(1) *Imparting education about drugs.* The target population for educational measures for prevention should be young college/university students particularly those living in hostels and away from the control of their parents, people living in slums, industrial workers, and truck drivers and rickshaw-pullers. The method of imparting education should be such that people involve themselves actively and there is a free exchange of valuable information. The type of education which would be more effective and misleading knowledge about artificial euphoria and acquire information which is more authoritative pertaining to physical and psychological effects of the so-called mood modifying drugs, their pharmacological properties and their medical uses. Parents have to play an important role in imparting education.

(2) *Changing physicians' attitudes.* A change in the attitude of doctors in prescribing too many drugs can go a long way in controlling the abuse of drugs. The doctors have to show a greater care in not ignoring the side effects of the drugs. Though drugs help many, yet there are dangers of over-dependency. Once a patient gets a prescription from a doctor that cures his ailment, he ceases to consult the doctor and continues to use the drugs indiscriminately or excessively whenever he suffers from the same ailment. Thus, people come to depend more on medication than on physician which ultimately is dangerous.

(3) *Undertaking follow-up study* of addicts treated under detoxification programmes.

(4) *Giving deterrent punishment to policemen* and other law-enforcers found working in collusion with drug pedlars.

(5) Parents need to play a crucial role in controlling drug use among their children. Since parental neglect, over-hostility, rejection, marital disharmony play an important role in perpetuating drug addiction, parents have to take more care in keeping the family environment conducive and harmonious. Since addiction does not develop overnight and it involves a process of evolution of losing interest in studies, activities and hobbies, indulging in irresponsible behaviour, irritability, impulsive conduct and having a dazed expression, parents can locate the early signs by being alert and can make sure that the child withdraws from the habit.

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Black Money

Black money is both an economic and a social problem. In the latter context, it is perceived as a problem with adverse sociological effects on society, like social inequalities, social deprivations, etc.; in the former context, it is perceived as a parallel economy, an underground economy or an unofficial economy that is the consequence of the economic policies of the government and has damaging effects on country's economy and nation's socialist planning development. When problem like poverty affects those people who are poor, unemployment affects those who are unemployed, alcoholism and drug abuse affect those who consume them, black money is a problem which does not affect those who have black money but it affects the common man in the society. No wonder, it has been described as a problem with a difference

The Concept

Black money is tax-evaded income. It can be earned both through legal and illegal means. Its legitimate source is that the income-earners do not reveal their whole income for tax purposes. For example, government doctors earning money by private practice even when they get non-practising allowance, teachers earning money through examinations and book royalty and not including it in income-tax returns, advocates charging much higher fee than shown in their account books, and so forth. Its illegitimate source is bribe, smuggling, black-marketing, selling commodities at prices higher than the controlled prices, taking 'pugree' for house, shop, etc., selling house at

a high price but showing it at a much lower price in the account books, and so forth.

It is possible to convert black money into white money and vice versa. For example, when a person manages to get the receipt from the shopkeeper by paying the sales-tax for a commodity but does not purchase it actually, his black money is converted into white money. In such case, the shopkeeper sells the same commodity to other person without giving him any receipt for it. On the other hand, if a person purchases something (say a scooter, or VCR, etc.) and pays Rs. 15,000 for it out of white money but gets a receipt of only Rs. 10,000, the balance of Rs. 5,000 becomes black money for the seller. In this case, the white money becomes the black money.

Magnitude of Prevalence

It is not easy to calculate the magnitude of black money in any society. The economists in the United States, United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden and Italy adopted different measures but could not estimate the amount involved in black money. Norway and Sweden used questionnaire method for eliciting answers from persons whether they had participated in illegal activities as buyers or sellers. Italy attempted to estimate the underground economy by finding out the difference between the size of the labour-force officially reported and actually employed. This enabled to determine the productivity in the underground sector. The United Kingdom tried to assess parallel economy by comparing the official estimates of the Gross National Product (GNP) made from the consumption side with those made from the income side. In the United States, Guttman assumed that only cash is used in illegal transactions. He tried to find out the difference between currency required for economic transactions in a fixed period and actual currency held outside banks in the same period.

In spite of the varied methods used, it is not possible to estimate the magnitude of the black money in a society, even though it is described as a world-wide phenomenon. It is said to be in operation not only in the developing countries but also in the developed countries like United States, United Kingdom, USSR, Japan, Canada, France, Germany etc.

A study conducted by the IMF a few years back (Vito Tangani : *The Underground Economy*, December 1983: 13) showed that in regard to the size of the underground money, India holds the first rank followed by the United States and Canada having the second rank.

In India, the black money or the unaccounted wealth estimated by Prof Kaldor in 1953-54 as Rs. 600 crore was estimated by Wanchoo Committee as Rs. 1,000 crore in 1965-66 and Rs. 1,400 crore in 1969-70. Rargrekar placed the figures of black money at Rs. 1,150 crore for 1961-62, Rs. 2,350 crore for 1964-65, Rs. 2,833 crore for 1968-69, and Rs. 3,080 crore for 1969-70. Chopra's estimate (*Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XVII, Nos. 17 & 18, April, 24 and May 1, 1982) showed that the black money in 1960-61 was Rs. 916 crore which increased to Rs. 8,098 crore in 1976-77. According to Gupta (*Economic and Political Weekly*, January 16, 1982: 73), the amount of black money in our country was Rs. 3,034 crore in 1967-68 and Rs. 40,867 crore in 1978-79. According to his estimate, the black money which constituted 9.5% of the GNP in 1967-68 swelled to nearly 49% in 1978-79. In 1981, black money was estimated by one source as Rs. 7,500 crore (6.8% of the national income at current prices) and by other source as Rs. 25,000 crore (22.7% of the national income at current prices).

The National Institute of Public Finance and Policy estimated the quantum of black money in economy in 1985 at around Rs. 1,00,000 crore or about 20.0% of the national income. The Planning Commission study, however, has now estimated it to be in the range of Rs. 70,000 crore. Further, it is generated at the rate of Rs. 50,000 crore per year (*The Hindustan Times*, 2 August, 1991: 11). The flight of capital has resulted in an overseas stash which government officials conservatively place at \$50 million (about Rs. 1,30,000 crore).

The scholars have also pointed out that of the total black money in the society, about one-fourth (26.0%) is from the tax-evaded income. In the United States, the black money in the society is expected to be about 8.0% of its Gross National Product (GNP). While in India, the black money is more from the illegal sources, in the United States it is more (about 75.0%) from the legal sources.

Causes of Generating Black Money

1 Unrealistic Tax Laws

The increase in taxes and duties compel some people to evade them. The present rules (1991) prescribe the limit of Rs. 22,000 as free income for levying income tax. Can a person exist within this limit in this age of inflation? A mason or a carpenter earns about Rs. 60 to Rs. 80 per day in a city and Rs. 80 to Rs. 100 per day in metropolitan areas. Even a good 'gol-gappa' seller or a 'pan' shopkeeper earns more

than Rs. 100 a day. Assuming that these people work for 300 days in a year, their income will exceed the prescribed income tax limit. And how many of these workers pay income tax? A film actor getting Rs. 20 lakh per picture has to pay about three-fourth of his income as income tax. Instead of paying such a huge tax, he maintains 'double' accounts and evades paying tax and possesses more black money. A doctor with a private practice of more than Rs. 500 per day, a surgeon charging a fee of Rs. 5,000 per operation and doing at least ten operations a month, an advocate charging Rs. 2,000 per hearing, a shopkeeper doing a business of more than Rs. 5,000 per day, a contractor with a turnover business of Rs. 1 crore per year, an industrialist with a profit of millions of rupees per year—all are bound to hide their real income to escape paying income tax between 50% to 70% of the total income. Indirect taxes, like excise duty, custom duty, sales tax and octroi, etc. also encourage evasion of taxes and increase in black money.

If income tax rate is reduced, there is more likelihood of hiding less and increasing revenue. This was demonstrated in 1985-86 when the maximum rate of income tax was lowered from 61.9% to 50.0%. As a result, incomes declared by the self-employed increased almost three times to Rs. 9,654 crore by 1988-89.

2. Different Rates of Excise Duty

Within similar products, there are different rates of excise duty. For instance, in textiles and cigarettes, this leads to tax evasion through mis-classification of output. In textiles, separate rates of excise are charged for cloth of different varieties. Manufacturers regularly downgrade a product to pay lower rates of excise. This alone generates Rs. 1,000 crore a year in black money. For the entire manufacturing sector, including steel, evasion in excise, custom and sales taxes accounts for over Rs. 50,000 crore in black money every year.

3. Control Policy

Another cause of black money is the price-control policy of the government. In selecting commodities for control and in determining their prices, the government fails to take into account the elasticities involved in demand and supply. For example, according to the report of the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) for the year 1981, black money worth Rs. 840 crore was created in the Indian economy over the period of nine years from 1965-66 to 1974-75 as a

result of the operation of price controls in six commodities, viz., cement, steel, paper, vanaspati, automobile tyres and fertilizers. Similarly, as a result of control on sugar, about Rs. 400 crore of black money were generated in the year 1979-80. Regulation of foreign exchange also leads to over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports and black-marketing of currency. Thus, more stringent the measures of control and more regulated an economy, more will be the effort to violate it, which will increase hoarding, fraud, artificial scarcity and the resultant black money.

4. Quota System

Yet another source of black money is the quota system. The import quota, the export quota and the foreign exchange quota are generally misused by selling them at a premium

5. Scarcity

Black money is also caused by scarcity and defective public distribution system. When essential goods become scarce, people have to pay higher than the controlled prices, which generates black money. The scarcity of kerosene oil, sugar, refined oil etc. have always resulted in illegitimate transactions and black money.

6. Inflation

The increase in prices of commodities like petrol, etc. in international market, increase in prices of commodities due to high increase in duties and taxes imposed by the government, the conspicuous consumption created by the people with unaccountable money, diverting resources from production to speculation—all these cause inflation which in turn creates black money.

7. Elections in a Democratic System

Each election in the country involves thousands of crores of rupees. For contesting Lok Sabha election, a candidate normally spends more than one million rupees and for contesting Vidhan Sabha election, one spends more than Rs. 5 lakh in the present times. Since the expenditure allowed by law for a candidate is limited and the companies are not allowed to give donations to political parties for elections, the elections are generally financed by the black money holders. These people expect political patronage and economic concessions which are obtained with the consent and the connivance of political elites in

power in the form of artificial controls on commodities, laxity in the means of distribution, etc. All these methods create black money.

8. Real Estate Transactions

Estate transaction is an important source of generating black money. In these days, purchasing a house and/or land is considered to be not only very profitable but too. There is a growing tendency of transforming the rural agricultural land to urban residential land due to the paucity of building sites in the urban areas. Establishing unapproved colonies on agricultural land is illegal. The transaction value shown by the colonisers in registration deeds is much less than the actual amount or the market value. This enables the seller of the land to evade capital gain tax. According to an estimate, the illegal transaction of property alone generates about Rs. 2,000 crore of black money in a year, assuming that there are about 50 lakh transactions in urban property every year.

The high rates of stamp duty—ranging between 14.5% and 28.0% in different states—are a major cause for under-valuation of property and unreported deals, or both. The suggestion is that if duties are reduced to 2% to 3%, it will prevent evasion. Another hurdle is the Urban Land Ceiling Act, which reduces the supply of land and creates a black market. Roughly over Rs. 13,000 crore a year are generated through the real estate route

Social Effects

Besides the economic effects, there are many social consequences of black money also. In economic terms, black money robs the exchequer of its due share, increases economic inequality and hampers programmes of economic development. Socially, it increases social inequality, creates frustrations among honest people, increases crimes like smuggling, bribery, etc. and adversely affects social services programmes for the uplift of the poor and the weaker sections of society. It also distorts the measurement of true rates like growth rate, inflationary rate, unemployment rate, poverty, etc. which in turn affects the government policies for containing these problems.

Measures of Control

Over the past 40 years, the government has at various times announced seven schemes offering opportunities to bring black money overboard.

Some of these schemes are : introducing the scheme of special Bearer Bonds, demonetising high denomination currency notes, stringent raids and scheme of voluntary disclosures. In July, 1991, the Union Finance Minister proposed a new scheme—National Housing Bank Scheme—to woo black money back into the legitimate operations of the national economy. The scheme offers possessors of unaccounted money an opportunity to deposit any amount of money (with a minimum limit of Rs 10,000) with NHB without disclosing the source of funds. The offer remained open for seven months and closed on January 31, 1992. It permits the account holders facility to withdraw 60% of their deposits from the account while the remaining 40% are impounded to be used for projects such as slum clearance and housing for the poor. The withdrawals are to be made after stating the purpose for which the money is proposed to be used. These people are taxed at the rate of 40% while the balance amount is channeled back into the open economy.

The demonetisation of 1,000 rupee notes in 1978 brought out currency worth Rs. 29 crore. Voluntary Disclosure Scheme of 1951, 1955 and 1975 yielded Rs. 249 crore of disclosed account. The Disclosure Scheme launched in 1986 brought in just Rs. 67 crore. The 1991 scheme is open till March 31, 1992. About 375 raids in 1978 yielded assets worth Rs. 217 lakh.

Some scholars have maintained that all these measures have touched only the tip of the iceberg. All the schemes have hardly fetched Rs. 5,000 crore over a period of forty years. The main drawback in these schemes is that they touch the problem of black money already created but they do not go into the root cause of generation of black money and that why a person is prepared to take the risk of keeping black money despite so many problems. Unless this problem is tackled, the menace of black money will continue to increase.

It has been suggested that the problem of black money and parallel economy can be contained by reducing taxes in some areas, giving incentives for voluntary disclosure of income, overhauling the economic intelligence unit, curbing administrative corruption at various levels, exempting tax on money spent on house construction, doing away with control policies, and so forth. Isolated attempts may not yield much but a package of mutually reinforcing measures along with a strong political will and the commitment of political elites may prove to be successful to a large extent.

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